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Decision

Decision  DeLeon-Mejia, Jonathan v. Boston Police Department 2/19/26

Date: 02/19/2026
Organization: Civil Service Commission
Docket Number: G1-24R-124
  • Appearance for Appellant: James W. Gilden, Esq.
  • Appearance for Respondent: Omar Bennani, Esq.
  • Hearing Officer: Angela C. McConney

The Commission allowed the appeal of a candidate bypassed for appointment for police officer based on his driving history and prior employment history as the Boston Police Department was either unable to support the reasons for bypass or show a connection between the reasons and the candidate's current ability to serve as a police officer. 

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Decision

Law Clerk Chanel Palmer assisted with the drafting of this decision

Pursuant to G.L. c. 31, § 2(b), the Appellant, Jonathan DeLeon-Mejia, appealed to the Civil Service Commission (Commission) the January 13, 2024 decision of the Boston Police Department (Department) to bypass him for original appointment to the position of police officer in the Department.[1] The Department based its decision on Mr. DeLeon-Mejia’s work history, judgment, and poor driving record, including eight NSC courses.[2]

The Commission held a pre-hearing conference on May 14, 2025 via remote videoconference. On June 11, 2025, I conducted an evidentiary hearing at the offices of the Commission, located at 100 Cambridge Street, Boston.[3] I recorded the hearing via the Webex platform.[4] The parties filed post hearing briefs on August 8, 2025, whereupon the administrative record closed.

FINDINGS OF FACT

The Respondent entered into evidence three exhibits (R. Exhibit 1-3), and the Appellant entered four exhibits (A. Exhibit 1-4). Based on the exhibits entered into evidence and the testimony of the following witnesses:

Called by the Department:

  • Natasha Levarity, Director of Human Resources, BPD
  • Detective Sophia Vega-Jones, BPD

Called by the Appellant:

  • Jonathan DeLeon-Mejia, Appellant

and taking administrative notice of all matters filed in the case, pertinent law, and reasonable inferences from the credible evidence, I make the following findings of fact:

  1. Jonathan DeLeon-Mejia (Mr. DeLeon-Mejia or Appellant) was born in Puerto Rico and is a resident of the City of Boston.  He is fluent in Spanish.  (R. Exhibit 2; Testimony of Appellant)
  2. Mr. DeLeon-Mejia graduated from a Boston high school and holds both an Associate’s degree and a bachelor’s degree in criminal justice.  (Testimony of Appellant)
  3. Mr. DeLeon-Mejia has been working as a bus operator for the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority (MBTA) since 2019.  (Testimony of Appellant)
  4. Mr. DeLeon-Mejia, who co-parents a child with his former partner, has served as a mentor in several youth programs, including the Hyde Square Task Force and the Latino Law Enforcement Group Organization (LLEGO).[5]  (Testimony of Appellant)

Civil Service Process

  1. On June 10, 2023, Mr. DeLeon-Mejia took the civil service examination for the position of permanent full-time police officer.  (Stipulated Facts)
  2. On July 1, 2023, the state’s Human Resources Division (HRD) established an eligible list for Boston police officer. Mr. DeLeon-Mejia ranked 79th on the eligible list.  (Stipulated Facts)
  3. On August 9, 2023, HRD issued Certification #09448 to the Department, from which it could fill vacancies from the top candidates willing to accept employment.  (Stipulated Facts)
  4. Mr. DeLeon-Mejia submitted his application for the full-time original appointment of Boston Police Officer.  (R. Exhibit 3)

Background Investigation

  1. The Department’s Recruit Investigation Unit (RIU) assigned Det. Sophia Vega-Jones to conduct Mr. DeLeon-Mejia’s background investigation. The detective investigated his education, work history, residency, criminal offender registry information (CORI), financial records, driving record, military history, social media, drugs, field investigation and observation reports (FIOs), interviews, references and other documents. (Testimony of Vega-Jones)
  2. On September 5, 2024, Det. Vega-Jones updated Mr. DeLeon-Mejia’s previous “Privileged and Confidential Memorandum” (PCM) (from the prior hiring cycle in which he was bypassed) to include the results of her investigation.  (R. Exhibit 1; Testimony of Levarity)
  3. Det. Vega-Jones found that Mr. DeLeon-Mejia’s current significant other reported no major domestic conflicts. His ex-girlfriend stated that they had their ups and downs but coparent the child they share without any issues.  (R. Exhibit 1)
  4. Three of Mr. DeLeon-Mejia’s neighbors completed Neighborhood Assessment Forms. One neighbor has lived near Mr. DeLeon-Mejia for nine years and stated that he is very responsible and enjoys helping others, particularly the elderly. Another neighbor has lived near Mr. DeLeon-Mejia for eight years and stated that Mr. DeLeon-Mejia is very sociable, helpful, and will perform well as a police officer. A third neighbor has lived near Mr. DeLeon-Mejia for five years and said that he has witnessed Mr. DeLeon-Mejia be respectful to those around him. This third neighbor also expressed that he believed that Mr. DeLeon-Mejia would be a good police officer.  (R. Exhibit 1)
  5. Three other associates of Mr. DeLeon-Mejia completed Personal Reference Forms. One individual who has known Mr. DeLeon-Mejia for five years described him as patient and kind. She believed he would be a great fit for the department as he would help build bridges with the community. Another individual who has known Mr. DeLeon-Mejia for four years stated that he knew Mr. DeLeon-Mejia was involved with volunteer organizations. He said that Mr. DeLeon-Mejia does not shy away from responsibilities and believes that he would be responsible in his role with the Department. A third individual who has known Mr. DeLeon-Mejia for 15 years stated that Mr. DeLeon-Mejia has a calm demeanor and can de-escalate any situation. He also believes Mr. DeLeon-Mejia will be a good police officer because it is in his nature to help others. (R. Exhibit 1)
  6. Det. Vega-Jones visited Mr. DeLeon-Mejia’s home and found that it was well kept, very neat and orderly, with personal effects present throughout the home. Mr. DeLeon-Mejia also provided the appropriate proof of residency documents. The detective concluded that Mr. DeLeon-Mejia met the residency requirement for the civil service exam.  (R. Exhibit 1) Driving History
  7. Det. Vega-Jones reviewed Mr. DeLeon-Mejia’s Registry of Motor Vehicles (RMV) driving history.   (R. Exhibit 1)
  8. According to his RMV driving history, Mr. DeLeon-Mejia’s last surchargeable event was approximately nine years ago, when he was cited for a 2016 speeding incident while driving in New York.  (R. Exhibit 1)
  9. Prior to that 2016 speeding violation in New York, he was found Responsible for the following: failure to slow down on March 2, 2010; a speeding incident and failure to stop on November 11, 2010; a speeding incident on November 23, 2010; a speeding incident on August 9, 2011; a speeding incident on October 25, 2011; failure to wear a seatbelt on July 8, 2012; operating without a license, failing to have a valid inspection sticker, and a crosswalk violation on August 21, 2012; failure to wear a seatbelt on December 4, 2013; operating an unregistered vehicle and operating without a license on April 9, 2014; operating an unregistered vehicle and operating without a license on April 9, 2014; operating with an open container of alcohol, a motor carrier safety violation, and a speeding incident on April 14, 2014; a speeding violation on November 3, 2015; and making an improper turn on November 1, 2016.  (R. Exhibit 1)
  10. According to his RMV driving history, Mr. DeLeon-Mejia’s driver’s license has been suspended four times: in December 2010 for failure to pay court fines and costs; in September 2011 for failure to pay court fines and costs, reinstated December 1, 2011; in August 2012 for failure to pay court fines and costs; January 2014 for failure to pay court fines and costs. (R. Exhibit 1)
  11. The roundtable has a policy of excluding any candidate who had undertaken an NSC course within the immediate past three years. Serebour v. Boston Police Dep’t, 36 MCSR 293, 296 (2023).
  12. Mr. DeLeon-Mejia completed eight NSC courses, the last one in 2020.  (R. Exhibit 1)
  13. The RMV issues a suspension notice to operators with three surchargeable events (including out-of-state violations) within a two-year period.  G.L. c. 175, § 113B. If another surchargeable event is added to an operator’s driving record, and two of the previous violations are within a three-year period, the operator will be given an additional three-surchargeable event suspension or revocation. There is no limit to the number of these suspensions or revocations that can be added. Multiple three-surchargeable events suspensions or revocations may be served at the same time. An NSC course or Massachusetts Driver Retraining Program is required each time a suspension or revocation of this type is issued.  G.L. c. 175, § 113B.  (R. Exhibit 2)
  14. The operator has 90 days from the issuance of the suspension notice to complete a mandatory NSC course or Massachusetts Driver Retraining Program before the suspension or revocation becomes active. If the operator completes the course before the date listed on the suspension notice, the RMV will not take any additional actions to suspend or revoke one’s permit, license, or right to operate. If the operator fails to complete the course before the date on the notice, the RMV will suspend or revoke the operator’s permit, license, or right to operate until he/she has successfully completed the course.  G.L. c. 175, § 113B.
  15. During his six years of employment as a bus operator with the MBTA, Mr. Deleon-Mejia has been involved in one motor vehicle accident (in 2019) that was deemed “preventable” by the MBTA.  (R. Exhibit 1)

Employment History

  1. The MBTA also reported that Mr. DeLeon-Mejia is respectful but had received written warnings for six unexcused absences between 2021 and 2022, and an administrative suspension due for a one-day 2019 AWOL. (R. Exhibit 1)
  2. Mr. DeLeon-Mejia stated that on those six days in 2021-2022, he was not absent but was rather late because he was taking care of his ailing father. Mr. DeLeon-Mejia was unaware that he could have requested Paid Family and Medical Leave (PFML) for those days.  (Testimony of Appellant)
  3. A prior employer, an airport caterer, discharged Mr. DeLeon-Mejia on November 29, 2014, after a disagreement he had with an airport agent who allegedly disrespected one of his drivers.  (R. Exhibits 2 and 3; Testimony of Appellant)
  4. In 2015, Mr. DeLeon-Mejia was terminated for doing homework during his shift while he was not in uniform at a security company.  (A. Exhibit 2, R. Exhibits 2 and 3; Testimony of Appellant)

  5. A second security firm fired Mr. DeLeon Mejia on January 6, 2019, after a manager “talked down to Mr. DeLeon-Mejia.”  (R. Exhibits 2 and 3; Testimony of Appellant)

    Bypass

  6. The Department convened a roundtable comprised of representatives from its Human Resources (HR) office, its Legal department, and its Internal Affairs department (IAD) to review Mr. DeLeon-Mejia’s candidacy for the position of permanent full-time police officer. HR Director Natasha Levarity served as HR’s representative at the roundtable. The HR and IAD representatives are the only voting members of the roundtable.  (Testimony of Levarity)
  7. After Det. Vega-Jones presented the PCM to the roundtable, the roundtable deliberated.  (R. Exhibit 1)
  8. The roundtable did not recommend Mr. DeLeon-Mejia for appointment, but the Department extended conditional offers to 55 candidates ranked below Mr. DeLeon-Mejia on the certification.  (Stipulated Facts; Testimony of Levarity)
  9. HR Director Levarity informed Mr. DeLeon-Mejia of the Department’s decision and informed him of his appeal rights. This timely appeal followed.  (R. Exhibit 3)
  10. HR Director Levarity referenced three reasons for bypass in the January 13, 2024 letter:  Mr. DeLeon-Mejia’s work history; poor judgment; and driving history.  (R. Exhibit 3; Testimony of Levarity)

The core mission of Massachusetts civil service law is to enforce “basic merit principles” for “recruiting, selecting and advancing of employees on the basis of their relative ability, knowledge and skills” and “assuring that all employees are protected against coercion for political purposes, and are protected from arbitrary and capricious actions.” G.L. c. 31, § 1.  See, e.g., Massachusetts Ass’n of Minority Law Enforcement Officers v. Abban, 434 Mass. 256, 259 (2001); MacHenry v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 40 Mass. App. Ct. 632, 635 (1995), rev. den., 423 Mass. 1106 (1996). See also Brookline v. Alston, 487 Mass. 278 (2021) (analyzing broad scope of the Commission’s jurisdiction to enforce basic merit principles under civil service law). The role of the Civil Service Commission in a bypass appeal is to determine whether, “on the basis of the evidence before it, the appointing authority has sustained its burden of proving that there was reasonable justification for the action taken by appointing authority.” Cambridge v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 43 Mass. App. Ct. 300, 304 (1997).  SeeWatertown v. Arria, 16 Mass. App. Ct. 331 (1983); McIsaac v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 38 Mass. App. Ct. 411 (2000); Police Dep’t of Boston v. Collins, 48 Mass. App. Ct. 411 (2000); Leominster v. Stratton, 58 Mass. App. Ct. 726, 728 (2003).

Original appointments of civil service employees are made from a list of candidates, called a “certification,” whose names are drawn in the order in which they appear on the civil service “eligible list,” using what is called the 2n+1 formula. G.L. c. 31, §§ 6 – 11; 16 – 27; Personnel Administration Rules, PAR.09.  An appointing authority must provide specific written reasons, consistent with basic merit principles, when choosing to bypass a higher ranked candidate in favor of a lower ranked one.  G.L. c. 31, § 27; PAR.08(4).

In its review of bypass decisions, the Commission must determine whether the appointing authority has shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that it had “reasonable justification” for the bypass, after conducting an “impartial and reasonably thorough review” of the relevant background and qualifications bearing on the candidate’s present fitness to perform the duties of the position. Boston Police Dep’t v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 483 Mass. 461, 474-78 (2019); Police Dep’t of Boston v. Kavaleski, 463 Mass. 680, 688-89 (2012); Beverly v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 78 Mass. App. Ct. 182, 187 (2010); Leominster v. Stratton, 58 Mass. App. Ct. 726, 727-28 (2003).  An action to bypass a candidate is justified when it is “done upon adequate reasons sufficiently supported by credible evidence, when weighed by an unprejudiced mind, guided by common sense and by correct rules of law.” Cambridge, 43 Mass. App. Ct. at 304, quoting Selectmen of Wakefield v. Judge of First Dist. Court of Eastern Middlesex, 262 Mass. 477, 482 (1928); Commissioners of Civil Serv. v. Municipal Court of the City of Boston, 359 Mass. 211, 214 (1971).  Cambridge further states, “[i]n the task of selecting employees of skill and integrity, appointing authorities are invested with broad discretion.” Id. at 304.

The Commission’s role, while important, is relatively narrow in scope: reviewing the legitimacy and reasonableness of the appointing authority’s actions. Falmouth v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 447 Mass. 814, 824-26 (2006).

Public safety officers are vested with considerable power and discretion and therefore must be held to a high standard of conduct. See, e.g., Falmouth v. Civil Serv. Comm’n., 61 Mass. App. Ct. 796, 801 (2004), citing Cambridge, supra, 43 Mass. App. Ct. at 303-305; Police Comm’r v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 22 Mass. App. Ct. 364, 371, rev. den. 398 Mass. 1103 (1986).

ANALYSIS

The Department has not proven by a preponderance of the evidence that it had reasonable justification to bypass Mr. DeLeon-Mejia for appointment due to his work history, less-than-spotless driving history, and his alleged lack of good judgment based on his work history and driving history.

Bypass Reason: Work History

               The Department seeks indicators of reliability among candidates, and stated that  Mr. DeLeon-Mejia’s terminations from three separate employers and his attendance issues at his current position presented red flags for the Department.  

               In his application, Mr. DeLeon-Mejia reported leaving several jobs within a short period of time. In November 2014, one employer terminated him after he had a disagreement with an airport agent for disrespecting one of Mr. DeLeon-Mejia’s subordinates. In 2015, Mr. DeLeon-Mejia was terminated for doing his homework and not wearing his uniform while on duty in violation of company policy. In January 2019, a third employer terminated Mr. DeLeon-Mejia due to a manager having “talked down” to him.

Although Mr. DeLeon-Mejia appeared impulsive in these instances, they occurred six, ten and eleven years ago. In one instance, Mr. DeLeon-Mejia was standing up for a subordinate. In another, he believed that he was being disrespected.

People who have known Mr. DeLeon-Mejia for a long time, however, provided favorable reviews to Det. Vega-Jones.  One neighbor has known Mr. DeLeon-Mejia for nine years said that he is very responsible and enjoys helping others, particularly the elderly. Another neighbor who has known Mr. DeLeon-Mejia for eight years said that Mr. DeLeon-Mejia is very sociable, helpful, and will perform well as a police officer. A third neighbor who has known Mr. DeLeon-Mejia for five years and said that he has witnessed Mr. DeLeon-Mejia be respectful to those around him. Finally, Mr. DeLeon-Mejia’s current significant other reported that they coparent their child without any issues.

The roundtable was also concerned that Mr. DeLeon-Mejia had six unexcused absences between 2021-2022; additionally, he was suspended for being AWOL for one day in 2019 in his current position. The roundtable was concerned that Mr. DeLeon-Mejia’s behavior would not be a good fit for the hierarchical structure of the Department and did not reflect the reliability it expects from its sworn officers. Repeated absences, or tardiness, could present a safety issue in the staffing of the Department. 

However, Mr. DeLeon-Mejia attendance issues occurred while he was caring for an ailing parent, when he failed to inform his employer of his responsibilities and properly request the legally available time off.

               Based on the foregoing, I do not find that Mr. DeLeon-Mejia’s employment history is so problematic as to provide an independent and reasonable basis for bypass.

Bypass Reason: Driving History

               The Department also expressed in its bypass letter concern about Mr. DeLeon-Mejia’s driving history:

The ability to safely operate a vehicle is an essential duty of a Boston Police Office, and officers are often called upon to issue citations for motor vehicle infractions. Your motor vehicle history reflects negatively on your ability to complete this essential task and deems you unsuitable for employment as a Boston Police Officer. (R. Exhibit 3)

               Mr. DeLeon-Mejia’s RMV record shows three surchargeable accidents, operating with an open container of alcohol, speeding violations, operating an unregistered motor vehicle, operating a motor vehicle without a valid inspection sticker, failure to wear a seatbelt, and attendance at eight NSC courses. Additionally, Mr. DeLeon-Mejia’s driver’s license was also suspended after speeding incidents, for a payment default, and for three surchargeable events.

Police departments are rightfully concerned with liability should an officer injure a member of the public or cause property damage by driving unsafely. However, the analysis of a candidate’s driving history should be based on the totality of their record, not singular events. See White, 38 MCSR 167 (2025). For these reasons, the Commission has found that an exceptionally poor driving record is a reasonable justification for a bypass of a candidate. See Aviles v. Boston Police Dep’t, 39 MCSR XX (2026); Cheam v. Boston Police Dep’t, 38 MCSR 382 (2025); Serebour v. Boston Police Dep’t, 36 MCSR 293 (2023); Gilmore v. Boston Police Dep’t, 36 MCSR 212 (2023); McGrath v. Lowell, 22 MCSR 560 (2009); Torres v. Lowell, 22 MCSR 558 (2009); Campbell v. Boston Fire Dep’t, 22 MCSR 489 (2009); Jones v. Boston Police Dep’t, 22 MCSR (2008).

There is no denying the appropriateness of diligently investigating a candidate’s driving record, as police officers are often called upon to operate a police cruiser, sometimes at high speeds in stressful situations. Moore v. Boston Police Dep’t, 37 MCSR 146 (2024), aff’dMoore v. Boston Police Dep’t, et al., No. 2484CV02253 (Suff. Sup. Ct., Sept. 19, 2025). As the Commission has previously found, however, an appointing authority must conduct a reasonably thorough review of the candidate’s driving record and consider the applicant’s driving history in the proper context in order to determine whether there is a nexus between the prior misconduct and the candidate’s current ability to perform the duties of the position to which they seek appointment.

“An appointing authority, as part of a reasonably thorough review, should at least afford the applicant with the opportunity to address the underlying issues, either with the background investigator or an interview panel.” Wine v. City of Holyoke, 31 MCSR 19, 24 (2018). By affording a candidate the opportunity to address driving infractions head-on, an appointing authority will have an adequate basis on which to decide whether the infractions have any bearing on the candidate’s fitness to perform the responsibilities of the position.

To evaluate driving histories in the proper context, the Commission has ruled that appointing authorities must consider such factors as:

  • The recency of any infractions;
  • Whether the candidate is required to drive more frequently because of their occupation, particularly in high traffic areas;
  • Whether any of the violations such as nonpayment of fines for inspection stickers may be attributable to socioeconomic factors, and, accordingly, may have no bearing on whether an appellant can effectively serve in a public safety position.

See, e.g., Stylien v. Boston Police Dep’t, 31 MCSR 209, 210 (2018); Stylien v. Boston Police Dep’t, 31 MCSR 154 (2018); Gibbons v. Woburn, 32 MCSR 14 (2019); Kodhimaj v. Department of Correction, 32 MCSR 377 (2019); Dorn v. Boston Police Dep’t, 31 MCSR 375, 376 (2018). 

               More broadly, when the bypass, as here, involves a person of color, appointing authorities must consider public policy concerns related to the racial disparity in traffic stops. See Commonwealth v. Gonsalves, 429 Mass. 658, 670 (1999) (Ireland, J., concurring) (“The widespread public concerns about police profiling, commonly referred to as ‘DWB—driving while black,’ has been the subject of much discussion and debate both across the country and within the Commonwealth”).

The Department conducted a reasonably thorough review of Mr. DeLeon-Mejia’s driving record. The Department reviewed information lawfully available to them through the RMV and the CJIS related to his driving record.

As an MBTA bus operator since 2019, Mr. DeLeon-Mejia is required to drive frequently and operate in high traffic areas. Lack of registration and an inspection sticker may be an indication of financial hardship, in addition to the three license suspensions for failure to pay court costs and fines.  See White at38 MCSR 167, 168 (2025).

The legislature and the executive branch have recognized that the loss of a driver’s license provides a particular hardship to low-income residents of the Commonwealth, and may create a never-ending cycle of debt.[6] The two branches of government never intended to punish operators for being poor and unable to pay fines and court.[7] 

               It is undisputed that Mr. DeLeon-Mejia had to take eight NSC courses in order to maintain his license. The administrative record does not include the dates of earlier seven NSC courses, so I was unable to verify whether Mr. DeLeon-Mejia took courses for every three driving offenses that occurred within a two-year window, or if he had to attend an additional NSC course when two of his previous violations fell within a three-way window. G.L. c. 175, §113B. Thus, an operator may fall into a “trap” of repeating NSC courses. Nonetheless, it is entirely within the candidate’s power to drive safely and obey the rules of the road.

               This number of NSC courses in a short period of time is concerning, but Mr. DeLeon-Mejia has been operating an MBTA bus without incident since 2019. In his current position, he carefully and swiftly maneuvers large vehicles (full of residents of the Commonwealth)  through city traffic.

               In accordance with Department policy, candidates are automatically excluded if they attended a NSC course within the previous three years. Serebour at 36 MCSR 293, 296 (2023). Once the three-year lookback window is past, the roundtable has the discretion to consider the candidate’s driving history and whether the NSC course remedied the driving behavior.  Rivera-Hernandez at 326 (2024).

               The Commission has upheld the bypasses of other candidates who have undertaken numerous NSC courses. Serebour v. Boston Police Dep’t, 36 MCSR 293 (2023) (bypassed candidate took six NSC courses); Rivera-Hernandez v. Boston Police Dep’t, 387 MCSR 323 (2024) (bypassed candidate attended four NSC courses because of five surchargeable accidents in which he was found at least 50% at fault); Cheam v. Boston Police Dep’t, 38 MCSR 382 (2025) (bypassed candidate received five warnings two years after his fourth NSC course); Aviles v. Boston Police Dep’t, 39 MCSR XX (2026) (bypassed candidate attended two NSC courses).

In my examination of Mr. DeLeon-Mejia’s RMV record, notwithstanding the eight NSC courses, his actual entries were not as numerous as would be expected. In comparison with the above-referenced cases, Mr. DeLeon-Mejia appeared to have fallen into the “trap” of repeating NSC courses as I discussed earlier in this decision. The exact date of each NSC course is not in the administrative record, but it appears that, on more than one occasion, another surchargeable event was added to  Mr. DeLeon-Mejia's driving record while two of the previous violations were within a three-year period – and he was given an additional three-surchargeable event suspension or revocation. As there is no limit to the number of these suspensions or revocations that could be added, he apparently received multiple three-surchargeable events suspensions or revocations at the same time.  G.L. c. 175, § 113B.  This NSC course “trap” results in a heavy imposition of time and costs upon an operator.

               Mr. DeLeon-Mejia’s last surchargeable event was approximately nine years ago, for an out-of-state speeding incident. He was found Responsible for 20 civil infractions from 2010 to 2016. His driver’s license was suspended four times from 2010 to 2014 for financial reasons.   More importantly, Mr. DeLeon-Mejia has been working as a bus operator since 2019 without serious incident. 

               I find that Mr. DeLeon-Mejia’s driving record at this time does not provide an independent reason for bypass.

Bypass Reason: Poor judgment

The Department’s bypass reason of poor judgment rests on Mr. DeLeon-Mejia’s driving history and work history. Since I have found that neither Mr. DeLeon-Mejia’s driving history nor work history provides a reason for bypass, the Department’s bypass reason of lack of judgment based on driving history and work history may not form a reasonable basis for bypass.

CONCLUSION

               Based on the preponderance of credible evidence, I conclude that the Boston Police Department lacked reasonable justification to bypass Jonathan DeLeon-Mejia based on his work history, judgment, and driving history.

For all the reasons stated above, the appeal of Jonathan DeLeon-Mejia filed under Docket No. G1-24R-124 is hereby allowed.

Pursuant to its authority under Chapter 310 of the Acts of 1993, the Commission hereby orders the following:

The Commission, pursuant to the powers of relief inherent in Chapter 534 of the Acts of 1976 as amended by Chapter 310 of the Acts of 1993, orders the Human Resources Division or the Department as its delegate, to take the following action:

The name of Jonathan DeLeon-Mejia shall be placed at the top of all current and future certifications for the position of permanent full-time police officer with the Boston Police Department until he is appointed or bypassed. Further, if the Appellant is selected for appointment, he shall receive a retroactive seniority date for civil service purposes the same as candidates selected from Certification #09448 issued on August 9, 2023. This retroactive seniority date is not intended to provide the Appellant with any additional compensation or benefits including creditable time toward retirement.  Once the Appellant has been provided with this relief, the BPD shall notify the Commission, with a copy to the Appellant, so that the Commission may direct HRD to no longer place the Appellant’s name at the top of future certifications.

Civil Service Commission

/s/ Angela C. McConney

Angela C. McConney

Commissioner

By vote of the Civil Service Commission (Bowman, Chair; Markey, McConney, and Stein, Commissioners [Dooley – Absent]) on February 19, 2026.

Either party may file a motion for reconsideration within ten days of receipt of this Commission order or decision. Under the pertinent provisions of the Code of Mass. Regulations, 801 C.M.R. § 1.01(7)(l), the motion must identify a clerical or mechanical error in this order or decision or a significant factor the Agency or the Presiding Officer may have overlooked in deciding the case.  A motion for reconsideration does not toll the statutorily prescribed thirty-day time limit for seeking judicial review of this Commission order or decision.

Under the provisions of G.L. c. 31, § 44, any party aggrieved by this Commission order or decision may initiate proceedings for judicial review under G.L. c. 30A, § 14 in the superior court within thirty (30) days after receipt of this order or decision. Commencement of such proceeding shall not, unless specifically ordered by the court, operate as a stay of this Commission order or decision.  After initiating proceedings for judicial review in Superior Court, the plaintiff, or his / her attorney, is required to serve a copy of the summons and complaint upon the Boston office of the Attorney General of the Commonwealth, with a copy to the Civil Service Commission, in the time and in the manner prescribed by Mass. R. Civ. P. 4(d).

Notice to:
James W. Gilden, Esq.(Appellant)
Omar Bennani, Esq. (for Respondent)
Stephanie Andino (HRD)
Regina Caggiano (HRD)

                [1]Mr. DeLeon appealed his first bypass to the Commission on July 25, 2024, Docket No.  G1-24-124. The Commission issued an October 31, 2024 Order of Dismissal Nisi, allowing the Appellant to file a motion to revoke if he were not appointed by February 1, 2025. After he was bypassed a second time, the Commission allowed the Appellant’s motion to revoke on March 5, 2025 and docketed the within appeal as G1-24R-124.

                [2] Link to RMV website regarding NSC courses

                [3] The Standard Adjudicatory Rules of Practice and Procedure, 801 C.M.R. §§ 1.01 et seq. (Formal Rules), apply to adjudications before the Commission with Chapter 31 or any Commission rules taking precedence.

                [4] Should there be a judicial appeal of this decision, the plaintiff in the judicial appeal would be obligated to supply the court with a transcript of this hearing to the extent that they wish to challenge the decision as unsupported by the substantial evidence, arbitrary and capricious, or an abuse of discretion. In such cases, the plaintiff in the judicial appeal must transcribe the transcript from the Commission’s official recording.

                [5] Link to Latino Law Enforcement Group

                [6] House Bill 3662, An Act to increase opportunity by ending debt-based driving restrictions, 194th Session of the General Court.

[7] ‘A real cycle of debt.’ The RMV has marked millions of licenses for non-renewal due to unpaid fees,The Boston Globe, Jun. 9, 2025; Unpaid parking tickets, tolls, and excise taxes won’t lead to loss of license under Healey plan, The Boston Globe, Jan. 27, 2026.

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