Board of Review Decision 334-FHK2-D645

The claimant resigned because of concerns about his health which he believed derived from work-related stress. However, because the employer responded with temporary staff, engaged a consulting firm, and approved the claimant’s proposed staffing changes, he is ineligible for benefits pursuant to G.L. c. 151A, § 25(e)(1), because he did not make reasonable efforts to preserve his employment before leaving or establish that such efforts would have been futile.

Board of Review
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Boston, MA 02114
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Issue ID: 334-FHK2-D645

Board of Review Decision

Introduction and Procedural History of this Appeal 

The employer appeals a decision by a review examiner of the Department of Unemployment Assistance (DUA) to award unemployment benefits. We review, pursuant to our authority under G.L. c. 151A, § 41, and reverse. 

The claimant resigned from his position with the employer on February 10, 2025. He filed a claim for unemployment benefits with the DUA, effective February 9, 2025, which was approved in a determination issued on March 19, 2025. The employer appealed the determination to the DUA hearings department. Following a hearing on the merits attended by both parties, the review examiner affirmed the agency’s initial determination and awarded benefits in a decision rendered on October 11, 2025. We accepted the employer’s application for review.

Benefits were awarded after the review examiner determined that the claimant involuntarily left employment for urgent, compelling, and necessitous reasons and, thus, was entitled to benefits pursuant to G.L. c. 151A, § 25(e)(1). After considering the recorded testimony and evidence from the hearing, the review examiner’s decision, and the employer’s appeal, we remanded the case to the review examiner to take additional evidence regarding the claimant’s efforts to preserve his employment before quitting and documentary evidence regarding his alleged medical conditions leading up to his separation. Both parties attended the remand hearing. Thereafter, the review examiner issued his consolidated findings of fact and credibility assessment. Our decision is based upon our review of the entire record.

The issue before the Board is whether the review examiner’s decision, which concluded that the claimant’s decision to quit his job because of his health constituted an urgent, compelling, and necessitous reason for doing so, is supported by substantial and credible evidence and is free from error of law.

Findings of Fact

The review examiner’s consolidated findings of fact and credibility assessment are set forth below in their entirety:

1. The employer is a Massachusetts municipality. The claimant was employed from February 2023, until February 10, 2025, as Director of the Department of Public Works (DPW). 
2. The claimant oversaw a department with a staff of over thirty and wide-ranging responsibilities for the physical infrastructure of the town, ranging from road maintenance to snow removal and the procurement of water and sewer contracts. 
3. The claimant found the position to be intensive and stressful and made overtures to the Town Manager (TM) for additional staffing. 
4. On October 16, 2023, the TM and the Town Council approved an interim Executive Operations Officer position to support the claimant’s work at the DPW. 
5. On October 17, 2023, an appointment was made to the interim Executive Operations Officer position. 
6. On February 15, 2024, the employer agreed to establish a position of DPW Assistant Director. Despite ongoing recruitment efforts, the position was not filled prior to the claimant’s separation. 
7. In July 2024 the interim Executive Operations Officer position was made permanent.
8. To replace the Executive Operations Officer, the TM arranged for two members of his department’s staff to work two days a week each at the DPW. Another member of the TM’s staff was assigned to assist the DPW with procurement and contract processes. 
9. Following the Town Council approving the DPW staffing proposal on February 3, 2025, temporary staff were hired from a staffing agency. 
10. In July 2024, the claimant resigned from his position because of the workload. The claimant withdrew his resignation after discissions with the TM and assurances that the employer would seek additional support. 
11. On October 15, 2024, the claimant e-mailed the TM stating he was struggling with burn out and the weight of his position. The claimant and TM agreed that the claimant take a few days away. 
12. On October 15, 2024, the TM contacted a consultancy firm with experience with municipal and public works matters. The TM met representatives of the consultancy firm at an industry conference and had been considering contacting them based on the discussions with the claimant. 
13. On November 1, 2024, the consultancy firm responded to the TM. The TM shared the response with the claimant and Human Resources (HR). The TM reviewed the proposal to determine what next steps to take if any. 
14. The TM, claimant, and HR were involved in ongoing discussions to evolve a response to the proposal. 
15. The claimant had no objection to the use of the consultancy firm. The claimant did have some questions about the timeline and whether any consultants or new staff would need training or orientation in DPW policies and procedures. 
16. The TM was in contact with the consultants both verbally and via e-mail regarding setting up meetings. The claimant was aware of these discussions but was focused on internal staffing matters. No meetings had taken place with the consultants by the time of the claimant’s separation. 
17. From October 2024 onwards the TM sought to support the claimant through the loaning of administrative staff to the DPW from other departments, approving the hiring of a temporary employee to deal with DPW accounting. 
18. On January 6, 2025, the claimant presented a staffing proposal for the DPW. The staffing proposal was developed by the claimant independently of the consultancy firm. There were no meetings with the consultants at that time. 
19. The claimant presented the staffing proposal in early January 2025 after the completion of a town sewer contract project. The time and workload involved in the sewer project had prevented focus on staffing concerns. 
20. The TM supported the proposal and forwarded the proposal to HR to review proposed job descriptions. 
21. On January 17, 2025, the Executive Operations Officer left the employer. 
22. On January 22, 2025, a complete package had been developed including organizational charts and job descriptions and was shared with stakeholders. 
23. On January 29, 2025, the Town Council DPW Sub-Committee approved the proposal, accepting it in whole. The claimant was present at the committee meeting. 
24. On February 3, 2025, the Town Council approved the proposal, accepting it in whole. The claimant was present at the council meeting. 
25. On February 5, 2025, the claimant and TM had brief conversations and exchanged text messages about the logistics of preparing for an upcoming winter storm, including bringing in additional plows and plow drivers. The claimant informed the TM he would be out of town for a few days with the conversation ending amicably. 
26. On February 10, 2025, shortly after 10:00 a.m., the claimant texted the TM asking him to call him. There followed a phone conversation between the two in which the claimant, who was having an anxiety attack at that moment, spoke of his personal struggle with stress and anxiety. The claimant used an expletive out of exasperation which was not directed at the TM. 
27. Although the Town Council had approved the staffing proposal, the claimant continued to find the position stressful and overwhelming. The claimant was receiving treatment for chronic insomnia and anxiety panic attacks [sic]. The claimant’s sleep disorder was impacting on his overall health and wellbeing. The staffing proposal changes were not yet enacted, and the temporary reassigning of other town staff had been helpful to the claimant and the DPW but the claimant remained personally overwhelmed. 
28. On February 10, 2025, the claimant gave notice to the employer, effective immediately.
29. The claimant did not reference his health or personal struggles in his resignation since he intended it to be a brief respectful notice and did not believe going into personal detail was beneficial or appropriate. 
30. At the time of separation, the claimant was eligible for FMLA leave. The claimant did not apply for a leave of absence because he believed that his position was the cause of his ill health and the issues would re-occur upon returning from any leave. 
31. The claimant did not request any accommodation. The claimant did not notify the employer, either HR or the TM, of any medical or health conditions or concerns. 
32. The claimant left his position because of concerns about his health. 
33. On March 19, 2025, DUA issued a Notice of Approval, stating that the claimant left his position for good cause attributable to the employer. The employer appealed the Notice. 

Credibility Assessment:

At both the initial hearing and the Board of Review hearing to gather additional evidence, both parties agreed on the material facts. The parties agreed on the efforts undertaken by the employer to support the claimant in his role as DPW director. The employer provided all staffing-related documentation requested by the Board of Review. 

The claimant did not provide any contemporaneous medical documentation. However, the claimant credibly testified that he left his position because of personal struggles. The claimant was clearly emotional at the Board of Review hearing in describing his efforts to deal with stress and anxiety while not requesting any accommodations or leave because he was not comfortable sharing his situation with the employer.

Ruling of the Board

In accordance with our statutory obligation, we review the record and the decision made by the review examiner to determine: (1) whether the consolidated findings are supported by substantial and credible evidence; and (2) whether the review examiner’s conclusion is free from error of law. Upon such review, the Board adopts the review examiner’s consolidated findings of fact and deems them to be supported by substantial and credible evidence. We further believe that the review examiner’s credibility assessment is reasonable in relation to the evidence presented, except insofar as it states the claimant did not provide any medical documentation responsive to the Board’s remand order. In fact, the claimant’s counsel uploaded two partial, redacted medical records on the day of the hearing, dated July 23, 2024, and another dated June 26, 2025. As a matter of law, however, we reject the review examiner’s legal conclusion that the claimant is entitled to benefits, as outlined below.

Because the claimant resigned from his position with the employer, this case is properly analyzed under under G.L. c. 151A, § 25(e)(1), which provides, in pertinent part, as follows: 

[No waiting period shall be allowed and no benefits shall be paid to an individual under this chapter] . . . (e) For the period of unemployment next ensuing . . . after the individual has left work (1) voluntarily unless the employee establishes by substantial and credible evidence that he had good cause for leaving attributable to the employing unit or its agent . . . . 

An individual shall not be disqualified from receiving benefits under the provisions of this subsection, if such individual establishes to the satisfaction of the commissioner that his reasons for leaving were for such an urgent, compelling and necessitous nature as to make his separation involuntary. 

Under these provisions, the claimant has the burden to show that he left employment for good cause attributable to the employer or for urgent, compelling, and necessitous reasons. Crane v. Comm’r of Department of Employment and Training, 414 Mass. 658, 661 (1993). 

In his initial decision, the review examiner concluded that there was no evidence that the claimant left work for good cause attributable to the employer. We agree with this part of his conclusion.

Instead, the review examiner determined that the claimant separated for urgent, compelling, and necessitous reasons. Our standard for determining whether a claimant’s reasons for leaving work are urgent, compelling, and necessitous has been set forth by the Supreme Judicial Court. We must examine the circumstances in each case and evaluate “the strength and effect of the compulsive pressure of external and objective forces” on the claimant to ascertain whether the claimant “acted reasonably, based on pressing circumstances, in leaving employment.” Reep v. Comm’r of Department of Employment and Training, 412 Mass. 845, 848, 851 (1991). 

The review examiner’s initial conclusion relied on findings, some of which were preserved in his consolidated findings, where he accepted the claimant’s testimony regarding the stressful nature of his job and his belief that the job had negatively affected his health. See Consolidated Findings 3 (the job was “intensive and stressful”), 10 (the claimant resigned in July of 2024 because of his workload, but rescinded his resignation), and 11 (the claimant told the town manager “he was struggling with burn out and the weight of his position” by email on October 15, 2024). Despite the employer’s approval of the claimant’s staffing proposal for his department, the claimant still found his job “stressful and overwhelming,” he received “treatment for chronic insomnia, anxiety, and panic attacks,” and he felt his “sleep disorder was impacting on his overall health and wellbeing.” See Consolidated Finding 27. After a telephone conversation with the town manager on February 10, 2025, when the review examiner found the claimant “was having an anxiety attack at the moment,” he told the employer about “his personal struggle with stress and anxiety,” and “used an expletive out of exasperation,” the claimant quit his job, effective immediately. See Consolidated Findings 26 and 28. Based on these findings, the review examiner initially concluded that the claimant quit for urgent, compelling, and necessitous reasons.

However, even assuming arguendo that the claimant’s health concerns did rise to the level of urgent, compelling, and necessitous reasons for resigning, to qualify for benefits, the Supreme Judicial Court has held that an employee who voluntarily leaves employment has the burden to show that he made a reasonable attempt to correct the situation, or that such attempt would have been futile. Guarino v. Dir. of Division of Employment Security, 393 Mass. 89, 93–94 (1984). Elaborating on this, the claimant must show that he had “taken such ‘reasonable means to preserve [his] employment’ as would indicate the claimant’s ‘desire and willingness to continue [his] employment.’” Norfolk County Retirement System, 66 Mass. App. Ct. 759, 766 (2009), quoting Raytheon Co. v. Dir. of Division of Employment Security, 364 Mass. 593, 597–598 (1974). To satisfy the reasonable preservation requirement, a claimant does not have to establish that he had no choice but to resign; he merely needs to show that his actions were reasonable. Norfolk County Retirement System, 66 Mass. App. Ct. at 766. 

The review examiner’s initial decision failed to consider the claimant’s duty to make reasonable efforts to preserve employment. After remand, we conclude that the claimant has failed to meet his burden of preservation.

While the claimant believed that his job was having detrimental effects on his health, he did not notify the employer of any medical or health conditions or concerns and he did not request any accommodations from the employer to address these concerns. See Consolidated Finding 31. Although the claimant was eligible for a leave of absence under the Family and Medical Leave Act at the time he separated, he did not request such a leave. See Consolidated Finding 30. While the claimant may well have believed that his health issues would recur after returning from any leave he might have taken (Consolidated Finding 30), this belief is purely speculative, given the staffing changes that the employer was implementing.

The evidence before us establishes that the employer was amenable to the claimant’s various requests to reorganize his department and workload. They appointed an executive operations officer to support the claimant on October 17, 2023. See Consolidated Findings 4–5. On February 15, 2024, they created a position for assistant director of the Department of Public Works (DPW), which remained unfilled despite ongoing recruitment efforts. See Consolidated Finding 6. The employer assigned other town employees to help the claimant’s DPW during the week and hired temporary staff as recently as February 3, 2025. See Consolidated Findings 8–9 and 17. 

When the claimant complained to the town manager of burnout on October 14, 2024, the town manager suggested that the claimant take “a few days away” and began exploring using a consultancy firm to provide staff with experience in municipal and public works matters, involving the claimant in discussions with the consultancy firm. See Consolidated Findings 11–16.

When the claimant submitted his own staffing proposal for the DPW to the town manager on January 6, 2025, the town manager supported the proposal, submitting it promptly to human resources to review proposed job descriptions; presenting it to the town council DPW subcommittee on January 29, 2025; and submitting it to the town council on February 3, 2025, when it was approved in its entirety. See Consolidated Findings 18–24.

Shortly after the town council approved the claimant’s proposal, the claimant and town manager spoke on February 5, 2025, about logistics to prepare for an upcoming storm. The claimant was going out of town for a few days and their conversation ended amicably. See Consolidated Finding 25. However, upon returning to work on February 10, 2025, the claimant spoke with the town manager, telling him about his struggle with stress and anxiety, using an expletive out of exasperation, and ultimately quitting that day effective immediately. See Consolidated Findings 26 and 28. In view of the employer’s favorable responses to the claimant’s staffing proposals and the claimant’s failure to disclose his health concerns, request accommodations for those concerns, or pursue a leave of absence, we conclude that the claimant did not make reasonable efforts to preserve his employment before quitting. 

We, therefore, conclude as a matter of law that the claimant is not eligible for benefits pursuant to G.L. c. 151A, § 25(e)(1), because he failed to make reasonable efforts to preserve his employment. 

The review examiner’s decision is reversed. The claimant is denied benefits for the week ending February 15, 2025, and for subsequent weeks, until such time as he has had at least eight weeks of work and has earned an amount equivalent to or in excess of eight times his weekly benefit amount. 

Boston, Massachusetts                                              Date of Decision – May 12, 2026

1. All of the findings referenced in this paragraph, except for Consolidated Finding 26, were substantively unchanged from the review examiner’s initial findings. Only Consolidated Finding 26 was new after remand.
2. We note that, despite being asked on remand to provide documentary evidence to corroborate any treatment the claimant allegedly sought for medical conditions between July 1, 2024, and his resignation on February 10, 2025, he provided only one partial, redacted medical record from July 23, 2024. See Remand Exhibit 3, Board of Review Remand Order dated November 18, 2025.

Charlene A Stawicki, Esquire
Member

Michael J. Albano
Member

Any further appeal would further appeal further appeal would be to a Massachusetts State District Court
(See Section 42, Chapter 151A, General Laws, Enclosed)

The last day to appeal this decision to a Massachusetts District Court is thirty days from the mail date on the first page of this decision. If that thirtieth day falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday, the last day to appeal this decision is the business day next following the thirtieth day.

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