Decision  Pimentel Paredes, Karla v. City of Lowell 5/28/26

Date:	05/28/2026
Organization:	Civil Service Commission
Docket Number:	G1-25-117

• Appearance for Appellant: Karla Pimental Paredes
• Appearance for Respondent: Garrett Bealieu, Esq.
• Hearing Officer: Angela C. McConney

The Commission affirmed the decision of the City of Lowell to bypass a candidate for original appointment to the position of permanent full-time police officer because she was not forthcoming about two domestic violence incidents.

Decision

CSC Law Clerk Edward Groome assisted with the drafting of this decision. 

On May 13, 2025, the Appellant, Karla Pimentel Paredes (Ms. Pimentel Paredes or Appellant), pursuant to G.L. c. 31, § 2(b), filed a timely appeal with the Civil Service Commission (Commission), contesting the decision of the City of Lowell (City or Respondent) to bypass her for original appointment to the position of permanent, full-time police officer with the Lowell Police Department (Department). The Department based its decision on Ms. Pimentel Paredes’ lack of candor throughout the application process. 

The Commission held a pre-hearing conference on June 10, 2025. On September 22, 2025, I conducted an in-person full evidentiary hearing at Lowell City Hall, located at 375 Merrimack Street, Lowell, MA. I recorded the hearing via the Webex platform. In October of 2025, the parties submitted their proposed decisions, whereupon the administrative record closed.

Findings of Fact

                I admitted eleven exhibits from the Respondent (R. Exhibits 1-11). Based upon the documents submitted and the testimony of the following witnesses: 

Called by the Respondent:

• Detective Judy Phothimath, Family Services Unit, Lowell Police Department
• Captain Marisol Nobrega, Training, Recruiting and Hiring, Lowell Police Department

Called by the Appellant:

• Martha, the Appellant’s Sister
• Karla Pimentel Paredes, Appellant

and taking administrative notice of all pleadings filed in the case, pertinent rules, statutes, regulations, case law and policies, and drawing reasonable inferences from the credible evidence, I make the following findings of fact:

The Appellant’s Background

1. The Appellant is a high school graduate. She attended college but did not graduate.  (R. Exhibit 3; Testimony of the Appellant)
2. The Appellant pursued a career path in Early Childhood Education and has been employed at a preschool in Lowell since August of 2023.  (R. Exhibits 3 and 9; Testimony of the Appellant) 

The Civil Service Exam and the Appellant’s Application

3. On March 16, 2024, Appellant took the civil service examination to become a police officer, scoring 84.  (Stipulated Facts)
4. On June 1, 2024, the state’s Human Resources Division (HRD) established an eligible list for Lowell Police Officer.  (Stipulated Facts)
5. On August 26, 2024, HRD issued Certification No. 10084 to the Department, from which it could fill 20 vacancies.  (Stipulated Facts) 
6. The Appellant’s name appeared in a tie-group ranked 62nd on the certification.   (Stipulated Facts)
7. On September 13, 2024, the Appellant submitted her application for Employment Form (Application) to the Department.  (R. Exhibit 3) 
8. Question 41c of the Application asked if police had ever responded to the applicant’s residence for any reason. The Appellant responded “Yes” and marked the reason as “Domestic Violence” without further elaboration.  (R. Exhibit 3) 
9. Question 45-3 on the application asked if the Appellant had ever had a temporary or permanent restraining order issued against her under the provisions of G.L. c. 209A, §§ 3, 4, 5. The Appellant responded in the negative.  (R. Exhibit 3)

The City’s Background Investigation 

10. In October of 2024, the Department assigned Det. Judy Phothimath to review Ms. Pimentel Paredes’ Application and conduct her background check.  (Testimony of Det. Phothimath)
11. Det. Phothimath met with Ms. Pimentel Paredes, reviewed her Application, reviewed her employment records, verified her criminal and driving records, and reviewed her personal, professional and neighbor references.  (Testimony of Det. Phothimath)
12. In her review of Ms. Pimentel Paredes’ Criminal Offender Record Information (CORI), Det. Phothimath discovered that Ms. Pimentel Paredes was the defendant in two restraining orders issued in 2017 and 2019.  (R. Exhibit 5)
13. The first restraining order was issued on March 24, 2017, upon an affidavit from Ms. Pimentel Paredes’ stepmother. According to the affidavit, the stepmother changed the locks and put Ms. Pimentel Paredes out of the family home after she attempted to strike her younger sister with a belt.  (R. Exhibit 8) 
14. The 2017 restraining order does not contain a date for return of service.  (R. Exhibit 8) 
15. Neither party appeared for the next court date, and the restraining order expired by order of law on April 7, 2017.  (R. Exhibit 5) The second restraining order was issued on August 20, 2019, upon an affidavit from Ms. Pimentel Paredes’ former romantic partner and the father of her child. According to the affidavit, Ms. Pimentel Paredes broke the partner’s belongings when she was picking up her things. The partner expressed his fear and alleged that this was not the first time that Ms. Pimentel Paredes had chased him or caused him to fear for his safety.  (R. Exhibit 5)
16. At the time, Ms. Pimental Paredes and her former partner resided in the same apartment complex.  (R. Exhibit 7)
17. On August 21, 2019, a Department police officer served Ms. Pimentel Paredes the restraining order in hand.  (R. Exhibits 7 and 9) 
18. After the 2019 restraining order was modified to reflect that the parties lived in close proximity in the same apartment complex, Ms. Pimentel Paredes was served the modified restraining order in hand at the court on August 28, 2019.  (R. Exhibit 6; Testimony of Det. Phothimath) 
19. On October 28, 2024, Det. Phothimath interviewed Ms. Pimentel Paredes at police headquarters.  (R. Exhibit 9; Testimony of Det. Phothimath)
20. Ms. Pimentel Paredes informed the detective that Department police officers had responded to her residence when she was the victim of a domestic violence. The Appellant did not discuss the August 21, 2019 incident in which police were called due to her violation of the 2019 restraining order. This violation occurred because the parties lived in the same apartment complex, and the order was subsequently modified to ensure Ms. Pimentel Paredes would not be in violation of the order simply by being in her own home.   When Det. Phothimath informed the Appellant that she had discovered both restraining orders during her background investigation, the Appellant responded that she was unaware of the existence of such orders.  (R. Exhibit 6, 7 and 9) 
21. On November 7, 2024, Det. Phothimath conducted a follow-up interview with the Appellant at her home.  (R. Exhibit 9; Testimony of Det. Phothimath)
22. During this meeting, the Appellant acknowledged the existence of the 2019 restraining order and the fact that she had been served in hand.  (R. Exhibit 9) 
23. The Appellant maintained that she had not been served with the 2017 restraining order and denied the allegations contained in the affidavit attached to the order. (R. Exhibit 9; Testimony of Det. Phothimath)

The Oral Interview Board

24. As part of the hiring process, the Respondent scheduled an Oral Interview Board (Board) to interview the Appellant. On December 12, 2024, the Appellant appeared before the Board, which was comprised of an officer, a sergeant, a lieutenant, a captain, and a deputy superintendent from the Department.  (R. Exhibit 10) 
25. When a Board panelist questioned whether police had ever been called to her residence, the Appellant responded that she had been a victim of domestic abuse in 2020, called the police on her former partner and obtained a restraining order.  (R. Exhibit 10)
26. When asked whether the 2020 incident was the only time that police had been called to her residence, the Appellant responded in the affirmative.  (R. Exhibit 10)
27. When asked whether she had been involved in other instances of domestic violence, the Appellant responded “No . . . that was the only one.”  (R. Exhibit 10)
28. When a Board panelist asked about the 2017 restraining order, the Appellant responded that she had never been served with the order.  (R. Exhibit 10) 
29. When asked about the 2019 incident that led to the issuance of the second restraining order, the Appellant explained that an argument ensued after she went to her former partner’s residence to retrieve her belongings, he called the police to the residence, and later obtained a restraining order.  (R. Exhibit 10) 
30. When a Board panelist asked why she had told Det. Phothimath that she had never been served with the 2019 restraining order, the Appellant responded that she had misunderstood and thought that the detective was referring to an active restraining order, not one which had expired.  (R. Exhibit 11) 
31. The Appellant also noted that she had requested expungement of both the 2017 and 2019 restraining orders.  (Appellant’s Pre-Hearing Conference Memorandum)

The City’s Decision to Bypass the Appellant

32. The Superintendent of Police, Gregory C. Hudon, informed the Appellant that she had been bypassed in a March 10, 2025 letter, enclosing her appeal rights. The City referenced Ms. Pimentel Paredes’ denials and inconsistent statements about the 2017 and 2019 restraining orders as the reason for bypass, and its concern that she had not been forthcoming regarding her involvement in instances of domestic violence.  (R. Exhibit 1) 
33. Superintendent Hudon wrote in the bypass letter:

Given the nature and recency of these events it is unlikely that most people would forget they had occurred. During this process you were not entirely forthcoming about your involvement in incidents of domestic violence. When asked, you presented the one incident in which it was documented that you were in fact a victim. Only after further questioning did you present information as it related to allegations in which others claimed you were the aggressor. This behavior is not in line with the Lowell Police Department’s core values. Police officers are expected to maintain the highest levels of integrity and accountability, even in adverse conditions. 

(R. Exhibit 1)

34. The City appointed a lower-ranked candidate to the position of permanent full-time police officer.  (Stipulated Facts)
35. On May 13, 2025, the Appellant filed a timely appeal.  (Stipulated Facts)

Applicable Legal Standard

The core mission of Massachusetts civil service law is to enforce “basic merit principles” for “recruiting, selecting and advancing of employees on the basis of their relative ability, knowledge and skills” and “assuring that all employees are protected against coercion for political purposes, and are protected from arbitrary and capricious actions.” G.L. c. 31, § 1; see, e.g., Massachusetts Ass’n of Minority Law Enforcement Officers v. Abban, 434 Mass. 256, 259 (2001); MacHenry v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 40 Mass. App. Ct. 632, 635 (1995), rev. den., 423 Mass. 1106 (1996); see also Brookline v. Alston, 487 Mass. 278 (2021) (analyzing broad scope of the Commission’s jurisdiction to enforce basic merit principles under civil service law). The role of the Civil Service Commission in a bypass appeal is to determine whether “on the basis of the evidence before it, the appointing authority has sustained its burden of proving that there was reasonable justification for the action taken by appointing authority.” Cambridge v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 43 Mass. App. Ct. 300, 304 (1997).  See Watertown v. Arria, 16 Mass. App. Ct. 331 (1983); McIsaac v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 38 Mass. App. Ct. 411 (2000); Police Dep’t of Boston v. Collins, 48 Mass. App. Ct. 411 (2000); Leominster v. Stratton, 58 Mass. App. Ct. 726, 728 (2003).  

Original appointments of civil service employees are made from a list of candidates, called a “certification”, whose names are drawn in the order in which they appear on the applicable civil service “eligible list”, using what is called the 2n+1 formula. G. L. c. 31, §§ 6 through 11, 16 through 27; Personnel Administration Rules, PAR.09.

In its review of bypass decisions, the Commission must determine whether the appointing authority has shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that it had “reasonable justification” for the bypass, after conducting an “impartial and reasonably thorough review” of the relevant background and qualifications bearing on the candidate’s present fitness to perform the duties of the position. Boston Police Dep’t v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 483 Mass. 461, 474-78 (2019); Police Dep’t of Boston v. Kavaleski, 463 Mass. 680, 688-89 (2012); Beverly v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 78 Mass. App. Ct. 182, 187 (2010); Leominster v. Stratton, 58 Mass. App. Ct. 726, 727-28 (2003). An action to bypass a candidate is justified when it is “done upon adequate reasons sufficiently supported by credible evidence, when weighed by an unprejudiced mind, guided by common sense and by correct rules of law.” Cambridge, 43 Mass. App. Ct. at 304, quoting Selectmen of Wakefield v. Judge of First Dist. Court of Eastern Middlesex, 262 Mass. 477, 482 (1928); Commissioners of Civil Serv. v. Municipal Court of the City of Boston, 359 Mass. 211, 214 (1971).  Cambridge further states: “In the task of selecting employees of skill and integrity, appointing authorities are invested with broad discretion.” Id. at 304.  

The Commission’s role, while important, is relatively narrow in scope: reviewing the legitimacy and reasonableness of the appointing authority’s actions. Falmouth v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 447 Mass. 814, 824-26 (2006).  The issue for the Commission is “not whether it would have acted as the appointing authority had acted, but whether, on the facts found by the Commission, there was reasonable justification for the action taken by the appointing authority in the circumstances found by the Commission to have existed when the appointing authority made its decision.” Arria, 16 Mass. App. Ct. at 334.  See Commissioners of Civil Serv. v. Municipal Ct. of Boston, 369 Mass. 84, 86 (1975) and Leominster v. Stratton, 58 Mass. App. Ct. at 727-28.  The Commission owes substantial deference to the appointing authority's exercise of judgment in determining whether there was “reasonable justification” shown. Beverly v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 78 Mass. App. Ct. at 188.  That “deference is especially appropriate with respect to the hiring of police officers.” Id.  Public safety officers are vested with considerable power and discretion and must be held to a high standard of conduct. See, e.g., Falmouth v. Civil Serv. Comm’n., 61 Mass. App. Ct. 796, 801 (2004) (citing Cambridge v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 43 Mass. App. Ct. 300, 303-305, rev. den., 10 428 Mass. 1102 (1997)); Police Comm’r v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 22 Mass. App. Ct. 364, 371, rev. den. 398 Mass. 1103 (1986).

Analysis

By a preponderance of the evidence, I find that the City had reasonable justification to bypass Ms. Pimentel Paredes for original appointment to the position of permanent full-time police officer. Ms. Pimentel Paredes was not forthcoming about being the defendant in two separate restraining orders, and gave inconsistent responses on the Application form, during an interview with the background investigator and before the oral interview board. 

Ms. Pimentel Paredes’ withholding of the facts about the two restraining orders created a reasonable justification for the appointing authority to find that she did not meet the high standard expected from those in the position of police officer. Reid v. Boston Police Dep’t, 37 MCSR 188 (2024). Police officers must respond to domestic violence situations in the line of duty, and a history of domestic violence may affect how they respond. L.G. v. Boston Police Dep’t, 39 MCSR 16, 20 (2026). The City is rightfully concerned that those with a background of domestic abuse should not be the ones investigating incidents of domestic abuse. Ramirez-Martinez v. Salem, 37 MCSR 396, 398 (2024). 

The administrative record does not show that Ms. Pimentel Paredes was served with the 2017 restraining order, but it shows that she was served with the 2019 restraining order twice in hand: with the original order and with a later modification. Before the Commission, Ms. Pimentel Paredes contested the veracity of the affidavits serving as the bases for both orders. However, the truth of those allegations, or lack thereof, is not the reasoning on which the Department based its decision to bypass her. Rather, the City’s decision was based upon her lack of candor throughout the application process. 

The Department provided Appellant multiple opportunities to explain her involvement in the 2019 events leading to the second restraining order. There are three discrete situations where she failed to be forthcoming in the hiring process. 

First, in response to Question 45-3 on the Application, which asked whether candidates were ever subject to a temporary or permanent restraining pursuant to G.L. c. 209A, §§ 3-5, Ms. Pimentel Paredes responded no, despite being a defendant on two separate restraining orders, including one with in-hand service. The Appellant explains that this omission was a result of the five-day turnaround expected and that she had rushed through the process of filling out and reviewing her application.  (Appellant’s Post-Hearing Brief). 

An appointing authority relies heavily on the information candidates provide in their applications to perform a thorough background check into whether they are qualified. Perez-Martinez v. Brockton, 37 MCSR 13,18 (2024). Hence, I sustain the Respondent’s conclusion that Ms. Pimentel Paredes offered a false answer to Question 45-3 on her Application. I find that her failure to answer this question truthfully is a valid reason for bypass, and also qualifies on its own as a sole reason for bypass. 

Notwithstanding her failure to complete the Application accurately, the ability to complete detailed reports is an essential job duty of the position of police officer. Ms. Pimentel Paredes’ omissions of the 2019 restraining order on the Application and in subsequent interviews provides reasonable justification for the appointing authority to bypass her as an applicant.

Secondly, in her October 28, 2024 interview with Det. Phothimath, Ms. Pimentel Paredes claimed that she had never been served with a restraining order. Det. Phothimath then presented her with the two restraining orders, but agreed to investigate them further. When the detective and Ms. Pimentel Paredes met again on November 7, 2024, Ms. Pimentel Paredes acknowledged the existence of the 2019 restraining order and its in-hand service. I find that Ms. Pimentel Paredes denial of service of a retraining order – despite being served in hand twice with the 2019 order - is a valid reason for bypass, and also qualifies on its own as a sole reason for bypass. 

Thirdly, in her interview before the December 12, 2024 Oral Interview Board, Ms. Pimentel Paredes’ revealed that she had been the victim in a 2020 incident when asked if police had ever been called to her home. When asked if she ever been involved in any other instances of domestic violence, the Appellant responded that the 2020 incident had been the only one.  She did not reveal the 2017 and 2019 restraining orders, although the Board interview occurred after the October 28 and November 2024 meetings with Det. Phothimath.

Ms. Pimentel Paredes’ untrue responses before the Board provides reasonable justification for the Department to believe that the Appellant did not have the necessary ability to be forthright and honest. Ms. Pimentel Paredes later explained that she did not reveal restraining orders because she thought that they had been expunged.

I find that her failure to be truthful in the oral board interview is a valid reason for bypass, and also qualifies on its own as a sole reason for bypass.  

When applicants put themselves forward as candidates for appointment as police officers, they do so with the understanding that they will be held to the highest possible standard of conduct. It is well established that an applicant’s lack of truthfulness and candor may be considered as a reason for bypass. See O’Brien v. Somerville, 25 MCSR 294 (2012); Joseph v. Boston Police Dep’t, 37 MCSR 265 (2024); Carusone v. Boston Police Dep’t, 38 MCSR 360 (2025). Indeed, the Commission has consistently recognized that “a police officer must be truthful at all times,” and “failure to do so constitutes conduct unbecoming an officer.” MacHenry v. Wakefield, 7 MCSR 94 (1994). There is a “strong public policy against employing police officers who are untruthful.” Royston v. Billerica, 19 MCSR 124, 128 (2006). As such, allegations of untruthfulness ought to be made with an appropriate degree of seriousness, and investigated with sufficient diligence. See, e.g., Morley v. Boston Police Dep’t, 29 MCSR 456 (2016).  This happened here.

Final Analysis 

The appropriate inquiry is whether it is reasonable for the Lowell Police Department to assume the risks presented by Appellant’s appointment as a Lowell police officer.  It is rare for candidates to be advanced beyond the interview stage of the application process if they are defendants in a domestic violence incident.  See L.G. v. Boston Police Dep’t, 39 MCSR 16 (2026).

The Commission has consistently afforded appointing authorities deference in evaluating candidates against the expectations and requirements of the position. The Commission’s role is to determine whether the appointing authority has demonstrated, by a preponderance of the evidence, “reasonable justification” for the bypass, following an impartial and reasonably thorough review of the candidate’s background and qualifications as they relate to the candidate’s present fitness to perform the duties of the position. The Department cannot be made to assume the risk that the hire of Appellant would entail.  See L.G. v. Boston Police Dep’t, 39 MCSR 16, 20 (2026).

I find that the Department was reasonably justified in bypassing the Appellant for all of the reasons contained in the bypass letter.  

Conclusion

                Accordingly, the Commission upholds Lowell Police Department’s decision to bypass Karla Pimentel Paredes. The appeal filed under G1-25-117 is hereby denied.

Civil Service Commission

Angela C. McConney 

Angela C. McConney
Commissioner

By vote of the Civil Service Commission (Bowman, Chair; Dooley, Markey, McConney, and Stein, Commissioners) on May 28, 2026.

Either party may file a motion for reconsideration within ten days of receipt of this Commission order or decision. Under the pertinent provisions of the Code of Mass. Regulations, 801 C.M.R. § 1.01(7)(l), the motion must identify a clerical or mechanical error in this order or decision or a significant factor the Agency or the Presiding Officer may have overlooked in deciding the case.  A motion for reconsideration does not toll the statutorily prescribed thirty-day time limit for seeking judicial review of this Commission order or decision. 

Under the provisions of G.L. c. 31, § 44, any party aggrieved by this Commission order or decision may initiate proceedings for judicial review under G.L. c. 30A, § 14 in the Superior Court within thirty (30) days after receipt of this order or decision. Commencement of such proceeding shall not, unless specifically ordered by the court, operate as a stay of this Commission order or decision.  After initiating proceedings for judicial review in Superior Court, the plaintiff, or his / her attorney, is required to serve a copy of the summons and complaint upon the Boston office of the Attorney General of the Commonwealth, with a copy to the Civil Service Commission, in the time and in the manner prescribed by Mass. R. Civ. P. 4(d).

Notice to:
Karla Pimentel Paredes (Appellant) 
Garrett Beaulieu, Esq. (for Respondent)

1. The Standard Adjudicatory Rules of Practice and Procedure, 801 C.M.R. § 1.01 (formal rules), apply to adjudications before the Commission with Chapter 31 or any Commission rules taking precedence.
2. The Commission provided a link to the parties. Should there be a judicial appeal of this decision, the plaintiff in the judicial appeal is obligated to supply the court with a transcript of this hearing to the extent that they wish to challenge the decision as unsupported by substantial evidence, arbitrary or capricious, or an abuse of discretion. In such cases, the plaintiff in the judicial appeal must transcribe the transcript from the Commission’s official recording.
3. The Commission assigns pseudonyms or uses the first name of a private citizen witness when that individual’s identity is irrelevant to the proceeding and/or would represent an unwarranted invasion of privacy.
4. Ms. Pimentel Paredes’ sister, testified that the Appellant had not attempted to hit her with the belt, and that the stepmother’s affidavit was not truthful. 
5. Ms. Pimintel Paredes asked the Commission to expunge the restraining orders in her Prehearing Memorandum. However, the Commission is not empowered to order such a remedy.