Decision  Rivera, Edwin v. Worcester Public Schools 10/29/26

Date:	10/29/2026
Organization:	Civil Service Commission
Docket Number:	D1-25-269

• Appearance for Appellant: Alan Shapiro, Esq.
• Appearance for Respondent: Jonathan Atwater, Esq. , Sean P. Sweeney, Esq.
• Hearing Officer: Shawn C. Dooley

The Commission affirmed the decision of Worcester Public Schools to terminate the Appellant from his position due to unprofessional behavior, insubordination, continued issues with anger management, and the violation of the terms of his last chance agreement. 

Decision

CSC Law Clerk Edward Groome assisted with the drafting of this decision. 

On November 26, 2025, the Appellant, Edwin Rivera (Appellant), pursuant to M.G.L. c. 31, § 43, filed a timely appeal with the Civil Service Commission (Commission) contesting the decision of the Worcester Public Schools (WPS) to terminate him from his position as a 12-Month Aide to the Physically Handicapped - Bus Driver.  The Commission held a remote pre-hearing conference on January 13, 2026.  On May 6 and June 3, 2026, I conducted an evidentiary hearing at the offices of the Commission, located at 100 Cambridge Street, Suite 200, Boston, Massachusetts [FN2].  I recorded the hearing via the Webex platform. [FN3] [FN4] Both parties submitted proposed decisions on July 20, 2026, whereupon the administrative record closed.  For the reasons set forth below, the Appellant’s appeal is denied.

Findings of Fact

I accepted into evidence seven exhibits from the Appellant (A. Exhibits 1-7) and twenty-five exhibits that had been submitted by the WPS (R. Exhibits 1-25). [FN5] In addition, the parties submitted into evidence five joint exhibits (J. Exhibits 1-5).  Based on the documents submitted and the testimony of the following witnesses:

Called by Respondent:

• Edgar Fuster, Bus Driver, Worcester Public Schools
• Jason Crue, Bus Driver, Worcester Public Schools
• Angel Carrasquillo, Transportation Operations Supervisor, Worcester Public Schools
• Wayne Cardwell, Assistant Director of Transportation, Worcester Public Schools
• Michael Freeman, Director of Transportation, Worcester Public Schools
• Yeu Kue, Assistant Superintendent, Worcester Public Schools
• Brian Allen, Superintendent of Schools, Worcester Public Schools

Called by the Appellant:

• Edwin Rivera, Appellant
       
                                                                                    

and taking administrative notice of all pleadings filed in the case, pertinent rules, statutes, regulations, case law and policies, and drawing reasonable inferences from the credible evidence, I make the following findings of fact:

1. The Appellant began working as a bus driver in 2008. Between 2008 and 2012, the Appellant worked for Durham School Services, which was the company contracted to operate the buses for Worcester Public Schools. (Testimony of the Appellant)
2. The Appellant was hired by Worcester Public Schools in 2012 when WPS terminated Durham’s contract and decided to make busing services an internal operation of the school system.  He continued working as a bus driver in a permanent capacity until his termination on November 13, 2025. (Testimony of the Appellant; R. Exhibit 3)
3. During his employment with WPS, the Appellant was a 12-Month Aide to the Physically Handicapped, with his primary responsibility being the transportation of children with special needs (bus driver). (Testimony of the Appellant)
4. Prior to 2019, the Appellant had no disciplinary record. (Testimony of Kue)
5. The evidentiary record discloses no complaints regarding his interaction with students, teachers, or parents. (Testimony of the Appellant; R. Exhibit 1)
6. On July 11, 2019, Wayne Cardwell, the Appellant’s supervisor, questioned the Appellant about several unauthorized stops he had made after dropping off the students for the day.  During this questioning, the Appellant yelled at Mr. Cardwell as well as Gary Morrison, a WPS transportation liaison, who happened to be in the office at the time the Appellant came in and confronted Mr. Cardwell. The incident was documented in contemporaneous emails from both Mr. Cardwell and Mr. Morrison. (R. Exhibits 20-21)
7. On July 17, 2019, Mr. Cardwell received a request from Michael Freeman, a WPS Transportation department manager, asking that he retrieve video from the camera on board the bus that was operated by the Appellant. Mr. Cardwell did so. (R. Exhibit 16)
8. The Appellant questioned why Mr. Cardwell was removing footage from his camera and accused Mr. Cardwell of doing this because he didn’t like him.  Mr. Cardwell explained that he did not know why it was being requested, just that Mr. Freeman had directed him to get the recording.  The Appellant stated that he wanted to speak to Mr. Freeman and began walking to his office.  On his way to Mr. Freeman’s office, the Appellant flipped over a chair in the breakroom.  Mr. Freeman was not in the office at this time. (R. Exhibit 16)
9. Approximately one hour later, the Appellant was standing in front of Mr. Cardwell’s desk and after a period of the Appellant not saying anything, Mr. Cardwell asked him if he needed anything, or if he was going to “punch out” for the day.  The Appellant became aggressive and responded by telling Mr. Cardwell not to talk to him, and to “shut up”.  The Appellant continued yelling and asked Mr. Cardwell to step outside, which Mr. Cardwell interpreted as the Appellant wanting to fight him.  Mr. Cardwell did not respond or go outside and stood at the top of the stairs watching the Appellant.  The Appellant began throwing his belongings onto the floor and then again aggressively approached Mr. Cardwell and stood closely in front of him while continuing to yell at him.  At this point, Angel Carrasquillo, who was a transportation liaison at this time, stepped in between the two men to de-escalate the situation. This incident was witnessed by several employees and documented in contemporaneous emails. (Testimony of Carrasquillo; Testimony of Cardwell; R. Exhibits 16-19)
10. In response to the July 17, 2019, incident, the Appellant received a 3-day suspension on August 19, 2019.  The Appellant served this suspension from August 19th through August 21^st of 2019. (R. Exhibit 15)
11. On September 14, 2020, the Appellant returned from his morning route and parked his bus in a parking lot where employees’ vehicles are typically kept.  Maintenance Supervisor Benjamin Rivera instructed the Appellant to move the bus, an order which the Appellant refused.  The Appellant received a verbal warning from this incident, which was documented in writing on September 24, 2020. (R. Exhibit 14)
12. On April 26, 2021, in violation of WPS policy, the Appellant drove his bus through the middle of the parking lot. Angel Carrasquillo was directed by Mr. Cardwell to remind him that this was against WPS rules and to not do this going forward.  The Appellant responded that he did not care and the rule was “dumb.”   He informed Mr. Carrasquillo that he would continue to cut through the parking lot and did not care that this might result in disciplinary action from Mr. Cardwell. (R. Exhibit 13) 
13. The April 26^th event was memorialized in an email that Mr. Cardwell sent to Michael Freeman, who at the time was Assistant Director of Transportation at WPS. (R. Exhibit 13)
14. On December 30, 2021, the Appellant became aggravated that he was asked to deliver Covid testing kits to schools throughout the district on a day when school was not in session.  He did not feel this was his job even though the drivers’ contract stated that during days when there was no school, bus drivers were expected to perform work as directed as there were no children to transport.  He later came into the office and had a verbal altercation (yelling) with Mr. Cardwell regarding this task. (R. Exhibit 12)
15. This event was memorialized in an email from Mr. Cardwell to Mr. Freeman. (R. Exhibit 12)
16. On February 3, 2022, the Appellant inserted himself into a conversation between Mr. Cardwell and another WPS employee in a matter that did not involve the Appellant. The Appellant became argumentative and stated that Mr. Cardwell does not know how to do his job.  This incident was documented in an email sent on February 14, 2022, by Mr. Carrasquillo. (R. Exhibit 11)
17. On March 28, 2023, the Appellant was involved in an incident where he became aggressive and argumentative with his supervisors as well as Mr. Carrasquillo.  This incident was reported to Human Resources, and Assistant Superintendent Dr. Yeu Kue [FN6] opened an investigation into the matter. (Testimony of Kue)
18. During the period that this investigation was taking place, the Appellant was placed on paid administrative leave. (Testimony of Freeman)
19. As part of Dr. Kue’s investigation, she met with the Appellant, his counsel, and his union representative. (Testimony of Kue)
20. The Appellant stated that the reason he had become upset was that he had felt he had been wronged, and informed Dr. Kue that he struggles with anxiety and depression. (Testimony of Kue)
21. The Appellant did not dispute that he had become aggressive with his supervisors and stated only that he was passionate about his job and that he would seek treatment. (Testimony of Kue)
22. Dr. Kue suggested that the Appellant make use of the WPS employee assistance program and recommended that he remain on leave for two weeks and pursue leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act, which he did. (Testimony of Kue)
23. Dr. Kue reviewed letters of support submitted on behalf of the Appellant on April 10 and April 12, 2023.  In these letters, the Appellant’s colleagues requested that he be allowed to return to work and praised his dedication to his job. (A. Exhibit 7)
24. On April 23, 2023, the Appellant signed a document entitled “Final Chance Agreement” acknowledging his inappropriate behavior toward peers and supervisors.  The agreement provided in relevant part:  “Please note that the signing of this agreement indicates that any future incidents along the line of the above behaviors will result in more progressive discipline, up to and including termination.” (R. Exhibit 10)
25. He was represented by his union throughout this process, including a representative being with him when he signed the Final Chance Agreement. (Testimony of Kue)
26. Following the Appellant’s meeting with Dr. Kue, he began therapy and his primary care physician prescribed him medication to manage his anxiety and depression. (Testimony of the Appellant)
27. He continued treatment until December 2024 when he was forced to stop due to factors beyond the Appellant’s control.  The Appellant attempted to find an anger management program but was unable to identify one that provided in-person instruction that was also administered in Spanish, his primary language.  There was no course in the area that was both held in person and in Spanish.  Due to the fact that he had previously attempted (unsuccessfully) to take an anger management class that was online and in English, he opted to delay treatment until an in-person Spanish program became available. (Testimony of the Appellant; A. Exhibit 4)
28. On August 10, 2023, the Appellant parked his personal vehicle in a restricted spot in front of the WPS Transportation Department office. He had previously been spoken to in July and was told that he was not allowed to park in this area.  As a result of parking there again after being told that it was not allowed, he received an official verbal warning which was documented in a letter that same day and placed in his personnel file. (R. Exhibit 9)
29. On February 12, 2024, there was a significant snowfall event predicted for the following day and the Appellant and other drivers were informed in the afternoon that their schedule for February 13th would be modified in order for the drivers to assist with snow removal. (Testimony of Cardwell)
30. The drivers were informed that instead of a normal non-school day shift of 6:00 am - 2:30 pm, they were instructed that they would be required to come in at 4:00 pm and would be expected to stay between 2 to 6 hours, depending on snowfall and the pace of clean-up. (Testimony of Cardwell)
31.  Contracted 12-month employees are required to come in on workdays when school is not in session as part of their contract.  They are paid for a full 8-hour shift on those days even if they are released early by their supervisor.  Since these days do not require the bus drivers to be transporting students, they are assigned other tasks as determined by management. (Testimony of Cardwell) 
32. Any employee who does not want to come in for a shift (including clearing snow in a snow emergency) is not required to and they have the option of taking personal time off (PTO) or vacation time for the day.  This needs to be claimed prior to the start of the workday by contacting their supervisor. (Testimony of Freeman) 
33. The Appellant was very upset with the decision to modify the bus drivers’ hours as it would require him working into the evening and possibly as late as 10:00 pm.  He went into the office to express his frustration with this decision and began aggressively arguing with Mr. Cardwell over this decision. (Testimony of Carrasquillo; R. Exhibit 1)
34. Following this confrontation, the Appellant walked out of the building and deliberately kicked over a bucket filled with windshield washer fluid and squeegees as WPS employees were standing there talking.  One of those employees, Jason Crue (training supervisor), got splashed by the fluid and hit by the squeegee poles. He then asked the Appellant what his problem was.  At this point, the Appellant began yelling at Mr. Crue and aggressively approached him.  Before the Appellant reached Mr. Crue, several other employees stepped between the two men and forcibly moved the Appellant away from the scene. (R. Exhibits 1, 7-8, 22; Testimony of Freeman, Cardwell, Carrasquillo, Crue, and Fuster)
35. Following the February 12, 2024 incident, the Appellant was placed on paid administrative leave.  He remained on paid administrative leave until his termination on November 13, 2025. (Testimony of Kue)
36. During the pendency of his administrative leave, the Appellant began working at the United States Postal Service. (Testimony of the Appellant)
37. On March 25, 2024, the Appellant received a Notice of Intent to Terminate him from his position.  In the Notice of Intent, the reasons for the Appellant’s contemplated termination included concerns about unprofessional behavior, insubordination, and aggressive and argumentative behavior towards staff. (R. Exhibit 4)
38. In the Notice of Intent, the Appellant was notified that he could request a meeting to arrange a hearing regarding termination and that he could be represented by counsel at said hearing. (R. Exhibit 4)
39. On March 26, 2024, the Appellant’s primary care physician referred him to a psychiatrist for evaluation. (A. Exhibit 1)
40. Following the Appellant’s receipt of the March 25^th Notice of Intent to Terminate, he was given the opportunity to apply for other positions within Worcester Public Schools.  The Appellant applied for several other positions but did not receive any other offers of employment. (R. Exhibit 5; Testimony of the Appellant)
41. On May 20, 2024, the Appellant received notice that the Respondent would be continuing its intent to terminate him, given that he had not moved forward with another position. (R. Exhibit 5)
42. Between May and July of 2024, the Appellant’s medical providers noted that he had made significant progress in his treatment for anxiety and depression. (A. Exhibits 2-4)
43. Due to scheduling issues, a meeting on the Notice of Intent to Terminate could not be scheduled until May 30, 2025. (Testimony of Kue)
44. The Appellant met with the Superintendent of Schools [FN7] on May 30, 2025, and requested that he be allowed to return to work. No decision was made regarding this request. (Testimony of the Appellant)
45. On July 14, 2025, the Appellant enrolled in anger management classes. Since he had been unable to find any in-person Spanish classes, he took an online program that was taught in English. He completed this program in December 2025. [FN8] (Testimony of the Appellant; A. Exhibits 5 and 6)
46. On September 30, 2025, the Appellant received a notice of contemplated disciplinary action from Superintendent Allen.  The notice listed a timeline of the discipline discussed herein and scheduled a just cause hearing to determine if there was just cause for his termination. (R. Exhibit 1)
47. Superintendent Allen listed the following reasons that led him to contemplate dismissal and proceed with the termination hearing:
    • Conduct unbecoming a custodian [FN9]
    • Unprofessional behavior
    • Aggressive and argumentative behavior with staff
    • Insubordination 
    • Violation of District Policy 
    • Pattern of inappropriate behavior
    • Violation of the terms of your Final Chance Agreement 

(R. Exhibit 1)

48. Superintendent Allen designated Dr. Yeu Kue, Assistant Superintendent for Personnel, Engagement, and Equity of WPS, as the hearing officer. (R. Exhibit 1)
49. The hearing was held before Dr. Kue on October 17, 2025. The Appellant stated in the hearing that he had made significant progress in his anger management treatment with an anticipated completion date of December 2025. (R. Exhibit 2)
50. The Appellant was represented by legal counsel, Mr. Alan Shapiro, Esq., and a Spanish language interpreter was also present at the Appellant’s request. (R. Exhibit 2)
51. The Appellant submitted a personal statement on October 24, 2025, which Dr. Kue reviewed as part of her decision-making process. (R. Exhibit 2)
52. On November 10, 2025, Dr. Kue submitted her report of the hearing to Superintendent Brian Allen.  Dr. Kue’s report recommended dismissal given that the Appellant had not meaningfully contested the allegations of misconduct and his continued disciplinary history. (R. Exhibit 2)
53. She further noted in her report that the Appellant’s statements in regard to personal difficulties in his life and the steps that he is taking to improve (because of how much this job means to him) is almost verbatim a repeat of a conversation that she had with him in 2023 involving discipline that resulted in his signing his Final Chance Agreement. (R. Exhibit 2)
54. Dr. Kue found in her hearing report that the WPS had substantially proven the allegations in the Notice of Contemplated Action and the Appellant did not provide any evidence to contravene those allegations.  Therefore, she determined that just cause existed to terminate the Appellant. (R. Exhibit 2)
55. She further addressed the fact that although the Appellant is seeking to better himself and to receive treatment for anxiety, depression, and anger management, that does not excuse him from his obligations to comport himself in a matter consistent with his job duties and responsibilities.  She further stated that she was extremely concerned that if he returned, his problematic behavior would continue. (R. Exhibit 2)
56. On November 13, 2025, Superintendent Allen adopted the findings and conclusions in Dr. Kue’s report and issued a Notice of Dismissal to the Appellant. (R. Exhibit 3)

Legal Standard

The Civil Service Commission is charged with ensuring that employment decisions are made consistent with basic merit principles.  Basic merit principles require, among other things:

. . . [the] retaining of employees on the basis of adequacy of their performance, correcting inadequate performance, and separating employees whose inadequate performance cannot be corrected; . . . assuring fair treatment of all applicants and employees in all aspects of personnel administration without regard to political affiliation, race, color, age, national origin, sex, marital status, military status, disability, sexual orientation, gender identity or religion and with proper regard for privacy, basic rights outlined in this chapter and constitutional rights as citizens, and . . . assuring that all employees are protected . . . from arbitrary and capricious actions. (G.L. c. 31, § 1)

Section 41 of the civil service law, G.L. c. 31, states in part:

Except for just cause and except in accordance with the provisions of this paragraph, a tenured employee shall not be discharged, removed, suspended for a period of more than five days . . . .

An action is “justified” if it is “done upon adequate reasons sufficiently supported by credible evidence, when weighed by an unprejudiced mind, guided by common sense and by correct rules of law.”  Commissioners of Civil Service v. Municipal Ct. of Boston, 359

Mass. 211, 214 (1971); Cambridge v. Civil Service Comm’n, 43 Mass. App. Ct. 300, 304

(1997); Selectmen of Wakefield v. Judge of First Dist. Ct., 262 Mass. 477, 482 (1928).

The Commission determines justification for discipline by inquiring “whether the employee has been guilty of substantial misconduct which adversely affects the public interest by impairing the efficiency of public service.” School Comm. Of Brockton v. Civil Service Comm’n, 43 Mass. App. Ct. 486, 488 (1997); Murray v. Second Dist. Ct., 389 Mass. 508, 514 (1983).

The Appointing Authority’s burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence is satisfied “if it is made to appear more likely or probable in the sense that actual belief in its truth, derived from the evidence, exists in the mind or minds of the tribunal notwithstanding any doubts that may still linger there.” Tucker v. Pearlstein, 334 Mass. 33, 35-36 (1956).

Section 43 of G.L. c. 31 states in relevant part:

If a person aggrieved by a decision of an appointing authority made pursuant to section forty-one shall, within ten days after receiving written notice of such decision, appeal in writing to the commission, he shall be given a hearing before a member of the commission . . . .

If the commission determines, by a preponderance of the evidence, that there was just cause for an action taken against such person, it shall affirm the action of the appointing authority and deny the appeal; provided, however, that if the commission does not so determine, it shall reverse the action and allow the appeal, in whole or in part, and the person concerned may be returned to their position with or without loss of compensation or other benefits and subject to such other orders as the commission may deem appropriate to restore and protect the rights provided to such person under this chapter; provided, further, that if the preponderance of the evidence establishes that the action was based upon harmful error in the application of the appointing authority's procedure, an error of law, or upon any factor or conduct on the part of the employee not reasonably related to the fitness of the employee to perform in the position, the commission shall allow the appeal, in whole or in part, and the person concerned may be returned to their position with or without loss of compensation or other benefits. The commission may also modify any penalty imposed by the appointing authority.

Under section 43, the Commission is required “to conduct a de novo hearing for the purpose of finding the facts anew.” Falmouth v. Civil Service Comm’n, 447 Mass. 814, 823 (2006), and cases cited. However, “[t]he commission’s task . . . is not to be accomplished on a wholly blank slate.  After making its de novo findings of fact, the commission does not act without regard to the previous decision of the [appointing authority], but rather decides whether ‘there was reasonable justification for the action taken by the appointing authority in the circumstances found by the commission to have existed when the appointing authority made its decision.’” Id. at 823-824, quoting Watertown v. Arria, 16 Mass. App. Ct. 331, 334 (1983), and cases cited.

 Analysis

                     There is little factual dispute that the Appellant engaged in hostile and unprofessional behavior toward fellow WPS employees as well as his supervisors.  The latest such incident was far from an isolated incident and had become part of a pattern of behavior over the five years preceding the Appellant’s placement on paid leave.  Despite numerous conversations, warnings, and even the issuance of a Final Chance Agreement, the Appellant did not meaningfully alter his comportment.  I applaud the fact that the Appellant did not attempt to deny that his behavior was problematic and I acknowledge that he took responsibility for the instances of poor behavior that were cited by WPS.  And while I appreciate that the Appellant appears remorseful, given his history of warnings and second chances, I find little evidence in this record that he would change his behavior if retained in his former position.  While there may be additional issues surrounding his mental health that have added to his overall problematic demeanor, the Worcester Public Schools should not be required to continue to employ a person who is unable to behave professionally.  Further, in this case, not only did the Appellant not seek any accommodation for any mental health issues that arose during his tenure, he also neglected to take an anger management course (despite demonstrated anger issues) until well after he was placed on administrative leave and served with a notice of contemplation of termination.

                I found the testimony of the Appellant’s supervisors to be sincere and credible.  I did not perceive any animosity toward the Appellant, and they appear to have been genuinely concerned for him as a person and employee throughout his tenure with WPS.  I did not find any of the discipline to be unjustified or retaliatory and I deem their approach to have been very measured and patient given the repeated aggressive behavior of the Appellant. And while some of the instances of the Appellant’s misbehavior did not result in formal discipline, WPS management nevertheless demonstrated that those incidents were part of an on-going pattern of misbehavior.  The fact that formal discipline was not always imposed appears to have been the result of an overall culture of tolerance and a commitment to avoiding confrontation whenever possible, as opposed to a lack of concern with his behavior.  

On the other hand, I found that the Appellant did not take the past warnings and discipline sufficiently seriously and, as such, I did not find his testimony regarding his willingness to change and his unmitigated love for the job to be credible.  Throughout his tenure, he had been given numerous opportunities to adjust his overall attitude and his pattern of behavior continued to be one of aggression and disrespect.  Often, it seemed as though the Appellant deliberately sought out the confrontation with his superiors.  To his credit, in both this proceeding as well as during his termination hearing with the district, he did not attempt to put forth a defense that the accusations surrounding his antagonistic / inappropriate behavior were untrue.  And, while I accept his argument that some of the instances of past behavior (not refuted) were not properly documented in his personnel file, I did not find this omission to negate the fact that proof of these incidents nonetheless support a pattern of problematic behavior even though the events did not result in formal discipline.  This case is distinguishable from Martin v. Dracut Housing Authority, 32 MCSR 165 (2019), in which the appellant had no notice of the allegations contained in the undisclosed emails relied upon by the appointing authority.  Here, by contrast, I did not find that the WPS was reliant upon emails that did not yield formal discipline to make the determination that Respondent intended to terminate the Appellant.  Further, much of the information referenced had previously been addressed in prior discipline proceedings and therefore, while he may not have been aware of the actual email, he had been informed of the corresponding facts contained within.  There is no disagreement that the Appellant was repeatedly counseled as to his poor behavior and, moreover, the expectation that all employees should be respectful to management and co-workers was conveyed to him throughout his tenure. In making my determination, I did not give contested email evidence significant weight and viewed them simply as contemporaneous correspondence that supported the testimony as to the Appellant’s behavior at the time.

Therefore, having determined that the Appellant did engage in the alleged misconduct, I must decide whether WPS had reasonable justification to impose the terminal level of discipline (discharge) it opted for in this case.  As stated by the Supreme Judicial Court in Falmouth v. Civ. Serv. Comm’n, 447 Mass. 814, 823-824 (2006):

After making its de novo findings of fact, the commission must pass judgment on the penalty imposed by the appointing authority, a role to which the statute speaks directly.  G.L. c. [31], § 43 (‘The commission may also modify any penalty imposed by the appointing authority.’)  Here the commission does not act without regard to the previous decision of the [appointing authority], but rather decides whether ‘there was reasonable justification for the action taken by the appointing authority in the circumstances found by the commission to have existed when the appointing authority made its decision.’ 

Id., quoting Watertown v. Arria, 16 Mass. App. Ct. 331, 334 (1983).  The Court continued:“Such authority to review and amend the penalties of the many disparate appointing authorities subject to its jurisdiction inherently promotes the principle of uniformity and the ‘equitable treatment of similarly situated individuals.’” Falmouth, 447 Mass. at 824, quoting Police Comm’r of Boston v. Civ. Serv. Comm’n, 39 Mass. App. Ct. 594, 600 (1996).  The Court further observed:

However, in promoting these principles, the commission cannot detach itself from the underlying purpose of the civil service system— ‘to guard against political considerations, favoritism and bias in governmental employment decisions.’  Unless the commission’s findings of fact differ significantly from those reported by the [appointing authority] or interpret the relevant law in a substantially different way, the absence of political considerations, favoritism or bias would warrant essentially the same penalty.  The commission is not free to modify the penalty imposed by the town on the basis of essentially similar fact finding without an adequate explanation. 

Falmouth, supra, at 824 (citations omitted).  With this guidance in mind, I do find that given the on-going problematic behavior, without improvement, on behalf of the Appellant, the Respondent had just cause for terminating this employee.  There is no evidence that this determination was a result of any bias, political consideration, or favoritism.

I do not credit the Appellant’s assertion that he did not understand the severity of the Final Chance Agreement since it did not expressly state that any future wrongdoing by the Appellant would automatically result in termination. The very title of the document highlights the gravity of the situation and by signing this he understood that this was his last chance to correct his behavior or he would be fired.  Given that his termination was for the exact type of behavior that led to this agreement only adds to weight of the document.  It would be very different if there was some type of minor, non-behavioral misstep that resulted in termination based on the Final Chance Agreement.  In discussing last chance agreements, this Commission in Tejeda v. City of Brockton, D1-24-177, (July 10, 2025), stated: 

[T]he Agreement serves as evidence that Mr. Tejeda had been given an opportunity to avoid termination with the clear understanding that continued employment was contingent on his compliance with department rules. This context informs, but does not dictate, the proportionality of the discipline imposed. Nevertheless, the LCA undermines any claim that termination was unexpected or disproportionate considering Mr. Tejeda’s disciplinary history. 

Id., 38 MCSR 251, 259 (2025).  As in Tejeda, the Appellant had a clear understanding that his continued employment was contingent on him eliminating his bad behavior. 

The fact that WPS did not make this agreement an “absolute” with termination being the only possible outcome, and instead allowed for some leeway depending on the future infraction, constituted a benefit to the Appellant and does not negate the spirit of the agreement.  Further, he received counsel from his union representative as to the significance of this document and it is clear that he would have been terminated if he refused to accept the terms; this further underscored the serious consequence that would arise if his behavior continued.  To set a precedent that a last chance agreement may be null and void, merely for allowing the hiring entity to retain disciplinary flexibility, would prove foolhardy and would result in future agreements specifying only absolute consequences, resulting in employees being terminated for minor infractions without considering improvement or a whole host of other factors. 

While the Appellant made the argument that this behavior was the result of factors relating to his depression and other mental health issues, there is little in the evidence he put forth, except comments made in the disciplinary hearing with Dr. Kue in 2023, showing that he attempted to address these issues with his supervisors or ask for an accommodation relating to his mental health status.  And while Dr. Kue counseled him on getting additional help to deal with his anger issues, including urging him to take an additional two weeks off before returning to work, whatever steps the Appellant took did not appear to result in a cessation of his negative and confrontational demeanor.  In addition, despite her being genuinely concerned for the Appellant’s well-being, the discipline Dr. Kue imposed reflected the seriousness and on-going nature of the offenses and therefore included a literal last-chance agreement proviso.  In signing and accepting this agreement, the Appellant not only acknowledged his past inappropriate behavior but in doing so he stated that he understood that this was his “final chance” if his inappropriate conduct in the workplace continued. 

Regrettably, the Appellant did not change course and continued to act hostile toward his fellow employees and supervisors.  This resulted in his eventual termination.  As the Commission stated in McKenzie v. City of Boston, 20 MCSR 423 (2007), members were “not persuaded by [the Appellant’s] argument that there were mitigating circumstances which ‘negate’ just cause in this case.”  In addition, “the [respondent] repeatedly tried to help [the appellant] address his anger issues. They also used progressive discipline against [the appellant] and put him on clear notice that if he had another violent or disruptive outburst, he could be terminated.”  So, while there may be other issues affecting the Appellant personally, that does not negate WPS’s ability to determine that they could no longer employ an individual who was unable to be professional and respectful in the workplace despite numerous attempts at intervention. 

As an aside, I did find it commendable that, despite the long history of poor comportment by the Appellant, the school district provided him with the opportunity to seek another position within a different department at WPS.  While it is unclear as to why this avenue did not prove fruitful, the mere fact that this was offered as a prospect supports the fact that there was no animus toward the Appellant on behalf of the employer in making the eventual determination to terminate his employment. 

Given that the Appellant’s inappropriate conduct had been an on-going problem for years, with repeated discussions, warnings, and discipline, including a “Final Chance Agreement” signed by the Appellant, and with the Appellant showing no progress or significant attempt to correct his behavior, I find that the Respondent was reasonably justified in their determination (i.e., had just cause) to terminate his employment. 

Conclusion

Therefore, for all the reasons stated above, the appeal of Edwin Rivera, filed under Docket Number D1-25-269, is hereby denied.

Civil Service Commission

/s/ Shawn C. Dooley 

Shawn C. Dooley
Commissioner

By vote of the Civil Service Commission (Bowman, Chair; Dooley, Markey, McConney, and Stein, Commissioners) on October 29, 2026.

Either party may file a motion for reconsideration within ten days of receipt of this Commission order or decision. Under the pertinent provisions of the Code of Mass. Regulations, 801 C.M.R. § 1.01(7)(l), the motion must identify a clerical or mechanical error in this order or decision or a significant factor the Agency or the Presiding Officer may have overlooked in deciding the case.  A motion for reconsideration does not toll the statutorily prescribed thirty-day time limit for seeking judicial review of this Commission order or decision. 

Under the provisions of G.L. c. 31, § 44, any party aggrieved by this Commission order or decision may initiate proceedings for judicial review under G.L. c. 30A, § 14 in the superior court within thirty (30) days after receipt of this order or decision. Commencement of such proceeding shall not, unless specifically ordered by the court, operate as a stay of this Commission order or decision.  After initiating proceedings for judicial review in Superior Court, the plaintiff, or his / her attorney, is required to serve a copy of the summons and complaint upon the Boston office of the Attorney General of the Commonwealth, with a copy to the Civil Service Commission, in the time and in the manner prescribed by Mass. R. Civ. P. 4(d). 

Notice to: 
Alan H. Shapiro, Esq. (for Appellant) 
Sean P. Sweeney, Esq. (for Respondent)
Jonathan R. Atwater, Esq. (for Respondent)

2.   The Standard Adjudicatory Rules of Practice and Procedure, 801 C.M.R. § 1.01 (formal rules), apply to adjudications before the Commission with Chapter 31 or any Commission rules taking precedence.

3.   The Commission forwarded a link of this recording to both parties. Should there be a judicial appeal of this decision, the plaintiff in the judicial appeal is obligated to supply the court with a transcript of this hearing to the extent that they wish to challenge the decision as unsupported by substantial evidence, arbitrary or capricious, or an abuse of discretion. In such cases, the plaintiff in the judicial appeal must transcribe the transcript from the Commission’s official recording.

4.  Due to technical difficulties unknown to the Commission at the time, the system stopped recording the audio after approximately 30 minutes on the first      day of the hearing. Both parties were notified and were given the opportunity to have the first day’s testimony retaken or to have a recorded online ses         sion with any of the witnesses if either side determined there was a need for clarification or to record any specific testimony.  Both sides agreed that           these options were not necessary.  

5.  Exhibit 25 is being held under a protective order due to sensitive personal and medical information included in these records.

6.  Dr. Kue was Acting Chief Human Resources Officer at the time of this incident. 

7.  Rachel Monárrez, Ph.D. served as the Superintendent of Schools from 2022 until she resigned effective June 30, 2025.  Brian Allen, who was Deputy        Superintendent at this time, was appointed to the position of Superintendent of Schools for the City of Worcester effective July 1, 2025. 

8.  The Appellant enrolled in the anger management course over 15 months after he received the original notice of intent to terminate.  He completed the         anger management course approximately one month after he was terminated. 

9.  Although not discussed during the hearing, I believe this to be a scrivener’s error; it should have read either:  “12 month aide to the physically handicapped”, “bus driver”, or a combination of the two.