Decision  Joseph, Marcos v. Boston Police Department 10/1/26

Date:	10/01/2026
Organization:	Civil Service Commission
Docket Number:	G1-26-142

• Appearance for Appellant: Marcos Joseph
• Appearance for Respondent: Jennifer Cipolletti, Esq.
• Hearing Officer: Christopher C. Bowman

The Commission dismissed the bypass appeal of a candidate for Boston police officer as the candidate was bypassed for the same reasons in prior hiring cycles and the Commission recently issued a decision affirming those bypasses. 

Order of Dismissal

Procedural History 

On July 10, 2026, the Appellant, Marcos Joseph (Appellant), filed a bypass appeal with the Civil Service Commission (Commission), contesting the decision of the Boston Police Department (BPD) to bypass him for original appointment as a police officer.  On August 18, 2026, I held a remote pre-hearing conference which was attended by the Appellant and counsel for the BPD.   Counsel for the Appellant did not appear. 

Undisputed Facts 

Based on the statements of the parties and the written submissions, the following, unless otherwise noted, does not appear to be in dispute: 

1. The Appellant has filed four prior bypass appeals with the Commission, contesting the decision of the BPD to bypass him for appointment.  Most relevant to this appeal are the two prior appeals docketed under G1-23-145 and G1-24-099 (which were consolidated) as well as another more recent prior appeal docketed under G1-25-034. 
2. The reasons for bypass have not changed.  Although the BPD put forth multiple reasons for bypassing the Appellant in the prior hiring cycles, the Commission, in a decision dated October 17, 2024, opted to rule on only one of those reasons, concluding that the Boston Police Department was justified in bypassing the Appellant “ … because of his untruthfulness in connection with an immigration petition.”
3. On January 13, 2025, the BPD notified the Appellant that he was again being bypassed for appointment for the same reasons, including his untruthfulness in connection with an immigration petition. 
4. The Appellant appealed under Docket Number G1-25-034 and the Commission dismissed that 2025 appeal relying on its 2024 decision.  
5. In the interim, counsel for the Appellant appealed the Commission’s 2024 decision to Superior Court. The court recently advised counsel that the Appellant’s judicial appeal would be dismissed for failure to prosecute. 
6. The BPD has again bypassed the Appellant for the same reasons from a new eligible list and the Appellant has filed the instant appeal under G1-26-142. 

Standard for Summary Disposition  

The Commission may, on motion or upon its own initiative, dismiss an appeal at any time for lack of jurisdiction or for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 801 CMR 1.01(7)(g)(3).  A motion before the Commission, in whole or in part, via summary decision may be filed pursuant to 801 C.M.R. 1.01(7)(h).  An appeal may be decided on summary disposition only when, “viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party”, the undisputed material facts affirmatively demonstrate that the non-moving party has “no reasonable expectation” of prevailing on at least one “essential element of the case”. See, e.g., Milliken & Co. v. Duro Textiles LLC, 451 Mass. 547, 550 n.6 (2008); Maimonides School v. Coles, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 240, 249 (2008); Lydon v. Massachusetts Parole Bd., 18 MCSR 216 (2005). See also Mangino v. HRD, 27 MCSR 34 (2014) and cases cited (“The notion underlying the summary decision process in administrative proceedings parallels the civil practice under Mass. R. Civ. P. 56, namely, when no genuine issues of material fact exist, the agency is not required to conduct a meaningless hearing.”); Morehouse v. Weymouth Fire Dep’t, 26 MCSR 176 (2013) (“a party may move for summary decision when . . . there is no genuine issue of fact relating to his or her claim or defense and the party is entitled to prevail as a matter of law.”)

Analysis

The undisputed facts establish that summary decision is appropriate. In October 2024, following a full evidentiary hearing, the Commission affirmed BPD's bypass of the Appellant based solely upon his untruthfulness in connection with an immigration petition. Joseph v. Boston Police Department, 37 MCSR 265 (2024).  When BPD relied upon that same reason in a subsequent hiring cycle, the Commission dismissed Joseph's successive bypass appeal. Joseph v. Boston Police Department, 38 MCSR 69 (2025).  Dismissals of this nature also were directed in Lima v. City of New Bedford, 33 MCSR 285 (2020), and Reynolds v. City of Brockton, 37 MCSR 37 (2024).

Unlike the Appellant’s 2025 appeal, the present bypass arises from a certification generated from a newly established eligible list.  That circumstance does not, however, create a genuine issue of material fact concerning the historical conduct previously adjudicated by the Commission.[FN2] The BPD again relied upon the Appellant's untruthfulness concerning the immigration petition—a reason the Commission, after hearing the evidence, previously determined was independently sufficient to justify his bypass.  The Appellant filed no opposition to BPD's Motion for Summary Decision and has identified no new evidence, changed circumstance, or disputed material fact that would call into question the Commission's prior adjudication or require another evidentiary hearing concerning the same conduct. Viewing the record in the light most favorable to the Appellant, he therefore has no reasonable expectation of prevailing on his challenge to BPD's reliance upon that previously adjudicated bypass reason.[FN3]

Further, the Appellant sought judicial review of the Commission's 2024 decision, but that action is subject to dismissal for failure to prosecute.  The Commission's 2024 decision therefore remains undisturbed.  A successive Commission appeal is not the appropriate vehicle to relitigate the factual and legal conclusions reached in that final administrative decision.

Conclusion

                For the above reasons, the Appellant’s appeal under Docket Number G1-26-142 is hereby dismissed. 

Civil Service Commission

/s/ Christopher Bowman

Christopher C. Bowman
Chair

By a vote of the Civil Service Commission (Bowman, Chair; Markey, McConney and Stein, Commissioners [Dooley – Absent]) on October 1, 2026. 

Either party may file a motion for reconsideration within ten days of receipt of this Commission order or decision. Under the pertinent provisions of the Code of Mass. Regulations, 801 CMR 1.01(7)(l), the motion must identify a clerical or mechanical error in this order or decision or a significant factor the Agency or the Presiding Officer may have overlooked in deciding the case.  A motion for reconsideration does not toll the statutorily prescribed thirty-day time limit for seeking judicial review of this Commission order or decision.

Under the provisions of G.L. c. 31, § 44, any party aggrieved by this Commission order or decision may initiate proceedings for judicial review under G.L. c. 30A, § 14 in the superior court within thirty (30) days after receipt of this order or decision. Commencement of such proceeding shall not, unless specifically ordered by the court, operate as a stay of this Commission order or decision.  After initiating proceedings for judicial review in Superior Court, the plaintiff, or his / her attorney, is required to serve a copy of the summons and complaint upon the Boston office of the Attorney General of the Commonwealth, with a copy to the Civil Service Commission, in the time and in the manner prescribed by Mass. R. Civ. P. 4(d).

Notice to:
Marcos Joseph (Appellant) 
Gary Pelletier, Esq. (for Appellant) 
Jennifer Cipolletti, Esq. (for Respondent) 

1. When filing his appeal with the Commission, the Appellant indicated that he was represented by counsel.  That counsel never filed a notice of appearance.  For that reason, both counsel and the Appellant were given the opportunity to respond to the Respondent’s Motion for Summary Decision and both are being provided with a copy of this decision. 
2. The doctrine of issue preclusion in administrative adjudications applies when the parties in both proceedings are the same, as here; the issue in dispute is the same (e.g., truthfulness, as here); and the earlier adjudicatory disposition resolving that dispute was grounded in facts actually litigated.  Kobrin v. Bd. of Registration in Med., 444 Mass. 837, 843 (2005).
3. As further support for this conclusion, see City of Cambridge v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 43 Mass. App. Ct. 300, 304-305 (1997) (improper to disturb appointing authority’s decision not to risk hiring police officer candidate found to have “spoken falsely” under oath); and Town of Randolph v. Civ. Serv. Comm'n, 81 Mass. App. Ct. 1123 (2012) (unpublished disposition) (“The commission cannot substitute its judgment for the town's reasonable decision not to take the risk inherent in hiring as a police officer someone who may not have shown the utmost candor”).