On December 2, 2025, December 10, 2025, and January 9, 2026, the four Appellants (Daniel J. Quintiliani, James E. O’Connor, Fabian Belgrave and Frank Chiola) (collectively the Appellants), all of whom are police officers in the Boston Police Department (BPD), filed individual non-bypass equity appeals under Section 2(b) of the civil service law with the Civil Service Commission. All four Appellants alleged in their filings that they were aggrieved by the decision of the BPD to stop filling sergeant vacancies from the then-existing eligible list for sergeant upon which they were at or near the top, and which has now expired.
On January 20, 2026, I held a concurrent pre-hearing conference that was attended by all four Appellants and co-counsel for the BPD along with another Appellant (Other Appellant) and their counsel.[1] As part of their pre-hearing conference memo, the Other Appellant questioned the tie-breaking method used to make promotional appointments to sergeant in or around October 2025, alleging that the BPD “manipulated the promotional process to promote politically favored candidates …”. As part of the pre-hearing, the four Appellants confirmed that this alleged violation of basic merit principles was part of their appeal, at least generally in that they sought an explanation as to the tie-breaking method used by the BPD. The BPD subsequently submitted a position statement, which I have deemed a motion for summary decision, and each of the four Appellants made submissions which I have deemed to be their opposition to the BPD’s motion.
Undisputed Facts
- In September 2021, an eligible list for Boston police sergeant was established.
- The last promotions from that eligible list occurred in October 2025.
- Seven of the promotions made in October 2025 were from a group of candidates tied for 24th on the eligible list.
- All four Appellants were also tied for 24th on the eligible list in October 2025 but were not selected for promotional appointment.
- The process for establishing a new eligible list began in 2024.
- In anticipation of a new eligible list for BPD police sergeant being established in early 2026, the BPD chose not to make any further promotions to sergeant from the eligible list that was established in 2021.
- Rather, the BPD decided that any further promotional appointments to BPD police sergeant would be made from the new eligible list.
- A new eligible list for BPD police sergeant was established on February 13, 2026.
Parties’ Arguments
The Appellants’ argument is two-fold. First, the Appellants argue that, prior to the expiration of the eligible list for BPD Police Sergeant in February 2026, there were existing vacancies that should have been filled using the eligible list in place at the time, upon which they were next in line to be considered. Some of the Appellants generally labeled the BPD’s decision as “fundamentally unfair” and others cited the BPD’s purported reliance on overtime that resulted from delaying the filling of those vacancies as evidence that the BPD’s decision was not rational.
Second, regarding the last appointments made in October 2025, the Appellants effectively challenged the tie-breaking method used, alleging that no unform tie-breaking methods were in place, leaving the process open to undue subjectivity and favoritism. Specifically, one of the Appellants indicated during the pre-hearing conference that, prior to the October 2025 promotions, he was told by a member of the BPD command staff that some of the promotions made in October 2025 would be made based on seniority; that others would be selected by City Hall; and that he (the Appellant) should “make some calls”. None of the Appellants challenge the qualifications of those police officers promoted to sergeant in October 2025.
The BPD does not contest that there were unfilled sergeant vacancies prior to the expiration of the 2021 eligible list. Rather, the BPD argues that the Appellants lack standing to bring their appeals as the BPD has not bypassed them; there is no allegation that the BPD has used impermissible acting out-of-grade appointments; and that the nature of the civil service promotional process entails that some individuals’ names will expire on an eligible list prior to promotions being made.
Regarding whether bias or favoritism was involved in promoting candidates in October 2025 from among candidates tied on the eligible list, the BPD steadfastly denies the allegations, primarily through a five-page affidavit from the Superintendent-in-Chief of the BPD. In that affidavit, the Superintendent stated that tie-breaking decisions are based on seniority, work history, internal affairs history, prior assignments and “department necessities” which may include: foreign language fluency, community relationships, investigatory skills and “positive feedback from each officer’s prior supervisors and members of the community they have worked with.”
Standard for Summary Disposition
The Commission may, on motion or upon its own initiative, dismiss an appeal at any time for lack of jurisdiction or for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 801 CMR 1.01(7)(g)(3). A motion before the Commission, in whole or in part, via summary decision may be filed pursuant to 801 C.M.R. 1.01(7)(h). An appeal may be decided on summary disposition only when, “viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party”, the undisputed material facts affirmatively demonstrate that the non-moving party has “no reasonable expectation” of prevailing on at least one “essential element of the case”. See, e.g., Milliken & Co. v. Duro Textiles LLC, 451 Mass. 547, 550 n.6 (2008); Maimonides School v. Coles, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 240, 249 (2008); Lydon v. Massachusetts Parole Bd., 18 MCSR 216 (2005). See also Mangino v. HRD, 27 MCSR 34 (2014) and cases cited (“The notion underlying the summary decision process in administrative proceedings parallels the civil practice under Mass. R. Civ. P. 56, namely, when no genuine issues of material fact exist, the agency is not required to conduct a meaningless hearing.”); Morehouse v. Weymouth Fire Dep’t, 26 MCSR 176 (2013) (“a party may move for summary decision when . . . there is no genuine issue of fact relating to his or her claim or defense and the party is entitled to prevail as a matter of law”).
Applicable Service Law
Appeals Filed Under Section 2(b)
Section 2(b) of Chapter 31 authorizes appeals to the Commission by persons aggrieved by certain actions or inactions by the Human Resources Division (HRD) or, in certain cases by appointing authorities to whom HRD has delegated its authority, and which actions have abridged their rights under civil service laws. The statute provides:
No person shall be deemed to be aggrieved . . . unless such person has made specific allegations in writing that a decision, action, or failure to act on the part of the administrator [HRD] was in violation of this chapter, the rules or basic merit principles promulgated thereunder and said allegations shall show that such person's rights were abridged, denied, or prejudiced in such a manner as to cause actual harm to the person's employment status.
Chapter 310 of the Acts of 1993 prescribes the discretionary authority granted to the Commission to remediate a violation of civil service law:
If the rights of any person acquired under the provisions of chapter thirty-one of the General Laws or under any rule made thereunder have been prejudiced through no fault of his own, the civil service commission may take such action as will restore or protect such rights notwithstanding the failure of any person to comply with any requirement of said chapter thirty-one or any such rule as a condition precedent to the restoration or protection of such rights.
The fundamental mission of Massachusetts civil service law is to enforce “basic merit principles” described in Chapter 31, which command, among other things, “recruiting, selecting and advancing of employees on the basis of their relative ability, knowledge and skills including open consideration of qualified applicants for initial appointment” and “assuring that all employees are protected against coercion for political purposes, and are protected from arbitrary and capricious actions.” G.L. c. 31, § 1. The most important mechanism for ensuring adherence to basic merit principles in hiring and promotion is the process of conducting regular competitive qualifying examinations, open to all qualified applicants, and establishing current eligible lists of successful applicants from which civil service appointments are to be made based on the requisition by an appointing authority of a “certification” that ranks the candidates according to their scores on the qualifying examination, along with certain statutory credits and preferences. G.L. c. 31, §§ 6 through 11, 16 through 27. In general, each position must be filled by selecting one of the top three most highly ranked candidates who indicate they are willing to accept the appointment, which is known as the “2n+1” formula. G.L. c. 31, § 27; PAR.09.
To deviate from the rank order of preferred hiring and appoint a person “other than the qualified person whose name appears highest”, an appointing authority must provide written reasons – positive or negative, or both – consistent with basic merit principles, to affirmatively justify bypassing a lower ranked candidate in favor of a more highly ranked one. G.L. c. 31, §§ 1, 27; PAR.08. A person who is bypassed may appeal that decision under G.L. c. 31, § 2(b) for a de novo review by the Commission to determine whether the bypass decision was based on a “reasonably thorough review” of the background and qualifications of the candidates’ fitness to perform the duties of the position and was “reasonably justified”. Police Dep’t of Boston v. Kavaleski, 463 Mass. 680, 688 (2012), citing Massachusetts Ass’n of Minority Law Enforcement Officers v. Abban, 434 Mass. 256, 259 (2001); Brackett v. Civil Service Comm’n, 447 Mass. 233, 543 (2006) and cases cited; Beverly v. Civil Service Comm’n, 78 Mass. App. Ct. 182 (2010); Leominster v. Stratton, 58 Mass. App. Ct. 726, 727-28 (2003).
Section 2(b) Bypass Appeals
The Commission has consistently construed the plain meaning of the language in G.L. c. 31, § 27 to infer that selection from a group of tied candidates is not a bypass of a person whose “name appears highest”, for which an appeal may be taken as of right to the Commission. See, e.g., Edson v. Town of Reading, 21 MCSR 453 (2008), aff’d sub nom. Edson v. Civil Service Comm’n, Middlesex Sup.Ct. No. 2008CV3418 (2009) (“When two applicants are tied on the exam and the Appointing Authority selects one, the other was not bypassed”); Bartolomei v. City of Holyoke, 21 MCSR 94 (2008) (“choosing from a group of tied candidate does not constitute a bypass”); Coughlin v. Plymouth Police Dep’t, 19 MCSR 434 (2006) (“Commission . . . continues to believe that selection among a group of tied candidates is not a bypass under civil service law”); Kallas v. Franklin School Dep’t, 11 MCSR 73 (1996) (“It is well settled civil service law that a tie score on a certification . . . is not a bypass for civil service appeals”). See also Cotter v. City of Boston, 193 F.Supp.2d 323, 354 (D.Mass.2002), rev’d in part on other grounds, 323 F.3d 160 (1st Cir. 2003) (“when a civil service exam results in a tie score, and the appointing authority . . . promotes some but not all of the tied candidates, no actionable ‘bypass’ has taken place in the parlance of the Civil Service Commission.”)
Here, the undisputed facts establish that the BPD did not appoint any candidates ranked below the Appellants, but, rather, appointed candidates tied with the Appellants on the eligible list. Thus, as a matter of law, the Appellants’ non-selections are not a bypass and the BPD is not required to provide written reasons for their non-selection over others in the tie group and they do not have a statutory right of appeal to the Commission for a de novo review of the “reasonable justification” sustaining the reasons for selecting candidates in the tie group other than the Appellants.
Section 2(b) Non-Bypass Equity Appeals
As the Appellants filed these appeals as a non-bypass equity appeal, I reviewed whether the Appellants could be deemed aggrieved persons by considering whether the BPD’s decision not to fill any vacancies from the soon-expiring eligible list or the tie-breaking criteria used to decide whom within the last tie group should be appointed was tainted by nepotism, favoritism, or gender bias and/or was arbitrary and capricious, in violation of “basic merit principles”.
Analysis
Expiring on the vine
The undisputed facts, viewed in a light most favorable to the Appellants, establish that their appeals must be dismissed.
First, a person’s ranking on an eligible list does not create any “vested right” or expectation to receive an appointment or promotion during the life of the eligible list. In Callanan v. Personnel Administrator, 400 Mass. 597, 601 (1987), the plaintiffs, BFD firefighters, claimed that failure of the personnel administrator [HRD] to establish the eligible list for district fire chief deprived them of the opportunity to be considered for promotion to fire lieutenant before the time for expiration of the lieutenant's eligibility list. The delay in creating the district fire chief list had a “ripple effect” and prevented promotions from captains to fire chief, from lieutenants to captain, and hence from fire fighter to fire lieutenant. In rejecting the plaintiff’s claims, the Supreme Judicial Court stated: “The system the Legislature created, in which eligible lists expire and are replaced by new lists, involves risk that positions might become available immediately after the expiration of an old list – or immediately before the establishment of a new list. . . . [T]he statute does not justify expectations that certain positions will become available during the period of a single list.” See also Brackett v. Civil Service Comm’n., 447 Mass. 233, 252-53 (2006) and cases cited (placement on civil service list is no guarantee of appointment or promotion); Stuart v. Roache, 951 F.2d 446, 455 (1st Cir. 1991), cert. den., 504 U.S. 913 (1992) (“a police officer's expectation of promotion based on that list will not rise to the level of a “property interest” entitled to constitutional protection”); Davis v. Personnel Administrator, 27 Mass. App. Ct. 1113 (Rule 1:28) (citing Callanan), rev. den., 405 Mass. 1202 (1989).
Second, an appointing authority is granted considerable latitude in making decisions as to when, and whether, to fill vacancies. In the absence of arbitrary or capricious behavior, the Commission will not generally intrude. See Mayor of Lawrence v. Kennedy, 57 Mass. App. Ct. 904, 906 (2003); Gillespie et al v. Boston Police Dep’t., 24 MCSR 170 (2011); Mandracchia v. City of Everett, 21 MCSR 307 (2008); Catterall v. City of New Bedford, 20 MCSR 196 (2007). Thus, when it comes to filling a vacancy in a civil service position, an appointing authority is vested with “considerable authority . . . [and] retains the sole power to decide whether to fill vacancies on either a permanent or temporary basis.” City of Somerville v. Somerville Municipal Employee’s Ass’n, 20 Mass. App. Ct. 594, 597, rev. den., 396 Mass. 1102 (1985). “The appointing authority . . . many not be required to appoint any person to a vacant post [and] may select, in the exercise of sound discretion, among persons eligible for promotion or may decline to make any promotion.” Goldblatt v. Corporation Counsel of Boston, 360 Mass. 660, 666 (1971); O’Toole v. Newton Fire Dep’t, 22 MCSR 563 (2009) (Notwithstanding a provision in the collective bargaining agreement to make “promotions as soon as practicable after a vacancy occurs”, the appointing authority “is not required under the civil service law to fill a permanent or a temporary vacancy in a permanent position.”)
Third, the Appellants have not shown, or credibly alleged, that this case presents the rare situation, which the Commission does take seriously, in which an appointing authority is motivated by personal animus when making its decision to not to make promotions from an eligible list that will be expiring in the near future. See, e.g., LeDuc v. City of Lawrence, after further investigation, E-23-135 (2023) (mayor’s animus); Cutillo v. City of Malden, 23 MCSR 348 (2010) (police commissioner’s personal animus). Put another way, the Appellants have no “reasonable expectation” of showing that the BPD’s decision was anything more than a legitimate management call.
In sum, the Appellants’ civil service rights have not been impaired and they are not aggrieved by the failure to fill vacancies prior to the establishment of a new eligible list in February 2026. Their position is no different than any other persons who are not appointed from an eligible list before it expires, also referred to as “expiring on the vine,” which is the inevitable plight of any person whose name appears at the top of an eligible list when it expires as provided by law. This common phenomenon is inherent in the civil service appointment process. See, e.g., Eyma v. Department of Correction, 35 MCSR 227 (2022); Cuhna v. Department of Correction, 34 MSCR 224 (2021); Bergeron v. Town of Falmouth, 29 MCSR 546 (2016).
Tie Breaking Methodology
The Commission has acknowledged that, in theory, tie-breaking methods are properly subject to scrutiny under “basic merit principles”. In the matter of Araica v. Human Resources Division, 22 MCSR 183 (2009), the Commission declined to pursue an investigation into whether the proposed adoption of “banding” test scores on eligible lists (which has since been abandoned) violated merit principles; but Araica did note the importance of having a fair and unbiased tie-breaking system in place:
[W]ith banding, cities and towns are likely going to be presented with much larger and more diverse certification lists of candidates and will probably need to employ tie-breaking or other selection methods much more frequently and, perhaps even adopt new methods that were not necessary in the past, to choose whom to [appoint]. . . . HRD should be actively encouraging adoption of best practices to ensure that such tie-breaking methods are consistent with, and applied in accordance with, basic merit principles and all other applicable laws. We are confident that HRD will appreciate the importance of ensuring that this is done and that failure to do so would be . . . a disservice to all parties. We will not stand idly by if presented with competent evidence that unlawful favoritism was the driving force behind a particular . . . appointment.
Id., 22 MCSR at 186. See generally De Simone v. City of Cambridge, 24 MCSR 297 (2010) (interviews used as tie-breaking criteria); St. Pierre v. Fall River School Dep’t, 22 MCSR 445 (2009) (supervisor’s rating used in layoffs to break tie in seniority); Bartolomei v. City of Holyoke, 21 MCSR 94 (2008) (noting, without deciding, possible question of using alphabetical order as a tie-breaker); Johnson v. City of Everett, 20 MCSR 295 (2007), citing Cotter v. City of Boston, 193 F.Supp.2d 323, 354 (D.Mass. 2002), rev’d in part on other grounds, 323 F.3d 160 (1st Cir. 2003) (noting problematic lack of standard tie-breaking procedures); Coughlin v. Plymouth Police Dep’t, 19 MCSR 434 (2006) (same); Dalrymple v. Town of Winthrop, 19 MCSR 379 (interview panel used as tie-breaking criteria vs. alphabetical order or seniority); Sullivan v. North Andover Fire Dep’t, 7 MCSR 175 (1990) (seniority used as tie-breaker).
The Commission has not, however, in any previous appeal, rejected the validity of the tie-breaking methodology for making civil service appointments or promotions. As stated in De Luca v. Boston Fire Department, E-25-151 (2025), any claim that an appointing authority has used some form of patently arbitrary and capricious or unlawful discriminatory criteria to select among otherwise equally qualified candidates would be taken seriously. Similarly, nepotism, whether overt or concealed, has no place under basic merit principles in filling civil service positions. Thus, the Commission’s door must be open to hearing and remediating all such violations of the basic merit principles of civil service law in some appropriate manner.
On the other hand, non-selection of tied candidates is still not a bypass and scrutiny of a tie-breaking process cannot be converted into a bypass matter. Unlike a bypass, nothing in the civil service law mandates that an appointing authority provide the reasons for picking one tied candidate over another.
After taking all these factual and legal nuances into consideration, absent a legislative change or judicial construction of the statute that would require it, I conclude that Section 2(b) is not the intended or appropriate mechanism to address such challenges. Rather, as appropriate, the Commission may scrutinize questionable tie-breaking procedures when evidence of such is brought to its attention—through its broad independent statutory authority to conduct an investigation into any form of a violation of civil service law, on its own initiative or at the written request of “the governor, the executive council, the general court or either of its branches, the administrator [HRD], an aggrieved person, or by ten persons registered to vote in the commonwealth.” G.L. c. 31, § 2(a).
To assess whether the tie-breaking method used by the BPD in October 2025 warrants a decision by the Commission to open an investigation, I provided the BPD with the opportunity to submit a position statement and for each of the Appellants to submit a response. As referenced above, the BPD, as part of their position statement, submitted an affidavit from the BPD’s Superintendent-in-Chief rebutting any allegations of favoritism or political interference.
Section 2(a) Investigations
Section 2(a) of Chapter 31 grants the Commission broad discretion to decide to what extent an investigation is appropriate and what response, if at all, should issue. See, e.g., Dennehy v. Civil Service Comm’n, Suffolk Superior Court C.A. No. 2013-00540 (2014) (“The statutory grant of authority imparts wide latitude to the Commission as to how it shall conduct any investigation, and implicitly, as to its decision to bring any investigation to a conclusion.”) See also Erickson v. Civil Service Comm’n, Suffolk Superior Court C.A. No. 2013-00639 (2014); Boston Police Patrolmen’s Association et al v. Civil Service Comm’n, Suffolk Superior Court C.A. No. 2006-4617 (2007). The Commission’s exercise of its power to investigate is not subject to the general rules for judicial review of administrative agency decisions under G.L. c. 30A but can be challenged solely for an “abuse of discretion”. See Erickson v. Civil Service Comm’n, Suffolk Superior Court C.A. No. 2013-00639 (2014), citing Mayor of Revere v. Civil Service Comm’n, 31 Mass. App. Ct. 315, 321-22 (1991).
The Commission exercises its discretion to conduct an investigation only “sparingly” and, typically, when there is clear and convincing evidence of an entrenched political or personal bias or systemic violations of the civil service law that can be rectified only by the Commission’s affirmative remedial intervention into the hiring process. See, e.g., Richards v. Department of Transitional Assistance, 24 MCSR 315 (2011) (declining to investigate alleged age discrimination and favoritism in provisional promotions, but admonishing agency that “certain actions . . . should not be repeated on a going forward basis”). For example, after learning that an appointing authority had hired candidates and began placing them into the Police Academy without having informed numerous bypassed candidates of the right to challenge their non-selection by appeal to the Commission, the Commission initiated a thorough review of the appointing authority’s hiring cycle, which resulted in the entry of numerous orders to implement changes, both retrospective and prospective, to rectify the violations found by the Commission. See Investigation re: Boston Police Dep’t and Due Process of Non-Selected Candidates, 29 MCSR 367, supplemental decision, 29 MCSR 297 (2016). See also In Re: 2010/2011 Review and Selection of Firefighters in the City of Springfield, 24 MCSR 627 (2011) (investigation into hiring spearheaded by Deputy Fire Chief which resulted in his son’s appointment and required reconsideration of numerous candidates through a new hiring cycle conducted by outsiders not connected with the Springfield Fire Department); In Re: 2011 Review and Selection of Permanent Intermittent Police Officers By the Town of Oxford, CSC No. 1-11-280 (2011) (investigation of alleged nepotism in hiring Selectmen’s relatives required reconsideration of all 19 candidates through an new independent process); Dumont v. City of Methuen, 22 MCSR 391 (2009), findings and orders after investigation, CSC No. I-09-290 (2011) (rescinding hiring process and reconsideration of all candidates after Police Chief had participated in selection of her niece).
Analysis Related to whether an Investigation is warranted
I carefully reviewed the thoughtful submissions by the Superintendent-in-Chief of the BPD and the Appellants’ responses. To ensure clarity, none of the Appellants question whether the promoted candidates are qualified to serve as police sergeants, and their responses are focused on practices and procedures as opposed to the personal actions of any individual person(s).
This is not the first time that the Commission has addressed the issue of BPD tie-breaking methods. In Damas v. Boston Police Department, 29 MCSR 550 (2016), the Commission reviewed the tie-breaking methods used regarding original appointments to police officer. In Damas, Commissioner Paul Stein wrote in part that:
Some of the criteria BPD has used, on their face, do appear to be objective, rational and legitimate distinguishing characteristics, such as prior employment at BPD or in law enforcement. To be sure, in theory, some of the criteria could be misapplied and become a pretext for a nuanced form of nepotism or preference for individuals with personal contacts at the BPD. In the present case, however, those concerns do not rise above the speculative level and do not warrant the Commission’s further review at this time. Nevertheless, the Commission will continue to monitor the concerns that Mr. Damas has raised about the BPD’s tie-breaking process to ensure they do not persist in the future. In particular, it is hard to understand how the fact that picking a candidate who happens to be personally acquainted with the BPD Police Commissioner and/or knows other members of the BPD staff, over another otherwise equally qualified candidate who does not have those relationships, fits the standards of a merit-based hiring process. Similarly, if the BPD does, in fact, discourage applicants to use BPD members as “references” but considers “recommendations” from BPD staff for use as a tie-breaker, that problematic practice should be carefully reviewed. More generally, to avoid any future implications of impropriety and for the sake of transparency, the BPD should consider, possibly in collaboration with HRD, whether the time has come to promulgate specific uniform standards and objective tie-breaking procedures to guide future decisions. The establishment of such procedures would seem especially apt for appointing authorities such as the BPD who routinely hire a large number of recruits at a time and often are choosing a significant portion of any given recruit class through use of a tiebreaking process. The Commission trusts that these concerns will be taken seriously. The Commission will continue to pay close attention to developments in this area.
A decade later, I am presented with some of the same issues reviewed by Commissioner Stein as they relate to the tie-breaking methodology for promotional appointments. At least regarding promotional appointments, it appears that the BPD chose not to heed the Commission’s suggestion to develop uniform standards when it comes to selecting from among tied candidates. Moreover, the BPD tacitly acknowledges that the practice of having individuals “call” or effectively lobby, on their behalf, is an ongoing practice. As stated by each of the Appellants, this can create the appearance of an uneven playing field and undue subjectivity, influenced by such random factors as who has more frequent contact with the Superintendent, thus increasing the likelihood that they can advocate on behalf of their preferred candidate. This is not a model process.
The question before me, however, is whether the Appellants have a reasonable expectation of showing that there is an entrenched political or personal bias or systemic violation of the civil service law that can be rectified only by the Commission’s affirmative remedial intervention. They do not.
Most importantly, as referenced above, each of the candidates promoted from the tie-group is qualified for the position of sergeant, with most having a detective rating in their prior position as police officer. Unlike cases when a selection results in a bypass, which has not occurred here, the BPD does not need to show to the Commission whether the non-selected candidates have the same or similar qualifications. Put another way, the promotions made here from a group of tied candidates did not result in unworthy candidates being promoted.
Further, none of the Appellants has alleged with a sufficient degree of specificity that any of the candidates promoted from the tied group were promoted due to the type of favoritism or nepotism that has warranted the Commission’s intervention in the past regarding other appeals and requests for investigations.
Finally, in reaching my conclusion that an investigation is not warranted at this time, I am accepting the statement in the affidavit from the Superintendent-in-Chief of the Department, the highest-ranking uniform position in the BPD, that any references to “City Hall” to one of the candidates was “misunderstood” and only referred to final administrative processing issues. Relatedly, I am assuming that the City Hall “Professional Review Committee” referred to in the same affidavit (which I do not recall ever being aware of) has no authority to overrule merit-based promotional decisions made by the Police Commissioner, who is the sole appointing authority under the civil service law and rules.
The BPD should not view the outcome here as an endorsement of its current tie-breaking method. Rather, proactive steps should be taken to eliminate any question of undue subjectivity in the process, including, but not limited to, the practice of allowing advocacy (i.e. – “phone calls”) on behalf of certain candidates. While the Commission’s recommendations to fine-tune the tie-breaking method were not heeded by the BPD ten years ago, it would behoove them to take that recommendation more seriously today.
Conclusion
For all the above reasons, the Appellants’ appeals filed under Section 2(b) are hereby dismissed and I recommend that the Commission not initiate an investigation of this matter at this time under Section 2(a).
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
/s/ Christopher Bowman
Christopher C. Bowman
Chair
By a vote of the Civil Service Commission (Bowman, Chair; Dooley, Markey, McConney and Stein, Commissioners) on April 2, 2026, the Commission dismissed the Appellants’ appeals and accepted the recommendation not to initiate an investigation at this time.
Either party may file a motion for reconsideration within ten days of receipt of this Commission order or decision. Under the pertinent provisions of the Code of Mass. Regulations, 801 CMR 1.01(7)(l), the motion must identify a clerical or mechanical error in this order or decision or a significant factor the Agency or the Presiding Officer may have overlooked in deciding the case. A motion for reconsideration does not toll the statutorily prescribed thirty-day time limit for seeking judicial review of this Commission order or decision.
Under the provisions of G.L. c. 31, § 44, any party aggrieved by this Commission order or decision may initiate proceedings for judicial review under G.L. c. 30A, § 14 in the superior court within thirty (30) days after receipt of this order or decision. Commencement of such proceeding shall not, unless specifically ordered by the court, operate as a stay of this Commission order or decision. After initiating proceedings for judicial review in Superior Court, the plaintiff, or his / her attorney, is required to serve a copy of the summons and complaint upon the Boston office of the Attorney General of the Commonwealth, with a copy to the Civil Service Commission, in the time and in the manner prescribed by Mass. R. Civ. P. 4(d)
Notice to:
Joseph McClellan, Esq. (for BPD)
Daniel J. Quintiliani (Appellant)
James E. O’Connor (Appellant)
Fabian Belgrave (Appellant)
Frank R. Chiola (Ap
[1] Another Boston Police Officer filed a similar appeal on December 3, 2025 and was part of a concurrent pre-hearing held related to these appeals. As that police officer’s appeal involves a unique issue pertaining only to their appeal, that decision will be issued separately.
