Decision  Monteiro, Laura v. Department of Mental Health 7/9/26

Date:	07/09/2026
Organization:	Civil Service Commission
Docket Number:	C-25-313

• Appearance for Appellant: Laura C. Monteiro
• Appearance for Respondent: John DiPietrantonio, Esq. , Maria Sullivan, Esq.
• Hearing Officer: Shawn C. Dooley

The Commission denied the reclassification appeal of an employee of the Massachusetts Department of Mental Health (DMH) seeking to be reclassified as a Program Coordinator I because she was unable to demonstrate that she performed the distinguishing duties of that title more than 50% of the time. 

Decision

CSC Law Clerk Ed Groome assisted with the drafting of this decision. 

On December 22, 2025, Laura C. Monteiro (Appellant), pursuant to G.L. c. 30, § 49, filed a timely appeal with the Civil Service Commission (Commission), contesting the decision of the Human Resources Division (HRD) to affirm the Department of Mental Health (DMH)’s denial of her request for reclassification from Office Support Specialist II (OSS II) to the position of Program Coordinator I (PC I).  The Commission held a remote pre-hearing conference on February 17, 2026.  On April 14, 2026, I conducted an in-person full evidentiary hearing at the offices of the Commission, located at 100 Cambridge Street, Boston, Massachusetts. The hearing was recorded via the Webex videoconferencing platform, and copies were provided to the parties. Both parties filed proposed decisions. For the reasons stated below, the Appellant’s appeal is denied.

Findings of Fact

The Appellant entered thirty-nine exhibits into evidence (A. Exhibits 1-39) and DMH entered eight exhibits into evidence (R. Exhibits 1-8). Based upon the documents submitted and the testimony of the following witnesses: 

Called by DMH:

• Mary F. Connelly, Classification and Compensation Lead, EOHHS
• Lynne Olsen-Vieira, Chief Operating Officer, DMH

Called by the Appellant:

• Laura Monteiro, the Appellant
• Mary-Patrice Ruocco, Director of Operations and Quality Management, DMH

and taking administrative notice of all pleadings filed in the case, plus pertinent rules, statutes, regulations, case law and policies, and drawing from reasonable inferences from the credible evidence, I make the following findings of fact:

The Appellant’s Background

1.  The Appellant has been employed by DMH at Taunton State Hospital (TSH) since October 17, 2021. (Testimony of the Appellant)
2. At the beginning of the Appellant’s employment with DMH, she was classified as an Office Support Specialist I (OSS I), before being reclassified as an Office Support Specialist II (OSS II). (A. Exhibit 6)
3. The Appellant obtained a Master of Business Administration (MBA) degree on May 15, 2025. (A. Exhibit 34)

The Appellant’s First Reclassification Appeal

4. On March 2, 2023, the Appellant filed an appeal seeking reclassification from the position of Office Support Specialist I to Program Coordinator I. (A. Exhibit 6)
5. On August 2, 2024, the Appellant was reclassified as an Office Support Specialist II, with her reclassification being made retroactive, effective as of February 26, 2023. (A. Exhibit 6)
6. Among the reasons for the Appellant’s reclassification from OSS I to OSS II was the fact that she provided training to other employees at the time. (Testimony of Mary Connelly)
7. In response to this successful reclassification appeal, a Position Description Form 30 describing the duties of an OSS II was submitted to the Executive Office of Health and Human Services (EOHHS). (A. Exhibits 11, 12)

The Appellant’s Duties

8. The Office Support Specialist series of positions was first created in 2012, as a replacement for the Administrative Assistant series. (Testimony of Mary Connelly)
9. According to the Appellant’s Form 30, which was used as evidence for the previous reclassification appeal, a partial list of her duties and responsibilities include:
   1. serving as the point person for the tracking and hiring of staff; 
   2. overseeing the tracking of the hiring process, monitoring, identifying, and resolving issues related to the hiring process, and onboarding and offboarding staff;
   3. performing scheduling duties such as arranging conferences; 
   4. creating and maintaining the hospital’s Access database / Excel spreadsheets; and preparing correspondence, memorandums, minutes of meetings, reports, etc. according to TSH policies and procedures;
   5. maintaining schedules for conferences and trainings;
   6. developing workflows and job aids to assist others in completing the administrative process; and
   7. communicating with individuals / clients, by referring or directing individuals to the proper personnel / agency. 

(A. Exhibit 12)

10. Taunton State Hospital administers a facility-specific orientation for its new hires once per month, or on an as-needed basis. (Testimony of Lynne Olsen-Vieira; Appellant; and Mary-Patrice Ruocco)
11. The Appellant has been assisting with the facilitation and implementation of this orientation since its inaugural class on February 16, 2023. (A. Exhibit 1)
12. Although Form 30s are considered “living documents”, the Appellant’s Form 30 was not updated to reflect her responsibilities regarding the TSH orientation when she was reclassified from OSS I to OSS II. (Testimony of Mary Connelly)
13. Part of the Appellant’s duties with respect to the orientation include assisting subject matter experts (SMEs) from the hospital’s various departments with preparing slides and presenting material to new employees during orientation. (Testimony of the Appellant; and Mary-Patrice Ruocco)
14. The Appellant presents material to new employees if a SME is unable to attend the orientation. Other DMH personnel also frequently present portions of the material to new employees. (Testimony of the Appellant; and Lynne Olsen-Vieira)
15. The material the Appellant presents to new TSH employees is derived from the content of the slides, which are provided by the subject matter expert.  She does not create new content beyond what is included in the slide deck. (Testimony of the Appellant)
16. The Appellant took the initiative and prepared additional training materials, including a presentation on hospital code responses. (Testimony of the Appellant)
17. On days that an orientation is held, it typically lasts from 8:00 AM to 12:00 PM (Testimony of Lynne Olsen-Vieira)
18. When the orientation was first implemented, the Appellant spent approximately 15% of her time preparing presentations, assisting SMEs with preparing presentations, and facilitating the orientation itself. (R. Exhibit 3)
19. Since the creation of the TSH orientation, the Appellant’s degree of involvement in employee onboarding has grown significantly. (Testimony of the Appellant)
20. During some months out of the year, the Appellant stated that preparing training materials for the orientation, presenting content, and facilitating the TSH orientation was less intensive and therefore wouldn’t account for a majority of her worktime. (Testimony of the Appellant)
21. The Appellant does not directly or indirectly supervise any DMH staff. (Testimony of Mary-Patrice Ruocco)
22. The Appellant’s other duties include the creation of workflows in PolicyStat, for which she has site administrator access. (Testimony of the Appellant; A. Exhibit 32)
23. If the hospital’s PC I is unavailable, the Appellant may need to cover her responsibility of making updates and edits to certain facility policies. (Testimony of Mary-Patrice Ruocco)
24. The Appellant is also tasked with updating facility policies and ensuring compliance with Joint Commission accreditation regulations. (Testimony of the Appellant)

The Duties of a Program Coordinator I

25. Taunton State Hospital currently has one person on staff who is classified as a Program Coordinator I. (Testimony of Lynne Olsen-Vieira)
26. As part of her duties, this PC I is charged with managing the hospital’s Department of Communications, which involves logging visitor check-ins, serving as a conduit for code calls, supervision of six hospital employees, and meeting with the executive committee to assist in the development of policies twice per month. (Testimony of Lynne Olsen-Vieira)
27. According to the specifications for the Program Coordinator Series, “[i]ncumbents of positions in this series coordinate and monitor assigned program activities; review and analyze data concerning agency programs; provide technical assistance and advice to agency personnel and others; respond to inquiries; maintain liaison with various agencies and perform related work as required.” (R. Exhibit 1)
28. The Program Coordinator series’ specifications also state, “[t]he basic purpose of the position is to coordinate, monitor, develop and implement programs for an assigned agency.” (R. Exhibit 1)
29. Duties common to all levels in the Program Coordinator Series include: 
    1. Coordinates and monitors assigned program activities in order to ensure effective operations and compliance with established standards.
    2. Reviews and analyzes data concerning assigned agency programs in order to determine progress and effectiveness, to make recommendations for changes in procedures, guidelines, etc. And to devise methods of accomplishing program objectives. 
    3. Provides technical assistance and advice to agency personnel and others concerning assigned programs in order to exchange information, resolve problems and to ensure compliance with established policies, procedures and standards.
    4. Responds to inquiries from agency staff and others in order to provide information concerning assigned agency programs. 
    5. Maintains liaison with various private, local, state and federal agencies and others in order to exchange information and/or to resolve problems.
    6. Performs related duties such as attending meetings and conferences; maintaining records; and preparing reports. 

(R. Exhibit 1)

30. Program Coordinator I is the first-level supervisory job in its series. (R. Exhibit 1)
31. In the Program Coordinator specifications, under section VII (Supervision), it states that in regard to a Program Coordinator I:  “Incumbents of position of this level exercise direct supervision . . . over, assign work to and review the performance of 1-5 professional, technical, administrative and/or other personnel; and may exercise functional supervision . . . over 1-5 professional, technical administrative and/or other personnel.” (R. Exhibit 1)
32. The site-specific orientation at Taunton State Hospital is more appropriately categorized as an “event” rather than a program. (Testimony of Mary Connelly)

The Present Appeal

33. On April 2, 2025, the Appellant submitted an appeal for reclassification from the position of Office Support Specialist II to Program Coordinator I to the Executive Office of Health and Human Services. (A. Exhibit 8)
34. Mary F. Connelly, Classification and Compensation Lead, denied her appeal after determining that her duties fell within the specifications for an OSS II. (Testimony of Mary Connelly)
35. The Appellant appealed this decision to HRD. (Testimony of Appellant)
36. On December 18, 2025, HRD denied the appeal. (Testimony of Mary Connelly; R. Exhibit 8)
37. On December 22, 2025, the Appellant filed a timely appeal of HRD’s decision with this Commission. (Stipulated Fact)

Legal Standard

Section 49 of G.L. c. 30 provides in relevant part as follows:

“Any manager or employee of the commonwealth objecting to any provision of the classification affecting his office or position may appeal in writing to the personnel administrator . . . Any manager or employee or group of employees further aggrieved after appeal to the personnel administrator may appeal to the civil service commission. Said commission shall hear all appeals as if said appeals were originally entered before it. If said commission finds that the office or position of the person appealing warrants a different position reallocation . . . it shall be effective as of the date of the appeal . . . .”

Generally speaking, “the bar for proving that one’s position is misclassified is set very high.” Shields v. Dep’t of Revenue, 21 MCSR 263, 266 (2008).  To obtain a reclassification, as a general rule, an employee must establish that they are performing duties encompassed within the higher-level position a majority (i.e., at least 50% or more) of the time. See Thompson v. Division of Insurance and HRD, 29 MCSR 565 (2016) (an appellant must prove this by a preponderance of the evidence); Pellegrino v. Dep’t of State Police, 18 MCSR 261 (2005) (at least 51%); Gaffey v. Dep’t of Revenue, 24 MCSR 380, 381 (2011) (more than 50%); Madison v. Dep’t of Public Health, 12 MCSR 49 (1999) (at least 50%); Kennedy v. Holyoke Cmty. College, 11 MCSR 302 (1998) (at least 50%). 

More specifically, the Appellant must demonstrate that the majority of the time they are performing their duties, they perform activities that are “level distinguishing duties”. Duties which fall within both the higher and lower title do not count as “distinguishing duties”.  “Where duties are equally applicable to both the lower and higher titles, although they may be described slightly differently for each title, those types of overlapping duties are not distinguishing duties of the higher title.” Saunders v. Dep’t of Lab. Standards, 32 MCSR 413, 415 (2019). 

When analyzing a reclassification appeal, it is within the Commission’s discretion to weigh all of the facts and to make a determination based on the evidence presented. The Commission also possesses discretion to take into account all the facts and evidence admitted when making a decision in reclassification appeals in cases in which the specifications against which current job responsibilities are being measured are outdated.  When accounting for outdated specifications, the Commission has previously considered major shifts in the occupation’s field in cases where the description is highly rigid to determine the reasonability of the description.  These factors include the role’s adaptation of new technology and the evolution or material broadening of the title’s scope of duties. Strong v. DPH, 37 MCSR 199 (2024).

Analysis

Throughout this process, the Appellant’s supervisors and DMH personnel spoke very highly of her, both personally as well as to the quality of her work.  There is no doubt, based on the evidence presented, that the Appellant is performing above the level expected of an employee in her position.  As referenced in prior decisions, the Commission is restricted by the fact that the Program Coordinator series has not been updated in almost four decades and may not reflect the full range of expectations that are currently applied to employees of that classification.

However, the relevant question for the purpose of this appeal is not whether the Appellant is performing her work at a high level, but whether she meets the threshold for classification as a Program Coordinator I.  In making my decision, I have relied on all the relevant evidence submitted, including the job specifications, her Form 30, and the testimony of the witnesses.  Based on that review, I find that she has not proven by a preponderance of the evidence that she performs the duties of a Program Coordinator I more than 50% of the time.

The Appellant raises several arguments as to why she should be reclassified as a PC I.  Her primary stated reason for pursuing reclassification is that she contributes a great deal of her time to ensuring that the TSH orientation is run smoothly, and that the necessary training is delivered to new hires once per month.  However, as the Appellant concedes, she does not develop the underlying content being presented to these new hires at the orientation.  Instead, the Appellant works with subject matter experts to produce slides that will convey the necessary information in an effective manner.  While she does present this information to the new hires when a particular SME is unavailable, this time is not quantifiable or consistent.  Although this is undoubtedly valuable work, it does not rise to the level of program coordination, particularly considering that the example of a program DMH has cited is the current PC I’s management of an entire unit, which provides daily support to hospital operations.

It is undisputed that the Appellant’s Form 30, which was submitted following her first reclassification appeal, lists duties which are explicitly related to the training provided during the site-specific orientation.  Indeed, the Form 30 lists onboarding and scheduling said trainings as OSS II responsibilities.  One of the chief reasons for the Appellant’s initial reclassification from OSS I to OSS II was the fact that she had been delivering this training to new employees for some time.  Given that recognition of these duties was the basis for her original reclassification, the Appellant has not demonstrated a significant change of duties since being reclassified as an OSS II.  Moreover, the delivery of training, even if the Appellant were personally providing the presentation on every occasion without assistance from the SMEs, does not meet the definition of a “program” for the purpose of reclassification.

Further, I considered that even if the Appellant’s role in facilitating and coordinating the orientation event fell within the definition of a “program”, the fact remains that she was unable to marshal sufficient evidence to show that she is performing this duty a majority of the time.  Rather, the evidence demonstrates that the orientation itself is provided monthly and/or on an “as needed” basis, with the presentation lasting approximately four hours.  The Appellant has not presented evidence demonstrating the number of hours she spends developing any slides and coordinating with SMEs outside of the monthly presentation. Instead, she merely estimates that this encompasses more than 50% of her time.  But she also acknowledges that, even by her own estimation, during some months these tasks do not account for more than 50 percent of her work hours.  The only specific time allocation she was able to provide as it relates to the quantity of time she devotes to what she believes to be PC I distinguishing duties (as compared to OSS II duties) comes from the time period of the presentation itself.  This amounts to only four hours per month—which falls significantly short of the threshold necessary for reclassification.  In addition to the lack of detail of actual hours worked, the Appellant’s estimate that more than 50% of her time is spent on duties related to the orientation is also lacking as she has been unable to connect each of those tasks to a specific duty found in the Program Coordinator Series specification.  The Appellant’s current Form 30 encompasses some of the areas that she attributes to the higher classification.  However, since the Appellant was unable to show that she performed those duties more than 50% of the time, she has not met her burden to justify reclassification. 

Of the Appellant’s other duties, such as her role in updating policies within the PolicyStat program, these also do not rise to a level that justifies reclassification.  Rather, while the Appellant has shown that she has a similar level of access to facility policies as TSH’s PC I, the functions she performs in updating facility policies do not solely fall within the specifications for a Program Coordinator.  Both positions require the creation of workflows, and the Appellant’s Form 30 explicitly lists creation of workflows as an OSS II task.  The Appellant’s Form 30 further notes that updating facility protocols and policies falls within her current classification.  While it is true that the Appellant may update policies on behalf of the PC I when she is unavailable, she does not create these policies themselves or provide recommendations for how policies should be edited.  If she were able to demonstrate that she performed these additional tasks, those aspects might rise to the level of a Program Coordinator’s duties.  However, given that this aspect of her job is sporadic, and therefore not quantifiable as it is only performed when the PC I person is unavailable, even if I were to give her the most generous benefit of doubt, I could not credit this intermittent task as furnishing the base for a conclusion that the Appellant performs PC I distinguishing duties a majority of the time.  Also, the fact that TSH’s current PC I performs the task of updating policies does not support the Appellant’s position that since she also does this, she must be performing PC I level duties. Lannigan v. Department of Developmental Services, 30 MCSR 494, 500 (2017) states that evidence of duties that do not exclusively fall within the sought-after, higher-graded position will not be factored into a calculation that could lead to reclassification.  Again, the Appellant was unable to quantify the time spent on this task, therefore effectively making the underlying argument moot for the purpose of determining if she spends more that 50% of her time performing PC I specific duties.

Finally, it is worth noting that the Appellant acknowledges that she does not supervise any employees at TSH. The Program Coordinator Series’ specifications for a PC I state that “incumbents of positions at this level exercise direct supervision over, assign work to and review the performance of 1-5 professional, technical, administrative and/or other personnel.”  When one of the level-distinguishing duties is that the person in the higher classified position acts as a supervisor, the lack of supervisory duties may itself be a sufficient ground to deny reclassification.  Crawford v. Department of Revenue, 28 MCSR 500 (2015); MacLean v. Department of Conservation & Recreation, 24 MCSR 573, 575 (2011). 

However imperfect the specifications may be, they are the reference point the Commission is obligated to use when determining whether to allow a reclassification appeal. Strong v. DPH, 37 MCSR 192, 199 (2024).  HRD-approved Classification Specification documents “traditionally ha[ve] served as the touchstone for reclassification appeals”.  Id.  Unless compelling evidence is presented that shows the Appellant’s duties do not align in major part with her current classification, the Commission is not empowered to disregard the relevant specifications.  In this case, I find that the Appellant’s existing duties do align with those of an OSS II and do not align with those of a PC I when viewed through the prism of what constitutes the duties she discharges a majority of her time.  As such, the Appellant is unable to meet her burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that she performs the duties of a Program Coordinator I for greater than 50% of her working hours.

Conclusion 

                For all the reasons stated above, the appeal of Laura C. Monteiro, filed under Docket number C-25-313, is hereby denied.

Civil Service Commission

/s/ Shawn C. Dooley

Shawn C. Dooley
Commissioner

By vote of the Civil Service Commission (Bowman, Chair; Dooley, Markey, McConney, & Stein, Commissioners) on July 9, 2026.

Either party may file a motion for reconsideration within ten days of receipt of this Commission order or decision. Under the pertinent provisions of the Code of Mass. Regulations, 801 CMR 1.01(7)(l), the motion must identify a clerical or mechanical error in this order or decision or a significant factor the Agency or the Presiding Officer may have overlooked in deciding the case.  A motion for reconsideration does not toll the statutorily prescribed thirty-day time limit for seeking judicial review of this Commission order or decision.

Under the provisions of G.L. c. 31, § 44, any party aggrieved by this Commission order or decision may initiate proceedings for judicial review under G.L. c. 30A, § 14 in the superior court within thirty (30) days after receipt of this order or decision. Commencement of such proceeding shall not, unless specifically ordered by the court, operate as a stay of this Commission order or decision.  After initiating proceedings for judicial review in Superior Court, the plaintiff, or his / her attorney, is required to serve a copy of the summons and complaint upon the Boston office of the Attorney General of the Commonwealth, with a copy to the Civil Service Commission, in the time and in the manner prescribed by Mass. R. Civ. P. 4(d).

Notice to: 
Laura C. Monteiro (Appellant)
John DiPietrantonio, Esq. (for Respondent)
Maria Sullivan, Esq. (for Repondent) 

1. The Standard Adjudicatory Rules of Practice and Procedure, 801 CMR §§ 1.01, et seq., apply to adjudication before the Commission with G.L. c. 31, or any Commission rules, taking precedence.
2. Should there be a judicial appeal of this decision, the plaintiff in the judicial appeal would be obligated to supply the court with a transcript of this hearing to the extent that they wish to challenge the decision as unsupported by the substantial evidence, arbitrary and capricious, or an abuse of discretion. In such cases, the plaintiff in the judicial appeal must transcribe the transcript from the Commission’s official recording.