Decision  Gundacker, Scott v. Milford Fire Department 4/16/26

Date:	04/16/2026
Organization:	Civil Service Commission
Docket Number:	D1-15-127

• Appearance for Appellant: Joseph G. Donnellan, Esq.
• Appearance for Respondent: Katherine McNamara Feodoroff, Esq.
• Hearing Officer: Angela C. McConney

The Commission affirmed the decision of the Town of Milford to terminate firefighter Scott Gundacker for violating the terms of his last chance agreement. 

Decision

The Commission acknowledges the assistance of Clerk Peter Sorota for his assistance with drafting this decision. 

On May 22, 2025, the Appellant, Scott Gundacker, pursuant to G.L. c. 31, § 43, appealed to the Commission the May 16, 2025 decision of the Milford Fire Department (Department) to terminate Mr. Gundacker.

The Commission conducted a remote pre-hearing conference on July 8, 2025. I conducted a full evidentiary hearing on September 9, 2025, at the offices of the Commission, located at 100 Cambridge Street, Boston, MA. I recorded the hearing via Webex and provided a link to the parties. The parties submitted post-hearing briefs on November 3, 2025, whereupon the administrative record closed. 

Findings of Fact

              I admitted the Appellant’s exhibits (A. Exhibits 1-3), and the Respondent’s exhibits (R. Exhibits 1-14). Based on the documents submitted and the testimony of the following witnesses: 

Called by the Respondent:

• Mark Nelson, Chief, Milford Fire Department
• James Vignone, Captain, Milford Fire Department
• Donald Renaud, Firefighter, Milford Police Department

Called by the Appellant:

• Scott Gundacker, Appellant
• William Collins, Captain, Milford Fire Department
• Daniel Martino, Firefighter/EMT, Milford Fire Department
• Devin Yost, Firefighter, Milford Fire Department

and taking administrative notice of all pleadings filed in this case, plus pertinent rules, statutes, regulations, case law and policies, and drawing reasonable inferences from all the credible evidence, I make the following findings of fact:

Background

1. Mr. Gundacker has worked as an electrician since he was 14 years old. In addition, he began working as a firefighter for the Milford Fire Department in May of 2011. (Testimony of Appellant)
2. Mr. Gundacker attended the fire academy one month after his hire and received his EMT training within one year of hire.  (Testimony of Appellant)
3. The Department operates with four groups of firefighters who work in rotating shifts. These groups must at times work alongside one another due to overtime shifts and emergency situations. The members of these groups are expected to work well with the members of all groups, not just their own.  (Testimony of Appellant, Testimony of Nelson, Testimony of Renaud)
4. The Department conducts near-daily trainings which are mandatory for all firefighters on duty. These trainings take place each weekday, and sometimes on Saturdays and Sundays as well.  (Testimony of Nelson)
5. After working for the Department for one year, Mr. Gundacker was moved from Group 3 to Group 1.  (Testimony of Appellant)

Prior Discipline

6. Mr. Gundacker had no disciplinary record prior to June of 2020.  (R. Exhibit 14; Testimony of Appellant, Testimony of Nelson)
7. In 2019, a firefighter whom Mr. Gundacker had been close with passed away. This firefighter’s death significantly affected Mr. Gundacker.  (Testimony of Appellant)
8. In May of 2020, Mark Nelson was appointed as the chief of the Department.  (Testimony of Nelson)
9. On June 13, 2020, Mr. Gundacker moved a Department vehicle from inside the Department garage so that he could bring his personal vehicle inside of the Department garage. He did so for the sake of working on his vehicle, and in the process, accidentally broke an electric cord reel which was used to charge Department vehicles. However, the cord reel had not been properly put away prior to Mr. Gundacker using it. Regardless, this conduct violated department rules and state ethics laws.  (R. Exhibit 14; Testimony of Appellant, Testimony of Nelson)
10. After breaking the cord reel, he reported the incident and Lt. Denman was sent to the station where it occurred. Mr. Gundacker did not let Lt. Denman into the building. Mr. Gundacker did not repair the cord reel, and it cost the department approximately $30 to replace.  (R. Exhibit 14; Testimony of Nelson)
11. On June 17, 2020, Cpt. Vignone, then a Lieutenant, observed Mr. Gundacker wearing shorts and sandals while he was on shift. Cpt. Vignone ordered Mr. Gundacker to be in uniform. Mr. Gundacker disobeyed this order because he had spilled paint on his uniform. (R. Exhibit 14; Testimony of Nelson)
12. On July 7, 2020, Mr. Gundacker received a documented verbal warning as discipline for these incidents which took place on June 13 and June 17.  (R. Exhibit 14)
13. On July 11, 2020, Mr. Gundacker left work over a disagreement regarding his riding assignment vehicle. Mr. Gundacker was upset because Lt. Denman assigned him to ride in a different vehicle than he usually rode in. As a result, Mr. Gundacker stated that he couldn’t continue working that shift and left the station before another firefighter arrived to replace him, putting the department below its legally mandated minimum staffing threshold.  (R. Exhibit 14; Testimony of Appellant, Testimony of Nelson)
14. A few days prior to this incident, Mr. Gundacker had complained to the Deputy Chief of the Department about three Lieutenants who he felt unfairly twisted his words, and who had attempted to hug him after he asked them not to, Including Cpt. Vignone, then a Lieutenant, and Lt. Denman. Appellant contends that he left his shift on the 11^th because he believed Lt. Denman was retaliating against him for filing this complaint, causing him to feel unsafe.  (Testimony of Appellant, Testimony of Vignone)
15. On July 22, 2020, Mr. Gundacker received a letter of suspension notifying him that he was to be suspended without pay for the span of a single 10-hour shift due to his conduct on July 11.  (R. Exhibit 14)
16.  On December 31, 2020, Mr. Gundacker entered into a Last Chance Agreement (LCA) with the Town of Milford due to an incident in which he punched a hole in a sheetrock wall at the Department. This incident took place on June 17, 2020, but Mr. Gundacker was not disciplined for it until an investigation had taken place.  (R. Exhibit 1; Testimony of Appellant, Testimony of Nelson)
17. Per the terms of this LCA, Mr. Gundacker received a 10-day unpaid suspension, he underwent 6 months of counselling with a licensed psychotherapist of his choosing, and he agreed that the Town of Milford would be entitled to terminate Mr. Gundacker any time within 7 years of the agreement if Mr. Gundacker intentionally damaged Town or Department property, exhibited any form of violence, or committed any serious rules violation. This LCA was agreed to in lieu of termination.  (R. Exhibit 1; Testimony of Nelson)
18. The terms of the LCA set a “serious rules violation” bar, in contrast with “[m]inor rules violations, such as a single instance of tardiness.”  (R. Exhibit 1)
19.  In 2021, shortly after returning from his suspension, Mr. Gundacker began referring to his coworkers as “rats and thieves”—both in reference to an incident where items were stolen from his locker, and in reference to his general discomfort with his group. He repeated the phrase both in and out of conversation, and coworkers complained that he would repeatedly sing the phrase loudly enough for them to hear. In one instance, he wrote the phrase on a Department whiteboard. Following an investigation into this incident he was placed on administrative leave, directed to receive further counseling, and was moved from group 1 to group 4.  (Testimony of Appellant, Testimony of Nelson) 

20. From the date Mr. Gundacker began working in group 4 and until the incident on April 11, no issues occurred regarding Mr. Gundacker’s conduct.  (Testimony of Collins)
     

    April 11, 2025 Incident

21.  On April 7, 2025, Mr. Gundacker attended a wake for a deceased firefighter. Cpt. Vignone’s father was present at the wake, and Mr. Gundacker refused to shake his hand.  (Testimony of Appellant, Testimony of Vignone, Testimony of Marino)
22. On April 9, 2025, Cpt. Vignone attended a hazmat team training, which FF Marino was present for as well. Cpt. Vignone remarked to FF Marino saying: “By the way, I really wanted to kill [Mr. Gundacker] … …He didn’t shake my dad’s hand.”  (Testimony of Vignone, Testimony of Marino)
23. On April 10, 2025, Mr. Gundacker was working overtime while group 3 was on shift. Lt. Touhey instructed those on duty in a mandatory training exercise regarding the use of a handheld saw known as the K-12. Since Mr. Gundacker was working overtime, Lt. Touhey permitted him to instead do the hands-on training with the saw on April 11, 2025, when group 4 would be on duty.  (Testimony of Appellant, Testimony of Nelson, Testimony of Vignone)
24. At the time of this incident, Mr. Gundacker already had substantial experience operating the K-12 saw and other similar handheld saws due to his work as an electrician. This prior experience in no way exempted Mr. Gundacker from the mandatory training regarding safe operation of the K-12.  (A. Exhibit 2; Testimony of Appellant, Testimony of Nelson)
25.  On April 11, 2025, the same training exercise was repeated during group 4’s shift. Those on duty were Mr. Gundacker, FF Alt, FF Martino, FF Shinney Farina, FF Renaud, FF Ruelas, FF Yost, Cpt. Vignone, and Lt. Touhey. Those on duty who had not yet completed the training were instructed in the use of the K-12 saw and then required to make a single cut into an inoperable junk vehicle using the K-12. Lt. Touhey once again led the training.  (A. Exhibit 2; Testimony of Appellant, Testimony of Nelson, Testimony of Vignone.)
26.  Cpt. Collins, the captain of group 4, was not on duty that shift as he was studying for the captain’s exam. Cpt. Vignone was on shift instead, working overtime. In addition, Lt. Touhey, FF Alt, and FF Renaud were all working overtime, and were not members of group 4.  (A. Exhibit 2, R. Exhibit 6-9; Testimony of Nelson, Testimony of Vignone, Testimony of Collins)
27.  Lt. Touhey instructed the group on using the K-12, and he informed the group that everyone who hadn’t already done so was required to engage in the practical training with the K-12. When delivering this instruction, he gave nonverbal cues that it applied to Mr. Gundacker in particular. (A. Exhibit 2; Testimony of Appellant, Testimony of Vignone, Testimony of Renaud)
28.  Mr. Gundacker was upset by this, as he felt singled out by Lt. Touhey’s comment. He began muttering profanities to himself as a result.  (A. Exhibit 2, R. Exhibit 5, R. Exhibit 8-9; Testimony of Appellant, Testimony of Vignone)
29.  After being instructed on the proper use of the K-12, those present went to put on the proper protective equipment (PPE) which was required when operating the K-12. (A. Exhibit 2, R. Exhibit 8-9; Testimony of Appellant, Testimony of Martino)
30.  Upon returning in PPE, Mr. Gundacker volunteered to perform the practical training first, and he grabbed the K-12 from another firefighter’s hand.  (A. Exhibit 2, R. Exhibit 5-9; Testimony of Appellant, Testimony of Nelson, Testimony of Vignone, Testimony of Renaud)
31.  To complete the training, Mr. Gundacker was required to make a single straight cut into the hood of the junk vehicle. He did so, but in addition, he carved the word “fuck” into the hood of the junk vehicle in a manner which did not constitute a cut into the vehicle.  (A. Exhibit 2, R. Exhibit 5-9; Testimony of Appellant, Testimony of Nelson, Testimony of Vignone, Testimony of Renaud)
32.  Everyone on shift, besides FF Martino, was present to witness this incident. FF Martino was still putting on his PPE, and as a result did not witness any of Mr. Gundacker’s conduct during this incident.  (A. Exhibit 2; Testimony of Appellant, testimony of Vignone, testimony of Martino)
33.  Nobody instructed Mr. Gundacker against doing what he did besides FF Shinney Farina, who cautioned Mr. Gundacker against carving a profanity into the hood of the junk vehicle for fear of departmental discipline against him. After the incident, FF Shinney Farina took the saw and made several cuts into the hood intended to cover the profanity carved into the vehicle.  (A. Exhibit 2, R. Exhibit 6-9; Testimony of Appellant, Testimony of Nelson, Testimony of Vignone, Testimony of Renaud)
34. After completing the training, Mr. Gundacker stood away from the group so that he did not have to continue wearing his PPE.  (A. Exhibit 2, R. Exhibit 9; Testimony of Appellant, Testimony of Vignone)
35. The Remainder of Mr. Gundacker’s shift on April 11, 2025 proceeded normally. He worked the remainder of his shift without interruption, and nobody remarked to him that his conduct during the training had been inappropriate during this time. (Testimony of Appellant, Testimony of Nelson, Testimony of Vignone)
36.  On April 14, Cpt. Vignone and Lt. Touhey spoke with Chief Nelson regarding Mr. Gundacker’s conduct during the training on April 11. Cpt. Vignone relayed concerns raised by FF Alt, and Lt. Touhey relayed concerns raised by FF Renaud. Afterwards, Chief Nelson requested that everyone present for the training send him an incident report containing their recounting of the events that transpired.  (A. Exhibit 2; Testimony of Nelson, Testimony of Vignone, Testimony of Renaud)
37. On April 15, Chief Nelson called Mr. Gundacker and Cpt. Collins to speak with him regarding Mr. Gundacker’s conduct on April 11. Chief Nelson notified Mr. Gundacker that he was considering discipline up to and including termination. Mr. Gundacker responded that his behavior had been an attempt to “showcase his talents” with the K-12.  (R. Exhibit 4; Testimony of Nelson)
38. Mr. Gundacker was placed on paid administrative leave beginning on April 15, while an investigation into his conduct took place.  (R. Exhibit 3)
39.  On May 2, 2025, Chief Nelson sent Mr. Gundacker a notice of contemplated discipline up to and including termination. This notice informed Mr. Gundacker that a hearing regarding his discipline would take place at the Milford Fire Department on May 9, 2025.  (R. Exhibit 4)
40. At the request of Mr. Gundacker’s union representative, the hearing instead took place on May 13, 2025. During the hearing, the town submitted 13 exhibits, while Mr. Gundacker and his representatives did not submit any exhibits or provide any testimony.  (R. Exhibit 2; Testimony of Nelson)
41. On May 13, 2025, Chief Nelson provided Mr. Gundacker with a proposed settlement agreement which included suspension, counseling, and an extension of Mr. Gundacker’s LCA.  (R. Exhibit 12)
42. Based on the Department hearing held on May 13, Chief Nelson sent Mr. Gundacker a notice of termination on May 16, 2025.  (R Exhibit 2)
43. On May 30, 2025, Mr. Gundacker’s union representatives filed a grievance on his behalf, stating that Mr. Gundacker had been wrongfully terminated and his conduct had not violated the terms of his LCA.  (R. Exhibit 11)
44. On June 6, 2025, Chief Nelson held a meeting regarding this grievance, during which Mr. Gundacker again refused the proposed settlement agreement from May 13.  (R. Exhibit 12)
45. On June 9, 2025, Chief Nelson denied the grievance filed on Mr. Gundacker’s behalf.  (R. Exhibit 12)
46. Mr. Gundacker appealed his termination to the Commission on May 22, 2025.  (Stipulated fact)
47. During the hearing before the Commission, Chief Nelson was unable to point to a written Department rule regarding Mr. Gundacker’s conduct, as the Department rulebook had not been updated since 1979. Chief Nelson instead relied on Department precedent and past practices.  (Testimony of Nelson)

Applicable Legal Standard

A tenured civil service employee aggrieved by a disciplinary decision of an appointing authority made pursuant to G.L. c. 31, § 41, may appeal to the Commission under G.L. c. 31, § 43, which provides in relevant part as follows: 

If the commission by a preponderance of the evidence determines that there was just cause for an action taken against such person it shall affirm the action of the appointing authority, otherwise it shall reverse such action and the person concerned shall be returned to his position without loss of compensation or other rights; provided, however, if the employee by a preponderance of evidence, establishes that said action was based upon harmful error in the application of the appointing authority's procedure, an error of law, or upon any factor or conduct on the part of the employee not reasonably related to the fitness of the employee to perform in his position, said action shall not be sustained, and the person shall be returned to his position without loss of compensation or other rights. The commission may also modify any penalty imposed by the appointing authority. 

Under Section 43, the Commission is required “to conduct a de novo hearing for the purpose of finding the facts anew.” Town of Falmouth v. Civil Service Comm’n., 447 Mass. 814, 823 (2006). However, “[t]he commission's task … is not to be accomplished on a wholly blank slate. After making its de novo findings of fact, the commission does not act without regard to the previous decision of the [appointing authority], but rather decides whether ‘there was reasonable justification for the action taken by the appointing authority in the circumstances found by the commission to have existed when the appointing authority made its decision.’” Id., quoting internally from Watertown v. Arria, 16 Mass. App. Ct. 331, 334 (1983). 

An action is “justified” if it is “done upon adequate reasons sufficiently supported by credible evidence, when weighed by an unprejudiced mind; guided by common sense and by correct rules of law.” Comm’rs of Civil Serv. v. Mun. Ct. of the City of Boston, 359 Mass. 211, 214 (1971); Cambridge v. Civil Service Comm'n, 43 Mass. App. Ct. 300, 304 (1997); Selectmen of Wakefield v. Judge of First Dist. Ct., 262 Mass. 477, 482 (1928). The Commission determines justification for discipline by inquiring, “whether the employee has been guilty of substantial misconduct which adversely affects the public interest by impairing the efficiency of public service.” School Comm. v. Civil Service Comm’n, 43 Mass. App. Ct. 486, 488 (1997); Murray v. Second Dist. Ct., 389 Mass. 508, 514 (1983). 

Section 43 of G.L. c. 31 also vests the Commission with authority to affirm, vacate or modify discipline but that discretion is “not without bounds” and requires sound explanation for doing so. See, e.g., Police Comm’r v. Civil Service Comm’n, 39 Mass. App. Ct. 594, 600 (1996) (“The power accorded to the commission to modify penalties must not be confused with the power to impose penalties ab initio . . . accorded the appointing authority”); see also Falmouth, 447 Mass. at 823, quoting Watertown v. Arria, 16 Mass. App. Ct. 331, 334 (1983). However, the Supreme Judicial Court has added that, in the absence of “political considerations, favoritism, or bias,” the same penalty is warranted “unless the commission’s findings of fact differ significantly from those reported by the town or interpret the relevant law in a substantially different way.” Falmouth, 447 Mass. at 824.

Analysis

The Town of Milford, by a preponderance of the evidence, has proven that it had just cause to terminate Mr. Gundacker as discipline for his conduct on April 11, 2025. 

On December 31, 2020, Mr. Gundacker entered a last chance agreement with the Town of Milford. This agreement was to remain in effect until December 31, 2027, and it gave Mr. Gundacker explicit notice that he was to comport himself to a level of conduct beyond disciplinary scrutiny, or he would be subject to termination. The nature of this agreement is such that no employee would ever knowingly and intelligently enter into such an agreement with his employer were there not already grounds for his termination. And in fact, Mr. Gundacker had accumulated an extensive record of disciplinary infractions over the seven months prior to his LCA with the Town. In the incident leading to Mr. Gundacker entering the LCA, he punched a hole in the sheetrock wall of a Milford fire station. As a result, the Town had ample grounds for termination at this time, both due to the severity of conduct, and consonant with the practice of progressive discipline, yet Chief Nelson opted instead to provide Mr. Gundacker with a final opportunity to conform his actions to the rules and expectations of the Milford Fire Department via the LCA.

Mr. Gundacker’s behavior on April 11, 2025 may not have been an incident warranting termination when regarded in a contextual vacuum, but within the context of his LCA with the Town, this incident provided clear grounds for termination, because a reasonable individual could have understood it to be a disciplinable offense. Mr. Gundacker’s LCA distinguishes serious rules violations from “minor rules violations such as a single instance of tardiness.”  This establishes that, per the document Mr. Gundacker knowingly and intelligently signed, a rules violation need not be egregious for it to be “serious”; it need only be more serious than isolated instances of understandable human error. This incident did not display understandable human error. It was not comparable or even proximate in severity to the example of a minor rules violation provided in the LCA. 

Mr. Gundacker made a conscious yet ill-advised choice to disrupt a training activity so he could carve profanity into the hood of a junk motor vehicle. To be sure, that vehicle was of no value, and the act of carving profanity did not result in any damage to Department property. However, Mr. Gundacker’s actions were clearly an expression of frustration and discontent with his superior officer and the training exercise in which he was engaged. Per Mr. Gundacker’s own statements and testimony, he was upset by the instructions Lt. Touhey had delivered which he felt singled him out, and he had begun audibly muttering profanities to himself as a result. He further stated that he had carved the profanity for the sake of showcasing his talents. In other words, Mr. Gundacker was driven to express frustration with the instructions he received from a superior officer, and he further sought to demonstrate that he was talented enough with the K-12 saw that the training exercise was frivolous to him. Rather than being an attempt at levity, as the appellant described it, Mr. Gundacker’s actions seem to have stemmed from a wounded sense of pride. While the Department concedes that firefighters routinely swear on the job, and the simple use of profanity is not a disciplinable offense, context matters. Directing profanity towards a superior officer or their instructions is plainly insubordinate. 

The Appellant contends that the Milford Fire Department’s outdated rulebook renders the discipline unsubstantiated, as there is no clearly articulated rule to point to which outlines Mr. Gundacker’s conduct as a serious rules violation. While the Department certainly ought to bring its rulebook up to date, it would not have been difficult for Mr. Gundacker to conclude that his actions may warrant discipline, and when one is beholden to the terms of a last chance agreement, it is not the proper time for one to test the bounds of ambiguities in Department rules. It is untenable to claim that Mr. Gundacker was unaware of the consequences that result from his conduct. He was fully aware of the LCA he was beholden to, and as such, he could have known of the need to avoid any sort of behavior which may reasonably warrant discipline. It is unreasonable to claim that only Mr. Gundacker was oblivious to the inappropriate nature of his conduct when FF Shinney Farina had immediately reacted to Mr. Gundacker’s actions with concerns over potential discipline, and two other firefighters had independently expressed concerns to their superior officers regarding Mr. Gundacker’s actions. 

The Appellant further raises the issue of Cpt. Vignone exhibiting bias towards Mr. Gundacker due to an incident which had occurred shortly prior. Cpt. Vignone neither raised any complaint against Mr. Gundacker, nor participated in the subsequent Department investigation. He was nothing more than a witness and an intermediary between Chief Nelson and other witnesses who had found the incident disturbing. His potential bias seems to be minimal, but even then, it is immaterial to the fairness of the procedure for Mr. Gundacker’s discipline.

No witness provided any evidence or testimony disputing the simple fact that Mr. Gundacker engaged in the conduct for which he was disciplined. The only significant factual dispute raised through testimony regarding this incident was the nature of Mr. Gundacker’s intentions. However, I found Mr. Gundacker’s account lacking in credibility at times, especially given how he sought to downplay the past incident in which he punched a hole through a sheetrock wall. Further, even his own account does not lend itself to the conclusion that the Department lacked just cause for the discipline it issued. Appellant witness testimony establishing Mr. Gundacker’s competence as a firefighter and history of good conduct under Cpt. Collins are immaterial. Working effectively as a firefighter requires a capacity to cooperate constructively with all Department officers, which Mr. Gundacker has not evinced through his actions. 

Conclusion

              Accordingly, the Commission upholds this disciplinary action of the Milford Fire Department. The appeal filed under D1-25-127 is hereby denied.

Civil Service Commission

Angela C. McConney 

Angela C. McConney

Commissioner

By vote of the Civil Service Commission (Bowman, Chair; Dooley, Markey, McConney, and Stein, Commissioners) on April 16, 2026.

Either party may file a motion for reconsideration within ten days of the receipt of this Commission order or decision. Under the pertinent provisions of the Code of Mass. Regulations, 801 C.M.R. § 1.01(7)(l), the motion must identify a clerical or mechanical error in this order or decision or a significant factor the Agency or the Presiding Officer may have overlooked in deciding the case.  A motion for reconsideration does not toll the statutorily prescribed thirty-day time limit for seeking judicial review of this Commission order or decision. 

Under the provisions of G.L. c. 31, § 44, any party aggrieved by this Commission order or decision may initiate proceedings for judicial review under G.L. c. 30A, § 14 in the superior court within thirty (30) days after receipt of this order or decision. Commencement of such proceeding shall not, unless specifically ordered by the court, operate as a stay of this Commission order or decision.  After initiating proceedings for judicial review in Superior Court, the plaintiff, or his / her attorney, is required to serve a copy of the summons and complaint upon the Boston office of the Attorney General of the Commonwealth, with a copy to the Civil Service Commission, in the time and in the manner prescribed by Mass. R. Civ. P. 4(d).

Notice to: 

Joseph G. Donnellan, Esq. (for Appellant)

Katherine McNamara Feodoroff, Esq. (for Respondent)

1.  The Standard Adjudicatory Rules of Practice and Procedure, 801 C.M.R. §§ 1.01 et seq. (Formal Rules), apply to adjudications before the Commission with Chapter 31 or any Commission rules taking precedence.
2.  Should there be a judicial appeal of this decision, the plaintiff in the judicial appeal would be obligated to supply the court with a transcript of this hearing to the extent that they wish to challenge the decision as unsupported by the substantial evidence, arbitrary and capricious, or an abuse of discretion. In such cases, the plaintiff in the judicial appeal must transcribe the transcript from the Commission’s official recording.