Decision  Vil, Smith v. Division of Insurance 3/19/26

Date:	03/19/2026
Organization:	Civil Service Commission
Docket Number:	C-25-316

• Appearance for Appellant: Smith Vil
• Appearance for Respondent: Patrick Butler, Esq.
• Hearing Officer: Christopher C. Bowman

The Commission dismissed the appeal of an Insurance Examiner III (IE III) at the Division of Insurance (DOI) as he failed to first seek a review from the state’s Human Resources Division.

Decision on Respondent's Motion to Dismiss

On December 23, 2025, Smith Vil (Appellant), an Insurance Examiner III (IE III) at the Division of Insurance (DOI), filed an appeal with the Civil Service Commission (Commission), contesting DOI’s decision to deny his request for reclassification.

On February 17, 2026, I held a remote pre-hearing conference attended by the Appellant and counsel for the Executive Office of Economic Development (EOED), the Secretariat under which DOI falls. EOED subsequently filed a motion to dismiss the Appellant’s appeal, and the Appellant filed an opposition.

Undisputed Facts

1. On February 4, 2013, the Appellant was appointed to the position of IE III at DOI with a functional title of Senior Financial Analyst.
2. DOI falls under the Executive Office of Economic Development (EOED).
3. On November 6, 2025, the Appellant filed a request with EOED seeking reclassification to the position of “Principal Financial Analyst, Senior Insurance Examiner IV, Financial Manager or a higher grade within the existing series if applicable.”
4. DOI does not utilize an IE IV title.
5. As part of his appeal to the Commission, the Appellant argued that the work that he performs is “comparable” to that of a Bank Examiner IV, a newly created title at the Division of Banks (DOB), another agency that falls under EOED. 
6. After meeting with the Appellant, reviewing an Interview Guide that he completed along with his Form 30 Job Description, EOED concluded that the Appellant was properly classified as an IE III as, according to EOED, more than 50% of the Appellant’s job duties and responsibilities fall within the IE III job classification specifications.
7. On December 23, 2025, the Appellant was notified of EOED’s determination and informed of his right to file an appeal with the state’s Human Resources Division (HRD).
8. The Appellant never filed an appeal with HRD.
9. On December 23, 2025, the Appellant filed an appeal with the Commission.

Summary Disposition Standard

When a Respondent before the Commission is of the opinion there is no genuine issue of disputed material fact relating to the Appellant’s stated claim, no viable ground of appeal on the facts stated, and the Respondent is entitled to prevail as a matter of law, this party may move, with or without supporting affidavits, either to dismiss the entire appeal or for summary decision on a particular claim. 801 CMR 1.01(7)(h). Such motions are decided under the well-recognized standards for summary disposition as a matter of law—i.e., “viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party,” the substantial and credible evidence established that the non-moving party has “no reasonable expectation” of prevailing on at least one “essential element of the case,” and has not rebutted this evidence by “plausibly suggesting” the existence of “specific facts” to raise “above the speculative level” the existence of a material factual dispute requiring an evidentiary hearing. See, e.g., Nigro v. City of Everett, 30 MCSR 277 (2017); Lydon v. Massachusetts Parole Bd., 18 MCSR 216 (2005). Accord Milliken & Co., v. Duro Textiles LLC, 451 Mass. 547, 550 n.6 (2008); Maimonides School v. Coles, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 240, 249 (2008). See also Iannacchino v. Ford Motor Co., 451 Mass. 623, 635-36 (2008) (discussing standard for deciding motions to dismiss); cf. R.J.A. v. K.A.V., 406 Mass. 698 (1990) (factual issues bearing on plaintiff’s standing required denial of motion to dismiss).

Commission’s Jurisdiction to Hear Classification Appeals

Section 49 of Chapter 30 states in relevant part that:

A manager or an employee of the commonwealth objecting to any provision of the classification affecting the manager or employee's office or position may appeal in writing to the personnel administrator [HRD].

…

Any manager or employee or group of employees further aggrieved after appeal to the personnel administrator may appeal to the civil service commission. Said commission shall hear all appeals as if said appeals were originally entered before it.

…

The provisions of this section, as they relate to appeals on the reallocation of a class or group of classes to a higher job group or job groups, shall not apply to any employee whose position is included in a collective bargaining unit represented by an employee organization certified in accordance with the provisions of section four of chapter one hundred and fifty E.

Analysis

Here, it is undisputed that the Appellant never filed an appeal with HRD.  Based on the plain language of Section 49 of Chapter 30, an Appellant may only file a further appeal with the Commission after filing an appeal with HRD and receiving an adverse determination.  For that reason, the Commission lacks jurisdiction to hear this appeal.

Even if the Appellant had first filed an appeal with HRD and received an adverse determination, it is unlikely that the Commission would have jurisdiction to hear his appeal based on other issues. First, the Appellant has not identified an active job title at DOI to which he seeks to be reclassified. Second, and relatedly, the Appellant’s appeal can best be described as a request for a class or group reallocation, focused primarily on whether his current salary is commensurate with his job duties and responsibilities.  As stated above, Section 49 states that: “The provisions of this section, as they relate to appeals on the reallocation of a class or group of classes to a higher job group or job groups, shall not apply to any employee whose position is included in a collective bargaining unit represented by an employee organization certified in accordance with the provisions of section four of chapter one hundred and fifty E.”  It is undisputed that the Appellant’s position is included in a collective bargaining agreement.

Finally, I have not overlooked the serious allegations by the Appellant including alleged disparate treatment.  Those allegations, while troubling if true, appear to fall outside the jurisdiction of the Commission and appear more related to matters typically reviewed by the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination, to which the Appellant indicated that he had or would be filing a complaint. 

Conclusion

For the above reasons, EOED’s motion to dismiss is allowed and the Appellant’s appeal under Docket No. C-25-316 is hereby dismissed.

Civil Service Commission

/s/ Christopher Bowman

Christopher C. Bowman

Chair

By a vote of the Civil Service Commission (Bowman, Chair; Dooley, Markey, McConney and Stein, Commissioners) on March 19, 2026. 

Either party may file a motion for reconsideration within ten days of receipt of this Commission order or decision. Under the pertinent provisions of the Code of Mass. Regulations, 801 CMR 1.01(7)(l), the motion must identify a clerical or mechanical error in this order or decision or a significant factor the Agency or the Presiding Officer may have overlooked in deciding the case.  A motion for reconsideration does not toll the statutorily prescribed thirty-day time limit for seeking judicial review of this Commission order or decision.

Under the provisions of G.L. c. 31, § 44, any party aggrieved by this Commission order or decision may initiate proceedings for judicial review under G.L. c. 30A, § 14 in the superior court within thirty (30) days after receipt of this order or decision. Commencement of such proceeding shall not, unless specifically ordered by the court, operate as a stay of this Commission order or decision.  After initiating proceedings for judicial review in Superior Court, the plaintiff, or his / her attorney, is required to serve a copy of the summons and complaint upon the Boston office of the Attorney General of the Commonwealth, with a copy to the Civil Service Commission, in the time and in the manner prescribed by Mass. R. Civ. P. 4(d).

Notice:

Smith Vil (Appellant)

Patrick Butler, Esq. (for Respondent)