| Date: | 07/09/2026 |
|---|---|
| Organization: | Civil Service Commission |
| Docket Number: | G1-25-256 |
The Commission affirmed the decision of the Weymouth Fire Department to bypass a candidate for appointment as a firefighter based on inconsistent and misleading statements during the application process, history of poor judgment, and issues surrounding past involvement with police.
On November 18, 2025, the Appellant, Dylan Kelley (Appellant), filed a timely appeal with the Civil Service Commission (Commission) pursuant to G.L. c. 31, § 2(b), challenging the decision of the Weymouth Fire Department (WFD) to bypass him for appointment as a fire fighter. The Commission held a remote pre-hearing conference on December 9, 2025. On April 15, 2026, I conducted an evidentiary hearing at the offices of the Commission, located at 100 Cambridge Street, Boston, Massachusetts. I recorded the hearing via the Webex platform and forwarded a link of this recording to both parties. Both parties filed proposed decisions. For the reasons set forth below, the Appellant’s appeal is denied.
The Appellant entered four exhibits into evidence (App. Ex. 1-4) and the WFD entered 10 exhibits into evidence (Res. Ex. 1-10). Based on the exhibits entered into evidence and the testimony of the following witnesses:
Called by the WFD:
Called by the Appellant:
and taking administrative notice of all papers filed in the case, plus pertinent rules, statutes, regulations, case law and policies, and drawing reasonable inferences from the credible evidence, I make the following findings of fact:
1. Inconsistent Residency Documentation
Appellant’s 2022 application documented residency from January 2019 through January 2020. However, his 2025 application shows different dates of residency for the same address, creating an inconsistency that raises questions about the accuracy of his submissions.
2. Misrepresentation of Military Discharge Status
Appellant stated in his 2025 application that he received an honorable discharge from the U.S. Army. Review of his DD214 revealed that he actually received a general discharge under honorable conditions, which is a distinctly different classification. When questioned during the interview, Appellant claimed to possess DD214 paperwork reflecting an honorable discharge but was unable to produce such documentation upon follow-up.
3. False EMT Certification Claims
Appellant stated in his 2025 application that he was a certified EMT. However, searches of both Massachusetts and National EMT registries found no evidence of him holding an EMT certification. During the interview, the Appellant claimed his license had lapsed and expired, but subsequent follow-up revealed he could not produce any evidence of ever holding EMT certification.
4. Driver's License Revocation
The Appellant’s driver's license was revoked for unpaid child support obligations.
5. Pattern of Police and Court Interactions
Beginning in 2007 and continuing through 2020, the Appellant has had multiple interactions with police and court proceedings. This pattern of legal involvement does not meet the character standards expected of Weymouth Fire Department personnel.
(Res. Ex. 2 and App. Ex. 4)
The core mission of Massachusetts civil service law is to enforce “basic merit principles” for “recruiting, selecting and advancing of employees on the basis of their relative ability, knowledge and skills” and “assuring that all employees are protected against coercion for political purposes, and are protected from arbitrary and capricious actions.” G.L. c. 31, § 1. See, e.g., Massachusetts Ass’n of Minority Law Enforcement Officers v. Abban, 434 Mass. 256, 259 (2001); MacHenry v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 40 Mass. App. Ct. 632, 635 (1995), rev. den., 423 Mass. 1106 (1996).
Original appointments of civil service employees are made from a list of candidates, called a “certification”, whose names are drawn in the order in which they appear on the applicable civil service “eligible list”, using what is called the 2n+1 formula. G. L. c. 31, §§ 6 through 11, 16 through 27; Personnel Administration Rules, PAR.09. An appointing authority must provide specific, written reasons – positive or negative, or both -- consistent with basic merit principles – for bypassing a higher ranked candidate in favor of a lower ranked one. G.L. c. 31, § 27; PAR.08(4).
A person may appeal a bypass decision under G.L. c. 31, § 2(b) for de novo review by the Commission. The Commission’s role is to determine whether the appointing authority has shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that it has “reasonable justification” for the bypass after an “impartial and reasonably thorough review” of the relevant background and qualifications bearing on the candidate’s present fitness to perform the duties of the position. Boston Police Dep’t v. Civil Service Comm’n, 483 Mass. 461, 474-78 (2019); Police Dep’t of Boston v. Kavaleski, 463 Mass. 680, 688-89 (2012); Beverly v. Civil Service Comm’n, 78 Mass. App. Ct. 182, 187 (2010); Leominster v. Stratton, 58 Mass. App. Ct. 726, 727-28 (2003).
“Reasonable justification . . . means ‘done upon adequate reasons sufficiently supported by credible evidence, when weighed by an unprejudiced mind, guided by common sense and by correct rules of law’”. Brackett v. Civil Service Comm’n, 447 Mass. 233, 243 (2006); Commissioners of Civil Service v. Municipal Ct.,359 Mass. 211, 214 (1971) and cases cited. See also Mayor of Revere v. Civil Service Comm’n, 31 Mass. App. Ct. 315, 321 (1991) (bypass reasons “more probably than not sound and sufficient”).
The governing statute, G.L. c. 31, gives the Commission’s de novo review “broad scope to evaluate the legal basis of the appointing authority's action” and it is not necessary that the Commission find that the appointing authority acted “arbitrarily and capriciously.”City of Cambridge v. Civil Service Comm’n, 43 Mass. App. Ct. 300, 303-305, rev. den., 428 Mass. 1102 (1997). Thecommission “. . . cannot substitute its judgment about a valid exercise of discretion based on merit or policy considerations by an appointing authority” but, when there are “overtones of political control or objectives unrelated to merit standards or neutrally applied public policy, then the occasion is appropriate for intervention by the commission.” Id. (emphasis added). See also Town of Brookline v. Alston, 487 Mass. 278 (2021) (analyzing broad scope of the Commission’s jurisdiction to enforce basic merit principles under civil service law).
Public safety officers are vested with considerable power and discretion and must be held to a high standard of conduct. See, e.g., Falmouth v. Civil Service Comm’n., 61 Mass. App. Ct. 796, 801 (2004), citing City of Cambridge v. Civil Service Comm’n, 43 Mass. App. Ct. 300, 303-305, rev. den., 428 Mass. 1102 (1997); Police Comm’r v. Civil Service Comm’n, 22 Mass. App. Ct. 364, 371, rev. den. 398 Mass. 1103 (1986).
An Appointing Authority is well within its rights to bypass an individual for fudging the truth as part of an application for a civil service position. It is reasonable to infer that a person who does so in order to get a job will be inclined to lie on the job. See O’Brien v. Somerville, 25 MCSR 292 (2012). See also Minoie v. Town of Braintree, 27 MCSR 216 (2014); Polin v. Randolph, 23 MCSR 229 (2011).
Although G.L. c. 31, § 27 requires an appointing authority to file written bypass reasons “immediately,” a delay in doing so is a procedural defect, not an automatic basis to invalidate an otherwise justified bypass. Relief is warranted only where the defect prejudiced the appellant’s substantial rights—for example, by impairing the ability to file a timely appeal or to obtain meaningful Commission review. See G.L. c. 30A, § 14(7); Sherman v. Randolph, 472 Mass. 802, 812 (2015); City of Boston v. MCAD, 47 Mass. App. Ct. 816, 819 n.6 (1999).
Where the bypass reasons existed at the time of the decision, were supported by credible evidence, and the appellant ultimately received notice and a full evidentiary hearing, the Commission should not overturn the bypass based solely on delayed notice. The dispositive issue remains whether the appointing authority had “reasonable justification”—that is, adequate reasons supported by credible evidence and grounded in common sense and correct rules of law. See City of Cambridge v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 43 Mass. App. Ct. 300, 303-05 (1997); City of Beverly v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 78 Mass. App. Ct. 182, 187-88 (2010); Brackett v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 447 Mass. 233, 241 (2006). If earlier notice would not have altered the available relief or the Commission’s ability to review the merits, the delay supplies no independent sole basis to disturb the appointing authority’s decision.
As a preliminary matter, the Appellant argues that the WFD failed to comply with the civil service law and rules by not providing him with bypass reasons “immediately”. Section 27 of Chapter 31, as amended by Chapter 238 of the Acts of 2024, states in relevant part that, when a candidate is bypassed for appointment:
“… the appointing authority shall immediately provide to the [bypassed candidate] a written statement of the reasons for appointing the [lower ranked candidate] and such appointment shall be effective only when such statement of reasons has been provided. This written statement shall notify the bypassed individual of their right to appeal to the commission, should the reasons proffered not be deemed by the individual sound and sufficient, within 60 days of issuance of the statement of reasons.”
Personnel Administration Rule (PAR) .08(4) is the rule meant to administer this section of the statute. PAR.08(4), however, was adopted prior to: a) a decision by the state’s Human Resources Division (HRD)—in statutory terms, the “Administrator”—delegating many duties and responsibilities to Appointing Authorities; and b) the 2024 statutory changes to Section 27 designed to reflect the new delegation scheme.
Taken together, the delegation and recent statutory changes eliminate the need for appointing authorities to submit bypass reasons to HRD. Rather, appointing authorities must now send the bypass reasons directly to the bypassed candidate and continue to notify the bypassed candidates of their right to appeal the bypass to the Civil Service Commission.
The now outdated PAR, however, states in part that “… No reasons that are known or reasonably discoverable by the appointing authority, and which have not been disclosed to the Personnel Administrator, shall later be admissible as reasons for selection or bypass in any proceeding before the Personnel Administrator or the Civil Service Commission … .”
In Otero v. City of Lowell and Civ. Serv. Comm’n, Middlesex Sup. Crt. No. SUCV 2016-3429-LI (2019), the Superior Court concluded that, if the bypass reasons weren’t provided to the bypassed candidate “immediately” (i.e. – at the time or even before the appointments became effective), then the appointing authority was effectively barred from using those reasons to defend the bypass before the Civil Service Commission. Put another way, if the appointing authority waited 30 days after the effective date of the appointments to notify the bypassed candidates of the reasons for bypass, the bypass was invalid.
Respectfully, this was not the intention of the Rules, even as currently drafted. While the statute requires immediate notification of bypass reasons to non-selected candidates, the corresponding rules did not intend to effectively invalidate a bypass when immediate notification to a bypassed candidate did not occur. In fact, the proverbial hammer referenced in the statute to ensure immediate notification was limited only to the effective date of the selected candidate’s appointment, leaving the possibility that the effective date of the appointment could be delayed if the appointing authority failed to meet the immediate notification standard.
The reference in the PARs that no reasons that are known to the appointing authority and not disclosed to HRD (now the candidate under delegation) shall later be admissible before the Civil Service Commission is distinguishable from the statutory immediate notification requirement. The clear intent of the PARs is to prohibit an appointing authority from putting forth additional reasons for bypass beyond those stated in the notification, regardless of whether the notification was sent “immediately”, or within a reasonable time period thereafter, to the bypassed candidate. The following example illustrates the intent of PAR.08(4). An appointing authority notifies a candidate of three reasons for bypass via letter. The bypassed candidate files a timely appeal of those reasons with the Commission and a pre-hearing is conducted by the Commission. As part of the pre-hearing, it becomes apparent that the three reasons for bypass may not be justified. The PARs are meant to prohibit an appointing authority from then citing an additional reason for bypass to justify the bypass decision before the Commission, if they were already aware of the reason at the time the bypass letter was sent to the bypassed candidate.
While the statute still provides a mechanism for ensuring compliance with the immediate notification requirement, neither the statute nor the rules effectively invalidate a bypass due to a short delay in sending out bypass letters. A short delay is precisely what happened here and I see no reason not to evaluate the substantive reasons for bypass because of that short gap in notification.
In regard to this appeal, I find that the WFD has shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that it had reasonable justification to bypass the Appellant for appointment as a firefighter based upon misstatements on his application, lack of transparency, past interactions with the police, and the shifting narrative surrounding his rationale for his misstatements and omissions.
The evidence shows that the Appellant, at the time that he filled out the WFD application, was not certified or licensed as an EMT. While being an EMT was not a requirement to be appointed as a Weymouth fire fighter, the fact that the Appellant stated that he had such a license, when in fact he did not, is troubling. The question on the application is unambiguous: “Do you have a Massachusetts, National, or other EMT or Paramedic license?” The Appellant checked the “yes” box and then wrote “EMT License.” He did not state that he took the course and had yet to take the test or any of the other narratives he would later tell the hiring officers to re-frame this statement. It was clear and definitive. Further, when asked for documentation, the Appellant had the opportunity to clarify his situation but instead continued to make vague and misleading statements suggesting that he had held an EMT license at some point in the past. When Deputy Chief Murphy wrote him asking him to supply his EMT number that he agreed to provide during the interview, the Appellant wrote, “my EMT number is non existent do [sic] to being lapsed and not current”. This statement is not accurate as no license was ever issued to the Appellant at the time. He further stated that he was “unable to access the system as well as the paperwork being lossed [sic] over the years,” which again implies that he was licensed at some point or else he would have never been in the system in the first place. I believe his statements were deliberately deceptive and intended to make it appear that he was, at least at some point, a licensed EMT.
Equally troubling was the Appellant’s assertion that he received an honorable discharge from the US Army. He stated in his application that his discharge was honorable and did not qualify this statement in any way. When Deputy Chief Murphy questioned him regarding documentation showing that he was honorably discharged, he stated that he was “working with the proper channel to request a new updated dd214 but that could take months to receive.” The Appellant was aware that he received a general discharge under honorable conditions as opposed to an honorable discharge and I find that he was not being totally forthcoming in this regard. His later explanation that he was honorably discharged when he extended his contract and that the Army discharged him (with a DD-214) only to immediately recommit him is illogical. He later tried to state that he received an honorable discharge for the first half of his service in an attempt to explain his statement on his application. The Army does not typically issue DD-214’s when a soldier extends their contract – only when they are separated from service – and, in fact, the Appellant possessed a DD-214 that listed his separation code as JKQ - General (Under Honorable Conditions). Therefore, his statement regarding that he was waiting for an updated form showing that he was honorably discharged appears to be, at best, misleading. I am confident that he knew his discharge status and attempted to use the VA form (which does not distinguish between honorable and general under honorable conditions due to the fact that they both entitled the person to VA services) to cloud matters; once again, I view it as a deliberate act to mislead and cover up his misstatements. In addition, the Appellant stated during the hearing before the Commission that he was demoted in rank due to discipline while in the Army from Sergeant to specialist, but on his application, he states that his Article 15 (fraternization) charge was dismissed with no findings.
I did not find the Appellant credible regarding his explanations concerning both his EMT certification status as well as his military discharge status. In both instances, it appears, rather than a matter of mere misunderstanding, that the Appellant was trying to explain away his misstatements as well as the additional information he provided in an attempt to distance himself from unflattering personal facts. I believe he knew at the time of his application that his answers were not truthful and attempted to deflect once the true facts were discovered. What makes this situation particularly disheartening is that if the Appellant had put down the correct information on these questions, neither answer would have disqualified him from being hired as a Weymouth firefighter.
Although his past interactions with police personnel are significant, especially given that one of these instances was the impetus for the discipline that led to his general as opposed to honorable discharge from the Army, I have determined that there is no need to go into detail surrounding each of these events. Further, given the fact that the two reasons addressed in this analysis are significant enough to uphold the City’s decision to bypass, I chose not to go into greater detail surrounding the other issues listed in the bypass letter.
For all the above-stated reasons, the appeal of Dylan Kelley, filed under docket number G1-25-256, is hereby denied.
Civil Service Commission
/s/ Shawn C. Dooley
Shawn C. Dooley
Commissioner
By vote of the Civil Service Commission (Bowman, Chair; Dooley, Markey, McConney, & Stein, Commissioners) on July 9, 2026.
Either party may file a motion for reconsideration within ten days of receipt of this Commission order or decision. Under the pertinent provisions of the Code of Mass. Regulations, 801 CMR 1.01(7)(l), the motion must identify a clerical or mechanical error in this order or decision or a significant factor the Agency or the Presiding Officer may have overlooked in deciding the case. A motion for reconsideration does not toll the statutorily prescribed thirty-day time limit for seeking judicial review of this Commission order or decision.
Under the provisions of G.L. c. 31, § 44, any party aggrieved by this Commission order or decision may initiate proceedings for judicial review under G.L. c. 30A, § 14 in the superior court within thirty (30) days after receipt of this order or decision. Commencement of such proceeding shall not, unless specifically ordered by the court, operate as a stay of this Commission order or decision. After initiating proceedings for judicial review in Superior Court, the plaintiff, or his / her attorney, is required to serve a copy of the summons and complaint upon the Boston office of the Attorney General of the Commonwealth, with a copy to the Civil Service Commission, in the time and in the manner prescribed by Mass. R. Civ. P. 4(d).
Notice to:
Jack C. Zachary, Esq (for Appellant)
John M. Collins, Esq. (for Respondent)
