| Date: | 06/25/2026 |
|---|---|
| Organization: | Civil Service Commission |
| Docket Number: | G1-25-042 |
The Commission affirmed the decision of the Boston Police Department to bypass the candidate for original appointment to the position of permanent full-time police officer based on concerns about his prior misconduct and poor judgment.
Pursuant to G.L. c. 31, § 2(b), the Appellant, Franklin Senise, appealed to the Civil Service Commission (Commission) the January 13, 2025 decision of the Boston Police Department (Department) to bypass him for original appointment to the position of permanent full-time police officer in the Department. The Department based its decision on Mr. Senise's poor judgment and criminal conduct.
The Commission conducted a remote pre-hearing conference on March 18, 2025. On June 10, 2025, I conducted an evidentiary hearing at the offices of the Civil Service Commission located at 100 Cambridge Street, Suite 200, Boston. I recorded the hearing via Webex. The Respondent a submitted post hearing brief in August 2025, whereupon the administrative record closed.
For the reasons set forth below, Appellant’s appeal is denied.
I admitted eleven exhibits from the Respondent (R. Exhibits 1-11), and four exhibits from the Appellant (A. Exhibits 1-4). Based upon the documents entered into evidence and the testimony of:
Called by the Department:
Called by the Appellant:
and taking administrative notice of all pleadings filed in the case, pertinent rules, statutes, regulations, case law and policies, and drawing reasonable inferences from the credible evidence, I make the following findings of fact:
Civil Service Process
Background Investigation
the clerk magistrate denied the complaint due to the alleged victim’s absence. (R. Exhibit 5; Testimony of Finn)
The core mission of Massachusetts civil service law is to enforce “basic merit principles” for “recruiting, selecting and advancing of employees on the basis of their relative ability, knowledge and skills” and “assuring that all employees are protected against coercion for political purposes, and are protected from arbitrary and capricious actions.” G.L. c. 31, § 1. See, e.g., Massachusetts Ass’n of Minority Law Enforcement Officers v. Abban, 434 Mass. 256, 259 (2001); MacHenry v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 40 Mass. App. Ct. 632, 635 (1995), rev. den., 423 Mass. 1106 (1996). See also Brookline v. Alston, 487 Mass. 278 (2021) (analyzing broad scope of the Commission’s jurisdiction to enforce basic merit principles under civil service law). The role of the Civil Service Commission in a bypass appeal is to determine whether, “on the basis of the evidence before it, the appointing authority has sustained its burden of proving that there was reasonable justification for the action taken by appointing authority.” Cambridge v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 43 Mass. App. Ct. 300, 304 (1997). SeeWatertown v. Arria, 16 Mass. App. Ct. 331 (1983); McIsaac v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 38 Mass. App. Ct. 411 (2000); Police Dep’t of Boston v. Collins, 48 Mass. App. Ct. 411 (2000); Leominster v. Stratton, 58 Mass. App. Ct. 726, 728 (2003).
Original appointments of civil service employees are made from a list of candidates, called a “certification,” whose names are drawn in the order in which they appear on the civil service “eligible list,” using what is called the 2n+1 formula. G.L. c. 31, §§ 6 – 11; 16 – 27; Personnel Administration Rules, PAR.09. An appointing authority must provide specific written reasons, consistent with basic merit principles, when choosing to bypass a higher ranked candidate in favor of a lower ranked one. G.L. c. 31, § 27; PAR.08(4).
In its review of bypass decisions, the Commission must determine whether the appointing authority has shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that it had “reasonable justification” for the bypass, after conducting an “impartial and reasonably thorough review” of the relevant background and qualifications bearing on the candidate’s present fitness to perform the duties of the position. Boston Police Dep’t v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 483 Mass. 461, 474-78 (2019); Police Dep’t of Boston v. Kavaleski, 463 Mass. 680, 688-89 (2012); Beverly v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 78 Mass. App. Ct. 182, 187 (2010); Leominster v. Stratton, 58 Mass. App. Ct. 726, 727-28 (2003). An action to bypass a candidate is justified when it is “done upon adequate reasons sufficiently supported by credible evidence, when weighed by an unprejudiced mind, guided by common sense and by correct rules of law.” Cambridge, 43 Mass. App. Ct. at 304, quoting Selectmen of Wakefield v. Judge of First Dist. Court of Eastern Middlesex, 262 Mass. 477, 482 (1928); Commissioners of Civil Serv. v. Municipal Court of the City of Boston, 359 Mass. 211, 214 (1971). Cambridge further states, “[i]n the task of selecting employees of skill and integrity, appointing authorities are invested with broad discretion.” Id. at 304.
The Commission’s role, while important, is relatively narrow in scope: reviewing the legitimacy and reasonableness of the appointing authority’s actions. Falmouth v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 447 Mass. 814, 824-26 (2006).
Public safety officers are vested with considerable power and discretion and therefore must be held to a high standard of conduct. See, e.g., Falmouth v. Civil Serv. Comm’n., 61 Mass. App. Ct. 796, 801 (2004), citing Cambridge, supra, 43 Mass. App. Ct. at 303-305; Police Comm’r v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 22 Mass. App. Ct. 364, 371, rev. den. 398 Mass. 1103 (1986). “Police officers are not drafted into public service; rather they compete for their positions. In accepting employment by the public, they implicitly agree that they will not engage in conduct which calls into question their ability and fitness to perform their official responsibilities.” Police Comm'r v. Civil Service Comm'n, 22 Mass. App. Ct. 364, 371, rev. den. 398 Mass. 1103 (1986).
The Department has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that there was reasonable justification to bypass Mr. Senise for original appointment to the position of Boston Police Officer based on his prior misconduct and his failure to exercise good judgment.
Det. Finn’s investigation was reasonably thorough and detailed, and provided Mr. Senise with the opportunity to provide information and explain his statements on the application. I find that the detective conducted a fair investigation. I now examine whether the two reasons cited by the Department justified its decision.
Domestic Violence Incident – January 2011
In the January 13, 2025 bypass letter, Ms. Levarity wrote:
On January 21, 2011, a victim walked in to file a report in which she alleged that you assaulted her. … The Detective sought a criminal complaint against you for Assault and Battery. That criminal complaint was denied because the victim failed to appear at the hearing. Due to this incident, the Boston Police Department is concerned with your conduct.
(R. Exhibit 1)
A series of decisions by the Civil Service Commission “demonstrate that the Commission takes issues surrounding domestic violence very seriously.” Sweeney v. Medford, 37 MCSR 2 (2024). Historically, “the Commission has long held that evidence of domestic violence is a valid reason to bypass a candidate for appointment, particularly in regard to public safety appointments.” Golden v. Department of Correction, 33 MCSR 194 (2020). In finding domestic violence issues a reason for bypass, an Appointing Authority must determine that the allegations are likely true, a standard definition for preponderance of the evidence. O’Brien v. Lowell, 2015 WL 11108807, at 7 (2015). It does not have to prove that Appellant engaged in the alleged acts, only that there was a sufficient quantum of evidence to substantiate a legitimate concern. Id. In doing so, the Appointing Authority must conduct a “reasonably thorough review” of the issues at hand. Id. Once this has been satisfied, it is then up to the Appointing Authority “to determine whether [it] is willing to risk hiring the applicant.” Boston Police Dep’t v. Civil Service Comm’n, 483 Mass. 461, 477 (2019).
Mr. Senise’s conduct during the January 17, 2011 incident created a reasonable justification for the appointing authority to find that he did not meet the high standard expected from those in the position of police officer. Reid v. Boston Police Dep’t, 37 MCSR 188 (2024). Police officers must respond to domestic violence situations in the line of duty, and a history of domestic violence may affect how they respond. L.G. v. Boston Police Dep’t, 39 MCSR 16, 20 (2026). The Department is rightfully concerned that those with a background of domestic abuse should not be the ones investigating incidents of domestic abuse. Ramirez-Martinez v. Salem, 37 MCSR 396, 398 (2024).
The preponderance of evidence shows that Mr. Senise engaged in misconduct on January 17, 2011 when he yelled angrily at his romantic partner at the time, trapped her in a bedroom, threw her on a bed and attempted to choke her. A detective photographed the numerous bruises and scratches on her body, which were evident four days later when she filed a report at the police station.
As a result of this incident, a detective followed up by speaking with the former partner and sought a criminal complaint for assault and battery.
When Det. Finn, the BPD’s background investigator, presented the allegations to him, Mr. Senise said that he and the partner had attended court together, and that she had asked for the charges to be dismissed.
It is likely that a complaint would have issued if the former partner had appeared for the probable cause hearing.
In the January 13, 2025 bypass letter, Ms. Levarity also wrote:
On July 28, 2011, a victim filed a walk-in report in which she alleged that her boyfriend, identified as you, stole $3000 in cash and a piece of jewelry from her apartment. … She reported that she fell asleep and woke up to discover $3000 and a piece of gold jewelry missing from her apartment. She reported that she confronted you, and you initially denied taking the property. You later admitted to giving the gold chain to a friend to pawn. You then returned $400 by repeatedly stating that you would pay her the balance when you received your tax returns. She stated that after significant delays, she ultimately reported the matter to the police. The detective sought a hearing on this matter, and the victim appeared at this hearing. The clerk issued a criminal complaint against you for larceny over $250.
(R. Exhibit 1)
In July 2011, the former partner informed the police that Mr. Senise had reportedly taken $3,000 in cash and a gold chain from her. She provided the detective with a text message exchange where Mr. Senise agreed to pay her back and asked her to say that she had lent him the money. In the same text messages, the partner also expressed her dislike of court involvement, and that that was the reason she had not pursued the domestic assault and battery seven months earlier.
When Det. Finn presented the allegations to him, Mr. Senise said that the money was for charges related to the partner’s use of his motor vehicle. I don’t find this to be credible. Mr. Senise said that the money and the gold chain were for expenses related to the loan of his car to the partner, but that she would also pay him back. There is no ring of truth here: these assertions make no sense.
In certain circumstances, the Department may consider underlying behavior that does not involve law enforcement action, the court system or result in a conviction. Ramirez-Martinez v. Salem, 37 MCSR 396, 398 (2024). However, in this matter, law enforcement and the court system were involved as a result of the January 2011 incident.
Lack of Good Judgment
Mr. Senise's actions in January and July 2011 created a reasonable justification for the appointing authority to find that he did not meet the high standard that police officers are held to. Reid v. Boston Police Dep’t, 37 MCSR 188, 192 (2024).
The January 2011 incident provides a clear illustration of Mr. Senise’s failure to exercise sound judgment. Mr. Senise’s physical assault on the former partner left scratches and bruises that were evident four days later when a detective photographed them.
The July 2011 incident shows Mr. Senise’s failure to exercise sound judgment a second time. Although the former partner had gone to the police for the alleged January 2011 assault, Mr. Senise chose to take her money and gold chain a scant six months later. The former partner sought help from law enforcement again, but this time pursued action in the court system.
Now, the Appellant has applied to be a law enforcement officer. It is important to vet an applicant’s judgment to ensure that he would not abuse his power as a law enforcement officer. Here, Mr. Senise has chosen to abuse the same person on two occasions, requiring that individual to seek protection from law enforcement.
While these incidents occurred many years ago, I find that the seriousness of this misconduct during the January and July 2011 incidents provided the Department with sufficient evidence to question whether Mr. Senise has the proper judgement and overall fitness to serve as a police officer. See Perez-Martinez v. Brockton, 37 MCSR 13, 17 (2024).
In reaching this conclusion, I did not overlook that the former romantic partner informed Det. Finn that she hoped for a second chance for Mr. Senise, and asked the Department to attribute his conduct to youthful mistakes.
However, the grace that she has extended does not absolve Mr. Senise of responsibility for his actions. When applicants put themselves forward as candidates for appointment as police officers, they do so with the understanding that they will be held to the highest possible standard of conduct.
Final Analysis
The appropriate inquiry is whether it was reasonable for the Department to be concerned about the risks presented by Mr. Senise’s appointment as a Boston police officer. The Commission has consistently afforded deference to appointing authorities in evaluating candidates against the expectations and requirements of the position. The Commission’s role is to determine whether the appointing authority has demonstrated, by a preponderance of the evidence, “reasonable justification” for the bypass, following an impartial and reasonably thorough review of the candidate’s background and qualifications as they relate to the candidate’s present fitness to perform the duties of the position.
The Department cannot be made to assume the risk that hiring Mr. Senise would entail. I find that the Department was reasonably justified in bypassing the Appellant due to concerns about his conduct and judgment.
Accordingly, the Boston Police Department has proven by a preponderance of the evidence that it had reasonable justification for bypassing Franklin Senise for original appointment to the permanent full-time position of Boston Police Officer. The appeal filed under G1-25-042 is hereby denied.
Civil Service Commission
Angela C. McConney
Angela C. McConney
Commissioner
By vote of the Civil Service Commission (Bowman, Chair; Markey, McConney and Stein [Dooley absent], Commissioners) on June 25, 2026.
Either party may file a motion for reconsideration within ten days of the receipt of this Commission order or decision. Under the pertinent provisions of the Code of Mass. Regulations, 801 C.M.R. 1.01(7)(l), the motion must identify a clerical or mechanical error in this order or decision or a significant factor the Agency or the Presiding Officer may have overlooked in deciding the case. A motion for reconsideration does not toll the statutorily prescribed thirty-day time limit for seeking judicial review of this Commission order or decision.
Under the provisions of G.L. c. 31, § 44, any party aggrieved by this Commission order or decision may initiate proceedings for judicial review under G.L. c. 30A, § 14 in the superior court within thirty (30) days after receipt of this order or decision. Commencement of such proceeding shall not, unless specifically ordered by the court, operate as a stay of this Commission order or decision. After initiating proceedings for judicial review in Superior Court, the plaintiff, or his / his attorney, is required to serve a copy of the summons and complaint upon the Boston office of the Attorney General of the Commonwealth, with a copy to the Civil Service Commission, in the time and in the manner prescribed by Mass. R. Civ. P. 4(d).
Notice to:
Franklin Senise (Appellant)
Jennifer Cipolletti, Esq. (for Respondent)
