| Date: | 04/02/2026 |
|---|---|
| Organization: | Civil Service Commission |
| Docket Number: | G1-25-169 |
The Commission affirmed the decision of the Boston Police Department to bypass a candidate for appointment as a police officer based on her history of poor judgment and her failure to be forthcoming about her association with known criminals.
On July 21, 2025, the Appellant, Terrie Miranda (Appellant), filed a timely appeal with the Civil Service Commission (Commission) pursuant to G.L. c. 31, § 2(b), challenging the decision of the Boston Police Department (BPD) to bypass her for appointment as a police officer. The Commission held a remote pre-hearing conference on August 19, 2025. On January 20, 2026, I conducted an evidentiary hearing at the offices of the Commission, located at 100 Cambridge Street, Boston, Massachusetts.[1] I recorded the hearing via the Webex platform and forwarded a link to this recording to both parties.[2] Both parties filed proposed decisions. For the reasons set forth below, the Appellant’s appeal is denied.
The Appellant did not enter any exhibits into evidence and the BPD entered 11 exhibits into evidence (Ex. 1-11). Based on the exhibits entered into evidence and the testimony of the following witnesses:
Called by the BPD:
Called by the Appellant:
and taking administrative notice of all papers filed in the case, plus pertinent rules, statutes, regulations, case law and policies, and drawing from reasonable inferences from the credible evidence, I make the following findings of fact:
Appellant’s Background
Civil Service Process
BPD Background investigation
The role of the Civil Service Commission in an entry-level bypass appeal is to determine whether, “on the basis of the evidence before it, the appointing authority has sustained its burden of proving that there was reasonable justification for the action taken by the appointing authority.” City of Cambridge v. Civil Service Commission, 43 Mass. App. Ct. 300, 304 (1997); See Town of Watertown v. Arria, 16 Mass. App. Ct. 331 (1983); McIsaac v. Civil Service Commission, 38 Mass. App. Ct. 411 (2000); Police Department of Boston v. Collins, 48 Mass. App. Ct. 411 (2000); City of Leominster v. Stratton, 58 Mass. App. Ct. 726, 728 (2003). The Commission has held in numerous decisions that its function is to determine whether the appointing authority has shown that it had “reasonable justification” for the bypass after an “impartial and reasonably thorough review” of the relevant background and qualifications bearing on the candidate’s present fitness to perform the duties of the position. Boston Police Dep’t v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 483 Mass. 461, 474-78 (2019); Police Dep’t of Boston v. Kavaleski, 463 Mass. 680, 688-89 (2012); Beverly v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 78 Mass. App. Ct. 182, 187 (2010); Leominster v. Stratton, 58 Mass. App. Ct. 726, 727-28 (2003). Massachusetts General Laws chapter 31, § 2(b) provides that “no decision of the administrator[8] … shall be reversed by the commission except upon a finding that such decision was not based upon a preponderance of evidence in the record.”
An action to bypass a candidate is justified when it is “done upon adequate reasons sufficiently supported by credible evidence, when weighed by an unprejudiced mind, guided by common sense and by correct rules of law.” City of Cambridge, 43 Mass. App. Ct. at 304, quoting Selectmen of Wakefield v. Judge of First Dist. Court of Eastern Middlesex, 262 Mass. 477, 482 (1928); Commissioners of Civil Service v. Municipal Court of the City of Boston, 359 Mass. 211, 214 (1971).
City of Cambridge further states, “[i]n the task of selecting employees of skill and integrity, appointing authorities are invested with broad discretion.” Id. at 304. The Commission’s role, while important, is relatively narrow in scope: reviewing the legitimacy and reasonableness of the appointing authority’s actions. Falmouth v. Civil Service Commission, 447 Mass. 814, 824-826 (2006). In doing so, the Commission owes substantial deference to the appointing authority’s exercise of judgment in determining whether there was “reasonable justification” shown. City of Beverly v. Civil Service Commission, 78 Mass. App. Ct. 182, 188 (2010). That “deference is especially appropriate with respect to the hiring of police officers.” Id. The issue for the Commission is “not whether it would have acted as the Appointing Authority had acted, but whether, on the facts found by the Commission, there was reasonable justification for the action taken by the appointing authority in the circumstances found by the Commission to have existed when the appointing authority made its decision.” Town of Watertown v. Arria, 16 Mass. App. Ct. 331, 334 (1983). See Commissioners of Civil Service v. Municipal Ct. of Boston, 369 Mass. 84, 86 (1975) and Leominster v. Stratton, 58 Mass. App. Ct. 726, 727-728 (2003).
The position of a police officer is one of “special public trust,” Police Commissioner of Boston v. Civil Service Commission, 22 Mass. App. Ct. 364, 372 (1986). In seeking employment by the public, police officer candidates “implicitly agree that they will not engage in conduct that calls into question their ability and fitness to perform their official responsibilities.” See id. at 371. Those who are privileged to enter the public service, and especially those who serve in public safety positions as guardians of the lives and property of others, are expected to be held to a higher standard, commensurate with the trust reposed in them. See, e.g., Desmond v. Town of West Bridgewater, 27 MCSR 645 (2014), on remand, 29 MCSR 555 (2016). The Department is well within its rights to bypass an individual for fudging the truth as part of an application process for the position of police officer. See, e.g., Minoie v. Town of Braintree, 27 MCSR 216 (2014) (multiple omissions about prior domestic abuse restraining orders and residences); Noble v. Massachusetts Bay Trans. Auth., 25 MCSR 391 (2012) (concealing suspension from school for involvement in criminal activity); Burns v. City of Holyoke, 23 MCSR 162 (2010) (claiming he withdrew from another law enforcement application process from which he was actually disqualified) Escobar v. Boston Police Dept., 21 MCSR 168 (2008) (misrepresenting residence).
The BPD has shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that it had reasonable justification to bypass the Appellant for appointment as a police officer based on her poor judgment, continued association with a known criminal, as well as her less-than-transparent responses about her knowledge of this history.
I do not credit the Appellant’s testimony regarding her lack of knowledge of her fiancé (J.B.)’s criminal behavior as it did not align with the facts surrounding their relationship. Further, she provided conflicting information regarding their relationship timeline as well as their on-going living situation. While she originally stated that the very first time she heard of any illegal activity was when she received the bypass letter, she admitted during the hearing that she had seen the newspaper article regarding his arrest (including his picture) at the time of the incident. She made further statements I find implausible, including that when her children were brought home by her boyfriend’s sister after he had been arrested, neither the boyfriend’s sister nor her children mentioned the police and corresponding arrest. Her statements relating to being unaware of the charges against J.B. are further undermined by evidence showing DCF involvement after the incident, of which I reasonably conclude the Appellant was aware.
All of this is further compounded by the disconnect as to their dating timeline and living arrangement. In her application, the Appellant stated that they were together as a couple and resided with him from 2016 to the present. Yet throughout her testimony she stated that they had never lived together and the relationship was on again, off again with large chunks of time not being together. Continuing a romantic relationship with an individual with a known criminal history calls into question the Appellant’s maturity and judgment. See Pina v. Boston Police Department, 36 MCSR 184 (2023) (concluding that the BPD’s bypass of a candidate with ties to individuals with a significant criminal history provided reasonable justification to bypass the candidate for appointment.) Here, the Appellant maintained a relationship with J.B. after learning that he was in possession of a significant amount of heroin and fentanyl, illegal substances that have caused untold harm to the public, and he was transporting these drugs while her children were in his custody and care. The fact that the Appellant chose to not only maintain this relationship with him after learning this information but chose to become engaged to this person raises concerns about her decision-making. What I find to be even more troublesome than the fact that she knew of this history, was her attempt to feign ignorance and distance herself from these facts in order to obtain an appointment as a police officer.
The Appellant maintained a relationship with J.B. for over 8 years after learning that he was in possession of heroin and fentanyl in amounts large enough to be charged with intent to distribute. These are not recreational drugs but highly dangerous substances and he was arrested with these drugs while the Appellant’s children were in his car. J.B. admitted to sufficient facts on both intent to distribute charges and disposed of the case with a continued without a finding (CWOF) settlement. The Appellant’s closeness to J.B. after the incidents, which continued at the time of her application, provided the BPD with a valid reason for bypassing the Appellant for appointment.
In making this decision, I have not overlooked the many positive attributes of the Appellant. She works as a phlebotomist, professor, and by all accounts is [CB3] a good mother to her three children. Nevertheless, the BPD has shown that it made a reasonable determination that the Appellant’s judgment and associations, not to mention her inability to be forthcoming surrounding the same, present the BPD with too much of a risk to appoint her as a police officer at this time.
For all the above-stated reasons, the appeal of Terrie Miranda, filed under docket number G1-25-169, is hereby denied.
Civil Service Commission
/s/ Shawn C. Dooley
Shawn C. Dooley
Commissioner
By vote of the Civil Service Commission (Bowman, Chair; Dooley, Markey, McConney, & Stein, Commissioners) on April 2, 2026.
Either party may file a motion for reconsideration within ten days of receipt of this Commission order or decision. Under the pertinent provisions of the Code of Mass. Regulations, 801 CMR 1.01(7)(l), the motion must identify a clerical or mechanical error in this order or decision or a significant factor the Agency or the Presiding Officer may have overlooked in deciding the case. A motion for reconsideration does not toll the statutorily prescribed thirty-day time limit for seeking judicial review of this Commission order or decision.
Under the provisions of G.L. c. 31, § 44, any party aggrieved by this Commission order or decision may initiate proceedings for judicial review under G.L. c. 30A, § 14 in the superior court within thirty (30) days after receipt of this order or decision. Commencement of such proceeding shall not, unless specifically ordered by the court, operate as a stay of this Commission order or decision. After initiating proceedings for judicial review in Superior Court, the plaintiff, or his / her attorney, is required to serve a copy of the summons and complaint upon the Boston office of the Attorney General of the Commonwealth, with a copy to the Civil Service Commission, in the time and in the manner prescribed by Mass. R. Civ. P. 4(d).
Notice to:
James Gilden, Esq. (for Appellant)
Joseph McClellan, Esq. (for Respondent)
[1] The Standard Adjudicatory Rules of Practice and Procedure, 801 C.M.R. § 1.01 (formal rules), apply to adjudications before the Commission with Chapter 31 or any Commission rules taking precedence.
[2] Should there be a judicial appeal of this decision, the plaintiff in the judicial appeal would be obligated to supply the court with a transcript of this hearing to the extent that they wish to challenge the decision as unsupported by the substantial evidence, arbitrary and capricious, or an abuse of discretion. In such cases, the plaintiff in the judicial appeal must transcribe the transcript from the Commission’s official recording.
[3] Detective Flynn has since been promoted to the rank of Sergeant. To avoid confusion, this decision will refer to him by his previous rank.
[4] The Appellant was thirty-nine when she took the Civil Service Examination.
[5] Pseudonyms were given to her previous relationships due to the sensitive nature of the information provided.
[6] For reasons discussed in the analysis, I did not credit the Appellant’s testimony that she first heard of any of these incidents involving J.B. when she received the bypass letter from the BPD.
[7]I did not find the Appellant’s driving record, standing alone, to be a valid reason for bypass. As other reasons did justify her bypass, I need not address the details of her driving history here.
[8] “Administrator” is construed to mean any local appointing authority or its designated representative, per G.L. c. 31, § 2(c), and thus covers BPD Roundtable decision-makers.
[RQ1]I think it’s spelled Levarity
[SD2]I thought so as well except this was how BPD spelled it. Ill fix. LOL
