On June 26, 2026, I issued a decision that affirmed the Massachusetts Teachers’ Retirement System’s (MTRS) conclusion that the petitioner’s regular compensation during the second year preceding her retirement needed to be reduced under the “anti-spiking” provision in G.L. c. 32, § 5(2)(f). At the end of the decision, I directed the MTRS “to return to the petitioner, with interest, any excess withholdings.” On June 30, 2026, the MTRS moved for reconsideration, insisting that the directive to return any excess withholdings with interest is “not supported by Chapter 32, case law, and PERAC’s position on this issue.” The petitioner has not responded to the MTRS’s motion. The MTRS is mistaken, so its motion is denied.
With respect to the MTRS’s first argument, Section 5(2)(f) of Chapter 32, which describes how retirement boards are to determine whether a portion of regular compensation is to be excluded because of spiking, provides: “Any withholdings excluded from the calculation of a member’s average annual rate of regular compensation under this paragraph, shall be returned to the member with interest at the assumed actuarial rate.” (Emphases added.) The plain language of the Section 5(2)(f) is unambiguous and compulsory—excess withholdings must be returned with interest. See Garcia v. Exec. Off. of Hous. & Livable Communities, 495 Mass. 86, 91 (2024) (“the Legislature’s use of the word ‘shall’ reflects the imposition of a nondiscretionary, mandatory obligation”). See generally Mahan v. Bos. Ret. Bd., 490 Mass. 604, 613 (2022) (“Courts must follow the plain language of a statute when it is unambiguous and when its application would not lead to an absurd result, or contravene the Legislature’s clear intent.” (Quotation omitted.)).
In urging a contrary conclusion, the MTRS relies upon G.L. c. 32, § 20(5)(c)(2). Section 20(5)(c)(2) provides a remedy for errors in contributions and benefit calculations. The MTRS claims that the excess withholdings at issue here are tantamount to a contribution error and are therefore governed by Section 20(5)(c)(2). Even if the MTRS’s analogy to a contribution error were valid (an issue that I do not decide), its argument overlooks the well-settled cannon of statutory interpretation that an on-point and more specific statute controls over a general one. See, e.g., Frechette v. D’Andrea, 494 Mass. 167, 175 (2024). Here, Section 5(2)(f) addresses the remedy for excess withholdings in the anti-spiking context in particular, and it is therefore “the more specific” (and controlling) statute in the circumstances presented.
The MTRS’s second argument—that the directive to return any excess withholdings with interest is not supported by case law—relies upon decisions that did not involve the interpretation or application of the anti-spiking provision in G.L. c. 32, § 5(2)(f). In Hollstein v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Board, ten employees of the Boston School Committee claimed that the Boston Retirement Board erred in “denying them interest payments on pension contributions improperly deducted from their wages.” 47 Mass. App. Ct. 109, 110 (1999). Hollstein rejected that argument, relying upon its interpretation of G.L. c. 32, § 20(5)(c) to hold that a “requirement to pay interest on excessive pension deductions should not be read into the statute where the Legislature did not provide for it.” Id. at 111. Here, as noted, the Legislature did provide for the payment of interest on excess withholdings in the anti-spiking context. See G.L. c. 32, § 5(2)(f). Herrick v. Essex Regional Retirement Board, the other case cited by the MTRS, holds that where “a retirement board makes a legal error in denying retirement benefits that is corrected by a court, the plaintiff is entitled to a rate of interest determined by the board’s actuary.” 465 Mass. 801, 802 (2013) (quotation omitted). Nothing of the sort happened here. Herrick does not advance the MTRS’s position.
In addition, the MTRS’s argument sits uncomfortably next to at least fifteen decisions from the Division of Administrative Law Appeals (DALA) that direct the return of excess withholdings with interest in the anti-spiking context. Given the plain language of Section 5(2)(f), as described above, I find these many decisions to be both persuasive and correct.
Finally, contrary to the MTRS’s third argument, PERAC has issued guidance that expressly calls for excess withholdings to be returned with interest in the anti-spiking context. PERAC Memo # 38 / 2012 states:
If a member is found to violate the provisions of Section [5(2)(f)], then a retirement board would need to determine the amount of the contributions the member made on regular compensation above and beyond the regular compensation used in determining his or her benefit. These excess contributions would be refunded to the member along with interest at the assumed actuarial rate used in a system’s most recent actuarial valuation.
So, PERAC’s relevant guidance is consistent with the plain language of Section 5(2)(f) and the many DALA decisions listed supra, n.5. PERAC Memo # 14 / 2018, the one on which the MTRS relies in its motion for reconsideration, simply reflects the holdings of Hollstein and Herrick, which for the reasons discussed above, involved scenarios not presented here. Memo # 14 / 2018 does not purport to clarify or supersede Memo # 38 / 2012. In fact, it does not mention the anti-spiking provision in Section 5(2)(f) at all.
Chapter 32, on-point decisions, and PERAC’s guidance all indicate that the MTRS must return to the petitioner, with interest, any excess withholdings. The motion for reconsideration is, therefore, denied.
___/s/ Thomas E. Bocian______________________
Thomas E. Bocian
Administrative Magistrate
Division of Administrative Law Appeals
14 Summer Street, 4th floor
Malden, MA 02148
Tel: (781) 397-4700
www.mass.gov/dala