Board of Review Decision 352-MM49-2R47

The claimant resigned in lieu of being terminated for leaving a student alone and unsupervised in the restroom. However, she did not do so in wilful disregard of the employer’s interest. Her actions were, at most, poor judgment and she is eligible for benefits pursuant to G.L. c. 151A, §§ 25(e)(1).

Board of Review
100 Cambridge Street, Suite 400
Boston, MA 02114
Phone: [phone]
Fax: [phone]

Issue ID: 352-MM49-2R47

Board of Review Decision

Introduction and Procedural History of this Appeal 

The claimant appeals a decision by a review examiner of the Department of Unemployment Assistance (DUA) to deny unemployment benefits. We review, pursuant to our authority under G.L. c. 151A, § 41, and reverse. 

The claimant separated from her position with the employer on May 23, 2025. She filed a claim for unemployment benefits with the DUA, effective June 8, 2025, which was approved in a determination issued on September 4, 2025. The employer appealed the determination to the DUA hearings department. Following a hearing on the merits attended only by the employer, the review examiner overturned the agency’s initial determination and denied benefits in a decision rendered on October 22, 2025. We accepted the claimant’s application for review.

Benefits were denied after the review examiner determined that the claimant resigned because she was about to be discharged for deliberate misconduct in wilful disregard of the employer’s interest and, thus, was disqualified, under G.L. c. 151A, § 25(e)(1). After considering the recorded testimony and evidence from the hearing, the review examiner’s decision, and the claimant’s appeal, we remanded the case to the review examiner to obtain additional evidence pertaining to the reason for the claimant’s separation. Both parties attended the remand hearing. Thereafter, the review examiner issued her consolidated findings of fact. Our decision is based upon our review of the entire record.

The issue before the Board is whether the review examiner’s decision, which concluded that the claimant resigned under a reasonable belief that she would have been discharged for deliberate misconduct in wilful disregard of the employer’s interest after she left a student locked alone in a restroom, is supported by substantial and credible evidence and is free from error of law.

Findings of Fact

The review examiner’s consolidated findings of fact and credibility assessment are set forth below in their entirety:

1. On August 31, 2023, the claimant began working full-time for the employer, a school district, as a special education teacher. She reported to her supervisor in the behavior room and to the principal. Her most recent rate of pay was an annual salary of $90,494.00. 
2. The employer maintains policies concerning employee conduct and staff/student interactions. These policies prohibit placing a student in seclusion — meaning being left alone — as this puts the student in danger. These policies exist to protect students, to ensure that the employer is in compliance with the law, and to ensure that teachers are following their moral and legal duties as educators. 
3. The policies also prohibit students from being anywhere in the school building without an adult present, including in their classroom. 
4. The policies are contained in the employee handbook. They are reviewed with employees upon hiring and during annual training. 
5. Employees who violate the policy are subject to discipline, up to and including discharge. 
6. If a student is placed in danger, the employer could face consequences from the Department of Education and from civil lawsuits. 
7. The employer maintains an expectation that students are never left alone, including in the classroom and while going to the bathroom. The employer expects this to ensure the safety of the students. 
8. The school bathrooms are kept locked. If students need to use the bathroom, a teacher will bring them to the bathroom, unlock the bathroom, wait for the students to use the bathroom, and then lock the bathroom after the students exit. 
9. Teachers are expected to have coverage for their classrooms if they must bring a student to the bathroom in the middle of class. 
10. A teacher typically has behaviorists assigned to their classroom. At least one behaviorist is supposed to be with a teacher at all times. 
11. Teachers are provided with radios in their classrooms if they need to call for help. 
12. Most teachers used a group text chat to ask each other for help. 
13. On April 29, 2025, one of the claimant's students - a 14-year-old middle-school student with special needs asked to use the bathroom. 
14. The claimant had taught this student for 8 months and knew him relatively well. On at least one previous occasion, the student had expressed concern about using the bathroom and asked the claimant to be locked in for comfort and privacy. The claimant had agreed to this request. 
15. On April 29, 2025, when the student asked to use the bathroom, the claimant did not have anyone else with her in the classroom. 
16. The claimant told the student to wait. 
17. The claimant reached out to a group chat to see if there was a teacher or behaviorist available who could bring the student to the bathroom. 
18. No one answered the claimant’s request. 
19. The student asked to use the bathroom two more times. By the final time, the student made it clear that this was an emergency and that he desperately needed to use the bathroom. He was in tears. 
20. The claimant felt that she had no good options. She could either leave her classroom unattended and bring the student to the bathroom or continue to ask for help and hope that someone arrived before the student was no longer able to hold himself back. 
21. The claimant did not want the student to have an accident and soil himself. 
22. The claimant informed her classroom that she was going to bring the student to the restroom, that she was going to leave the door propped open, and that she was going to check on them. 
23. The claimant brought a student from her classroom to the restroom. The restroom was approximately 20 feet away from the classroom. 
24. The claimant did not have class coverage when she brought the student to the bathroom. She propped the door to the classroom open. 
25. When the claimant brought the student to the restroom, the student asked the claimant to lock him in the bathroom. He was in distress and concerned about safety and privacy while he used the facilities. 
26. The claimant locked the student in the bathroom. 
27. After the student went in, the claimant returned to her classroom to check on them. 
28. When the claimant was checking on her classroom, another staff member unlocked the restroom and found the claimant's student there. The staff member reported the incident to the employer. 
29. On April 30, 2025, the claimant was placed on administrative leave from teaching pending an investigation into the incident. 
30. The employer informed the student's parents about the incident. 
31. During the investigation, the employer interviewed the staff member who found the student, the student themselves, and the claimant. In addition, they reviewed video footage. 
32. The principal interviewed the student with his parents present. The student stated that he had to go to the bathroom badly, that the claimant brought him to the bathroom, that he had asked to be locked in for comfort, that the claimant locked him in, and that another teacher unlocked the door. 
33. On May 16, 2025, the employer interviewed the claimant. The executive director of human capital services, the employee relations manager, and the principal were present representing the employer. The claimant’s union lawyer and union representative were present. 
34. During the May 16, 2025, meeting, the executive director of human capital services and employee relations manager conducted most of the questioning. They asked the claimant factual questions about what had happened and about her judgment in deciding to leave her class unattended and to lock the student in the bathroom.
35. The claimant admitted that she had locked the student in the bathroom. She stated that the student was begging to use the restroom and asked to be locked in. 
36. The claimant was advised that this was a serious situation that could result in her discharge. 
37. After the conclusion of the May 16, 2025, meeting, the superintendent of the school district was in favor of discharging the claimant. The employer had not made a formal decision about the claimant's position. 
38. If the claimant had not resigned, she would have been discharged. 
39. The claimant never made a report of any instances of harassment to the employer. 
40. On May 23, 2025, the claimant quit her position. She sent a resignation letter to the superintendent. (Exhibit 5). 
41. The claimant quit her position to avoid being discharged. 
42. On September 4, 2025, the Department of Unemployment Assistance issued a Notice of Approval allowing the claimant benefits under Section 25(e)(1) of the Law beginning June 14, 2025. The employer appealed. 

Credibility Assessment: 

Two witnesses for the employer (the executive director of human capital services and the principal) and a representative for the employer attended a hearing on October 8, 2025. The claimant did not attend. The claimant, three witnesses for the employer (the executive director of human capital services, the employee relations manager and the principal), and a representative for the employer attended a remand hearing on January 8, 2026. There was no evidence or testimony given during the remand hearing that calls into question the conclusion that the claimant quit her position to avoid being discharged. During the remand hearing, the employer’s witnesses testified that although a formal decision had not been reached at the time the claimant quit her position, the superintendent of the school system was in favor of discharging her and the claimant’s actions were serious and could result in discharge under the employer’s policies. The claimant’s belief that she would have been discharged if she had not quit is reasonable. 

During the hearing, however, the claimant, who had not been present at the initial hearing, credibly explained that on April 29, 2025, she was in a situation with no good options. From her perspective, she could either leave her classroom unattended and bring the student to the bathroom or continue to ask for help and hope that someone arrived before the student was no longer able to hold himself back. The claimant did not want the student to have an accident and soil himself, so she made the decision to bring the student to the bathroom while propping the door to her classroom open, and that while the student was using the bathroom, she would return to the classroom to check on her other students. Once she had brought the student to the bathroom, the student asked to be locked in for his own comfort and privacy, which was a request that he had made before. The claimant’s testimony that the student was the person who requested that the door be locked for his own comfort and privacy was supported by the testimony of the principal, who had interviewed the student during the investigation. The claimant decided to lock the door for the comfort and privacy of her student and then decided to go 10 ft. to her classroom to check on her other students. The claimant’s testimony providing context to her decision is determined to be credible, where it is logical, complete, and consistent with the employer’s testimony.

Ruling of the Board

In accordance with our statutory obligation, we review the record and the decision made by the review examiner to determine: (1) whether the consolidated findings are supported by substantial and credible evidence; and (2) whether the review examiner’s conclusion is free from error of law. Upon such review, the Board adopts the review examiner’s consolidated findings of fact and deems them to be supported by substantial and credible evidence. We further believe that the review examiner’s credibility assessment is reasonable in relation to the evidence presented. However, as discussed more fully below, we reject the review examiner’s legal conclusion that the claimant is not entitled to benefits.

The claimant resigned after she attended an investigatory meeting into an incident where she locked a student in a restroom and left him alone. Consolidated Findings 33–35, and 40. Ordinarily, qualification for benefits following a resignation is decided under G.L. c. 151A, 
§ 25(e)(1), which provides, in pertinent part, as follows:

[No waiting period shall be allowed and no benefits shall be paid to an individual under this chapter] . . . (e) For the period of unemployment next ensuing . . . after the individual has left work (1) voluntarily unless the employee establishes by substantial and credible evidence that he had good cause for leaving attributable to the employing unit or its agent . . . [or] if such individual established to the satisfaction of the commissioner that his reasons for leaving were for such an urgent, compelling and necessitous nature as to make his separation
involuntary. . . .  

This statutory provision expressly places the burden of proof upon the claimant. 

In this case, the claimant testified that she understood that her decision to leave her classroom unattended, lock the student in the restroom, and return to her classroom was contrary to the employer’s expectations. See Consolidated Findings 7, and 23–27. Both parties confirmed at the remand hearing that the claimant ultimately accepted the employer’s offer to resign her position in lieu of being terminated. See Consolidated Finding 38. In light of this evidence, we are satisfied that the claimant resigned because she reasonably believed she was about to be discharged.

It is well-settled that an employee who resigns under a reasonable belief that she is facing imminent discharge will not be disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits merely because the separation was technically a resignation and not a firing. See Malone-Campagna v. Dir. of Division of Employment Security, 391 Mass. 399 (1984). In such a case, the separation is treated as involuntary, and the inquiry focuses on whether, if the impending discharge had occurred, it would have been for a disqualifying reason under G.L. c. 151A, § 25(e)(2). We must, therefore, assess whether the claimant’s impending discharge was for a disqualifying reason under G.L. c. 151A, § 25(e)(2), which provides, in relevant part as follows:

[No waiting period shall be allowed and no benefits shall be paid to an individual under this chapter] . . . (e) For the period of unemployment next ensuing . . . after the individual has left work . . . (2) by discharge shown to the satisfaction of the commissioner by substantial and credible evidence to be attributable to deliberate misconduct in wilful disregard of the employing unit’s interest, or to a knowing violation of a reasonable and uniformly enforced rule or policy of the employer, provided that such violation is not shown to be as a result of the employee’s incompetence. . . .

For purposes of the foregoing provision, the burden shifts to the employer. See Cantres v. Dir. of Division of Employment Security, 396 Mass. 226, 231 (1985). 

The employer maintains policies prohibiting staff from leaving students without supervision. Consolidated Findings 2 and 3. However, it retains discretion over how to discipline employees who violate these policies. Consolidated Finding 5. As the employer did not provide evidence showing it discharged all other similarly situated employees who left students alone without adult supervision, it has not met its burden to show a knowing violation of a reasonable and uniformly enforced policy. 

We next consider whether the claimant engaged in deliberate misconduct in wilful disregard of the employer’s interest. Again, there is no question that the claimant’s act of leaving the classroom unattended and locking the student in the bathroom violated the employer’s expectations. The record further shows that she acted deliberately, as she acknowledged that she chose this course of action because no one was available to watch the classroom and the student desperately needed to go to the bathroom with the door locked. See Consolidated Findings 14–26.

In order to determine whether an employee’s actions were in wilful disregard of the employer’s interest, the proper factual inquiry is to ascertain the employee’s state of mind at the time of the behavior. Grise v. Dir. of Division of Employment Security, 393 Mass. 271, 275 (1984). In order to evaluate the claimant’s state of mind, we must “take into account the worker’s knowledge of the employer’s expectation, the reasonableness of that expectation and the presence of any mitigating factors.” Garfield v. Dir. of Division of Employment Security, 377 Mass. 94, 97 (1979) (citation omitted).

There was no dispute that the claimant understood her decision to lock the student in the restroom and leave him alone was contrary to the employer’s expectations. Consolidated Findings 7 and 17. As a safety measure, we believe that the employer’s expectation not to leave a classroom unattended and not to lock a student in the bathroom is facially reasonable. However, in this case, we do not agree with the review examiner’s initial conclusion that, in so doing, the claimant acted in wilful disregard of the employer’s expectations on April 29, 2025.

The Supreme Judicial Court has stated, “When a worker . . . has a good faith lapse in judgment or attention, any resulting conduct contrary to the employer’s interest is unintentional; a related discharge is not the worker’s intentional fault, and there is no basis under § 25(e)(2) for denying benefits.” Garfield, 377 Mass. at 97. 

In Garfield, the employer discharged a retail health food store manager for rearranging a store schedule without notifying the district manager. 377 Mass. at 98. The Court further stated, “[conclusions] of wilful misconduct must rest on findings of specific acts or omissions of the worker which adversely affect the employer’s interest.” Id. at 99. In that case, the store manager rearranged the schedule in order to ensure that the store had staff coverage while he attended a health food convention, and he did not notify the district manager because he believed that she was out of town and unreachable. Id. at 95 and 98. The Court held that the claimant acted responsibly in rearranging the schedule to accommodate his absence and that, at worst, his failure to call or leave a message for the district manager was a good faith error of judgment. Id. at 98. Thus, the store manager’s actions did not justify disqualification under G.L. c. 151A, § 25(e)(2). Id. at 100. 

Here, the consolidated findings show that the claimant fully intended to comply with the employer’s expectation that neither the students in the classroom nor the student seeking to use the restroom would be left alone. See Consolidated Findings 9–12, and 16–18. The claimant testified that she waited approximately five to seven minutes to receive a response from the group chat before making the decision to take the student to the restroom. While it likely would have been wiser for the claimant to also use the radio to obtain assistance, we do not believe that her failure to do so is evidence that she intended to disregard the employer’s expectations. See Consolidated Findings 11 and 20. The claimant had taken the steps that she normally would to obtain assistance, and, when no assistance was forthcoming, she found herself in a difficult situation. Consolidated Finding 20. 

As it was apparent that the student would likely soil himself if he did not get to the restroom immediately, the claimant concluded that the most appropriate action was to unlock the restroom for the student and allow him to use the restroom while she also attempted to monitor the students sitting in her nearby classroom. Consolidated Findings 19–27. In the absence of any significant evidence directly detracting from the claimant’s testimony that she acted to avoid having a situation where the student soiled himself in the classroom, and we see none, the record demonstrates the claimant’s decision on April 29, 2025, was, at most, a good-faith lapse in judgment rather than wilful disregard of the employer’s expectations.

We, therefore, conclude as a matter of law that the claimant resigned under a reasonable belief of imminent discharge. We further conclude that the claimant did not knowingly violate a reasonable and uniformly enforced policy nor deliberately engage in misconduct in wilful disregard of the employer’s interest as meant under G.L. c. 151A, § 25(e)(2). 

The review examiner’s decision is reversed. The claimant entitled to receive benefits for the week of June 8, 2025, and for subsequent weeks if otherwise eligible. 

Boston, Massachusetts                                              Date of Decision – April 7, 2026

1. The parties’ testimony in this regard, although not explicitly incorporated into the review examiner’s findings of fact, is part of the unchallenged evidence introduced at the hearing and placed in the record, and it is thus properly referred to in our decision today. See Bleich v. Maimonides School, 447 Mass. 38, 40 (2006); Allen of Michigan, Inc. v. Deputy Dir. of Department of Employment and Training, 64 Mass. App. Ct. 370, 371 (2005).
2. The claimant’s uncontested testimony in this regard is also part of the unchallenged evidence introduced at the hearing and placed in the record.

Charlene A Stawicki, Esquire
Member

Michael J. Albano
Member

Any further appeal would further appeal further appeal would be to a Massachusetts State District Court.
(See Section 42, Chapter 151A, General Laws, Enclosed)

The last day to appeal this decision to a Massachusetts District Court is thirty days from the mail date on the first page of this decision. If that thirtieth day falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday, the last day to appeal this decision is the business day next following the thirtieth day.

Visit this page to locate the nearest Massachusetts District Court.

Please be advised that fees for services rendered by an attorney or agent to a claimant in connection with an appeal to the Board of Review are not payable unless submitted to the Board of Review for approval, under G.L. c. 151A, § 37.

LSW/rh