On September 26, 2025, the Appellants—Shelley Lucier, Mala Ouchattou, and Michelle Waring (Appellants)—filed a timely appeal pursuant to G.L. c. 30, § 49, with the Civil Service Commission (Commission) contesting the decision of the Human Resources Division (HRD) to affirm the Department of Transportation (MassDOT)’s denial of their request for reclassification from Compliance Officer II (CO II) to Compliance Officer III (CO III). The Commission held a concurrent remote pre-hearing conference on November 18, 2025. On January 27, 2026, I conducted a concurrent evidentiary hearing at the offices of the Commission, located at 100 Cambridge Street, Boston, Massachusetts. I recorded the hearing via the Webex platform and forwarded a link to this recording to all parties. Both the Appellants and Respondent filed proposed decisions. For the reasons set forth below, the Appellants’ appeals are denied.
Findings of Fact
The Appellants entered eight exhibits (App. Exhibits 1-8) into evidence and MassDOT entered 18 exhibits into evidence (Res. Exhibits 1-18). Based on the exhibits entered into evidence and the testimony of the following witnesses:
Called by MassDOT:
• Amy Lynch, Classification and Compensation Manager, MassDOT
• Audrey Drinan, HR Specialist II, MassDOT
Called by the Appellants:
• Luis Sanchez, Program Coordinator III, Supervisor – DOT’s Electronic Vehicle Registration (EVR) Division
• Mala Ouchattou, Appellant
and taking administrative notice of all papers filed in the case, plus pertinent rules, statutes, regulations, case law, and policies and drawing from reasonable inferences from the credible evidence, I make the following findings of fact:
1. The Appellants’ respective appointment dates at MassDOT are as follows: Shelley Lucier - April 12, 2020, Mala Ouchattou - December 10, 2000, and Michelle Waring - January 4, 2009. (Stipulated Fact)
2. The Appellants were promoted to their current title (CO II) on the following dates: Shelley Lucier – May 7, 2023, Mala Ouchattou – May 3, 2020, and Michelle Waring – April 4, 2020. (Stipulated Fact)
3. All three Appellants hold the title of Compliance Officer II within the Electronic Vehicle Registration (EVR) Program. (Stipulated Fact)
4. In this role, the Appellants provide information concerning business policies and procedures to EVR Permit Holders and Associated Service Providers in the EVR Program (primarily vehicle dealerships and insurance agencies) during onboarding and implementation. The Appellants conduct (throughout the year) on-site field audits and compliance reviews of EVR Permit Holders, and verify that they comply with all rules, regulations, and standards applicable to the EVR Program. (Resp. Exhibits 3, 4, and 5)
5. On November 15, 2024, the Appellants filed requests for reclassification from Compliance Officer II (COII) to Compliance Officer III (COIII). (Stipulated Fact)
6. Amy Lynch, the Manager of MassDOT’s Classification and Compensation unit, assigned Audrey Drinan, Classification and Compensation Analyst, to review the Appellants’ applications. (Testimony of Lynch)
7. Ms. Drinan then requested the Appellants’ Form 30s which describe each of the Appellant’s duties and responsibilities. These forms are reviewed annually by the Appellants as well as their supervisor/manager. The Appellants signed these forms indicating that the job description as outlined on that form is accurate. (Resp.
Exhibits 3, 4, and 5; Testimony of Lynch)
8. Ms. Drinan also obtained a copy of each of the Appellants’ most recent Employee Performance Review System reports (EPRS). These also outline the Appellants’ duties and responsibilities as well as the evaluation of the Appellants’ performance of those duties and responsibilities over the course of the current employment year. (Resp. Exhibits 3, 4, and 5; Testimony of Lynch)
9. As part of the reclassification process, each Appellant filled out a questionnaire specifying the amount of time they perform on each of their job functions. This was reviewed by Ms. Drinan as part of her investigation into the Appellants’ request for reclassification. (Resp. Exhibits 9, 10, and 11; Testimony of Lynch)
10. Ms. Drinan also reviewed HRD’s Classification Specification for both the current (Compliance Officer II) and requested (Compliance Officer III) classifications. (Resp. Exhibit 1; Testimony of Lynch)
11. The Classification Specification for the Compliance Officer Series (CO I, II, III) has not been updated since 1987. (Resp. Exhibit 1)
12. Compliance Officer II is the second level professional job in this series. (Resp. Exhibit 1)
13. The level distinguishing duties listed for Compliance Officer II in the classification specification are as follows:
• Determine procedures to be used in collecting information and evidence in connection with complaints and alleged non-compliance with laws, rules, and regulations.
• Make recommendations concerning changes in policies and procedures governing assigned unit activities.
(Resp. Exhibit 1)
14. Compliance Officer III is the first level supervisory job in this series. (Resp. Exhibit 1)
15. The level distinguishing duties listed for Compliance Officer III in the classification specification are as follows:
• Oversee and coordinate assigned unit activities in order to ensure effective operations and compliance with laws, rules, regulations, and policies.
• Provide on-the-job training for employees.
• Review and analyze reports, memoranda, etc. for accuracy, completeness, and content and to take appropriate action to resolve problems.
• Confer with management staff and other agency personnel in order to provide information, to resolve problems and/or to recommend changes in policies and procedures.
(Resp. Exhibit 1)
16. All three Appellants listed their job duties and the percentage of time assigned to each task as exactly the same. The breakout is as follows:
• 28% - Provide compliance support to over 100+ locations
• 25% - Evaluate IEP users through transitional audits in the Diligent program for accuracy and completion.
• 10% - Provide business policies and procedures training/support to end users and associated service providers.
• 10% - Collaborate with other agencies and MassDOT Departments on projects and process improvements.
• 5% - Maintain vendor and third-party relationships.
• 5% - Review IEPs evaluation with ownership for proper follow up and training to identify trends related to transactional processing.
• 5% - Review and analyze data concerning assigned agency programs in order to determine progress and recommendations in procedures, guidelines, and to devise methods in accomplishing RMV objectives.
• 3% - Oversee successful implementation of EVR end user site installations.
• 3% - Update EVR reference guide and manuals as needed.
• 3% - Ensure all complaints are reacted to in a timely fashion.
• 3% - Provide input to update curriculum
(Resp. Exhibits 9, 10, and 11)
17. Ms. Drinan determined that many of the duties that the Appellants cited were consistent with the duties common to all levels in the Compliance Officer Series as listed in the Compliance Officer Series Classification Specifications—and thus duties that are performed by Compliance Officer I and IIs. (Resp. Exhibit 1; Testimony of Ms. Drinan)
18. Wherever possible, Ms. Drinan tried to align the breakout of job duties listed by the Appellants with the Form 30s and compiled that in the job analysis comparison chart as part of the classification appeal recommendation form that was given to each Appellant. (Resp. Exhibits 6, 7, and 8; Testimony of Drinan)
19. By using the detail provided in the Form 30, Ms. Drinan compared the job duty of providing compliance support to over 100+ locations (28%) to the common duties outlined in Section IV of the classification specification as follows:
¶ 1. Monitors, for an assigned program area, various activities, services or functions through observation, interviews, evaluations and /or conferences in order to ensure compliance with governing laws, rules, regulations, program goals, etc. and to provide feedback concerning agency programs.
¶ 5. Obtains evidence and establishes facts concerning complaints and alleged non-compliance with laws, rules and regulations by interviewing individuals and conducting on-site visits in order to determine extent of non-compliance, validity of complaints and to prepare evidence or information for appropriate action.
¶ 6. Verifies information obtained in order to establish accuracy and authenticity of facts.
¶ 7. Confers with parties to complaints in order to resolve issues, make appropriate settlements and to encourage compliance with established laws, rules and regulations.
¶ 8. Prepares reports concerning assigned activities in order to provide requested information and make appropriate recommendations.
¶ 9. Performs related duties such as maintaining records, attending meetings, and preparing correspondence.
(Res. Exhibits 1, 6, 7, and 8; Testimony of Ms. Drinan)
20. According to Ms. Drinan, providing compliance support to over 100+ locations should be considered a CO III duty. This level distinguishing duty is listed in the classification specification under CO III and states:
• Incumbents of this level also review and analyze reports, memoranda, etc. for accuracy, completeness, and content and to take appropriate action to resolve problems.
(Res. Exhibits 1, 6, 7, and 8; Testimony of Ms. Drinan)
21. Ms. Drinan further used the Form 30s to compare the job duty that the Appellants listed as representing 25% of their time (evaluating IEP users through transitional audits in the Diligent program for accuracy and completion) to the common duties outlined in Section IV of the classification specification as follows:
¶ 3. Maintains liaison and makes contact with assigned agency personnel in order to provide information concerning, and encourage compliance with, the provisions of laws, rules, regulations, etc.
¶ 4. Responds to inquiries in order to provide information concerning agency policies and procedures and laws, rules and regulations governing agency activities.
(Resp. Exhibits 1, 6, 7, and 8; Testimony of Ms. Drinan)
22. The CO III level distinguishing duty of reviewing and analyzing reports would also be an aspect of this job duty. (Testimony of Ms. Drinan)
23. Mr. Luis Sanchez is the supervisor for MassDOT’s EVR Division which entails supervising all three of the Appellants. Mr. Sanchez is the only Compliance Officer III in the EVR Division. (Testimony of Sanchez)
24. Further, it was established that the Appellants do spend some of their time training new hires which would be considered a COIII distinguishing duty. Mr. Sanchez explained that new hire training primarily consists of being assigned to a current CO II for on-the-job training and shadowing. In addition, if there is an employee who needs re-training in a particular area, they would be typically assigned to one of the other compliance officers in the EVR unit for shadowing/re-training. This training aspect is hard to quantify from a time standpoint as much of the training is observational as the “trainer” COII brings the trainee with them in the field to watch and learn while the “trainer” is performing their normal day-to-day tasks. (Testimony of Sanchez)
25. The EVR unit had two new employees hired in 2025, none in 2024, one in 2023, and none in 2022 and 2021, which further complicates being able to assign a percentage of time for this duty to any of the Appellants. (Testimony of Sanchez)
26. On January 24, 2025, Ms. Lynch issued MassDOT’s denial of the Appellants’ appeals stating that a majority of their duties are consistent with their current title of Compliance Officer II. (Res. Exhibit 12, 13, and 14)
27. On June 10, 2025, the Appellants appealed that denial with HRD, which was denied on September 2, 2025. (Testimony of Lynch)
Legal Standard
Section 49 of G.L. c. 30 provides in relevant part as follows:
“Any manager or employee of the commonwealth objecting to any provision of the classification affecting his office or position may appeal in writing to the personnel administrator . . . . Any manager or employee or group of employees further aggrieved after appeal to the personnel administrator may appeal to the civil service commission. Said commission shall hear all appeals as if said appeals were originally entered before it. If said commission finds that the office or position of the person appealing warrants a different position reallocation . . . it shall be effective as of the date of appeal . . . .”
To obtain a reclassification, as a general rule, an employee must establish that they are performing duties encompassed within the higher-level position a majority (i.e., at least 50% or more) of the time. See Thompson v. Division of Insurance and HRD, 29 MCSR 565 (2016) (an appellant must prove this by a preponderance of the evidence); Pellegrino v. Dep’t of State Police, 18 MCSR 261 (2005) (at least 51%); Gaffey v. Dept. of Revenue, 24 MCSR 380, 381 (2011) (more than 50%); Morawski v. Dep’t of Revenue, 14 MCSR 188 (2001) (more than 50%); Madison v. Dep’t of Public Health, 12 MCSR 49 (1999) (at least 50%); Kennedy v. Holyoke Cmty. Coll., 11 MCSR 302 (1998) (at least 50%). More specifically, the Appellants must demonstrate that the majority of the time they perform their duties, they perform activities that are “level distinguishing duties”. Duties which fall within both the higher and lower title do not count as “distinguishing duties”.
However, particularly where the assigned job title is not a good fit, the Commission is not bound to apply the classification specifications literally in every case. Blodgett v. Massachusetts Highway Dept., 24 MCSR 588 (2011); Lefebvre v. Department of Early Education, 22 MCSR 149 (2009). When analyzing a reclassification appeal, it is within the Commission’s discretion to weigh all of the facts and to make a determination based on the evidence presented. Past reported Commission reclassification decisions have established that the Commission is not bound to interpret the classification specifications in an overly literal fashion when adjudicating a case. Blodgett, 24 MCSR 590 (2011); Lefebvre, 22 MCSR 149 (2009). The Commission also possesses discretion to take into account all the facts and evidence admitted when making a decision in reclassification appeals in cases where the specifications against which current job responsibilities are being measured are outdated. When accounting for outdated specifications, the Commission has previously considered major shifts in the occupation’s field in cases where the description is highly rigid to determine the reasonability of the description. These factors include the role’s adaptation of new technology and the evolution or material broadening of the title’s scope of duties. Strong v. DPH, 37 MCSR 199 (2024).
Analysis
As a preliminary matter, the compliance officer job specifications have not been updated in almost four decades. While duties and responsibilities associated with such positions as compliance officer may not change markedly over the years, relying on job specifications that have not been reviewed, updated, or even refreshed in 40 years to make reclassification decisions is increasingly indefensible. While resources are always limited, ongoing efforts to update, or at least refresh, job specifications, need to be expedited, so that reclassification decisions such as this can be based on current and accurate descriptions of what is expected of incumbents in each classification.
To make my decision here, I have relied on all the relevant evidence submitted, including the job specifications, the Form 30s, the interview guide completed by each Appellant, and the testimony of those witnesses directly familiar with the job duties performed.
While all three of the Appellants are exemplary employees who go above and beyond what is required of them, the standard for reclassification is primarily tied to the determination as to whether they perform the level distinguishing duties of the job title that is being requested more than 50% of the time. While they have shown that there are certain aspects of the next higher title that they do perform, the Appellants were unable to show that they performed these tasks a majority of the time on a consistent basis and thus were unable to meet the 51% hurdle. When these 1987 specifications are eventually revisited, it is my hope that a mid-tier classification will be made available so a more experienced CO II who has greater responsibilities will not be classified the same as a new hire. Since these individuals are performing more tasks than are called for in the current specification, that should be recognized through an updated reclassification plan.
In analyzing this appeal, I considered the wide spectrum of services the Appellants perform throughout the year and that they work, for the most part, independently with their assigned locations. And while I appreciate the argument that this independence causes them to “supervise/oversee” each location or client the Appellants are assigned to, it does not meet the definition of first line supervision. The same holds true with the argument that throughout the year they confer with management of these locations as an example of meeting a level distinguishing duty. While this may be the case, it is clear that the relevant aspect of the CO III job specification is referring to internal MassDOT management as opposed to the clients when it states that a CO III will “confer with management staff and other agency personnel”.
The Appellants’ lack of formal supervisory duties associated with the requested higher-level title, independent of their failure to devote more than 50% of time to level distinguishing duties, also proves sufficient for reclassification denial. Sutliff v. Executive Office of Labor and Workforce Development, 32 MCSR 26 (2019). While the Appellants may train, answer questions, evaluate, and provide guidance for the people and organizations they serve, they do not evaluate peers and lack a formal supervisory role. The Commission has held that this lack of a specific supervisory role, as defined in the Compliance Officer III specification, which lists CO III as the first level of a principally supervisory job in this series, is sufficient to deny a reclassification appeal. See, e.g., Sutliff, supra, at 28; Snyder v. Dept. of Revenue, 23 MCSR 376, 380-81 (2010).
While the Appellants perform a wide range of duties that they handle on a day-to-day basis which they believe are more in line with a Compliance Officer III position, they neglect to specifically quantify the time involved in completing these duties and how they relate to their overall time so that it constitutes a majority of their worktime. Even allowing for the most generous interpretation of these duties, many of which can be assigned to all levels of the Compliance Officer series, the amount of time performing these tasks does not come close to being a majority of their work time.
I also considered the testimony that the Appellants were often called upon to train new employees and re-train existing employees. While this aspect does fall under the duties expected of a CO III, the Appellants were unable to quantify the amount of time dedicated to this aspect of their jobs. This was further complicated by the fact that the training primarily consists of the new hire shadowing one of the Appellants while they are performing their normal day to day tasks. In addition, training new employees is not an on-going aspect of their jobs as there have only been three new EVR CO II hires in the past five years. And while I appreciate that part of the job entails training the business partners and permit holders on various aspects of the EVR process including software, that does not constitute training employees. I interpret the duty referred to in the specification as training actual employees of the Commonwealth to do their job, not assisting clients or vendors.
Further, even if an individual completes duties specific to a requested title, that is not necessarily sufficient to achieve reclassification. An appellant may perform more complex work than described in their current classification and which instead fits within the desired classification. However, the Commission has held that if these duties are sporadic and not the main focus of the individual’s responsibilities, they are insufficient to justify reclassification. Saunders v. Department of Labor Standards, 32 MCSR (2019). While the Appellants perform some of the distinguishing job duties of a Compliance Officer III, they failed to show that they performed those job duties more than 50% of the time. Even if I were to agree that some of the Appellants’ current workload could be further categorized under CO III distinguishing duties, they still fail to get over the threshold for reclassification because these duties are sporadic and not pertinent to all three of the Appellants.
Conclusion
The Appellants have failed to meet the burden of proving that they perform the specific job duties of a Compliance Officer III a majority of the time. Therefore, the Appellants’ reclassification appeals are denied.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
/s/ Shawn C. Dooley
Shawn C. Dooley
Commissioner
By a vote of the Civil Service Commission (Bowman, Chair; Dooley, Markey, McConney, and Stein, Commissioners) on April 16, 2026.
Either party may file a motion for reconsideration within ten days of receipt of this Commission order or decision. Under the pertinent provisions of the Code of Mass. Regulations, 801 CMR 1.01(7)(l), the motion must identify a clerical or mechanical error in this order or decision or a significant factor the Agency or the Presiding Officer may have overlooked in deciding the case. A motion for reconsideration does not toll the statutorily prescribed thirty-day time limit for seeking judicial review of this Commission order or decision.
Under the provisions of G.L. c. 31, § 44, any party aggrieved by this Commission order or decision may initiate proceedings for judicial review under G.L. c. 30A, § 14 in the superior court within thirty (30) days after receipt of this order or decision. Commencement of such proceeding shall not, unless specifically ordered by the court, operate as a stay of this Commission order or decision. After initiating proceedings for judicial review in Superior Court, the plaintiff, or his / her attorney, is required to serve a copy of the summons and complaint upon the Boston office of the Attorney General of the Commonwealth, with a copy to the Civil Service Commission, in the time and in the manner prescribed by Mass. R. Civ. P. 4(d).
Notice to:
Shelley Lucier (Appellant)
Mala Ouchattou (Appellant)
Michelle Waring (Appellant)
James Norton, Esq. (for Respondent)
Lynne-Marie Reveliotis, Esq. (for Respondent)
Michele Heffernan, Esq. (HRD)
