On June 29, 2026, the Appellant, Ruben Santana (Appellant), filed an appeal with the Civil Service Commission (Commission), contesting the decision of the Boston Police Department (BPD) to bypass him for original appointment as a permanent, full-time police officer.
On August 4, 2026, I held a remote pre-hearing conference which was attended by the Appellant, his counsel and counsel for the BPD. The BPD filed a motion for summary decision and the Appellant filed an opposition.
Undisputed Facts
Based on the statements of the parties and the written submissions, the following, unless otherwise noted, is not in dispute:
- On March 16, 2024, the Appellant took the civil service examination for police officer and received a score of 87.
- On June 1, 2024, the state’s Human Resources Division (HRD) established the eligible list for Boston police officer.
- On September 5, 2025, HRD issued Certification No. 10772 to the BPD, upon which the Appellant was ranked 48th among those willing to accept appointment.
- The BPD appointed 227 candidates, 209 of whom were ranked below the Appellant.
- On May 13, 2026, the BPD notified the Appellant that he was bypassed for appointment.
- The reasons for bypass included driving history and work history, though the primary reason related to the Appellant’s arrest on January 31, 2025 wherein the Appellant was charged with Operating Under the Influence (OUI), Intoxicated Licensee carrying a firearm, and Motor Vehicle Operator Refusal to Identify Self.
- During the early morning hours of January 31, 2025, two Boston police officers were dispatched to an intersection in East Boston. As seen on body-worn camera and recounted in a police report, responding officers found the Appellant sitting in the driver’s seat of his idling car with his eyes closed. The Appellant failed to open his eyes even after officers yelled “Boston Police” and banged on the window multiple times. The Appellant eventually opened his eyes, slightly rolled down the window, disobeyed commands to fully open the window and started driving slowly forward. After the responding officer used his baton to strike the driver’s-side window, the Appellant started to drive forward at a higher rate of speed. The officers returned to their cruiser and pursued the Appellant with emergency lights activated.
- The officers located the Appellant’s vehicle idling a short distance away. Officers gave multiple commands for the Appellant to exit the vehicle; he initially refused, and officers eventually removed the Appellant from the vehicle.
- Officers noted in their police report that they noticed a strong odor of alcohol emanating from his person, slurred speech and unsteady balance. A loaded firearm was recovered from a duty belt, along with two 9mm magazines. An additional loaded firearm was located in a holster in the driver’s side door. Officers later confirmed that the Appellant, who was employed as a security officer, had an active license to carry (LTC) a firearm. After being transported to the police station for booking, the Appellant refused to take a breathalyzer test.
- The Appellant describes the above incident in his opposition to the BPD’s Motion for Summary Decision as follows:
… he was employed as an armed security guard [and] due to personal family matters and a lengthy shift he had left his assignment and started to work, he was so exhausted [that] he felt unsafe to drive and pulled off the road and parked where he felt safe. While deep asleep, someone (a police officer) banged on his window. Frightened and disoriented, the Appellant drove off. When he stopped a short distance away, he was still somewhat shaken up and was also upset by the behavior of the officers. He did not perform any field sobriety tests, nor did he take a Breathalyzer examination. Since he was coming from work, he still was wearing his service belt with his service weapon, together with his personal handgun.
- According to the Appellant, due to his status as a combat veteran, the criminal charges were dismissed before arraignment pursuant to the Commonwealth's veterans' diversion provisions under G.L. c. 276A, §§ 10–11 (the VALOR Act, as amended by the BRAVE Act).
Standard for Summary Disposition
The Commission may, on motion or upon its own initiative, dismiss an appeal at any time for lack of jurisdiction or for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 801 CMR 1.01(7)(g)(3). A motion before the Commission, in whole or in part, via summary decision may be filed pursuant to 801 C.M.R. 1.01(7)(h). An appeal may be decided on summary disposition only when, “viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party”, the undisputed material facts affirmatively demonstrate that the non-moving party has “no reasonable expectation” of prevailing on at least one “essential element of the case”. See, e.g., Milliken & Co. v. Duro Textiles LLC, 451 Mass. 547, 550 n.6 (2008); Maimonides School v. Coles, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 240, 249 (2008); Lydon v. Massachusetts Parole Bd., 18 MCSR 216 (2005). See also Mangino v. HRD, 27 MCSR 34 (2014) and cases cited (“The notion underlying the summary decision process in administrative proceedings parallels the civil practice under Mass. R. Civ. P. 56; namely, when no genuine issues of material fact exist, the agency is not required to conduct a meaningless hearing.”); Morehouse v. Weymouth Fire Dep’t, 26 MCSR 176 (2013) (“a party may move for summary decision when . . . there is no genuine issue of fact relating to his or her claim or defense and the party is entitled to prevail as a matter of law.”)
Legal Standard Regarding Bypass Appeals
When bypassing a candidate for appointment, the burden is on the appointing authority to show that it had reasonable justification for its bypass decision. Sherman v. Town of Randolph, 472 Mass. 802, 811 (2015) [“The commission must ‘properly place[ ] the burden on the [appointing authority] to establish a reasonable justification for the bypass[.]’” (quoting Massachusetts Ass'n of Minority Law Enforcement Officers v. Abban, 434 Mass. 256, 264 (2001)].
Analysis
The BPD argues that watching the footage removes any genuine issue of fact that the Appellant was highly intoxicated while operating his motor vehicle, and that he therefore broke the law in such a way that posed a significant threat to public safety in the City of Boston, putting at risk the lives that BPD police officers are sworn to protect.
The Appellant argues that there are sufficient issues of material facts that are in dispute and effectively argues that, when viewed in the light most favorable to him, the evidence does not support the conclusion that he engaged in any criminal conduct.
The BWC footage, which I reviewed, shows that the Appellant's vehicle was stopped with its engine running in the roadway, rather than safely parked along the side of the road as described in his opposition. The Appellant acknowledges that he had fallen into a deep sleep and that, when awakened by officers banging on his vehicle's windows, he became frightened and disoriented and drove away. For purposes of this decision, I assume that the Appellant was exhausted rather than intoxicated and that he did not initially recognize the individuals outside his vehicle as Boston police officers.
Even accepting those explanations, the circumstances raise substantial concerns about the Appellant's judgment and ability to respond appropriately in an unexpected and potentially dangerous situation. The Appellant was asleep in an idling vehicle stopped in the roadway, was sufficiently disoriented upon awakening that he drove away from the encounter and was in possession of two loaded firearms. Although the Appellant was licensed to carry firearms and was returning from his employment as an armed security officer, their presence heightened the potential safety consequences of the encounter.
This conduct, independent of the disputed allegation of intoxication, provided reasonable justification for the BPD's concerns regarding the judgment, situational awareness, and public-safety responsibilities expected of a police officer. Further, the fact that the criminal charges were dismissed does not, by itself, preclude consideration of underlying conduct established by a preponderance of the evidence.
In Canuto v. Boston Police Department, 37 MCSR 172 (2024), the Commission affirmed a bypass based on the candidate's demonstrated poor judgment involving the security of a firearm. Although the circumstances in Canuto differed from those presented here, the decision recognizes that an appointing authority may reasonably consider an applicant's judgment in circumstances involving firearms when assessing suitability for appointment as a police officer. The relevant concern here is not the Appellant's lawful possession of firearms, but his judgment and situational awareness during an encounter that presented potential risks to himself and responding officers.
In summary, I conclude that the BPD has established reasonable justification for the bypass by a preponderance of the evidence and that the Appellant has no reasonable expectation of prevailing on his appeal, even when the facts are viewed in the light most favorable to him.
Conclusion
For the above reasons, the BPD’s Motion for Summary Decision is allowed and the Appellant’s appeal under Docket Number G1-26-130 is hereby dismissed.
Civil Service Commission
/s/ Christopher Bowman
Christopher C. Bowman
Chair
By a vote of the Civil Service Commission (Bowman, Chair; Dooley, Markey and Stein, Commissioners [McConney – Absent]) on November 12, 2026.
Either party may file a motion for reconsideration within ten days of receipt of this Commission order or decision. Under the pertinent provisions of the Code of Mass. Regulations, 801 CMR 1.01(7)(l), the motion must identify a clerical or mechanical error in this order or decision or a significant factor the Agency or the Presiding Officer may have overlooked in deciding the case. A motion for reconsideration does not toll the statutorily prescribed thirty-day time limit for seeking judicial review of this Commission order or decision.
Under the provisions of G.L. c. 31, § 44, any party aggrieved by this Commission order or decision may initiate proceedings for judicial review under G.L. c. 30A, § 14 in the superior court within thirty (30) days after receipt of this order or decision. Commencement of such proceeding shall not, unless specifically ordered by the court, operate as a stay of this Commission order or decision. After initiating proceedings for judicial review in Superior Court, the plaintiff, or his / her attorney, is required to serve a copy of the summons and complaint upon the Boston office of the Attorney General of the Commonwealth, with a copy to the Civil Service Commission, in the time and in the manner prescribed by Mass. R. Civ. P. 4(d).
Notice to:
James Gilden, Esq. (for Appellant)
Jennifer Cipolletti, Esq. (for Respondent)