| Date: | 09/17/2026 |
|---|---|
| Organization: | Civil Service Commission |
| Docket Number: | E-26-260 |
The Commission ordered a re-do of the police sergeant promotional process for police sergeant after finding that proper safeguards were not in place to ensure a level playing field where the Appointing Authority's son was one of the candidates.
On November 11, 2025, the Appellant, Glenn J. Grammer (Appellant), filed a timely non-bypass equity appeal with the Civil Service Commission (Commission), regarding the promotional process for the rank of sergeant conducted by the Woburn Police Department (Department) in October of 2025. [FN1] During this process, the Appellant and the selected candidate, Officer Timothy Concannon (Officer Concannon), were tied on the eligible list.
The Commission held a pre-hearing conference on January 27, 2026. On May 27, 2026, I conducted a full evidentiary hearing at the offices of the Commission in Boston. The hearing was recorded via the Webex videoconferencing platform, and copies were provided to the parties.[FN 2] The parties filed proposed decisions on July 15, 2026, whereupon the administrative record closed.
The City entered 19 exhibits during the hearing, and three additional exhibits after the hearing at my request (R. Exhibits 1-22), and the Appellant entered 16 exhibits (A. Exhibits 1-16) into evidence. I granted the City’s motion in limine, in part, to exclude the Appellant’s proposed Exhibit 17 and portions of Appellant’s Exhibit 11 (BATES #A0066-A0070), while noting that the Appellant was permitted to present the underlying issue for limited purposes. Based upon the documents submitted and the testimony of the following witnesses:
Called by the City:
Called by the Appellant:
and taking administrative notice of all pleadings filed in the case, pertinent rules, statutes, regulations, case law and policies, and drawing reasonable inferences from the credible evidence, I make the following findings of fact:
The Appellant’s Background
Officer Concannon’s Background
The 2024 Promotional Process for Sergeant
The 2025 Promotional Process for Sergeant
The City of Woburn Police Department is seeking to fill a vacancy in the position of Sergeant. In accordance with Civil Service rules and regulations, the top three (3) candidates from the current eligibility list are to be interviewed and considered for promotion. Timothy Concannon is one of the three (3) candidates. In consultation with the City Solicitor and the Human Resources Director and to avoid any appearance of a conflict, I advised the Police Chief that I would have to recuse myself from this process and that he would have the final decision-making authority for selecting the successful candidate for promotion to Sergeant in the Woburn Police Department. (R. Exhibit 4)
“The City, on a going forward basis, should record all interviews for civil service appointments and promotions. Should the City fail to do so, the Commission may give no weight to any such interviews.”
20 plus years of experience. He has been involved in a series of calls, specifically the [redacted] call. He has learned what things were done right and wrong and exhaust[ed] all resources. He would ride out the decision in the moment.
Becoming a sergeant excites him, feels like it will rejuvenate him. He had been doing 20 years of the same thing and it is hard. This would be something he would look forward to. He feels he has a good command presence and people look to him, he is newer on the shift. Likes the ones that ask questions.
He feels it is the right time for him, doing patrol for 20 years and loves it. Likes helping people, solving problems, it is a fun job, a lot of good people in the department, this would provide him self worth and goals, it is good for him. (R. Exhibit 19)
Section 2(b) of G.L. c. 31 authorizes persons aggrieved by certain actions or inactions by the Human Resources Division (HRD) or, in certain cases, by appointing authorities to whom HRD has delegated its authority, to appeal to the Commission. Read in conjunction with G.L. c. 31, § 2(c), the statute provides:
No person shall be deemed to be aggrieved . . . unless such person has made specific allegations in writing that a decision, action, or failure to act on the part of the [local appointing authority] was in violation of this chapter, the rules or basic merit principles promulgated thereunder and said allegations shall show that such person's rights were abridged, denied, or prejudiced in such a manner as to cause actual harm to the person's employment status.
Chapter 310 of the Acts of 1993 prescribes the discretionary authority granted to the Commission to remediate a violation of civil service law:
If the rights of any person acquired under the provisions of chapter thirty-one of the General Laws or under any rule made thereunder have been prejudiced through no fault of his own, the civil service commission may take such action as will restore or protect such rights notwithstanding the failure of any person to comply with any requirement of said chapter thirty-one or any such rule as a condition precedent to the restoration or protection of such rights.
The primary purpose of Massachusetts civil service law is to enforce “basic merit principles” described in Chapter 31, which command, among other things, “recruiting, selecting and advancing of employees on the basis of their relative ability, knowledge and skills including open consideration of qualified applicants for initial appointment” and “assuring that all employees are protected against coercion for political purposes, and are protected from arbitrary and capricious actions.” G.L. c. 31, § 1. The most important mechanism for ensuring adherence to basic merit principles in hiring and promotion is the process of conducting regular competitive qualifying examinations, open to all qualified applicants, and establishing current eligible lists of successful applicants from which civil service appointments are to be made based on the requisition by an appointing authority of a “certification” that ranks the candidates according to their scores on the qualifying examination, along with certain statutory credits and preferences. G.L. c. 31, §§ 6 through 11, 16 through 27. In general, each position must be filled by selecting one of the top three (3) most highly ranked candidates who indicate they are willing to accept the appointment, which is known as the “2n+1” formula. G.L. c. 31, § 27; PAR.09.
To deviate from the rank order of preferred hiring and instead appoint a person “other than the qualified person whose name appears highest”, an appointing authority must provide written reasons – positive or negative, or both – consistent with basic merits principles, to affirmatively justify bypassing a lower-ranked candidate in favor of a more highly ranked one. G.L. c. 31, §§ 1 and 27; PAR.08. A person who is bypassed may appeal that decision under G.L. c. 31, § 2(b) for a de novo review by the Commission to determine whether the bypass decision was based on a “reasonably thorough review” of the background and qualifications of the candidates’ fitness to perform the duties of the position and was “reasonably justified”. Police Dep’t of Boston v. Kavaleski, 463 Mass. 680, 688 (2012), citing Massachusetts Ass’n of Minority Law Enforcement Officers v. Abban, 434 Mass. 256, 259 (2001); Brackett v. Civil Service Comm’n, 447 Mass. 233, 243 (2006) and cases cited; Beverly v. Civil Service Comm’n, 78 Mass. App. Ct. 182 (2010); Leominster v. Stratton, 58 Mass. App. Ct. 726, 727-28 (2003).
Section 2(b) Bypass Appeals
The Commission has consistently construed the plain meaning of the language in G.L. c. 31, § 27 to infer that selection from a group of tied candidates is not a bypass of a person whose “name appears highest”, for which an appeal may be taken as a matter of right to the Commission. See, e.g., Edson v, Town of Reading, 21 MCSR 453 (2008), aff’d sub nom. Edson v. Civil Service Comm’n, Middlesex Sup. Ct. No. 2008CV3418 (2009) (“When two applicants are tied on the exam and the Appointing Authority selects one, the other was not bypassed”); Bartolomei v. City of Holyoke, 21 MCSR 94 (2008) (“choosing from a group of tied candidate does not constitute a bypass”); Coughlin v. Plymouth Police Dep’t, 19 MCSR 434 (2006) (“Commission . . . continues to believe that selection among a group of tied candidates is not a bypass under civil service law”); Kallas v. Franklin School Dep’t, 11 MCSR 73 (1996) (“It is well settled civil service law that a tie score on a certification . . . is not a bypass for civil service appeals”). See also Cotter v. City of Boston, 193 F.Supp.2d 323, 354 (D. Mass. 2002), rev’d in part on other grounds, 323 F.3d 160 (1st Cir. 2003) (“when a civil service exam results in a tie score, and the appointing authority . . . promotes some but not all of the tied candidates, no actionable ‘bypass’ has taken place in the parlance of the Civil Service Commission.”).
Here, the undisputed facts demonstrate that the City did not appoint any candidate ranked below the Appellant. Rather, the selected candidate was tied with the Appellant on the eligible list considered in the 2024 and 2025 promotional processes. Thus, the Appellant’s non-selection is not a bypass and the Appellant does not have a statutory right to a de novo Commission review of whether the City had reasonable justification for selecting another candidate within the tie group.
Section 2(b) Non-Bypass Equity Appeals
As the Appellant has filed this appeal as a non-bypass equity appeal, I reviewed whether the Appellant could be deemed an aggrieved person by considering whether the tie-breaking criteria used to decide whom within the tie group would be appointed were tainted by nepotism, favoritism, or bias and/or were arbitrary and capricious, in violation of basic merit principles.
The Commission has acknowledged that, in theory, tie-breaking methods are properly subject to scrutiny under “basic merit principles”. In the matter of Araica v. Human Resources Division, 22 MCSR 183 (2009), the Commission declined to pursue an investigation into whether the proposed adoption of “banding” test scores on eligible lists (which has since been abandoned) violated merit principles. But Araica did note the importance of having a fair and unbiased tie-breaking system in place:
[W]ith banding, cities and towns are likely going to be presented with much larger and more diverse certification lists of candidates and will probably need to employ tie-breaking or other selection methods much more frequently and, perhaps even adopt new methods that were not necessary in the past, to choose whom to [appoint]. . . HRD should be actively encouraging adoption of best practices to ensure that such tie-breaking methods are consistent with, and applied in accordance with, basic merit principles and all other applicable laws. We are confident that HRD will appreciate the importance of ensuring that this is done and that failure to do so would be . . . a disservice to all parties. We will not stand idly by if presented with competent evidence that unlawful favoritism was the driving force behind a particular . . . appointment.
Id., 22 MCSR at 186. Regarding tie-breaking criteria in general, see: De Simone v. City of Cambridge, 24 MCSR 297 (2010) (interviews used as tie-breaking criteria); St. Pierre v. Fall River School Dep’t, 22 MCSR 445 (2009) (supervisor’s rating used in layoffs to break tie in seniority); Bartolomei v. City of Holyoke, 21 MCSR 94 (2008) (noting, without deciding, possible question of using alphabetical order as a tie-breaker); Johnson v. City of Everett, 20 MCSR 295 (2007), citing Cotter v. City of Boston, 193 F.Supp.2d 323, 354 (D. Mass. 2002), rev’d in part on other grounds, 323 F.3d 160 (1st Cir. 2003) (noting problematic lack of standard tie-breaking procedures); Coughlin v. Plymouth Police Dep’t, 19 MCSR 434 (2006) (same); Dalrymple v. Town of Winthrop, 19 MCSR 379 (interview panel used as tie-breaking criteria vs. alphabetical order or seniority); Sullivan v. North Andover Fire Dep’t, 7 MCSR 175 (1990) (seniority used as tie-breaker).
The Commission has not, however, in any previous appeal, rejected the validity of the tie-breaking methodology for making civil service appointments. Clearly, any claim that the Department used some form of patently arbitrary and capricious or unlawful discriminatory criteria to select among otherwise equally qualified candidates would be taken seriously. Similarly, nepotism, whether overt or concealed, has no place under basic merit principles in filling civil service positions. Thus, the Commission’s door must be open to hearing and remediating all such violations of the basic merit principles of civil service law in some appropriate manner.
Although the selection of the Mayor’s son for promotion to police sergeant resulted in the bypass of the first ranked candidate, that is not before me, as the bypassed candidate withdrew his appeal from the Commission. Since the Appellant, who was tied for second with the Mayor’s son, was not bypassed, he is not entitled to a de novo Commission determination on whether the City has shown that it had reasonable justification to appoint Officer Concannon. As referenced above, the Commission has repeatedly held that selection of one tied candidate is not a bypass. Damas v. Boston Police Dep’t, 29 MCSR 550, 552 (2016).
Rather, as part of this non-bypass equity appeal, the Appellant bears the burden of showing either that: (1) favoritism, bias, nepotism or other improper influence was in play; or (2) that the tie-breaking process failed basic merit principles because it was otherwise arbitrary and capricious.
Put another way, I am not reviewing whether Woburn had “reasonable justification” to prefer Officer Concannon over the Appellant. I am reviewing whether the process Woburn used to break the tie itself violated basic merit principles and thereby caused actual harm to the Appellant.
Based on a complete review of the record, including all the documents and witness testimony, the Appellant has not affirmatively shown that favoritism, bias, nepotism or other improper influence was behind Officer Concannon’s promotion. The Mayor did disclose his conflict and recuse himself and I found no evidence that he conveyed a preference or secretly participated; I credit the testimony of the selection committee members who testified before me; and the candidates were asked the same questions by the selection committee. Nor is Officer Concannon’s selection inexplicable on the merits. The contemporaneous notes contain legitimate materials about his FTO work, academy leadership, report review technology familiarity, and responses to supervisory questions. This is not a case in which an obviously unqualified candidate simply materialized as the winner.
A finding of actual nepotism or favoritism, however, is not necessary if the Commission independently finds that the tie-breaking mechanism itself was arbitrary and inconsistent with basic merit principles. Here, the decisive tie-breaking device was an interview process in which the Department admittedly did not use the uniform rating scale and standardized evaluation contemplated by its own policy; the interviews were not recorded; no numerical or other contemporaneous ranking of the individual answers exists; and the panel consisted entirely of City officials lower in the chain of an appointing authority whose son was one of the two tied candidates. Nothing in the record causes me to question the personal integrity or truthfulness of the three panel members. My concern, rather, is structural as opposed to personal: In an appointment involving the Mayor's son, an entirely internal panel composed of officials within the Mayor's administrative chain of command did not provide the degree of independence that, combined with the City's other procedural safeguards, could have insulated this unusually sensitive decision from legitimate questions concerning the integrity of the tie-breaking process.
Importantly, these deficiencies did not arise on a blank slate. Woburn had already been specifically warned by the Commission about precisely this subject. In Peary, Woburn had been placed on explicit notice by the Commission that continued reliance upon unrecorded outcome-determinative interviews could result in those interviews receiving no weight. It reiterated that interviews must preserve a “level playing field” and protect against “arbitrary action and undue subjectivity.” Department Policy 79 provided an objective safeguard adopted by the Department itself. Peary provided a separate Commission warning concerning the importance of recording promotional interviews. Woburn complied with neither safeguard in the process challenged here. In another decision that directly relates to Woburn’s Police Department’s promotional practices, Hunt v. City of Woburn, 33 MCSR 12 (2020), the Commission, cautioned the City against relying too heavily on inherently subjective factors such as “command presence” as part of the selection process. Yet, in the committee’s decision to promote Officer Concannon, “command presence” was one of the primary characteristics cited in making the promotional determination.
I do not conclude that any one of the deficiencies here, standing alone, established a violation of basic merit principles. Rather, it is their combination that is problematic: an acknowledged conflict involving the appointing authority's son; an entirely internal panel conducting a subjective interview that failed to use the uniform rating scale required by the Department's own policy; failure to record the interviews despite Peary; and contemporaneous documentation insufficient to permit meaningful review of the qualitative distinctions the panel later identified. In these unusual circumstances, these cumulative deficiencies rendered the tie-breaking mechanism insufficiently objective and reviewable and, therefore, arbitrary within the meaning of basic merit principles. Specifically, the process was arbitrary because it lacked sufficient objective safeguards to permit a fair and reviewable application of the merit principles governing promotional appointments.
My conclusion here is consistent with Neenan v. City of Quincy, 35 MCSR 21 (2022), in which the Commission examined the adequacy of safeguards employed where the appointing authority's son was a candidate for appointment and required additional measures designed to ensure an impartial selection process. Although Neenan arose in a bypass context and involved a different procedural posture, it supports the general principle that recusal of a conflicted appointing authority does not necessarily exhaust the measures appropriate to protect basic merit principles.
Because the defective tie-breaking mechanism was the mechanism by which the Appellant’s opportunity for promotion was resolved, the process defect was not merely technical; it directly affected his opportunity to compete for the promotion and therefore caused actual harm within the meaning of § 2(b). Accordingly, the Appellant’s appeal filed under Docket Number E-25-260 is hereby allowed in part.
Since I have not found intentional favoritism, I am not recommending the immediate rescission of Officer Concannon's promotional appointment. However, since the process was insufficiently safeguarded to satisfy basic merit principles, a prospective redo is appropriate. As such, I recommend that the Commission order the following:
Civil Service Commission
/s/ Shawn C. Dooley
Shawn C. Dooley
Commissioner
The Civil Service Commission (Bowman, Chair; Dooley, Markey, McConney, and Stein, Commissioners), voted to allow the appeal in part and adopt the recommended relief of the hearing officer on September 17, 2026.
Either party may file a motion for reconsideration within ten days of receipt of this Commission order or decision. Under the pertinent provisions of the Code of Mass. Regulations, 801 C.M.R. § 1.01(7)(l), the motion must identify a clerical or mechanical error in this order or decision or a significant factor the Agency or the Presiding Officer may have overlooked in deciding the case. A motion for reconsideration does not toll the statutorily prescribed thirty-day time limit for seeking judicial review of this Commission order or decision.
Under the provisions of G.L. c. 31, § 44, any party aggrieved by this Commission order or decision may initiate proceedings for judicial review under G.L. c. 30A, § 14 in the superior court within thirty (30) days after receipt of this order or decision. Commencement of such proceeding shall not, unless specifically ordered by the court, operate as a stay of this Commission order or decision. After initiating proceedings for judicial review in Superior Court, the plaintiff, or his / her attorney, is required to serve a copy of the summons and complaint upon the Boston office of the Attorney General of the Commonwealth, with a copy to the Civil Service Commission, in the time and in the manner prescribed by Mass. R. Civ. P. 4(d).
Notice to:
Michael Reilly, Esq. (for Appellant)
Ian Keefe, Esq. (for Respondent)
