| Date: | 06/25/2026 |
|---|---|
| Organization: | Civil Service Commission |
| Docket Number: | G1-26-101 |
The Commission dismissed the bypass appeal of a candidate for Boston Police Officer as he presented no new material information warranting a departure from the Commission’s previous adverse decision in December 2024.
CSC Law Clerk Jack Moses assisted with the drafting of this decision.
Pursuant to G.L. c. 31, § 2(b), the Appellant, Armani Marsman (Appellant), filed a timely appeal to the Civil Service Commission (Commission) contesting the decision of the Boston Police Department (Respondent or Department) to bypass him for original appointment to the position of permanent full-time police officer. The Department based its decision on the Appellant’s untruthfulness. The Commission held a pre-hearing conference on June 9, 2026 via videoconference. For the reasons set forth below, the appeal is denied.
Prior Bypass Appeal
Current Bypass Appeal
The Commission may, on motion or upon its own initiative, dismiss an appeal at any time for lack of jurisdiction or for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 801 CMR 5 1.01(7)(g)(3). A motion to resolve an appeal before the Commission, in whole or in part, via summary decision may be filed pursuant to 801 C.M.R. 1.01(7)(h). An appeal may be disposed of, however, on summary disposition only when, “viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party”, the undisputed material facts affirmatively demonstrate that the non-moving party has “no reasonable expectation” of prevailing on at least one “essential element of the case”. See, e.g., Milliken & Co. v. Duro Textiles LLC, 451 Mass. 547, 550 n.6 (2008); Maimonides School v. Coles, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 240, 249 (2008); Lydon v. Massachusetts Parole Board, 18 MCSR 216 (2005). See also Mangino v. HRD, 27 MCSR 34 (2014) and cases cited (“The notion underlying the summary decision process in administrative proceedings parallels the civil practice under Mass.R.Civ.P.56, namely, when no genuine issues of material fact exist, the agency is not required to conduct a meaningless hearing.”); Morehouse v. Weymouth Fire Dept, 26 MCSR 176 (2013) (“a party may move for summary decision when . . . there is no genuine issue of fact relating to his or her claim or defense and the party is entitled to prevail as a matter of law.”)
The undisputed facts, viewed in a light most favorable to the Appellant, establish that this appeal must be dismissed.
Here, the bypass reasons for this most recent hiring cycle are essentially the same as those contained in the prior hiring cycle when the Department bypassed the Appellant. Given that the Commission recently affirmed the Appellant’s bypass for the same reasons in the prior hiring cycle, there are no factual disputes which would warrant a new evidentiary hearing. Put another way, there is no additional information that could be presented by the Appellant that would change the Commission’s decision regarding the validity of the bypass reasons, reached by the Commission in a decision only a little over a year ago. SeeLima v. City of New Bedford, 33 MCSR 285 (2020) (Commission dismissed that appellant’s second bypass appeal as it had upheld same reasons in prior bypass decided by Commission months earlier); Reynolds v. City of Brockton, 37 MCSR 37 (2024).
The Appellant argues that the Commission’s May 20, 2022 decision granting relief to the Appellant was final, and the Department was thus barred from bypassing the Appellant specifically for concerns with the Appellant’s work history. The Appellant’s argument is not persuasive. The May 20, 2022 decision granted relief to the Appellant on the limited grounds that the Department’s bypass of the Appellant “was made without so informing the Appellant and did not conform to the civil service requirements.” Nothing in that decision precluded the Department from bypassing the Appellant in the future due to concerns with the Appellant’s prior work history. Furthermore, as the Appellant’s less than forthcoming testimony before the Commission at a later hearing formed a basis of the current bypass, the May 20, 2022 decision could not have possibly prevented the Department from bypassing the Appellant for this reason.
For the reasons stated above, the Department’s Motion to Dismiss is allowed, and the Appellant’s appeal filed under G1-26-101 is hereby dismissed.
Civil Service Commission
/s/ Christopher Bowman
Christopher C. Bowman
Chairman
By vote of the Civil Service Commission (Bowman, Chair; Markey, McConney, and Stein, Commissioners [Dooley – absent]) on June 25, 2026.
Either party may file a motion for reconsideration within ten days of receipt of this Commission order or decision. Under the pertinent provisions of the Code of Mass. Regulations, 801 C.M.R. § 1.01(7)(l), the motion must identify a clerical or mechanical error in this order or decision or a significant factor the Agency or the Presiding Officer may have overlooked in deciding the case. A motion for reconsideration does not toll the statutorily prescribed thirty-day time limit for seeking judicial review of this Commission order or decision.
Under the provisions of G.L. c. 31, § 44, any party aggrieved by this Commission order or decision may initiate proceedings for judicial review under G.L. c. 30A, § 14 in the superior court within thirty (30) days after receipt of this order or decision. Commencement of such proceeding shall not, unless specifically ordered by the court, operate as a stay of this Commission order or decision. After initiating proceedings for judicial review in Superior Court, the plaintiff, or his / her attorney, is required to serve a copy of the summons and complaint upon the Boston office of the Attorney General of the Commonwealth, with a copy to the Civil Service Commission, in the time and in the manner prescribed by Mass. R. Civ. P. 4(d).
Notice to:
Armani Marsman (Appellant)
Joseph A. McClellan, Esq. (for Respondent)
