| Date: | 04/16/2026 |
|---|---|
| Organization: | Civil Service Commission |
| Docket Number: | D-25-110 |
The Commission affirmed the decision of the Boston Police Department to suspend a captain for three days based on his ill-advised outburst directed at personnel of the Boston Police Academy where his son had been a recruit.
The Commission acknowledges the assistance of Clerk Peter Sorota in the drafting of this decision.
On April 28, 2025, the Appellant, Captain James M. Gaughan (Appellant or Mr. Gaughan), pursuant to G.L. 31, § 43, appealed to the Commission the March 29, 2024 decision of Boston Police Department (Department or BPD) to issue him a three-day suspension.
The Commission held a remote pre-hearing conference on June 10, 2025. I conducted a full evidentiary hearing on August 6, 2026, at the offices of the Commission, located at 100 Cambridge Street, Boston, MA. I recorded the hearing via Webex and provided a link to the parties. I kept the record open for the Department to provide two additional exhibits. The parties submitted post-hearing briefs on September 19, 2025, whereupon the administrative record closed.
I admitted the Appellant’s exhibits (A. Exhibits 1-8), and the Respondent’s exhibits (R. Exhibits 1-9). Based on the documents submitted and the testimony of the following witnesses:
Called by the Respondent:
Called by the Appellant:
and taking administrative notice of all pleadings filed in this case, plus pertinent rules, statutes, regulations, case law and policies, and drawing reasonable inferences from all the credible evidence, I make the following findings of fact:
Background
Mr. Gaughan’s philosophy is to discipline within the police force informally. (R. Exhibit 7; Testimony of Appellant)
Events of March 22, 2024
Internal Affairs Investigation
Employees shall conduct themselves at all times, both on and off duty, in such a manner as to reflect most favorably on the department. Conduct unbecoming an employee shall include that which tends to indicate that the employee is unable or unfit to continue as a member of the Department, or tends to impair the operation of the Department or its employees.
(R. Exhibits 1 and 4)
A person aggrieved by the disciplinary action of an appointing authority specified in G.L. c. 31, § 41, may appeal to the Commission under section 43, which states in part:
If the commission by a preponderance of the evidence determines that there was just cause for an action taken against such person it shall affirm the action of the appointing authority …
The Commission determines justification for discipline by inquiring whether the employee engaged in misconduct which adversely affects the public interest by impairing the efficiency of public service. Police Comm’r of Boston v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 22 Mass. App. Ct. 364, 370, rev. den. 398 Mass. 1103 (1986). The Appointing Authority satisfies the preponderance of the evidence standard if its evidence on disputed facts appears more likely or probable to be true. Tucker v. Pearlstein, 334 Mass. 33, 35-36 (1956); Selectmen of Wakefield v. Judge of First Dist. Ct., 262 Mass. 477, 482 (1928). The Commission conducts a de novo hearing to find facts. Sullivan v. Municipal Court of the Roxbury Dist., 322 Mass. 566, 572 (1948). After making its de novo findings of fact, the Commission must pass judgment on the penalty imposed by the appointing authority. Falmouth v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 447 Mass. 814, 823 (2006). In so doing, the Commission must uphold the appointing authority’s action if the Commission finds “there was reasonable justification for the action taken by the appointing authority in the circumstances found by the commission to have existed when the appointing authority made its decision.” Id. at 824; Leominster v. Stratton, 58 Mass. App. Ct. 726, 727-728, rev. den. 440 Mass. 1108 (2003); Watertown v. Aria, 16 Mass. App. Ct. 331, 334, rev. den. 390 Mass. 1102 (1983).
The Commission reviews the penalty imposed in light of the underlying purpose of the civil service system: to guard against political considerations, favoritism, and bias in governmental employment decisions. Falmouth, 447 Mass. at 824. The Commission is not charged with a duty to fine-tune employee discipline. See Boston Police Dep’t v. Collins, 48 Mass. App. Ct. 408, 412 (2000); Caira v. Waltham, 28 MCSR 574, 578 (2015); Blake v. Springfield Fire Dep’t, 28 MCSR 313, 317 (2015). “Unless the commission’s findings of fact differ significantly from those reported by the [municipality] . . . the absence of political considerations, favoritism, or bias would warrant essentially the same penalty.” Falmouth, 447 Mass. at 824 (Commission improperly substituted its judgment for towns where factual findings did not differ significantly). The Commission may not modify a penalty without a reasoned explanation. Police Comm’r of Boston v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 39 Mass. App. Ct. 594, 600 (1996); Faria v. Third Bristol Div. of the Dist. Ct. Dep’t., 14 Mass. App. Ct. 985, 986 (1982).
The Boston Police Department, by a preponderance of the evidence, has proven that it had just cause to discipline Mr. Gaughan.
Sergeant Detective Bagas conducted a thorough investigation, and issued her findings in a March 26, 2024 report. Lt. Det. Mammone concurred with her findings and sustained the Rule 102, § 3 Conduct Unbecoming allegations against Mr. Gaughan on March 27, 2024. On March 29, 2024, Superintendent Ciccolo issued Mr. Gaughan notice of a three-day suspension to be served on April 8, 9 and 10, 2024.
Deputy Superintendent Dahill later presided over a May 3, 2024 Section 41 hearing and recommended a three-day suspension.
Department Rule 102, § 3 states:
Employees shall conduct themselves at all times, both on and off duty, in such a manner as to reflect most favorably on the department. Conduct unbecoming an employee shall include that which tends to indicate that the employee is unable or unfit to continue as a member of the Department, or tends to impair the operation of the Department or its employees.
On March 22, 2024 at approximately 9:15 a.m., Mr. Gaughan arrived at the field located at the Moynihan Recreation Area, where Academy recruits trained. In the presence of a significant number of Academy instructors and recruits, he loudly asked to speak with a named sergeant and several named officers working at the Academy, within the hearing range of recruits. Two superior officers, who outranked Mr. Gaughan by appointment, approached him. When then-Deputy Superintendent Chrispin ordered Mr. Gaughan to leave the field, Mr. Gaughan responded that he “had the highest civil service rank.” When advised to go through the proper channels and file a formal Form 1920 internal affairs complaint, Mr. Gaughan derided the then-second in command’s style of management and his past use of the Form 1920 procedure.
I found the testimony of Superintendent Baston particularly credible. She displayed empathy for the Appellant and made every effort to provide him with the benefit of the doubt. Nonetheless, Superintendent Baston’s testimony showed that Mr. Gaughan had violated Rule 102, § 3. Superintendent Baston testified that Deputy Superintendent Chrispin had ordered Mr. Gaughan off the field three or four times before he complied. She further established that Mr. Gaughan was expected to comply with the orders of the second in command. In addition, she stated categorically that it would never be appropriate for an officer to address concerns by speaking directly to lower officers of another Bureau (the Academy) as Mr. Gaughan (assigned to the Hackney Unit) did in this case. I credit her testimony that such behavior would not be considered professional, and that Mr. Gaughan had operated outside of the chain of command. Further, I credit her description of Mr. Gaughan as appearing angry and upset as he approached the field. Finally, she corroborated the testimony of then-Deputy Superintendent Chrispin that the sergeant whom Mr. Gaughan had named and requested to speak with while on the field had later asked if they should be worried due to the incident involving Mr. Gaughan.
Mr. Gaughan’s March 22, 2024 conduct both impaired the operation of the Police Academy and did not reflect favorably upon the Department. The Appellant contends that his actions did not impair the operations of the Academy because, at the time he arrived at the field, the recruit officers were resting and, as a result, he did not disrupt any immediate activity taking place. However, even if Mr. Gaughan did not disrupt any immediate activity, his actions had a psychological impact on Academy staff members and impaired the functioning of the Department as a result. The sergeant that Mr. Gaughan was seeking out was intimidated by Mr. Gaughan’s appearance on the field.
More apparent is the fact that Mr. Gaughan’s conduct did not reflect favorably upon the Department. Mr. Gaughan holds the highest civil service rank obtainable within the Department, and as a result, he is held to a higher standard of conduct. Lower ranked officers and recruit officers will reasonably look to him as an example for acceptable conduct. As a result, his conduct imparted an unfavorable image upon the recruit officers present and any bystanders who witnessed this public incident. His actions reflected a lack of restraint which ought never be displayed by a BPD captain. Mr. Gaughan behaved unprofessionally, acted outside the chain of command, and briefly disregarded the orders of a superior officer.
I also examine the motivation behind Mr. Gaughan’s behavior. Mr. Gaughan testified that he acted on a personal philosophy of addressing concerns informally. He explained that doing so allowed officers to learn from their mistakes without disruption to their careers. Even if Mr. Gaughan’s conduct were well intentioned, such conduct reflected poor judgement. Addressing professional concerns directly with lower-ranked officers through informal means could be inadvisable even when all parties are in the same Bureau, but it becomes even more inappropriate when those officers are of another Bureau. Mr. Gaughan testified that he went to the Moynihan Recreation Area to address the alleged ill treatment that his son had received as a recruit officer in the Academy. It is particularly inappropriate to address an issue of this nature informally, because foregoing the proper channels to instead address such an issue informally creates an unavoidable impression of nepotistic intent. Not only was Mr. Gaughan a police officer, but other family members were employed or veterans of the Department. It is also troubling that Mr. Gaughan not only expected his relationship to protect his son, but he also expected his relationship with Superintendent Baston to shield him from disciplinary consequences. He appeared unaware that his conduct may have equated to personal and professional disrespect to her.
Throughout the Commission hearing, Mr. Gaughan sought to produce evidence which demonstrated that the Academy had in fact mistreated his son, while the Department sought to produce evidence to the contrary. The Commission is not the proper forum for such concerns and, thus, I have not addressed the matter.
Mr. Gaughan also raised the issue of the expedited IAD investigation, and Sergeant Detective Bagas testified that the timeline of her investigation in this case was atypical. Sergeant Detective Bagas was ordered to complete her investigation by the end of the week instead of within her standard ninety-day window. However, Mr. Gaughan has not demonstrated that the ensuing discipline was the result of any factors not reasonably relevant to his conduct. I find that violations of Rule 102, § 3, are especially troubling when committed by a BPD superior officer in the presence of the highest-ranking Academy staff and the recruit class. Such behavior from a Department officer holding the highest civil service rank enhanced the potential to reflect poorly on the Department, and thus reasonably could cause a swifter response from the IAD in comparison to the response that might be generated from a similar complaint against a lower-ranked officer.
Commission’s Authority to Modify a Penalty
The “power accorded to the commission to modify penalties must not be confused with the power to impose penalties ab initio, which is a power accorded to the appointing authority.” Falmouth v. Civil Service Comm’n, 61 Mass. App. Ct. at 800, quoting Police Comm’r v. Civil Service Comm’n, 39 Mass. App. Ct. 594, 600 (1996).
Even if the Commission were inclined to reduce Mr. Gaughan’s suspension, it must be noted that the same disciplinary penalty is warranted “unless the commission’s findings of fact differ significantly from those reported by the town or interpret the relevant law in a substantially different way.” Falmouth v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 447 Mass. at 824. Additionally, the “power accorded to the commission to modify penalties must not be confused with the power to impose penalties ab initio, which is a power accorded to the appointing authority.” Falmouth v. Civil Service Comm’n, 61 Mass. App. Ct. at 800, quoting Police Comm’r v. Civil Service Comm’n, 39 Mass. App. Ct. at 600. When the Commission passes judgment on an appointing authority’s selected disciplinary measure, it does not “act without regard to the previous decision of the [appointing authority].” Falmouth v. Civil Service Comm’n, 447 Mass. at 823, quoting Watertown v. Arria, 16 Mass. App. Ct. 331, 334 (1983).
Mr. Gaughan does not dispute the events of March 22, 2024. Instead, he argues that the Department did not follow the principles of progressive discipline and asserts that the imposition of a three-tour suspension was excessive in comparison with discipline imposed upon other officers for similar violations. Mr. Gaughan submitted an exhibit listing the Department’s disciplinary actions for conduct unbecoming violations over the past five years. Notably, Mr. Gaughan is the only person in the position of captain on the list.
It may be true that the other officers on the list received lesser disciplines than Mr. Gaughan for similar violations. However, as the holder of the highest civil service rank within the Department, Mr. Gaughan bears the burden of greater expectations for unimpeachable conduct and holds a greater capacity to harm the Department’s reputation through misconduct. See Mullane v. Boston Fire Dep’t, 38 MCSR 228 (2025).
The events of March 22, 2024 are inconsistent with Mr. Gaughan’s four decades of service to the City of Boston. It is thus unfortunate that he could not retire with an unblemished record. However, I must rule on the facts before me.
I find no allegations here of political considerations, favoritism, or bias. Moreover, the underlying material facts found by the Department’s hearing officer are backed by the testimony and documentary evidence I have reviewed. Thus, even if the Commission were inclined to modify Mr. Gaughan’s suspension, it would lack a rational justification for doing so.
Based on the preponderance of credible evidence presented at the hearing, I conclude that the Boston Police Department had just cause to discipline James Gaughan.
Accordingly, the appeal docketed as D-24-060 is hereby denied.
Civil Service Commission
Angela C. McConney
Angela C. McConney
Commissioner
By vote of the Civil Service Commission (Bowman, Chair; Dooley, Markey, McConney, and Stein, Commissioners) on April 16, 2026.
Either party may file a motion for reconsideration within ten days of receipt of this Commission order or decision. Under the pertinent provisions of the Code of Mass. Regulations, 801 C.M.R. § 1.01(7)(l), the motion must identify a clerical or mechanical error in this order or decision or a significant factor the Agency or the Presiding Officer may have overlooked in deciding the case. A motion for reconsideration does not toll the statutorily prescribed thirty-day time limit for seeking judicial review of this Commission order or decision.
Under the provisions of G.L. c. 31, § 44, any party aggrieved by this Commission order or decision may initiate proceedings for judicial review under G.L. c. 30A, § 14 in the superior court within thirty (30) days after receipt of this order or decision. Commencement of such proceeding shall not, unless specifically ordered by the court, operate as a stay of this Commission order or decision. After initiating proceedings for judicial review in Superior Court, the plaintiff, or his / her attorney, is required to serve a copy of the summons and complaint upon the Boston office of the Attorney General of the Commonwealth, with a copy to the Civil Service Commission, in the time and in the manner prescribed by Mass. R. Civ. P. 4(d).
Notice to:
Patrick N. Bryant, Esq. (for Appellant)
Robert S. Arcangeli (for Respondent)
