On February 10, 2026, the Appellant, Kelly Schmidt (Appellant), filed an appeal with the Civil Service Commission (Commission), contesting the decision of the City of Boston (City) to terminate him from his position as an Income Restricted Housing Portfolio Administrator (IRHPA) within the Mayor’s Office of Housing. On March 24, 2026, I held a remote pre-hearing conference which was attended by the Appellant and counsel for the City. The City subsequently filed a motion to dismiss the Appellant’s appeal and the Appellant filed an opposition. For the reasons stated below, the Appellant’s appeal is dismissed.
Facts / Chronology of Events
- Chapter 150 of the Acts of 1957 established the Boston Redevelopment Authority (BRA).
- Chapter 652 of the Acts of 1960 expanded the BRA’s powers by transferring Boston’s planning functions to the BRA, making it both the redevelopment authority and the City’s planning board.
- Chapter 1097 of the Acts of 1971 established the Boston Economic Development and Industrial Corporation (EDIC).
- Chapter 341 of the Acts of 1993 transferred the powers and duties of the members of EDIC to the BRA, stating in relevant part:
… members of the [BRA] shall be constituted as and shall have the powers of and discharge the duties of the member of the [EDIC] … for such purposes, said members shall constitute themselves separately and shall separately record all actions taken by them pursuant to [Chapter 1097 of the Acts of 1971].
- In 2016, then-Mayor Martin Walsh re-branded the BRA and EDIC as the Boston Planning and Development Agency (BPDA).
- On January 3, 2023, the Appellant was appointed by the Boston Planning and Development Agency (BPDA) as an Income Restricted Housing Planning Administrator (IHPA).
- The Appellant acknowledges that he was legally employed by the EDIC.
- In 2024, the City passed an ordinance that moved certain functions of the BPDA to the City.
- On July 1, 2024, the Appellant was transferred to the Mayor’s Office of Housing, formerly known as the Boston Public Facilities Department (PFD).
- On February 6, 2026, the Appellant was terminated from the PFD.
- The PFD was established by Chapter 642 of the Acts of 1966 which states in part that:
… Neither chapter thirty-one of the General Laws nor any rule made thereunder shall apply to … any other personnel elected by the [public facilities] Commission; provided, however, that said chapter thirty-one and rules made thereunder shall continue to apply to every person transferred to the service of the commission if at the time of such transfer such person holds an office or position under a permanent civil service appointment and is not still serving his probationary period; and further provided that said chapter and rules shall govern promotions among those to whom they continue to apply.
Parties’ Arguments
Both parties agree that certain employees of redevelopment authorities, such as the BRA, gain certain civil service protections, including the ability to contest a termination after six months of employment. See G.L. c. 121B, § 52 (“No person permanently employed by a redevelopment authority, who is not classified under chapter thirty-one, shall, after having actually performed the duties of his office or position for a period of six months, be discharged, removed, suspended, laid off, transferred from the latest office or employment held by him without his consent, lowered in rank or compensation, nor shall his office or position be abolished, except for just cause and in the manner provided by sections forty-one to forty-five, inclusive, of chapter thirty-one.”)
The City argues that the Appellant’s employment at the BPDA was not covered by Chapter 31 because he was employed by the EDIC, which is explicitly exempted from the civil service law. Further, the City argues that employees of the Mayor’s Office of Housing, formerly the Public Facilities Department, are not covered by the civil service law and that the position formerly occupied by the Appellant was not a civil service position.
The Appellant argues that the 1993 merger of the BRA and the EDIC made them a “joint employer” thus conveying to him the same civil service protections as BRA employees. Then, assuming that he gained such protections, the Appellant argues that he maintained them when he transferred to the Mayor’s Office of Housing, purportedly pursuant to Chapter 30, § 9J.
Standard for Summary Disposition
The Commission may, on motion or upon its own initiative, dismiss an appeal at any time for lack of jurisdiction or for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 801 CMR 1.01(7)(g)(3). A motion before the Commission, in whole or in part, via summary decision may be filed pursuant to 801 C.M.R. 1.01(7)(h). An appeal may be decided on summary disposition only when, “viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party”, the undisputed material facts affirmatively demonstrate that the non-moving party has “no reasonable expectation” of prevailing on at least one “essential element of the case”. See, e.g., Milliken & Co. v. Duro Textiles LLC, 451 Mass. 547, 550 n.6 (2008); Maimonides School v. Coles, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 240, 249 (2008); Lydon v. Massachusetts Parole Bd., 18 MCSR 216 (2005). See also Mangino v. HRD, 27 MCSR 34 (2014) and cases cited (“The notion underlying the summary decision process in administrative proceedings parallels the civil practice under Mass. R. Civ. P. 56, namely, when no genuine issues of material fact exist, the agency is not required to conduct a meaningless hearing.”); Morehouse v. Weymouth Fire Dep’t, 26 MCSR 176 (2013) (“a party may move for summary decision when . . . there is no genuine issue of fact relating to his or her claim or defense and the party is entitled to prevail as a matter of law”).
Analysis
The Appellant was never “permanently employed by a redevelopment authority.” Rather, he was appointed by the EDIC, whose employees the Legislature explicitly exempted from the civil service law upon its creation in 1971. The 1993 merger did not result in current or future employees of the EDIC becoming “permanently employed” by the BRA. Rather, the legislature explicitly stated that the merged board “shall constitute themselves separately and shall record all actions taken by them … .” Further, had the legislature intended for EDIC employees to obtain the same civil service protections as BRA employees, they would have stated as such, like when they added language to Chapter 642 of the Acts of 1966 providing certain employees transferred into the City’s Public Facilities Department with civil service protections.
Since the Appellant was never permanently employed by a redevelopment authority, he never obtained civil service protections. Even if he had, which he did not, (1) the “transfer” protections cited by the Appellant pertain to state departments, commissions, officers and employees” which the Appellant never was; and (2) the transfer protections provided for under Chapter 642 of the Acts of 1966 pertain only to employees who held an office or position under a permanent civil service appointment, which the Appellant never did.
Conclusion
As the Appellant never obtained civil service protections, either during his employment with the EDIC or the City, the Commission lacks jurisdiction to hear his appeal, which is hereby dismissed.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
/s/ Christopher Bowman
Christopher C. Bowman
Chair
By a vote of the Civil Service Commission (Bowman, Chair; Dooley, Markey, McConney and Stein, Commissioners) on July 23, 2026.
Either party may file a motion for reconsideration within ten days of receipt of this Commission order or decision. Under the pertinent provisions of the Code of Mass. Regulations, 801 CMR 1.01(7)(l), the motion must identify a clerical or mechanical error in this order or decision or a significant factor the Agency or the Presiding Officer may have overlooked in deciding the case. A motion for reconsideration does not toll the statutorily prescribed thirty-day time limit for seeking judicial review of this Commission order or decision.
Under the provisions of G.L. c. 31, § 44, any party aggrieved by this Commission order or decision may initiate proceedings for judicial review under G.L. c. 30A, § 14 in the superior court within thirty (30) days after receipt of this order or decision. Commencement of such proceeding shall not, unless specifically ordered by the court, operate as a stay of this Commission order or decision. After initiating proceedings for judicial review in Superior Court, the plaintiff, or his / her attorney, is required to serve a copy of the summons and complaint upon the Boston office of the Attorney General of the Commonwealth, with a copy to the Civil Service Commission, in the time and in the manner prescribed by Mass. R. Civ. P. 4(d)
Notice to:
Kelly Schmidt (Appellant)
Michael Berry, Esq. (for Respondent)
- Permanent employee is defined as: “A person who is employed in a civil service position (1) following an original appointment …”. An “original appointment” is an appointment made pursuant to Chapter 31. (Chapter 31, Section 1)
