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Decision

Decision  DeAngelo, Antonia v. City of Lowell 10/15/26

Date: 10/15/2026
Organization: Civil Service Commission
Docket Number: D1-26-23
  • Appearance for Appellant: Douglas I. Louison, Esq.
  • Appearance for Respondent: Garrett Beaulieu, Esq.
  • Hearing Officer: Angela C. McConney

The Commission vacated the termination of a Lowell police officer and ordered her reinstatement after determining that the City of Lowell lacked just cause to terminate her from employment as a police officer. 

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Decision

On January 6, 2026, pursuant to G.L. c. 31, § 43, the Appellant, Antonia DeAngelo (Ms. DeAngelo or Appellant), appealed to the Civil Service Commission (Commission) the December 31, 2025 decision of the City of Lowell (City) to terminate her employment as a permanent full-time police officer with the Lowell Police Department (LPD or Department). [FN1]

In addition to issuing charges for actions in violation of the Department Rules and Regulations, the Internal Affairs investigators referred Ms. DeAngelo to the District Attorney’s Office for the same underlying conduct. Ms. DeAngelo testified at the December 22, 2025 local Section 41 hearing while these charges were open. The District Attorney later declined to prosecute. 

The Commission conducted a remote pre-hearing conference on February 3, 2026. I held an evidentiary hearing on April 6, 2026 at the offices of the Commission located at 100 Cambridge Street, Suite 200, Boston, MA. I was joined by the Commission’s law intern, Peter Sorota.

The Commission recorded the hearing via the Webex platform. [FN2]

The parties submitted post hearing briefs in May 2026, whereupon the administrative record closed. 

For the reasons stated herein, the appeal is allowed.

Findings of Fact

I admitted 14 exhibits from the Respondent (R. Exhibits 1-14). [FN3] I admitted five exhibits from the Appellant (A. Exhibits 1-5). Based on these exhibits and the testimony of the following witnesses: 

Called by the City:

  • Sharon Demers, Nurse Case Manager, City of Lowell
  • Nellie Vieira, Workers Compensation Claims Agent, City of Lowell
  • Lieutenant James Kelleher, Lowell Police Department
  • Cpt. James Fay, Lowell Police Department 
  • Superintendent Gregory Hudon, Lowell Police Department

Called by the Appellant:

  • Antonia DeAngelo, Appellant 

and taking administrative notice of all pleadings filed in the case, pertinent rules, statutes, regulations, case law and policies, and drawing reasonable inferences from the credible evidence, I make the following findings of fact:

  1. The Department appointed Antonia DeAngelo (Ms. DeAngelo or Appellant) as a police officer in June 2013.  Ms. DeAngelo acknowledged that she received the Department Rules and Regulations on June 27, 2014.  (Stipulated Facts; Testimony of Appellant)
  2. Ms. DeAngelo holds a bachelor’s degree in criminal justice.  (Testimony of Appellant)
  3. After Ms. DeAngelo graduated from the police academy, she participated in a field training program for four months.  (Testimony of Appellant)
  4. Ms. DeAngelo served as a police officer on the early night shift, 3:00 p.m. to 11:00 p.m.  (Testimony of Appellant)
  5. After further training and advanced courses, Ms. DeAngelo was assigned to the Vice Unit. Upon her bidding, she was assigned to the District Response Unit, a proactive community policing unit.  (Testimony of Appellant)
  6. Ms. DeAngelo later became a field training officer.  (Testimony of Appellant)
  7. Ms. DeAngelo had no history of discipline and had never been subject to an internal investigation.  (Stipulated Facts; Testimony of Appellant)

Ms. DeAngelo’s Injury On Duty

  1. In July of 2022, Ms. DeAngelo was responding to a priority 1 call (firearm) in her cruiser when she got into an accident with a motorist and a police lieutenant responding to the scene. Ms. DeAngelo was t-boned (struck on both sides) by the other two operators.  (Testimony of Appellant)
  2. Ms. DeAngelo had an early misdiagnosis. She was initially diagnosed and treated for a concussion but continued to suffer knee pain and back pain. (Testimony of Appellant) 
  3. Before undergoing surgery on her knee, doctors advised Ms. DeAngelo that she had shattered cartilage and a damaged meniscus and would face a six-to-eight-week recuperation period. However, during the operation, the surgeon located a double meniscus tear which increased the recovery time for her knee surgery from two to six months.  (Testimony of Appellant)
  4. As Ms. DeAngelo recovered from the knee surgery, her back pain increased.  (Testimony of Appellant)
  5. Doctors thought Ms. DeAngelo was suffering from degenerative discs and prescribed physical therapy and cortisone shots.  (Testimony of Appellant)
  6. When Ms. DeAngelo sought other opinions, the new medical providers diagnosed her with a PARS fracture broken back with nerves entangled in the broken bones. (Testimony of Appellant)
  7.  In February 2024, Ms. DeAngelo underwent spinal fusion, anterior and posterior surgery.  (Testimony of Appellant)
  8. Ms. DeAngelo continued to consult different medical professionals and specialists for the concussion and her knee and back ailments.  She also treated with a pain specialist.  (Testimony of Appellant)
  9. Following the cruiser accident, the City placed Ms. DeAngelo on “injured-on-duty” status. The benefits of “injured-on-duty” status, pursuant to G.L. c. 41, § 111F, provide for the officer’s full salary without loss of pay, without federal or state income tax withholdings. (R. Exhibit 3; Testimony of Vieira) [FN4]
  10. Ms. DeAngelo remained in contact with Nellie Vieira, the City Workers Compensation Claims Agent.  (R. Exhibit 3; Testimony of Vieira)
  11. Although the City urged her to accept a disability retirement benefit, Ms. DeAngelo was determined to return to work and underwent the necessary surgeries on her knee and back.  (R. Exhibit 3; Testimony of Appellant)
  12. Sharon Demers, the City Nurse Case Manager, is responsible for overseeing injured City workers through their return to work or separation from work.  (Testimony of Demers)
  13. At the beginning of her recovery, Ms. Demers examined Ms. DeAngelo. Throughout her recovery, Ms. DeAngelo kept Ms. Demers apprised of her health, medical appointments, and the discovery of more injuries.  (Testimony of Appellant)
  14. After bed rest from approximately July to October 2022, Ms. DeAngelo began attending physical therapy as part of her recovery.  (Testimony of Appellant)
  15. After seeing other physical therapists, Ms. DeAngelo began to treat with Gerry Dybel, upon Ms. Demers’ referral.  (Testimony of Demers, Testimony of Vieira)
  16. Mr. Dybel owns Clinical Rehab Specialists in Chelmsford, a 20-minute drive from Ms. DeAngelo’s home. He and his spouse are the only therapists at the practice. (Testimony of Demers, Testimony of Vieira)
  17. Ms. Demers had been involved in City discussions about a disability retirement benefit for Ms. DeAngelo on at least one occasion. In February 2025, Ms. Demers told Ms. DeAngelo that the City would be involuntarily retiring her on disability retirement benefits.  (Testimony of Demers)
  18. Ms. DeAngelo was surprised because she wanted to return to work, and had undergone the surgeries for that express purpose.  (Testimony of Appellant)
  19. In April 2025, Mr. Dybel changed Ms. DeAngelo’s physical therapy program to a City-approved “work hardening” program.  (Testimony of Demers, Testimony of Vieira)
  20. Ms. Demers asked Ms. DeAngelo if she could return to work on light-duty while undergoing the work hardening program. Ms. DeAngelo agreed.  (Testimony of Appellant)
  21. “Work hardening,” or “work conditioning,” is a more aggressive form of physical therapy that is intended to simulate an employee’s full-duty job requirements. Due to the aggressive nature of the work hardening regimen, some of the exercises can only be conducted during the appointment sessions. (R. Exhibit 5; Testimony of Vieira)
  22. Ms. DeAngelo’s work conditioning appointments were scheduled for Mondays and Thursdays and lasted from one to two and a half hours. After the appointments, Ms. DeAngelo would return home to ice her back.  (R. Exhibit 5)
  23. Mr. Dybel had inquired if Ms. DeAngelo could join a gym to complete stretching and exercises outside her therapy appointments. Ms. DeAngelo let him know that she had a treadmill, weights, and other gym equipment at home. Mr. Dybel then taught Ms. DeAngelo a complementary regimen to perform at home as part of her treatment.  (R. Exhibit 5; Testimony of Appellant)
  24. On July 15, 2025, Ms. DeAngelo sent an email to Ms. Demers and other City officials stating: 

Good afternoon, 

I hope you are well.  I wanted to update that I went to my doctor’s appointment yesterday with my back surgeon. Dr. Carkner provided a note allowing me to do light-duty.  If there is more paperwork he or I need to fill out, please let me know.  He did refuse to fill out the paper I gave him (how long can I sit/stand/walk etc) stating that it is not something he could answer.  Attached is the note he provided.

(R. Exhibit 7) 

  1. The attached July 14, 2025 note from Dr. Carkner, who performed the back surgery on Ms. DeAngelo, stated in relevant part:  “Work Status Report:  Note to Provider:  cleared for light-duty on days she is not engaged in a work conditioning program.” (emphasis added) (R. Exhibit 8)
  2. Ms. Demers and Ms. Vieira spoke to the Department to create a light-duty assignment for Ms. DeAngelo tied to her job duties as a police officer.  (Testimony of Vieira)
  3. Cpt. Christopher Pangiotakis called Ms. DeAngelo and offered her a light-duty assignment on the day shift, although she had bid on the night shift.  (Testimony of Appellant) 
  4. The City assigned Ms. DeAngelo to the Traffic Bureau, a specialized unit.  (Testimony of Fay, Testimony of Appellant)
  5. Cpt. Pangiotakis wanted Ms. DeAngelo to start work on Thursday, July 17, 2025, but after she informed him that she had a work conditioning appointment on that date, he said that she could start her light-duty assignment one day later.  (Testimony of Appellant) 
  6. Ms. DeAngelo began working in the Traffic Bureau on Friday, July 18, 2025. Her assigned days were Tuesdays, Wednesdays and Fridays.   (Testimony of Appellant)
  7. Ms. DeAngelo spent a month and half undergoing in-service online training to learn the position.  (Testimony of Appellant)
  8. The City coded Ms. DeAngelo’s light-duty payroll as regular pay. The dates of her work conditioning appointments were coded for payroll as “INJURY” and paid as 111F benefits.  (R. Exhibit 13)
  9. Other than the above-referenced note from the surgeon “clearing” the Appellant for light-duty on “days that she was not engaged in a work conditioning program” there was no written order or written agreement stating that the Appellant was required to work light-duty on days that she was not participating in a work conditioning program. In fact, Ms. DeAngelo specifically notified the City on July 15, 2025 that the surgeon refused to offer an opinion on exactly how often Ms. DeAngelo could sit, stand or walk in a given week. (R. Exhibit 8; Testimony of Appellant) 
  10. Ms. DeAngelo reported to Cpt. James Fay. Her light-duty responsibilities included performing administrative tasks, such as entering traffic citations in the Department’s database.  (R. Exhibits 3, 7 and 8; Testimony of Fay)
  11. After returning to light-duty, Ms. DeAngelo continued her ongoing work conditioning program, including attending appointments at Clinical Rehab on Mondays and Thursdays.  (R. Exhibit 3)
     

July 21 and July 24, 2025

  1. Ms. DeAngelo was scheduled for appointments at Clinical Rehab on Monday, July 21 and Thursday, July 24, 2025, the week after starting her light-duty assignment. Mr. Dybel informed her approximately two days beforehand that he would be on vacation on July 21 and 24, 2025.   (Testimony of Appellant)
  2. On July 21 and 24, 2025, Ms. DeAngelo stayed at home and performed the stretching and conditioning exercises that her therapist had taught her to perform at home as part of her treatment.  (Testimony of Appellant)

August 28, 2025

  1. The proper procedure for police officers seeking sick time or time off requires calling the main desk and informing the desk officer; the desk officer then submits a slip to the Commanding Officer, who then enters the information into the Larrimore System. Officers who are on leave such as Family Medical Leave or 111F may also call the main desk. If the absence is a scheduled one or if the officer is on 111F, the police officer contacts or submits a slip to the Detail Office.  (Testimony of Fay)
  2. Sometimes specialized units operate differently. When she worked in the Vice Unit, also a specialized unit (as is the Traffic Unit), Ms. DeAngelo informed her supervisors when she needed time off, and they fulfilled any payroll duties.  (Testimony of Appellant)
  3. Cpt. Fay does not have access to the Larrimore System to change an officer’s time. (R. Exhibit 3; Testimony of Fay, Testimony of Appellant)
  4. Ms. DeAngelo informed Cpt. Fay of the August 28, 2025 medical appointment, but did not submit a leave form through the Detail Office. She did not ask the City to code her payroll entries differently.  (Testimony of Appellant)
  5. On Thursday, August 28, 2025, a day scheduled for the work conditioning program, Ms. DeAngelo underwent an urgent medical procedure.  (Part II, Hearing Recording) [FN5] (Testimony of Appellant)
  6. August 28, 2025 was her second appointment for that procedure. The procedure could not be completed at the first appointment because of the buildup from the scar tissue from her work-related injuries. A specialist had to be brought in to complete the procedure.  (Part II, Hearing Recording) (Testimony of Appellant)

September 15, 2025

  1. On Monday, September 15, 2025, a day scheduled for the work conditioning program, Ms. DeAngelo attended a medical appointment related to her work injury. (R. Exhibit 3; Testimony of Appellant)

September 29, 2025

  1. Ms. DeAngelo’s work conditioning program appointment on Thursday, September 25, 2025, lasted 2 ½ hours.  As she was getting ready to leave, Mr. Dybel informed Ms. DeAngelo that Ms. Demers from the City had not approved her next four scheduled therapy appointments (including September 29, 2025), and that the City was starting the disability retirement process. (Testimony of Appellant)
  2. Ms. DeAngelo was surprised because she had not yet reached her medical end point, the ability to run; she had only reached the point of walking backwards. Ms. DeAngelo and Mr. Dybel discussed her ongoing pain, and the fact that she was still treating with the pain specialist.  (Testimony of Appellant)
  3. When Ms. DeAngelo asked her for more work conditioning appointments, Ms. Demers confirmed that the City was starting the disability retirement process. Ms. Demers said that she had to speak to Ms. Vieira and would get back to Ms. DeAngelo.  (Testimony of Demers, Testimony of Vieira, Testimony of Appellant)
  4. Ms. Demers later informed Ms. DeAngelo that the City would deny any further requests for work conditioning because the therapist said she had reached her end goals. (Testimony of Demers)
  5. On Monday, September 29, 2025, Ms. DeAngelo performed her work conditioning regimen at home, doing the stretching and exercises that Mr. Dybel had taught her. (See Finding of Fact 28; Testimony of Appellant) 
  6. On her next scheduled day of light-duty work, Tuesday, September 30, 2025, Ms. DeAngelo informed Sgt. Otero and Lt. Gonzalez of the Detail Office that she had no further therapy appointments.  (Testimony of Appellant)
  7. On Tuesday, September 30, Ms. DeAngelo checked her work schedule and learned that she had been assigned to light-duty five days a week beginning  September 29, 2025.  (R. Exhibit 11; Testimony of Appellant)
  8. Dr. Carkner's note did not release Ms. DeAngelo to a five-day light-duty work schedule, and the record contains no evidence that another medical professional had done so. (See Finding of Fact 30)
  9. No one from the City informed Ms. DeAngelo that she was no longer receiving 111F benefits.  (R. Exhibit 11; Testimony of Appellant)

The City’s Investigation

  1. Ms. Vieira reviewed Ms. DeAngelo’s medical reports and notes. She noticed that some notes referred to Monday, July 21; Thursday, July 24; Thursday, August 28; Monday, September 15; and Monday, September 29, 2025 appointment dates without complementary reports, notes, or bills. Ms. DeAngelo’s payroll records recorded her as “INJ” or “injured-on-duty” status on those dates.  (R. Exhibits 6, 9-11; Testimony of Vieira, Testimony of Kelleher)
  2. Neither Ms. Vieira nor Ms. Demers questioned Ms. DeAngelo about the discrepancy.  (Testimony of Demers, Testimony of Vieira)
  3. Ms. Vieira contacted Mr. Dybel and inquired whether Ms. DeAngelo had attended work conditioning appointments on Monday, July 21; Thursday, July 24; Thursday, August 28; Monday, September 15; and Monday, September 29, 2025. Mr. Dybel confirmed that Ms. DeAngelo had not visited the clinic on those dates.  (R. Exhibit 6; Testimony of Vieira)
  4. On October 8, 2025, Ms. Vieira emailed Cpt. David Peaslee that Ms. DeAngelo had reported that she was “injured” on dates that she did not attend her work conditioning appointments, and that she had verified Ms. DeAngelo’s failure to appear with the clinic.  (R. Exhibit 6)

Internal Affairs Investigation

  1. On October 24, 2025, Cpt. Peaslee assigned Lt. James Kelleher to investigate Ms. DeAngelo’s usage of the “injured” payroll code on days she did not attend work conditioning appointments.  (R. Exhibit 3)
  2. Lt. Kelleher docketed the investigation as Case Number 2025-041L.  (R. Exhibit 3)
  3. Lt. Kelleher contacted Ms. Vieira and learned that Ms. DeAngelo’s surgeon had authorized her participation in a work conditioning program on designated days and that Ms. DeAngelo did not have to report to her light-duty assignment on those designated days.  (R. Exhibit 3)
  4. Lt. Kelleher contacted Mr. Dybel and confirmed that Ms. DeAngelo had not appeared at the clinic  on Monday, July 21; Thursday, July 24; Thursday, August 28; Monday, September 15 and Monday, September 29, 2025.  (R. Exhibit 3; Testimony of Kelleher)
  5. Lt. Kelleher checked City employee access records and learned that Ms. DeAngelo’s employee key card  was not used to access the police station on July 21, 2025, July 24, 2025, August 28, 2025, September 15, 2025, or September 29, 2025.  (R. Exhibit 3; Testimony of Kelleher)
  6. Lt. Kelleher reviewed the City computer access logs and learned that Ms. DeAngelo  did not log into any City computers on July 21, 2025, July 24, 2025, August 28, 2025, September 15, 2025, or September 29, 2025.   (R. Exhibit 3; Testimony of Kelleher)
  7. Lt. Kelleher confirmed with the City’s Finance Office that Ms. DeAngelo was paid $426.56 for each day she did not appear for scheduled work conditioning appointments or report to her light-duty assignment, resulting in compensation greater than $1,200.  (R. Exhibit 3; Testimony of Kelleher)
  8. Because Ms. DeAngelo received 111F pay on the dates under investigation, Lt. Kelleher examined the elements of G.L. c. 266, § 30 Larceny over $1,200 and G.L. c. 231, § 85BB False or fraudulent claim of hours worked by law enforcement officer.  (Testimony of Kelleher)
  9. On November 5, 2025, Lt. Kelleher interviewed Ms. DeAngelo in the presence of Officer Danny Brito, her union representative. The entire interview lasted less than thirty minutes.  (R. Exhibit 3; Testimony of Kelleher)
  10. Ms. DeAngelo told Lt. Kelleher that her doctor had coordinated an arrangement with the City’s Human Relations Department for her to attend physical therapy twice a week and perform light-duty the other days; that her therapy typically started between 10:00 a.m. and 11:00 a.m.; that the sessions lasted an average of two hours; and that she was not expected to work on the days that she performed work conditioning.  (R. Exhibit 5)
  11. For each of the five dates in question (Monday, July 21; Thursday, July 24; Thursday, August 28; Monday, September 15; and Monday, September 29, 2025), Lt. Kelleher asked Ms. DeAngelo if she had “attended the work conditioning session” or if she reported for work. In response to each date, Ms. DeAngelo answered “no” to both questions.  (R. Exhibits 3 and 5)
  12. Ms. DeAngelo told Lt. Kelleher that she had a medical appointment that was treatment of her work-related injury on September 15, 2025.   (R. Exhibits 3 and 5)
  13. Lt. Kelleher found that Ms. DeAngelo was properly paid 111F wages for September 15, 2025, and did not engage in misconduct by failing to attend her work conditioning appointment or by failing to report to her light-duty assignment in the Traffic Bureau.  (R. Exhibit 3; Testimony of Kelleher)
  14. When asked if she had any explanation for not reporting to work or to light-duty on the other four dates, Ms. DeAngelo told Lt. Kelleher that she had a medical appointment on August 28, 2025 that was causally related to her work-related injury. Further, she told Lt. Kelleher that she had informed Cpt. Fay of her August 28, 2025 medical appointment in advance.  (R. Exhibits 3 and 5)
  15. Ms. DeAngelo did not inform Lt. Kelleher that on the other three dates (Monday, July 21; Thursday, July 24; ;  and Monday, September 29, 2025) she had performed the work conditioning regimen at home as she had been taught to do by Mr. Dybel.  (Testimony of Appellant)
  16. Ms. DeAngelo then told Lt. Kelleher that “ … on the other dates, I just thought that I was off on 111F on those days” and that she thought that the light-duty assignment was structured in a way so that she would not sit at a desk for five days each week.  (R. Exhibit 3) 
  17. When asked by Lt. Kelleher if there was any other relevant information that she wanted to share, Ms. DeAngelo told Lt. Kelleher that she reported for light-duty on two Fridays that she “was not supposed to ...”  (Friday, August 22 and Friday, August 29, 2025.) 
  18. Lt. Kelleher did not find an oral or written directive advising Ms. DeAngelo what she was required to do in the event that her physical therapist was unavailable.   (Testimony of Kelleher)
  19. Lt. Kelleher confirmed with the City’s Finance Office that Ms. DeAngelo was paid 111F benefits of $426.56 for each day she did not appear at the clinic for work conditioning appointments or report to her light-duty assignment. This resulted in a total of $1,706.24 in compensation.  (R. Exhibit 3; Testimony of Kelleher)
  20. Lt. Kelleher concluded that Ms. DeAngelo had violated various Department Rules and Regulations by failing to report for light-duty after not attending physical therapy sessions on the remaining four dates:  Monday, July 21, 2025; Thursday, July 24, 2025; Thursday, August 28, 2025; and Monday, September 29, 2025.  (R. Exhibit 3)
  21. Lt. Kelleher issued a report on November 19, 2025, citing six Department Rules and Regulations:  (1) Section C - Professional Responsibilities: Subsection 9: “Perform such other police related services required by the city;” (2) Section H – Required Conduct, Subsection 16: Duty, Reporting For;  (3) Section J, Prohibited Conduct, Subsection 4, Conduct Unbecoming an Officer; (4) Section J, Prohibited Conduct, Subsection 6, Criminal Conduct; (5) Section J, Prohibited Conduct, Subsection 30, Neglect of Duty; and (6) Section J, Prohibited Conduct, Subsection 55, Unsatisfactory Performance (Officers).(R. Exhibit 4)
  22. In regard to Rule J, Subsection 6, Lt. Kelleher found that Ms. DeAngelo was in violation of the rule against criminal conduct for receiving a total of $1706.24 in payments issued under the Section 111F injured on-duty classification, a benefit that provides full, tax-exempt salary only to officers legitimately incapacitated due to a duty-related injury.   (R. Exhibit 4)
  23. Lt. Kelleher found that Ms. DeAngelo’s conduct constituted a violation of G.L. c. 266, § 30 Larceny Over $1,200. [FN6] Lt. Kelleher concluded that Ms. DeAngelo’s failure to report for duty on each of the four dates (Monday, July 21; Thursday, July 24, 2025; Thursday, August 28, 2025; and Monday, September 29, 2025), while accepting full pay, constituted four separate counts of G.L. c. 231, § 85BB Knowingly Submitting a False Claim of Hours Worked by a Law Enforcement Officer.  (See Finding of Fact 81; R. Exhibit 4) [FN7]
  24. When Superintendent Gregory Hudon reviewed the Internal Affairs report and listened to Ms. DeAngelo’s interview, he found that she took no responsibility and expressed no remorse for her actions. He recommended termination to the City Manager. (Testimony of Hudon) 
  25. Cpt. Fay informed Ms. DeAngelo that she was going to be placed on administrative leave. (Testimony of Appellant)

Section 41 Hearing

  1. Thomas A. Golden, Jr., the City Manager, is the Appointing Authority for the City of Lowell.  (R. Exhibit 1)
  2. On November 24, 2025, Mr. Golden issued Ms. DeAngelo a Notice of Contemplated Termination. See G.L. 31, § 41. On November 26, 2025, the City placed Ms. DeAngelo on administrative leave.  (R. Exhibit 1)
  3. The Notice of Contemplated Termination cited violations of six sections of the Department’s Rules and Regulations premised on Ms. DeAngelo’s conduct as she navigated the City’s plan for her to return to work after being on injured-on-duty status; specifically, it noted that she had failed to attend four scheduled dates of work conditioning appointments on July 21, July  24, August 28, and September 29, 2025.  (R. Exhibit 1; Testimony of Kelleher)
  4. In addition to missing the work conditioning appointments, the Notice cited that Ms. DeAngelo also failed to report to work for her injured status/light-duty assignment, and submitted false or fraudulent claims of hours worked (per G.L. c. 231, § 85B; G.L. c. 266, § 30) allowing her to receive tax-exempt compensation pursuant to G.L. c. 41, §111F. The Notice referenced that these actions were violations of Department Rules and Regulations, to wit: Section C -Professional Responsibilities: Subsection 9: “Perform such other police related services required by the city”; Section H – Required Conduct, Subsection 16: Duty, Reporting For;  Section J, Prohibited Conduct, Subsection 4, Conduct Unbecoming an Officer; Section J, Prohibited Conduct, Subsection 6, Criminal Conduct; Section J, Prohibited Conduct, Subsection 30, Neglect of Duty; and Section J, Prohibited Conduct, Subsection 55, Unsatisfactory Performance (Officers).  (R. Exhibit 1; Testimony of Kelleher)
  5. A Section 41 hearing was scheduled for December 22, 2025 in the City Council Chambers at City Hall.  (R. Exhibit 1; Testimony of Kelleher)
  6. The Appointing Authority designated Corey Williams, the City Solicitor, to serve as the hearing officer. G.L. c. 31, § 41.  (R. Exhibit 1; Testimony of Kelleher)
  7. Ms. DeAngelo testified and was subject to cross-examination.  (Testimony of DeAngelo)
  8. The City offered no witnesses. The November 19, 2025 Internal Affairs Report was its only exhibit. The hearing lasted less than an hour.  (R. Exhibit 3)
  9. Mr. Williams did not record the hearing. He did not prepare written findings or a written decision after the hearing. Rather, Mr. Williams reported his findings to Mr. Golden verbally.  (Testimony of Kelleher) 
  10. On December 31, 2025, Mr. Golden issued Ms. DeAngelo the Decision of the Appointing Authority, terminating her employment and enclosing her appeal rights. Within the Decision, Mr. Golden incorporated the November 24, 2025 Notice of Contemplated Termination. The decision states there was just cause to terminate Ms. DeAngelo “[f]or the good of the service of the City of Lowell Police Department” and for violating various rules and regulations of the Department cited in the findings above, all tied to Ms. DeAngelo’s failure to report for light-duty after not attending work conditioning sessions at the clinic on July 21, 2025; July 24, 2025; August 28, 2025; and September 29, 2025.   (R. Exhibits 1 and 2; Testimony of Kelleher)
  11. On January 3, 2026, Ms. DeAngelo received the Decision.  (Stipulated Facts; R. Exhibit 2)
  12. On January 6, 2026, Ms. DeAngelo appealed her termination to the Commission.  (Stipulated Facts) 

Applicable Civil Service Law

A tenured civil service employee may be disciplined or discharged for “just cause”, after due notice and hearing, upon a written decision “which shall state fully and specifically the reasons therefor.” G.L. c. 31, § 41.  An employee aggrieved by the decision may appeal to the Commission. G.L. c. 31, § 43. 

Under Section 43, the appointing authority carries the burden to prove “just cause” for the action taken by a “preponderance of the evidence.” Id.  See, e.g., Falmouth v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 447 Mass. 814, 823 (2006); Police Dep’t of Boston v. Collins, 48 Mass. App. Ct. 411, rev. den., 726 N.E.2d 417 (2000).  In performing its review, the Commission hears evidence and finds facts anew. 

                Examining an earlier but substantially similar version of the same statute, the Appeals Court wrote: 

We interpret this as providing for a hearing de novo upon all material evidence and a decision by the commission upon that evidence and not merely for a review of the previous hearing held before the appointing officer. There is no limitation of the evidence to that which was before the appointing officer. 

Leominster v. Stratton, 58 Mass. App. Ct. 726, 727-28 (2003). 

                The Commission determines just cause for discipline and discharge by inquiring “whether the employee has been guilty of substantial misconduct which adversely affects the public interest by impairing the efficiency of public service.” School Comm. v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 43 Mass. App. Ct. 486, 488, rev. den., 426 Mass. 1104 (1997). 

                It is also a basic tenet of merit principles, which are the core protections of civil service law, that discipline must be remedial, not punitive, designed to “correct inadequate performance” and “[only] separating employees whose inadequate performance cannot be corrected.” G.L. c. 31, § 1. 

                The Commission must take account of all credible evidence in the entire administrative record, when weighed by an unprejudiced mind, guided by common sense and by correct rules of law, including whatever would fairly detract from the weight of any particular supporting evidence. See Commissioners of Civil Serv. v. Municipal Ct. of Boston, 359 Mass. 211, 214 (1971), citing Selectmen of Wakefield v. Judge of First Dist. Ct., 262 Mass. 477, 482 (1928); Massachusetts Ass’n of Minority Law Enforcement Officers v. Abban, 434 Mass. 256, 264-65 (2001). 

                It is the purview of the hearing officer to determine the credibility of testimony presented to the Commission. “[T]he assessing of the credibility of witnesses is a preserve of the [Commission] upon which a court conducting judicial review treads with great reluctance.” Leominster v. Stratton, 58 Mass. App. Ct. at 729. 

                Section 43 of G.L. c. 31 also vests the Commission with authority to affirm, vacate or modify discipline but that discretion is “not without bounds” and requires sound explanation for doing so.  See, e.g., Police Comm’r v. Civil Service Comm’n, 39 Mass. App. Ct. 594, 600 (1996) (“The power accorded to the commission to modify penalties must not be confused with the power to impose penalties ab initio . . . accorded the appointing authority”). See also Falmouth v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 447 Mass. 814, 823 (2006), quoting Watertown v. Arria, 16 Mass. App. Ct. 331, 334 (1983). However, the Supreme Judicial Court has added that, in the absence of “political considerations, favoritism, or bias,” the same penalty is warranted “unless the commission’s findings of fact differ significantly from those reported by the town or interpret the relevant law in a substantially different way.” Falmouth, 447 Mass. at 824.

Analysis

The City has failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that it had just cause to terminate Ms. DeAngelo. 

The December 31, 2025 Decision of the Appointing Authority cited two bases for Ms. DeAngelo’s termination. The first reason was for the good of the service of the Lowell Police Department. 

The second reason was for violation of the Rules and Regulations of the Lowell Police Department due to the underlying conduct of Ms. DeAngelo’s failure to attend the work conditioning appointments on the scheduled dates, her failure to attend her light-duty assignment at the Traffic Department instead, and her entry of the payroll code “injured” for those days resulting in 111F payments.

My findings and conclusions differ significantly from those found by the City when it determined it had just cause to terminate Ms. DeAngelo’s employment. What is undisputed is that the City failed to memorialize its directives throughout this matter, leading to the conflicting narratives today. 

I find that Ms. DeAngelo was a credible witness. She underwent serious surgeries so that she could return to police work even though the City urged her to take disability retirement. Ms. DeAngelo had no history of discipline, and had never been subject to an Internal Affairs investigation. 

Section 41 Hearing

The City’s failure to document matters throughout this case culminated with the hearing officer’s failure to issue written findings or a report after the December 22, 2025 Section 41 hearing. Ms. DeAngelo was the only witness, and testified despite the open criminal charges for G.L. c. 231, § 85B and G.L. c. 266, § 30 (based on the City’s referral to the District Attorney’s Office). The City’s only exhibit was Lt. Kelleher’s November 19, 2025 IAD report. 

Because of the oral nature of the Hearing Officer’s findings and report, we have no record of Ms. DeAngelo’s testimony at the Section 41 hearing. 

Therefore, I look to her statements to Lt. Kelleher and her testimony before the Commission.

City Solicitor Corey Williams served as the hearing officer and presented his findings orally to the Appointing Authority and City Manager, Mr. Golden. Mr. Golden then incorporated the November 19, 2025 IAD report into the December 31, 2025 Decision of the Appointing Authority.  (R. Exhibits 2 and 3)

Although Section 41 does not expressly require that the local hearing be recorded or that a hearing officer's report be reduced to writing, an entirely oral process presents substantial risks.  The Commission therefore strongly recommends that appointing authorities record Section 41 hearings and require hearing officers to memorialize their findings and reports in writing, particularly where termination is contemplated. See Beltran v. Lawrence, dkt. no. D1-25-078, 39 MCSR --- (Sept. 17, 2026).

What was Ms. DeAngelo’s return-to-work assignment?

On July 14, 2025, Dr. Carkner cleared Ms. DeAngelo to return to work “for light-duty on days she is not engaged in a work conditioning program.”  (R. Exhibit 8)  At the time, Ms. DeAngelo was attending work conditioning at Clinical Rehab on Mondays and Thursdays.              Ms. Demers and Ms. Vieira created a light-duty assignment for Ms. DeAngelo, performing clerical work in the Traffic Bureau. Ms. DeAngelo began working in the Traffic Bureau on Friday, July 18, 2025, and reported to Capt. Fay. 

The City never gave Ms. DeAngelo her return-to-work authorization or her assignment to the Traffic Bureau in writing.  I find that this return-to-work assignment – i.e. the oral agreement between Ms. DeAngelo and the City as of July 18, 2025 – lacked clarity and provided inadequate notice of the work conditioning and light-duty reporting requirements.  See Freitas v. New Bedford School Dep’t, 30 MCSR 1 (2017) (Commission overturned discipline against a school employee where the employee was not given adequate notice of the requirement allegedly violated.)

Did Ms. DeAngelo’s return-to-work assignment require her to report for her light-duty assignment if there were no Monday/Thursday work conditioning sessions?

Dr. Carkner’s July 14, 2025 note authorized Ms. DeAngelo to return to work “for light-duty on days she is not engaged in a work conditioning program.”  On July 14, 2025, Ms. DeAngelo was attending work conditioning on Mondays and Thursday, leaving three days a week for light-duty.

The City argues that on the days regularly scheduled for work conditioning appointments, namely Mondays and Thursdays (after July 18, 2025), Ms. DeAngelo was required to report to work at the Traffic Bureau if she had no work conditioning appointment. 

However, Dr. Carkner’s note did not authorize a five-day work week. Further, no other medical professional or occupation health professional cleared Ms. DeAngelo’s return to a five-day work week. Recovering from a broken back, Ms. DeAngelo reasonably believed that her surgeon did not want her sitting five days per week in a chair. 

Again, the oral return-to-work assignment lacked clarity, and was silent on whether Ms. DeAngelo was supposed to report to the Traffic Bureau when a work conditioning appointment could not occur at the clinic on the regularly scheduled Mondays or Thursdays.  Cf. Freitas, 30 MCSR 1 (2017). 

I find that Ms. DeAngelo reasonably believed that if her work conditioning appointments could not be carried out on the regularly scheduled Monday or Thursday, her surgeon had not authorized her to work those days.

The City has asserted that Ms. DeAngelo had to report to her light-duty assignment on days she did not attend work condition appointments. However, throughout Ms. DeAngelo’s oral return-to-work communication with the City, no one told her that she had to report to the Traffic Bureau on days she did not attend work conditioning. 

Even if Ms. DeAngelo were required to report for light-duty on days in which she did not participate in a work conditioning program, the City has not shown that she violated that ambiguous agreement. 

July 21 and 24, 2025

Ms. DeAngelo learned a few days beforehand that her Monday, July 21 and Thursday, July 24, 2025 work conditioning appointments coincided with the Dybels’ vacation. Mr. Dybel and his spouse were the only employees of Clinical Rehab. Ms. DeAngelo had only started her light-duty assignment on Friday, July 18, 2025. On July 21 and July 24, 2025, Ms. DeAngelo stayed home and performed the stretching and conditioning exercises that Mr. Dybel had taught her to do at home as part of her work-conditioning regimen.  

In reaching the conclusion of no misconduct, I considered that Ms. DeAngelo did not volunteer this information during her initial IA interview with Lt. Kelleher. However, Lt. Kelleher never specifically asked Ms. DeAngelo if she did any work-conditioning exercises outside the clinic nor did he make any such inquiry of Mr. Dybel.  As referenced above, the City failed to record the local appointing authority hearing and the hearing officer failed to submit written findings that could be reviewed regarding this issue.  Furthermore, the City, which bore the burden of proof here, failed to call Mr. Dybel as a witness during this proceeding. Even when considering that Ms. DeAngelo did not mention to Lt. Kelleher that she did work conditioning exercises at home on July 21 and July 24, 2025, I found her testimony before the Commission in this regard to be credible. She credibly testified that Mr. Dybel had previously inquired with her about whether she had certain equipment at home; she had a treadmill and weights at home; Mr. Dybel had spoken to her about a complementary home regimen; and the clinic was indeed closed on those days because of the vacation of Mr. Dybel and his wife.  

In summary, on July 21 and July 24, 2025, Ms. DeAngelo did not attend the clinic but performed the stretching and conditioning exercises at home, as suggested by Mr. Dybel.  (Part II of the Hearing Recording; Findings of Fact 23 and 29)

August 28, 2025

                On Thursday, August 28, 2025, Ms. DeAngelo underwent a confidential invasive medical procedure. It was her second appointment for this procedure. The first appointment was unsuccessful due to the scarring in her body from the July 2022 work-related accident, and a specialist had to be brought in for this reason for the August 28, 2025 follow-up appointment.  As such, the City has not shown that the August 28, 2025 medical appointment was not related to Ms. DeAngelo’s injury sustained on duty. 

That is important because the City, after determining that Ms. DeAngelo attended a medical appointment on September 15, 2025 that was related to her work injury, found no misconduct for not performing light-duty on that day.  Since the August 28, 2025 appointment was also related to that work injury, it follows that Ms. DeAngelo did not engage in misconduct by not appearing for light-duty on August 28, 2025; nor did she engage in misconduct by receiving 111F benefits that day.  She reported her medical appointment to Capt. Fay, putting the City on notice if it believed her pay for that day should have been recorded as regular pay as opposed to 111F. 

September 29, 2025

The scheduled September 29 work-conditioning appointment did not occur because the City had not approved further appointments after September 25, 2025, without directly notifying Ms. DeAngelo. There is nothing in writing confirming that Ms. DeAngelo had reached a medical end point.  In fact, she is not yet able to run, one of the essential job duties of the position of police officer. 

Awaiting more appointments from the City, on September 29, 2025, Ms. DeAngelo properly performed her stretching and conditioning exercises at home, as directed by her therapist.

I find that Ms. DeAngelo reasonably believed that she did not have to report to the Traffic Bureau five days a week. She had not received clearance for a five-day work week in writing. No one ever advised her of a five-day light-duty assignment. 

Finally, the City failed to inform Ms. DeAngelo, orally or in writing, when it ended approval for her work hardening appointments. Ms. DeAngelo never got the benefit of rescheduling or treatment for those four days, even as she remains in pain with a difficult recovery from her back injuries. In fact, the City did not approve further work-conditioning appointments even though Ms. DeAngelo testified that she had not yet reached her treatment goals. 

The City also appears to have conflated two separate issues:  Ms. DeAngelo’s treatment for her injuries, and her alleged misuse of the payroll code leading to undeserved 111F benefits.  An employee’s failure to enter appropriate payroll codes does not entitle the City to deprive that individual of health care.

Before Ms. DeAngelo began light-duty on July 18, 2025, all the days of her absence from work were payroll coded as “injured” or 111F.  When she returned to work, her light-duty days were coded as regular pay, and the work-conditioning days were coded as “injured” or 111F. 

When the City noticed discrepancies between the payroll codes and Ms. DeAngelo’s absence from the work conditioning regimen, no one contacted her.  Instead, Ms. Vieira contacted the City’s Internal Affairs Division, and Cpt. Peaslee initiated an investigation. Similarly, when the City learned that Ms. DeAngelo did not undergo work conditioning on the four dates, it did not use its discretion to enter the appropriate payroll code before December 31, 2025. 

On the dates cited by the City, Ms. DeAngelo was undergoing a medical procedure or performing the stretching and conditioning exercises (as taught by her therapist) that were part of her work conditioning regimen. On the four relevant dates, Ms. DeAngelo exercised a proper use of “injured” time.

Thus, I find that the City did not prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Ms. DeAngelo knowingly or improperly received §111F benefits on any date.

Conclusion

The City has failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence that Ms. DeAngelo engaged in any misconduct here; thus, there was no just cause to warrant her termination. 

Rather, the City, relying on a highly subjective after-the-fact interpretation of a verbal agreement, made serious allegations that Ms. DeAngelo had violated Department Rules and Regulations and had engaged in criminal activity.  Upon referral of the alleged criminal activity, the District Attorney’s Office declined to prosecute.  Here, the City failed to prove any Department rule violations by a preponderance of the evidence. 

Further, the City’s ambiguous citation to terminating Ms. DeAngelo “for the good of the service” does not in and of itself establish just cause for discipline.  The Commission must determine whether the City has shown that Ms. DeAngelo engaged in the underlying alleged substantial misconduct.  The City has not. 

For the foregoing reasons, there was no just cause for her termination and Ms. DeAngelo’s appeal is allowed. 

Pursuant to G.L. c. 31, § 43, the Commission exercises its authority to order Antonia DeAngelo returned to her position as a Lowell Police Officer without loss of compensation or other benefits. 

Further, Ms. DeAngelo shall be reimbursed by the City for all applicable fees in Section 45 of Chapter 31.  Any petition for additional reasonable attorneys’ fees should be filed by counsel for Ms. DeAngelo no later than 30 days from the issuance of this decision. 

Civil Service Commission

/s/ Angela C. McConney

Angela C. McConney
Commissioner

By vote of the Civil Service Commission (Bowman, Chair; Dooley, Markey, McConney and Stein) on October 15, 2026.

Either party may file a motion for reconsideration within ten days of receipt of this Commission order or decision. Under the pertinent provisions of the Code of Mass. Regulations, 801 C.M.R. § 1.01(7)(l), the motion must identify a clerical or mechanical error in the decision or a significant factor the Agency or the Presiding Officer may have overlooked in deciding the case. A motion for reconsideration does not toll the statutorily prescribed thirty-day time limit for seeking judicial review of this commission order or decision.

Under the provisions of G.L. c. 31, § 44, any party aggrieved by this Commission order or decision may initiate proceedings for judicial review under G.L. c. 30A, § 14 in the superior court within thirty (30) days after receipt of this order or decision. Commencement of such proceeding shall not, unless specifically ordered by the court, operate as a stay of this Commission order or decision. After initiating proceedings for judicial review in Superior Court, the plaintiff, or his/her attorney, is required to serve a copy of the summons and complaint upon the Boston office of the Attorney General of the Commonwealth, with a copy to the Civil Service Commission, in the time and in the manner prescribed by Mass. R. Civ. P. 4(d).

Notice to:
Douglas I. Louison, Esq. (for Appellant)
Garret Beaulieu, Esq. (for Respondent)

  1. The Standard Adjudicatory Rules of Practice and Procedure, 801 CMR § 1.01 (Formal Rules), apply to adjudications before the Commission with Chapter 31 or any Commission rules taking precedence.
  2. The Commission provided a link to the parties. The hearing is recorded in three parts. Part II includes Ms. DeAngelo’s testimony and impounded medical information. If there is a judicial appeal of this decision, the plaintiff in the judicial appeal would be obligated to supply the court with a transcript of this hearing to the extent that they wish to challenge the decision as unsupported by the substantial evidence, arbitrary and capricious, or an abuse of discretion. If such an appeal is filed, the recordings provided to the parties should be used to transcribe the hearing.
  3. The Respondent submitted two sets of exhibits; redacted and unredacted copies. 

  4. Section 111F, entitled “Leave with pay for incapacitated employees”, in relevant part reads:

    Section 111F.  Whenever a police officer … of a city, town, or fire or water district is incapacitated for duty because of injury sustained in the performance of his duty without fault of his own, … he shall be granted leave without loss of pay for the period of such incapacity; … All amounts payable under this section shall be paid at the same times and in the same manner as, and for all purposes shall be deemed to be, the regular compensation of such police officer . . . .

  5. Part II of the Hearing Recording is impounded.
  6. See footnote 4. 
  7. Upon cross-examination, Lt. Kelleher conceded that he did not determine whether Ms. DeAngelo had knowingly submitted a false claim. He testified, “I didn’t find either way.” An element of the offenses of G.L. c. 266, § 30 Larceny Over $1,200 and G.L. c. 231, §85BB Knowingly Submitting a False Claim of Hours is the requisite intent to do so. 

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