This matter commenced on October 22, 2013, with Petitioner’s issuance of an Order to Show Cause alleging that Duarte violated G. L. c. 268A, § 19 in September 2010 while serving as a NBHA senior property manager. Duarte answered on November 11, 2013, denying most of the allegations. On January 15, 2014, Duarte made a motion to remove Petitioner’s counsel, which was denied. On February 6, 2014, Duarte moved to compel Petitioner to more fully respond to interrogatories and to provide a non-redacted copy of the complaint. Respondent’s motion was denied except as to one interrogatory. An adjudicatory hearing was held on August 7th and 8th, 2014. During the hearing, Duarte moved to identify the complainant and to have the complainant treated as a party opponent, again moved to remove Petitioner’s counsel, and also moved to bar the Presiding Officer from participating in the Commission’s deliberations. All of the motions were denied. At the hearing, fifteen exhibits were admitted into evidence, seven witnesses, including Duarte, testified and the Parties made their closing arguments before the Presiding Officer. The parties submitted their final briefs in September 2014.
In rendering this Decision and Order, each undersigned member of the Commission has considered the testimony of the witnesses at the adjudicatory hearing, the evidence in the public record and the arguments of the parties.
The Petitioner must prove its case and each element of the alleged violation by a preponderance of the evidence. 930 CMR 1.01(10)(o)2. The weight to be attached to any evidence in the record, including evidence concerning the credibility of witnesses, rests within the sound discretion of the Commission. 930 CMR 1.01(10)(n)3.
In order to prove a § 19 violation by Duarte, Petitioner must prove that Duarte participated as a municipal employee in a particular matter in which a member of his immediate family had, to his knowledge, a financial interest. Petitioner asserts that the evidence shows that Duarte violated § 19 by, as a NBHA senior property manager, directing the NBHA staff to stop the eviction of his brother John from NBHA housing on or about September 13, 2010. Duarte asserts that the evidence shows that he did not make the decision to stop John’s eviction, but instead merely passed on to NBHA management aide Santos NBHA attorney Cabral’s decision to stop the eviction, and argues that, in any event, John’s eviction was not stopped but only postponed and that John did not benefit financially from that postponement.
Based on the evidence in the record, we reach the following conclusions.
Duarte was a Municipal Employee
There is no dispute that Duarte was, at all relevant times, a NBHA senior property manager and an employee of the City of New Bedford. As such, Duarte was, at all relevant times, a municipal employee as defined in G. L. c. 268A, § 1(g).
John was Duarte’s Immediate Family Member
There is no dispute that John is Duarte’s brother. As such, John is a member of Duarte’s immediate family as defined in G. L. c. 268A, § 1(e).
The Decision to Stop John’s Eviction Was a Particular Matter
For conflict of interest law purposes, a “particular matter” is, inter alia, any “decision” or “determination.” G. L. c. 268A, § 1(k). Accordingly, the decision to stop John’s eviction was a particular matter within the meaning of the conflict of interest law.
John had, to Duarte’s Knowledge, a Financial Interest in the Stopping of His Eviction
“Financial interest” is not defined in the conflict of interest law. The Commission has determined that “financial interest” is not limited to direct financial interests, but extends to reasonably foreseeable financial interests, large or small, positive or negative, so long as they are not remote, speculative or insufficiently identifiable. In re Brennan, 2009 SEC 2237, 2244.
The stopping of his eviction allowed John to remain in NBHA housing despite his owing over $400 in back rent. Had he been evicted, John would have had to seek and pay for new housing and also pay for the cost of moving and possibly storing his possessions (or, more likely, incur additional debt to pay for those costs). John’s financial interest in the decision to stop his eviction was not remote, speculative or insufficiently identifiable. These inevitable consequences of eviction gave John a financial interest in the decision to evict him of which Duarte, given his many years of experience with NBHA tenant evictions, could not have been unaware. In any case, based on the evidence, it is more likely than not that Duarte knew of his brother’s financial interest in not being evicted. In addition, based on his experience, it is more likely than not that Duarte knew that John would be required to pay some portion of what he owed the NBHA in connection with his being allowed to stay. Thus, we find that John had to Duarte’s knowledge a financial interest in the decision to stop his eviction.
Duarte’s argument that his brother did not in fact financially benefit from the decision to stop the eviction because he was later evicted is both beside the point and without merit. The stopping of the September 13th eviction afforded John the opportunity to enter into an agreement with the NBHA on September 17, 2014 under which $242 of the $619.40 total he owed would be paid by Coastline, he would be allowed to stay in his NBHA home and he would be given time to pay off his debt in $94.35 monthly installments.[5] This agreement with the NBHA put John in an unquestionably better position financially and physically than he would have been had he been evicted and made homeless owing the $619.40 total in unpaid rent and fees. The fact that John was ultimately evicted several months later owing back rent and fees does not alter this fact.
Duarte Participated as a Municipal Employee in the Decision to Stop John’s Eviction
In order to have met its burden of proof, Petitioner must have proved by a preponderance of the evidence that Duarte participated “personally and substantially” as a municipal employee, “through approval, disapproval, decision, recommendation, the rendering of advice, investigation or otherwise,” in the particular matter of the decision to stop his brother’s eviction. G. L. c. 268A, § 1(j).
Petitioner asserts that Duarte personally and substantially participated in the decision to stop his brother’s eviction as part of his duties as a NBHA senior property manager. According to Petitioner, Duarte, as senior property manager, personally made the decision to stop the eviction and directed NBHA management aide Santos to do so. Petitioner asserts that this participation was substantial in that, without it, the eviction would have gone forward as scheduled. Duarte asserts that his involvement in the stopping of his brother’s eviction “does not meet the standard set out in §19’s definition of participation,” in that he merely “relayed the instructions” of NBHA attorney Cabral to his subordinate Santos and did not participate in making the decision to stop the eviction. Duarte, as “any manager would have done under the circumstances,” followed the NBHA’s attorney’s “directions” in a “correct and common procedure.” Duarte further in effect argues that it is not credible that he intervened to stop the eviction as alleged by Petitioner because, if he had wanted to stop his brother’s eviction, he would not have waited until the last moment to do so.
The preponderance of the evidence supports Petitioner. First, to the degree that Duarte’s version of his telephone conversation turns on his being in court with Cabral at the time, the weight of the credible evidence contradicts Duarte’s version. Although both Santos and Duarte placed their conversation during John’s eviction on a Friday[6] (which Duarte testified was September 10, 2010) the most reliable evidence of the date of John’s eviction and thus the date of the telephone conversation, the testimony and business records of the mover Moniz and the deputy sheriff Lt. Young, establishes Monday, September 13, 2010 as the date of the eviction. Moniz clearly recalled the date because it was the day before the Tuesday, September 14, 2010 election in which he was a candidate for office.
Second, and more importantly, Santos’s testimony that Duarte told her to “stop the move” and to have the movers “put the boxes back” in John’s apartment is credible.[7] By contrast, Duarte’s testimony that he merely repeated to Santos what he claims Cabral said to him, “If he has the money, let him stay,” is not credible.
Duarte’s testimony concerning his reaction to Santos calling him and Cabral’s perception of that reaction and his interaction with Santos and Cabral regarding John’s ongoing eviction is not credible. First, it was not believable that Duarte would have been “flabbergasted” by Santos calling him about John’s eviction at all let alone to the extent his facial reaction would have drawn Cabral’s attention and inquiry about what was going on or what was wrong. Second, given that, according to the witnesses, John was not at the eviction, it is improbable that Santos would have had a basis to tell Duarte that John, whom Santos testified she had not seen that morning, “ha[d] the money.” Third, Duarte’s testimony that he merely repeated to Cabral what he says Santos told him, “My brother is being evicted and he has the money,” and asked “What should she do?,” and then merely repeated to Santos what Cabral told him in response, “If he has the money, let him stay,” was not credible as explained above in footnote 4. In addition, given his background and nearly 20 years of NBHA management experience, as well as his observed and self-described firm personality, it is not believable that Duarte acted merely as a passive conduit between Santos and Cabral. Fourth, Duarte’s testimony is not credible given that he, not Cabral or Santos, had the authority to stop a tenant eviction.[8] Finally, Duarte’s testimony is not credible because as far as the evidence shows only he, not Santos or Cabral, had a motive to stop John’s eviction, i.e., to avoid having his brother forced to move from NBHA housing or even made homeless.
Accordingly, the preponderance of the evidence establishes that during the September 13, 2010 telephone conversation with his subordinate Santos that occurred while John’s eviction was in progress, Duarte said “tell them to stop” or other words to the effect of “stop the eviction” to Santos and that John’s eviction was stopped. Thus, the preponderance of the evidence establishes that Duarte personally and substantially participated in his official capacity as a NBHA senior property manager in the decision to stop his brother’s eviction (a decision in which his brother had to his knowledge a financial interest) by, in the exercise of his official authority, personally making the decision and directing his subordinate to stop the eviction. The fact that Duarte waited until the last minute to stop his brother’s eviction, while true and unexplained, does not change the fact that he stopped his brother’s eviction.
Duarte’s Claims of Error
In his Brief, Duarte asserts that the Presiding Officer erred in her rulings on three issues raised during the hearing: first, by refusing to allow Duarte to inquire into the identity of the complainant in this matter (which Duarte asserts violates his due process right to confront his accuser); second, by excluding Duarte’s evidence showing that the NBHA had stopped other evictions; and, third, refusing to allow Duarte to enter into evidence records of stopped evictions. In addition, Duarte asserts that it is error and “implicates” his due process rights to a fair hearing for the Presiding Officer to participate in the Commission’s deliberations because a “very strong possibility exists that [Commissioner Mangum’s] participation is going to have an undue influence on the rest of the Commission.” Duarte does not support his assertions with any legal argument or citations to the record.
Duarte’s assertions of error are without merit. First, the Commission is required to keep the identity of a complainant confidential. 930 CMR 3.01(5). Thus, sustaining Petitioner’s objections to Duarte’s questioning of Santos concerning the complainant’s identity was necessary and appropriate. Duarte’s rights are protected because the Commission only considers the evidence, including witness testimony, in the record in deciding this matter and Duarte had the opportunity in the adjudicatory hearing to examine all evidence and to question each witness. Second, the evidence relating to other NBHA evictions was not relevant to these proceedings given that there is no allegation that Duarte used his position to unduly benefit his brother or to treat him better than any other tenant. In any case, Duarte was allowed to testify about other evictions stopped at the last minute. Finally, the Presiding Officer’s participation in deliberations is essential to the Commission’s making credibility assessments concerning the witnesses. Without the Presiding Officer’s input the Commission would lack critical guidance in determining which witness to believe with regard to conflicting testimony. See Craven v. State Ethics Commission, 390 Mass. 191, 199 (1983) (rejecting argument that participation by hearing officer in Commission’s final decision violated due process). Accordingly, we find that there was no error by the Presiding Officer.