Background
On June 6, 2025, the Appellant, Michael Keady (Appellant), a permanent, tenured Senior Fire Alarm Operator (Senior FAO), filed an appeal with the Civil Service Commission (Commission), contesting an action by the Boston Fire Department (BFD) that the Appellant described as a “transfer” out of a functional position / designation of “Certified Training Officer” that he has held for six years. According to the Appellant, the action of the BFD adversely impacted his work hours and compensation.
On July 14, 2025, the BFD filed a motion to dismiss the Appellant’s appeal. On July 19, 2025, I held a pre-hearing conference which was attended by the Appellant and counsel for the BFD. I heard arguments from both parties and asked the BFD to submit, with an affidavit from the Appointing Authority, additional information related to the BFD’s personnel actions underlying this appeal. I received – and reviewed – the requested information.
Undisputed Facts
- The Fire Alarm Operator (FAO) series includes Fire Alarm Operator; Senior Fire Alarm Operator; and Principal Fire Alarm Operator, all of which are civil service titles covered by Chapter 31 (the civil service law).
- Separately, the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between the BFD and Local 718 calls for “Headquarter Specialist” designations appointed by and serving at the pleasure of the Fire Commissioner—for which the CBA requires a premium rate to be paid to the employee who has received the respective designation.
- Among the Headquarter Unit Specialist designations listed in the CBA is “Fire Alarm Operations Trainer” with a corresponding premium pay of $12,000 specified in the CBA.
- The Appellant is a permanent, tenured Senior Fire Alarm Operator with the BFD.
- For several years, the Appellant held the Headquarter Unit Specialist Designation of Fire Alarm Operations Trainer which, in addition to the above-referenced premium pay, has a more traditional schedule considered more favorable by the Appellant and which he asserts allows him a greater ability to address family medical-related issues on off-hours.
- On May 27, 2025, the Appellant was notified that the Fire Commissioner was replacing him as the Fire Alarm Operations Trainer and changing his assignment from Headquarters to a supervisory position at a separate location within the City.
- The change in the Appellant’s assignment did not cause any change in his civil service title of Senior Fire Alarm Operator [his pay grade] or his civil service seniority but did result in the discontinuation of the premium pay required by the CBA.
- The Appellant asserts that the BFD’s action also caused an abrupt change to a rotating work schedule, which has impeded his ability to address family medical issues.
- The Fire Commissioner designated another Senior Fire Alarm Operator with the least seniority as the new Fire Alarm Operations Trainer.
- The Fire Commissioner submitted an affidavit to the Commission stating that the designation, albeit separate from the civil service promotional process, was in the best interest of the Department given that other employee’s prior experience as a 911 training officer with the Boston Police Department several years ago and that the decision was also was consistent with that employee’s accommodation request.
Rule Regarding Dismissal for Lack of Jurisdiction
The Presiding Officer may at any time, on his or her own motion or that of a Party, dismiss a case for lack of jurisdiction to decide the matter, for failure of the Petitioner to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or because of the pendency of a prior, related action in any tribunal that should first be decided. 801 CMR 1.01 (7)(g).
Applicable Civil Service Law
Section 35 of G.L. c. 31 provides in relevant part: “A person who is aggrieved by a transfer, other than an emergency transfer or assignment, made pursuant to this section but who is not subject to the provisions of section forty-one with respect to such transfer, may appeal to the commission pursuant to the provisions of section forty-three and shall be entitled to a hearing and a decision by the commission in the same manner as if such appeal were taken from a decision of the appointing authority made, after hearing, under the provisions of section forty-one.”
Section 41 of G.L. c. 31 provides in relevant part: “Except for just cause and except in accordance with the provisions of this paragraph, a tenured employee shall not be discharged, removed, suspended for a period of more than five days, laid off, transferred from his position without his written consent if he has served as a tenured employee since prior to October fourteen, nineteen hundred and sixty-eight, lowered in rank or compensation without his written consent, nor his position be abolished.”
Analysis
There appears to be something amiss here. For several years, the Appellant, a Senior Fire Alarm Operator, was designated to serve as the BFD’s Fire Alarm Operations Trainer. Then, in May 2025, without any notice, he was abruptly notified that he would no longer serve in this capacity; the stipend related to this assignment would be discontinued; and he would revert to a non-traditional work schedule that appears to upend the Appellant’s ability to meet the medical needs of a family member at night. Adding to the eyebrow-raising sequence of events here is that the Fire Commissioner designated the Senior Fire Alarm Operator with the least seniority in the position to serve as the new Fire Alarm Operations Trainer. Even after reviewing the Fire Commissioner’s affidavit, I remain skeptical regarding what motivated the decision to end the Appellant’s Trainer role.
However, the functional designation of Fire Alarm Operations Trainer, along with the associated stipend, is squarely addressed by a collective bargaining agreement that gives the Fire Commissioner sole discretion to make – or rescind – these special assignments. More globally, the Appellant’s position as a permanent, tenured Senior Fire Alarm Operator has not been impacted here, nor has his base pay associated with that permanent position been impacted. For those reasons, the Commission lacks jurisdiction to hear this appeal. See Nichols v. Town of Norwell, 20 MCSR 293 (2007) (Commission lacked jurisdiction to hear appeal of police officer whose specialty assignment as police prosecutor and associated stipend was abruptly ended after 14 years); See also Johnston v. Worcester Public Schools, 26 MCSR 497 (2013) (Commission lacked jurisdiction to hear appeal of a junior building custodian whose functional assignment as “groundskeeper” and associated pay differential was ended after 7 years.) Further, when the Legislature deems it appropriate to create some right of appeal for loss of specialty assignments, they know how to do so. See G. L. c. 7, § 4H, ¶ 8, which provides certain police officers with the protection of a hearing before DALA when losing a detective assignment.
To the extent that the Appellant effectively argues that what occurred here was an involuntary transfer, the Commission has defined the term "transfer" as a "change of employment under the same appointing authority from a position in one class to a similar position in the same or another class or a change of employ in the same position, under the same appointing authority, from one geographical location to a different geographical location, provided that a different geographical location shall be one which is both more than a commuting distance from the employee's residence than its prior location and more distant from the employee's residence than his prior location...." Sullivan v. Dep't of Transitional Assistance, 11 MCSR 80 (1998).
A series of Commission decisions has established the difference between a transfer and a reassignment and that the Commission lacks jurisdiction over those appeals involving a reassignment:
In Appellant v. Department of Revenue, 1 MCSR 28, 29 (1985), the Commission dismissed the Appellant's appeal on the grounds that the action being appealed was a reassignment as opposed to a transfer. In that case, the employee's position in the Worcester DOR office was eliminated and he was reassigned to the Cambridge office. The employee claimed that this change in duty was effectively a transfer. The Commission found that the distances to Cambridge or to Worcester from the employee's home were approximately equal. It further found that the reassignment did not affect the employee's job title, duties, grade or salary. Therefore, the appellant in that case was reassigned, not transferred.
In McLaughlin v. Registry of Motor Vehicles, CSC Case No. G-01-1461 (2004), the Commission determined that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal given that the action taken did not constitute a transfer, but a reassignment. In McLaughlin, the appellant was not transferred to a different position but merely relocated to a different branch office while keeping the same job title, duties and pay.
In Sands v. City of Salem, 21 MCSR 502, 504 (2008), the Commission, citing Sullivan, determined that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal in that the action taken also did not constitute a transfer, but, rather, a reassignment. In Sands, the appellant, a Hoisting Equipment Operator, was no longer able to perform some of the essential duties in his previously held position. Therefore, in order to make reasonable accommodations for his medically-documented permanent disability, he was reassigned to perform cemetery-related duties in the Cemetery Department. Although his distance of travel from his residence was greater than previously, the Commission concluded that the change in travel did not impose an unreasonable hardship on the employee.
In McQueen v. Boston Public Schools, 21 MCSR 548, 551 (2008), the Commission determined that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal in that the action taken there did not constitute a transfer, but, rather, a reassignment. In McQueen, the appellant was reassigned from one elementary school to another. In dismissing his appeal, the Commission considered that the Appellant retained the same position of junior custodian and retained the same rate of pay in his new position.
In Anderson v. Saugus Public Schools, CSC Case No. D-09-381 (2010), the Commission determined that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal in that the action taken did not constitute a transfer, but, rather, a reassignment. In Anderson, the appellant retained her title of Principal Clerk; she did not face any reduction in pay nor had she been assigned to a work location that resulted in a longer commute. While her functional duties had changed, those duties still fell clearly within the clerical series. Even if the functional duties were substantially different, as they were in the Sands case, the Commission concluded that this alone would not constitute a transfer that is reviewable by the Commission.
In Haye and Simone v. Methuen Public Schools, 23 MCSR 122 (2010), the Commission determined that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal given that the action did not constitute a transfer, but, rather, a reassignment. In Haye and Simone, the appellants were both permanent junior building custodians. They were reassigned to building custodian positions different from those in which they had been serving. Each of them continued to serve in junior building custodian positions without any loss of compensation. Mr. Haye, who had previously worked in the functional title of "building custodian / store delivery person" and Mr. Simone, who had previously worked as "building custodian / system-wide groundskeeper", each had been reassigned to positions as junior building custodians in one of the elementary schools in the Methuen Public School system.
In Breen v. Gardner School Department, 25 MCSR 154 (2012), the Commission determined that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal in that the action did not constitute a transfer, but, rather, a reassignment. In Breen, the appellant was a Senior Clerk / Typist. She was laid off, then reinstated to her permanent civil service title of Senior Clerk / Typist. A subsequent arbitration decision, related to another employee, addressed provisions of the collective bargaining agreement related to the assignment of clerks to various positions in the School Department. Although the appellant was assigned to a different work location, her permanent title of Senior Clerk/ Typist was not disturbed.
In Bedard v. Marlborough Public Schools, CSC Case No. G-13-225 (2013), the Commission determined that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal in that the action did not constitute a transfer, but, rather, a reassignment. In Bedard, Ms. Bedard's permanent civil service title was not disturbed, she continued to perform administrative duties that were consistent with the clerk series, she suffered no reduction in pay, and her new work location was only a couple of miles away from her prior work location.
Based on the undisputed facts, what occurred here cannot be defined as an involuntary transfer, but rather a reassignment. In short, the Appellant, at best, was reassigned from a specialty position in headquarters back to a more traditional supervisory dispatch role that he previously held.
CONCLUSION
As the Commission lacks jurisdiction to hear this appeal, the Appellant’s appeal under Docket No. D1-25-134 is hereby dismissed. The Commission does not mean to diminish its concern with the "eyebrow raising" treatment that the Appellant may have received here, but the Commission’s authority cannot be extended to what the law expressly states to be a collective bargaining issue. Nothing in this decision should be interpreted as an endorsement of the BFD’s alleged actions here or an opinion on whether the Appellant may have a remedy in another forum.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
/s/ Christopher Bowman
Christopher C. Bowman
Chair
By a vote of the Civil Service Commission (Bowman, Chair; Dooley, Markey, McConney and Stein, Commissioners) on April 16, 2026.
Either party may file a motion for reconsideration within ten days of receipt of this Commission order or decision. Under the pertinent provisions of the Code of Mass. Regulations, 801 CMR 1.01(7)(l), the motion must identify a clerical or mechanical error in this order or decision or a significant factor the Agency or the Presiding Officer may have overlooked in deciding the case. A motion for reconsideration does not toll the statutorily prescribed thirty-day time limit for seeking judicial review of this Commission order or decision.
Under the provisions of G.L. c. 31, § 44, any party aggrieved by this Commission order or decision may initiate proceedings for judicial review under G.L. c. 30A, § 14 in the superior court within thirty (30) days after receipt of this order or decision. Commencement of such proceeding shall not, unless specifically ordered by the court, operate as a stay of this Commission order or decision. After initiating proceedings for judicial review in Superior Court, the plaintiff, or his / her attorney, is required to serve a copy of the summons and complaint upon the Boston office of the Attorney General of the Commonwealth, with a copy to the Civil Service Commission, in the time and in the manner prescribed by Mass. R. Civ. P. 4(d).
Notice to:
Michael Keady (Appellant)
Robert J. Boyle, Jr. Esq. (for Respondent)
