| Date: | 03/19/2026 |
|---|---|
| Organization: | Civil Service Commission |
| Docket Number: | E-25-194 |
The Commission denied an appeal from a candidate for municipal firefighter who claimed he was entitled to preference as a disabled veteran when he had not served the necessary period of active duty required by statute to qualify for such preference.
On August 19, 2025, the Appellant, Wayne S. Morse, appealed to the Civil Service Commission (Commission), pursuant to G.L. c. 31, § 2(b), contesting the decision of the state’s Human Resources Division (HRD) to deny him the statutory veteran’s preference on the current eligible list for municipal firefighter. A Pre-Hearing Conference was held on September 30, 2025. On November 25, 2025, HRD submitted a Motion for Summary Decision, which the Appellant opposed, and the appeal was assigned to me for further proceedings. By Procedural Order dated December 3, 2025, I scheduled a Motion Hearing for January 15, 2026 and ordered that, prior to the motion hearing: (1) the Appellant supplement his Opposition to HRD's Motion for Summary Decision by filing documentary evidence of at least one day of active duty service with the United States Marine Corps other than for training, and (2) HRD confirm that, if the Appellant produced such satisfactory documentation, he then would have a bona fide claim to disabled veteran's status. As of January 13, 2025, neither HRD nor the Commission had received any such supplementary documentation from the Appellant and HRD informed the Commission, therefore, that it could not respond to the Commission’s December 3, 2025 Procedural Order. I proceeded to hold the Motion Hearing as scheduled on January 15, 2026. The Appellant did not appear. After careful review of the information provided, HRD’s Motion for Summary Disposition is allowed and the Appellant’s appeal is dismissed.
HRD submitted four exhibits with its Motion for Summary Decision. (Resp. Exhs. 1 through 4) The Appellant’s Claim of Appeal and attachment is marked and referred to herein as App.Exh.1 and an attachment to Appellant’s e-mail dated November 12, 2025 is marked as App.Exh.2. Based on the submissions of the parties, the following facts are not disputed:
1. The Appellant, Wayne S. Morse, duly registered for and passed the civil service entry level examination for municipal firefighter administered by the state’s Human Resources Division on October 17, 2024. (Resp. Motion, Resp.Exh.3)
2. HRD’s civil service profile for the Appellant shows that he indicated he was a veteran. (Resp.Exhs. 1 & 4)
3. The Appellant has a service-connected disability for which he is receiving disability benefits from the United States Department of Veteran’s Affairs. (App.Exhs. 1 & 2; Resp.Exh.3)
4. On or about April 9, 2025, the Appellant requested that HRD confirm his veteran’s status. He submitted a DD214 dated June 17, 2011, along with a Driver’s License that stated he was a “Veteran” and a letter from the Veteran’s Administration. (Resp.Exhs. 1 &.4)
5. The Appellant’s request was assigned to HRD Test Administration Specialist (TES) Christopher Rogers, who is a retired United States Army veteran. (Resp.Exh.4)
6. In determining whether a person qualifies for veteran’s status under Massachusetts civil service law, HRD relies primarily on the information in the person’s DD214. HRD does not rely on a Driver’s License or VA letters as evidence to determine if the person meets the Massachusetts statutory qualification of a veteran. (Resp.Exh.4)
7. After an HRD review of the Appellant’s DD214, HRD informed the Appellant that his military service did not meet the statutory requirements to qualify him for veterans’ status under civil service law and adjusted his status on his HRD civil service profile to “non-veteran”. (Resp.Exh.4)
8. The Appellant’s June 7, 2011 DD214 contains the following information relevant to determine if the Appellant qualified for veteran’s status:
Block 2 – DEPARTMENT COMPONENT AND BRANCH – USMCR (K1)
Block 4a – GRADE, RATE OR RANK - PVT
Block 4b – PAY GRADE – E1
Block 6 – RESERVE OBLIGATION TERMINATION DATE – 2019 01 04
Block 8a – LAST DUTY ASSIGNMENT AND MAJOR COMMAND – D CO ITBN SOI EAST TRNG CMD CAMLEJ 28542
Block 9 - COMMAND TO WHICH TRANSFERRED – WPNS CO FORT DEVENS MA 4TH MARDIV, 25TH MRINES (RUC 14127)
Block 12a - DATE ENTERED AD THIS PERIOD – 2011 01 11
Block 12b – SEPARATION DATE THIS PERIOD – 2011 06 18
Block 12c – NET ACTIVE SERVICE THIS PERIOD – 00 05 08
Block 12h – INITIAL ENTRY TRAINING – 00 05 08
Block 12i – EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY GRADE – 2001 01 11
Block 18 – NOT A FINAL DISCHARGE . . . . Non-creditable Delayed Entry Program time . . . 6 days . . .
Block 23 TYPE OF SEPARATION
(Resp.Exhs.1 & 4)
9. According to TES Rodgers, the entries on the Appellant’s June 17, 2011 DD214 established that the Appellant enlisted in the United States Marine Corps Reserves and entered active duty on January 11, 2011, after six days in “Delayed Entry” status. He served a total of five months and eight days on active duty, all of which involved “initial entry training”, sometimes called “basic training”, during which new soldiers learn the fundamentals of being in the military. (Resp.Exh.4) [1]
8. This appeal duly ensued on August 19, 2025. (Claim of Appeal)
9. The Appellant attached an August 18, 2025 letter to his Claim of Appeal from the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) which stated: “This letter certifies that Wayne Stephen Morse II is receiving service-connected disability compensation from the Department of Veterans Affairs”. The letter states the amount of his benefits and the percentage of his disability with an effective date of January 1, 2025. (App.Exh.1)
10. By email dated October 7, 2025 to the Commission, the Appellant stated that he was “placed on active duty status under Title 10” but “cannot confirm the exact dates due to a lack of separation documentation” but his “educated guess” was that it “immediately started after completing school of infantry training on approximately 06-17-2011” while he remained at Camp Lejeune “for approximately 3 weeks . . . waiting for orders to report to my next duty station, U.S.M.R.C.R Ft Devens. During that time I was assigned to The [sic] 3rd Battalion 2nd Marines. . . an active duty division” of the Marine Corps. (Administrative Notice, Appellant’s email dated 10/7/25 (emphasis added))[2]
11. By email dated November 12, 2025, the Appellant provided a copy of a letter from the VA which stated that he “separated under honorable conditions from active duty military service and that you are entitled to compensation for service-connected disability(ies) . . . .” and described the percentage range of his disability. (App.Exh.2)
12. In his opposition to HRD’s Motion for Summary Decision, the Appellant asserted:
I respectfully request that the motion be denied and that a full hearing be scheduled to allow me the opportunity to present evidence regarding my military service. Specifically, the motion raises the issue of whether I ever served on active duty other than for training. This is a bona fide disputed fact.
I assert that there is a reasonable expectation that I will be able to show, during a full hearing, that I did in fact serve "at minimum" 1 day on active duty during wartime, beyond any training obligations. I have evidence supporting this claim.
(App. Opposition dated 11/15/2025) (emphasis added)
13. By email dated December 3, 2025, the Appellant wrote to the Commission:
At this time, I am unable to provide an official separation DD-214 because I am still awaiting one from Marine Headquarters in Quantico, Virginia. I have submitted the required request, but I have not yet received the finalized document.
(Administrative Notice [Appellant’s email dated 12/3/25])
A motion to dispose of an appeal, in whole or in part, via summary decision may be allowed by the Commission pursuant to 801 C.M.R. 1.01(7)(h) when, “viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party”, the undisputed material facts affirmatively demonstrate that the non-moving party has “no reasonable expectation” of prevailing on at least one “essential element of the case”. See, e.g., Milliken & Co. v. Duro Textiles LLC, 451 Mass. 547, 550 n.6 (2008); Maimonides School v. Coles, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 240, 249 (2008); Lydon v. Massachusetts Parole Bd, 18 MCSR 216 (2005). See also Mangino v. HRD, 27 MCSR 34 (2014) and cases cited (“The notion underlying the summary decision process in administrative proceedings parallels the civil practice under Mass.R.Civ.P.56; namely, when no genuine issues of material fact exist, the agency is not required to conduct a meaningless hearing.”); Morehouse v. Weymouth Fire Dept, 26 MCSR 176 (2013) (“a party may move for summary decision when . . . there is no genuine issue of fact relating to his or her claim or defense and the party is entitled to prevail as a matter of law.”)
The undisputed facts, viewed in a light most favorable to the Appellant, establish that this appeal must be dismissed. The qualification for a veteran’s preference under civil service law is governed by statute. Under the facts in this record and the applicable law, the Appellant’s military service with the Marine Corps Reserves was limited to a period of five months of basic training, which does not qualify him for the status of a veteran.
The issues presented here are similar to those addressed by the Commission in Peckham v. Department of Correction, 38 MCSR 185 (2025): Trainor v. Human Resources Division, 34 MCSR 427 (2021).
In the Peckham appeal, the Commission made a thorough review of the applicable civil service and other laws, including amendments to Chapter 31 made by the Chapter 238 of the Acts of 2024 and amendments to Chapter 115 made by Chapter 178 of the Acts of 2024 (the "HERO Act"). The Commission concluded that, under civil service law, in order to be granted disabled veteran's status for purposes of civil service benefits ( e.g., preferences in hiring and layoffs), the statutory requirements had not been changed and it remained the requirement that, to qualify as a disabled veteran, a candidate for a civil service position must first demonstrate that they qualify as a "veteran" as defined by G.L. c. 31, Section 1, which requires that the person "comes within the definition of a veteran appearing in [clause 43 of Section 7 of Chapter 4].” That statute provides, in relevant part:
Forty-third, “Veteran” shall mean (1) any person, (a) whose last discharge or release from his wartime service as defined herein, was under honorable conditions and who (b) served in the army, navy, marine corps, coast guard, or air force of the United States, or on full time national guard duty under Titles 10 or 32 of the United States Code or under sections 38, 40 and 41 of chapter 33 for not less than 90 days active service, at least 1 day of which was for wartime service; provided, however, than any person who so served in wartime and was awarded a service-connected disability or a Purple Heart, or who died in such service under conditions other than dishonorable, shall be deemed to be a veteran notwithstanding his failure to complete 90 days of active service . . . .
Wartime service” shall mean service performed by . . . a “Persian Gulf veteran”. . . . .
Persian Gulf veteran” shall mean any person who performed such wartime service during the period commencing August second, nineteen hundred and ninety and ending on a date to be determined by presidential proclamation or executive order and concurrent resolution of the Congress of the United States. . . .
Active service in the armed forces”, as used in this clause shall not include active duty for training in the army national guard or air national guard or active duty for training as a reservist in the armed forces of the United States.
G.L. c. 4, § 7, ¶ 43 (emphasis added).
Thus, both G.L. c. 31, Section 1 and G.L. c. 4, Section 7, expressly exclude from the definition of "active service" any "active duty for training in the army national guard or air national guard or active duty for training as a reservist in the armed forces of the United States".
As the Peckham decision explained, these statutes have been judicially construed to mean that, to meet the definition of a "veteran", and therefore qualify for disabled veteran's status, a person who holds a service-connected disability must have served at least one day on active duty other than for training. The Commission must follow the law, as construed by the courts, and does not have the authority to change it.
In the present appeal, it appears undisputed that the information that the Appellant provided to HRD in support of his claim for disabled veteran's status included a DD214, which established that: (a) the Appellant served 5 months and 8 days on active duty [Block 12c]; (b) his last duty assignment and station from which he was separated was "D Co, ITBN [Infantry Training Battalion], SOI [School of Infantry] East, Training Command [Block 8a & 8b]. (c) his Rank (PVT) and Pay Grade (E1) did not change from the date on which he first entered active duty [Blocks 4a, 4b & 12i]; and (c) upon discharge from active duty, the Appellant was transferred to the WPNS CO [FORT] DEVENS MA, 4TH MARDIV, 25TH MARINES [an infantry regiment with a Headquarters Company and one reserve Infantry Battalion based at Fort Devens MA]. Thus, according to the DD214, the entirety of the Appellant’s active duty consisted of training at the School of Infantry. If the Appellant performed any active duty "other than training", (e.g., other than reserve drills, annual training exercises, etc.) it would have to have been after he completed his initial training at Camp Lejeune.
In the Appellant’s emails to the Commission, he acknowledges the facts described above but asserts that he “has evidence” that he did, in fact, perform at least one day of active duty (other than for training) after completing his initial training. In his October 7, 2025 email, the Appellant specifically asserted that he served on such active duty for about three weeks with 3rd Battalion, 2nd Marines, a component of an active-duty Marine Division stationed at Camp Lejeune, but to date he has been unable to produce a DD214, orders, or other documentation to prove that service.
If the Appellant were to produce credible evidence that he served at least one day[3] of active duty with the 2ND Marine Division at Camp Lejeune or with the 4TH Marine Reserve Division at Fort Devens, other than for training (e.g., other than reserve drills, annual training exercises, etc.), he might have a bona fide claim to disabled veteran’s status. He did not establish that fact on this record, however, and his claim to disabled veteran's status fails based on relevant caselaw.
Nothing in this decision prohibits the Appellant from resubmitting a request to HRD and claiming veteran status in the future should he be able to produce the required documentation to show that he did serve a sufficient period of (non-training) active duty after June 17, 2011.
For the reasons stated above, HRD’s Motion to For Summary Disposition is granted and the Appellant’s appeal under Docket Number E-25-194 is dismissed.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
/s/ Paul M. Stein
Paul M. Stein
Commissioner
By vote of the Civil Service Commission (Bowman, Chair; Dooley, Markey, McConney, and Stein, Commissioners) on March 19, 2026.
Either party may file a motion for reconsideration within ten days of receipt of this Commission order or decision. Under the pertinent provisions of the Code of Mass. Regulations, 801 CMR 1.01(7)(l), the motion must identify a clerical or mechanical error in this order or decision or a significant factor the Agency or the Presiding Officer may have overlooked in deciding the case. A motion for reconsideration does not toll the statutorily prescribed thirty-day time limit for seeking judicial review of this Commission order or decision.
Under the provisions of G.L. c. 31, § 44, any party aggrieved by this Commission order or decision may initiate proceedings for judicial review under G.L. c. 30A, § 14 in the superior court within thirty (30) days after receipt of this order or decision. Commencement of such proceeding shall not, unless specifically ordered by the court, operate as a stay of this Commission order or decision. After initiating proceedings for judicial review in Superior Court, the plaintiff, or his / her attorney, is required to serve a copy of the summons and complaint upon the Boston office of the Attorney General of the Commonwealth, with a copy to the Civil Service Commission, in the time and in the manner prescribed by Mass. R. Civ. P. 4(d).
Notice to:
Wayne S. Morse (Appellant)
Michael J. Owens, Esq. (for Respondent)
[1]The reference to the Appellant’s duty station in Blocks 8a & 8b [SOI EAST TRNG CMD CAMLEJ”] is an abbreviation for Infantry Battalion, School of Infantry East, Training Command. (Administrative Notice [USMC SOI Training Command])
[2] I note that the June 2011 DD214 stated that the Appellant was transferred to WPNS CO, FORT DEVENS MA, 4TH MARINE DIV, 25TH MARINES, a Marine Corp Reserve Division. (Resp.Exh.1; Administrative Notice [4th Marine Div, 25th Marines]) The 3RD Battalion, Second Marines, is a distinct Marine infantry unit based at Camp Lejeune. (Administrative Notice [3rd Battalion, 2nd Marines])
[3] At the hearing on the Motion for Summary Decision, HRD raised, for the first time, another argument: namely, that HRD construes G.L. c. 31, §1 and G.L c. 4, §7, clause 43, to mean that the type of military service—to which the “one day” exception to the requirement for 90 days of wartime service applies—excludes service in the reserves, so that in order to qualify as a veteran, a member of the reserves must serve the full 90 days of wartime active duty, whether or not the member was disabled on duty. I do not need to address that interpretation today; rather, I leave it for consideration at some appropriate future date.
