| Date: | 06/11/2026 |
|---|---|
| Organization: | Civil Service Commission |
| Docket Number: | G1-25-164 |
The Commission affirmed the decision by the Boston Police Department to bypass a candidate for police officer due to concerns about his judgment and conduct related to various domestic dispute incidents.
CSC Law Clerk Jack Moses assisted with the drafting of this decision.
Pursuant to G.L. c. 31, § 2(b), the Appellant, Yahya Noor (Appellant), appealed to the Civil Service Commission (Commission) the July 9, 2025, decision of the Boston Police Department (Respondent or Department) to bypass him for original appointment to the position of permanent full-time police officer. The Department based its decision on the Appellant’s prior conduct and poor judgment.
The Commission held a pre-hearing conference on August 12, 2025 via videoconference. On February 4, 2026, I conducted an evidentiary hearing at the offices of the Commission, located at 100 Cambridge Street, Suite 200, Boston, Massachusetts.I recorded the hearing via the Webex platform. The parties submitted proposed decisions on or around March 19, 2026, whereupon the administrative record closed. For the reasons set forth below, the appeal is denied.
I admitted eleven exhibits from the Respondent (R. Exhibits 1-11) into evidence. I also admitted the Stipulated Facts as a joint exhibit (J. Exhibit 1). Based upon the documents submitted and the testimony of the following witnesses:
Called by the Respondent:
Called by the Appellant:
and taking administrative notice of all pleadings filed in the case, pertinent rules, statutes, regulations, case law and policies, and drawing reasonable inferences from the credible evidence, I make the following findings of fact:
The Appellant’s Background
Civil Service Process
Background Investigation
2020 Incident with BS
2021 Incident with CC
The core mission of Massachusetts civil service law is to enforce “basic merit principles” for “recruiting, selecting and advancing of employees on the basis of their relative ability, knowledge and skills” and “assuring that all employees are protected against coercion for political purposes, and are protected from arbitrary and capricious actions.” G.L. c. 31, § 1; see, e.g., Massachusetts Ass’n of Minority Law Enforcement Officers v. Abban, 434 Mass. 256, 259 (2001); MacHenry v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 40 Mass. App. Ct. 632, 635 (1995), rev. den., 423 Mass. 1106 (1996); see also Brookline v. Alston, 487 Mass. 278 (2021) (analyzing broad scope of the Commission’s jurisdiction to enforce basic merit principles under civil service law).
Original appointments of civil service employees are made from a list of candidates, called a “certification”, whose names are drawn in the order in which they appear on the applicable civil service “eligible list”, using what is called the 2n+1 formula. G. L. c. 31, §§ 6 through 11, 16 through 27; Personnel Administration Rules, PAR.09. To deviate from the rank order of preferred hiring and appoint a person “other than the qualified person whose name appears highest,” an appointing authority must provide written reasons – positive, negative, or both – consistent with basic merit principles. See G.L. c. 31, § 27; PAR.08(4). This is commonly referred to as a bypass.
The Commission’s role is to determine whether the appointing authority has shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that it has “reasonable justification” for the bypass after an “impartial and reasonably thorough review” of the relevant background and qualifications bearing on the candidate’s present fitness to perform the duties of the position. Boston Police Dep’t v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 483 Mass. 461, 474-78 (2019); Police Dep’t of Boston v. Kavaleski, 463 Mass. 680, 688-89 (2012); Beverly v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 78 Mass. App. Ct. 182, 187 (2010); Leominster v. Stratton, 58 Mass. App. Ct. 726, 727-28 (2003). Reasonable justification means that the appointing authority’s actions were based on adequate reasons supported by credible evidence, when weighed by an unprejudiced mind, guided by common sense and by correct rules of law. Selectmen of Wakefield v. Judge of First Dist. Ct. of E. Middlesex, 262 Mass. 477, 482 (1928). See also Commissioners of Civil Serv. v. Municipal Ct. of the City of Boston, 359 Mass. 214 (1971).
Public safety officers are vested with considerable power and discretion and must be held to a high standard of conduct. See, e.g., Falmouth v. Civil Serv. Comm’n., 61 Mass. App. Ct. 796, 801 (2004), citing Cambridge v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 43 Mass. App. Ct. 300, 303-305, rev. den., 428 Mass. 1102 (1997); Police Comm’r v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 22 Mass. App. Ct. 364, 371, rev. den. 398 Mass. 1103 (1986).
By a preponderance of the evidence, I find that the Department had reasonable justification to bypass the Appellant. The Department bypassed the Appellant for two primary reasons: 1) prior conduct and 2) judgment. Each ground on its own, if substantiated, is a sufficient reason for bypassing the Appellant.
Det. Finn’s investigation was reasonably thorough and detailed, and provided the Appellant with the opportunity to provide information and explain his statements on the application. I find that Det. Finn conducted a fair and comprehensive investigation.
I now examine whether the two reasons cited by the Department justified its decision.
Bypass Reason 1: Conduct
HR Deputy Director Shaw-Boyce wrote that the Appellant’s prior conduct was of significant concern to the Department. She cited the September 2020 incident:
… On September 12, 2020, Boston Police Officers responded to a radio call for a report of a domestic violence incident involving intimate partners. Officers noted that you were initially uncooperative and refused to identify yourself. A minor child on scene stated that he was afraid that you would hurt his mother, so he contacted 911.
The responding officers classified the September 12, 2020 incident as a “Verbal Dispute” in their police report. Nonetheless, the argument between the Appellant and BS that frightened BS’s child to the point of calling 911 simply cannot be classified as a “small argument,” as the Appellant tries to frame the dispute. Further, the Appellant refused to cooperate with officers, and even initially refused to disclose his identity. The Appellant argues that he did not know why the responding officers needed his ID, and that he did not “know the law.” This is not a legitimate defense. It is more than sensible that officers would request ID and ask parties to identify themselves when responding to (what the officers initially believed to be) a domestic violence incident. The fact that BS’s child thought it necessary to call 911 in the first place, coupled with the Appellant’s lack of cooperation, clearly demonstrates poor conduct on the Appellant’s part.
HR Deputy Director Shaw-Boyce cited the September 2020 incident:
… On November 6, 2021, a report was filed to document that you were not acting in accordance with a Probate Court Order that dictated custody terms. It was also noted that a 51A Report was filed alleging neglect of your children. …
In certain circumstances, the Department may consider underlying behavior that does not involve law enforcement action, the court system, or result in a conviction. Ramirez-Martinez v. Salem, 37 MCSR 396, 398 (2024). Notably, the Appellant was neither charged nor convicted as a result of the September 2020 incident, and the 51A Report alleging child neglect in response to the November 2021 incident was unsupported. Nonetheless, the Department fairly noted that the Appellant’s conduct in both of those instances fell short of required conduct for a police officer.
HR Deputy Director Shaw-Boyce testified to the risks of hiring the Appellant due to the allegations from both women, particularly CC.
Det. Finn noted that CC was consistent. Her statements in 2025 were substantially similar to those made to Det. Finn in the previous interview. Next, the “Lunatic In a Clown Suit Woman” text message was clear evidence of her allegation that the Appellant originally denied.
The Department’s bypass letter cites the following allegations from CC:
In all these instances, the Appellant demonstrated poor conduct towards a prior partner. Behavior of this sort does not preserve public trust, maintain public confidence, or avoid an abuse of power, and this behavior is unfitting of a police officer.
I find that the September 2020 and November 2021 incidents are disqualifying and provide reasonable justification for the Department to bypass the Appellant.
Bypass Reason 2: Judgment
The Appellant’s actions on September 12, 2020, and November 6, 2021 created a reasonable justification for the appointing authority to find that he did not meet the high standard that police officers are held to. Reid v. Boston Police Dep’t, 37 MCSR 188, 192 (2024).
The September 12, 2020 incident provides clear illustrations of the Appellant’s failure to exercise sound judgment. First, the Appellant argued so passionately with BS that her child was in apprehension of his mother’s safety and called the police. Second, the Appellant’s failure to cooperate with police upon their arrival is another example of poor judgment.
Similarly, the November 2021 incident shows the Appellant failing to exercise sound judgment. In response to CC allegedly withholding access to their children for “ten days,” the Appellant similarly violated the verbal custody agreement which provided that each parent would have the children for half of the week.
Now, the Appellant has applied to be a law enforcement officer. It is important to vet an applicant’s judgment to ensure that he would not abuse his power as a law enforcement officer. Here, the Appellant took the law into his own hands and withheld the children from CC. Even if CC herself originally withheld the children from the Appellant, sound judgment by the Appellant would have been pursuit of legal avenues, not responding “in kind” to prevent CC from spending time with their children.
The Appellant’s text message referring to CC as a “Lunatic in a Clown Suit Woman” once again demonstrates poor judgment. The Appellant’s behavior, demeaning the profession of social work and launching personal, insulting attacks on a previous partner show impulsiveness and lack of emotional control. The Appellant attempts to justify the text as a “reaction” to CC’s prior comments and says he did not intend to “undermine her career as a whole.” Nonetheless, the plain language and circumstances of the Appellant’s insulting text messages to CC provide clear evidence of the Appellant exercising poor judgment.
Lastly, an appointing authority relies heavily on the information candidates provide in their applications to perform a thorough background check into whether they are qualified. It is well established that an applicant’s untruthfulness may be considered as a reason for bypass. See O’Brien v. Somerville, 25 MCSR 292 (2012). Although the Appellant after-the-fact admitted to sending the text message to CC, the Appellant’s initial lack of candor in response to questioning from Det. Finn on the “Lunatic In a Clown Suit Woman” text to CC is unacceptable behavior for a candidate for a position of a police officer. The position of police officer requires the incumbent to gain and preserve public trust, maintain public confidence, and avoid an abuse of power by law enforcement officials. Here, the Appellant “laughed and denied” the comment. Such a brazen and dismissive initial response to Det. Finn’s questioning demonstrates that the Appellant may not have been fully honest when the Appellant initially denied sending the text.
I find that the Appellant’s conduct during the September 2020 and November 2021 incidents establishes judgment inconsistent with the law that a chosen candidate would be sworn to enforce to gain and preserve public trust, maintain public confidence, and avoid an abuse of power.
The Appellant’s hostile text message to CC describing her as a “Lunatic In a Clown Suit Woman,” as well as his initial denial to Det. Finn that he sent the text are further examples of his poor judgment.
Therefore, I find that the roundtable’s decision to bypass the Appellant based on his lack of sound judgment in the situations described above was reasonably justified.
The Birth Certificate
Although the Appellant’s conduct and judgment constitute sufficient reasons for bypass of the Appellant to appointment as a police officer, I will examine the other reasons noted in the Department’s bypass letter.
HR Deputy Director Teori Shaw-Boyce further justified the bypass as the Appellant “failed to complete all the required parts of the application process.” Later in the letter, Shaw-Boyce states that the Appellant “failed to provide [his] birth certificate.”
Here, I am not persuaded by the Department’s argument that Appellant’s failure to provide a birth certificate provided justification for the Department’s bypass.
The Appellant testified that he was born in Somalia and eventually fled to Kenya with his family as refugees at a young age. On his later journey to the United States, “the birth certificate did not accompany him.” It is more than reasonable to assume that leaving a war-torn nation and traveling to various other countries as a refugee at an early age would result in the loss of the Appellant’s birth certificate. In spite of the lack of an official birth record, the Appellant was able to legally enter the United States and eventually become a United States citizen. A justified lack of a birth certificate due to circumstances out of the Appellant’s control should not reflect poorly on the Appellant’s application.
Accordingly, I am not persuaded by the Department’s argument that the Appellant’s failure to complete his application by being unable to provide a birth certificate provided justification for the Department’s bypass.
Final Analysis
The appropriate inquiry is whether it was reasonable for the Boston Police Department to be concerned about the risks presented by the Appellant’s appointment as a Boston police officer. The incidents on September 2020 and November 2021 demonstrate that the Appellant’s conduct and judgment did not meet the standards necessary to be a police officer.
The Commission has consistently afforded deference to appointing authorities in evaluating candidates against the expectations and requirements of the position. The Commission’s role is to determine whether the appointing authority has demonstrated, by a preponderance of the evidence, “reasonable justification” for the bypass, following an impartial and reasonably thorough review of the candidate’s background and qualifications as they relate to the candidate’s present fitness to perform the duties of the position. The Department cannot be made to assume the risk that hiring the Appellant would entail.
I find that the Department was reasonably justified in bypassing the Appellant for concerns with the Appellant’s conduct and judgment.
Accordingly, the Boston Police Department has proven by a preponderance of the evidence that it had reasonable justification for bypassing the Appellant for original appointment to the permanent full-time position of Boston Police Officer. The appeal filed under G1-25-164 is hereby denied.
Civil Service Commission
/s/ Angela C. McConney
Angela C. McConney
Commissioner
By vote of the Civil Service Commission (Bowman, Chair; Dooley, Markey, McConney, and Stein, Commissioners) on June 11, 2026.
Either party may file a motion for reconsideration within ten days of receipt of this Commission order or decision. Under the pertinent provisions of the Code of Mass. Regulations, 801 C.M.R. § 1.01(7)(l), the motion must identify a clerical or mechanical error in this order or decision or a significant factor the Agency or the Presiding Officer may have overlooked in deciding the case. A motion for reconsideration does not toll the statutorily prescribed thirty-day time limit for seeking judicial review of this Commission order or decision.
Under the provisions of G.L c. 31, § 44, any party aggrieved by this Commission order or decision may initiate proceedings for judicial review under G.L. c. 30A, § 14 in the superior court within thirty (30) days after receipt of this order or decision. Commencement of such proceeding shall not, unless specifically ordered by the court, operate as a stay of this Commission order or decision. After initiating proceedings for judicial review in Superior Court, the plaintiff, or his / her attorney, is required to serve a copy of the summons and complaint upon the Boston office of the Attorney General of the Commonwealth, with a copy to the Civil Service Commission, in the time and in the manner prescribed by Mass. R. Civ. P. 4(d).
Notice to:
James W. Gilden, Esq. (for Appellant)
Omar Bennani, Esq. (for Respondent)
