| Date: | 03/19/2026 |
|---|---|
| Organization: | Civil Service Commission |
| Docket Number: | E-25-301 |
The Commission dismissed the appeal of a Pembroke Police Lieutenant as the Town has complied with the civil service law and rules pertaining to provisional promotions.
On December 22, 2025, the Appellant, Paul H. Joudrey, a permanent, full-time police lieutenant in the Town of Pembroke (Town)’s Police Department, filed a non-bypass equity appeal with the Civil Service Commission (Commission), arguing that the Town violated the civil service law or rules when making a provisional promotional appointment to the position of police lieutenant. On February 10, 2026, I held a remote pre-hearing conference which was attended by the Appellant, counsel for the Town and the Town Administrator. The Town subsequently submitted a motion for summary decision and the Appellant did not file a reply.
Section 15 of Chapter 31 permits appointing authorities to make provisional promotions when there is no suitable eligible list, or if the list contains the names of fewer than three persons eligible for and willing to accept employment, but no provisional promotion shall be continued after a certification by the administrator of the names of three persons eligible for and willing to accept promotion to such position. There is no requirement in the civil service law or rules that an appointing authority anticipate a vacancy and establish an eligible list prior to filling a vacancy when no such eligible list exists at the time.
The Civil Service Certification Handbook, however, issued to appointing authorities by HRD in 2009 requires that: "If a provisional promotion takes place, the appointing authority must submit documentation requesting to participate in the next exam cycle for the affected title.”
A motion to dispose of an appeal, in whole or in part, via summary decision may be allowed by the Commission pursuant to 801 C.M.R. 1.01(7)(h) when, “viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party”, the undisputed material facts affirmatively demonstrate that the non-moving party has “no reasonable expectation” of prevailing on at least one “essential element of the case”. See, e.g., Milliken & Co. v. Duro Textiles LLC, 451 Mass. 547, 550 n.6 (2008); Maimonides School v. Coles, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 240, 249 (2008); Lydon v. Massachusetts Parole Bd, 18 MCSR 216 (2005). See also Mangino v. HRD, 27 MCSR 34 (2014) and cases cited (“The notion underlying the summary decision process in administrative proceedings parallels the civil practice under Mass.R.Civ.P.56; namely, when no genuine issues of material fact exist, the agency is not required to conduct a meaningless hearing.”); Morehouse v. Weymouth Fire Dept, 26 MCSR 176 (2013) (“a party may move for summary decision when . . . there is no genuine issue of fact relating to his or her claim or defense and the party is entitled to prevail as a matter of law.”)
Here, it is undisputed that there was no eligible list for Peabody Police Lieutenant when the Town made a provisional promotion to that position in November 2025. Further, shortly after making this promotion, the Town entered into a delegation agreement with the state’s Human Resources Division to conduct an assessment center to establish an eligible list for this position.
After carefully reviewing the written and verbal statements made by the Appellant, I determine that he has no reasonable expectation of showing that he has been aggrieved by the Town’s decision to make a provisional promotion as his civil service title of police lieutenant has not been impacted, either through discipline, loss of compensation or an involuntary transfer. Being aggrieved is the sine qua non of any viable equity appeal, particularly under G.L. c. 31, § 2(b).
For the above reasons, the Town’s motion for summary decision is allowed and the Appellant’s appeal under Docket No. E-25-301 is hereby dismissed.
Civil Service Commission
/s/ Christopher Bowman
Christopher C. Bowman
Chair
By a vote of the Civil Service Commission (Bowman, Chair; Dooley, Markey, McConney and Stein, Commissioners) on March 9, 2026.
Either party may file a motion for reconsideration within ten days of receipt of this Commission order or decision. Under the pertinent provisions of the Code of Mass. Regulations, 801 CMR 1.01(7)(l), the motion must identify a clerical or mechanical error in this order or decision or a significant factor the Agency or the Presiding Officer may have overlooked in deciding the case. A motion for reconsideration does not toll the statutorily prescribed thirty-day time limit for seeking judicial review of this Commission order or decision.
Under the provisions of G.L. c. 31, § 44, any party aggrieved by this Commission order or decision may initiate proceedings for judicial review under G.L. c. 30A, § 14 in the superior court within thirty (30) days after receipt of this order or decision. Commencement of such proceeding shall not, unless specifically ordered by the court, operate as a stay of this Commission order or decision. After initiating proceedings for judicial review in Superior Court, the plaintiff, or his / her attorney, is required to serve a copy of the summons and complaint upon the Boston office of the Attorney General of the Commonwealth, with a copy to the Civil Service Commission, in the time and in the manner prescribed by Mass. R. Civ. P. 4(d).
Notice:
Paul H. Joudrey (Appellant)
David Jenkins, Esq. (for Respondent)
