Board of Review Decision 352-MNDJ-5LH2

Where retail store manager’s hours were cut from three shifts to two shifts per week, held she had good cause attributable to the employer to resign. A 33% cut was a substantial decline in wages. She was eligible for benefits pursuant to G.L. c. 151A, § 25(e)(1).

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Issue ID: 352-MNDJ-5LH2

Board of Review Decision

Introduction and Procedural History of this Appeal 

The claimant appeals a decision by a review examiner of the Department of Unemployment Assistance (DUA) to deny unemployment benefits. We review, pursuant to our authority under G.L. c. 151A, § 41, and reverse. 

The claimant resigned from her position with the employer on April 28, 2025. She re-opened a claim for unemployment benefits with the DUA, effective July 4, 2024, which was denied in a determination issued on July 18, 2025. The claimant appealed the determination to the DUA hearings department. Following a hearing on the merits attended by both parties, the review examiner affirmed the agency’s initial determination and denied benefits in a decision rendered on February 13, 2026. We accepted the claimant’s application for review.

Benefits were denied after the review examiner determined that the claimant voluntarily left employment without good cause attributable to the employer or urgent, compelling, and necessitous reasons and, thus, was disqualified under G.L. c. 151A, § 25(e)(1). 

Our decision is based upon our review of the entire record, including the recorded testimony and evidence from the hearing, the review examiner’s decision, and the claimant’s appeal.

The issue before the Board is whether the review examiner’s decision, which concluded that the claimant was ineligible for benefits, even though the claimant had primarily resigned due to a lack of available hours and had asked the employer about receiving additional hours of work prior to separation, is supported by substantial and credible evidence and is free from error of law.

Findings of Fact

The review examiner’s findings of fact are set forth below in their entirety:

1. The claimant worked for the employer, an interior design business, from October 1, 2019, until separating from employment on April 28, 2025.
2. Prior to working for the employer, the claimant had her own home décor business performing interior design work. (The claimant brought some of her stock over to the employer business with the agreement that she would be paid for those items.) 
3. The employer business consisted of a retail store and a studio, which were located at two different locations in [City A], Massachusetts. 
4. The claimant was hired to work as a store manager in the employer’s retail store for home décor products. The retail store was located at [Address A]. 
5. The claimant was working 24 to 32 hours per week. The claimant had benefits of paid sick, holiday and vacation days. The claimant was not offered health insurance. The claimant was paid $33 per hour in her position with the employer. 
6. The claimant worked three days per week. The claimant worked the day shift from 10:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m., including Saturday, and one evening shift per week from 2:00 p.m. to 8:00 p.m. The claimant also worked some Sundays during the holiday season. 
7. The claimant was hired to work three days per week (24 hours), but would be provided with additional days when the store was busy (holidays etc.). 
8. The claimant was responsible for managing the store, acting as store representative and handling communications with customers. 
9. In 2022, the owner asked the claimant to temporarily work at the employer’s [City B], Florida location. The claimant agreed, working approximately eight months at that location (32 to 40 hours per week). 
10. When the work was completed at the [City B], Florida location, the claimant returned to the employer’s retail store in [City A], Massachusetts and returned to work her regular schedule of three days per week. 
11. In July 2024, due to an increase in rent, the employer decided to close the retail store. 
12. The employer informed the claimant of the anticipated closure of the retail store a few months prior to the closing. The claimant was informed that she could work in the employer’s studio. The owner informed the claimant that the employer would provide her with two days of work and would try to increase her hours. There were no other position [sic] available for the claimant after the retail store closed. 
13. The claimant was not given a job description in her new position. The claimant understood that she would be performing home décor jobs and would be networking with builders, real estate agents and developers to generate business. 
14. When being informed of the retail store closure, the claimant agreed to work at the employer’s studio location. That location was at [Address B]. 
15. In July 2024, the employer’s retail store closed and the claimant began working at the employer’s studio location. The claimant’s rate of pay and benefits remained the same. 
16. The claimant was working two days per week, 9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., working varying days. 
17. Sometime thereafter, the employer set the claimant’s scheduled [sic] to work two days in a row from 9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. 
18. Shortly after starting at the studio location, the claimant inquired of the owner about receiving more hours of work. The owner informed the claimant that she was trying to generate more client work. 
19. The claimant was provided work assignments from the owner. The project manager and the design assistant would also provide the claimant with work. 
20. The owner was only in the studio approximately fifty percent of the time, as she had work to do outside of the studio. The claimant became aware that the owner had asked her co-workers about the claimant’s performance after she was moved to the studio location. 
21. The project manager and the design assistant were both in their 20’s. The claimant was in her late 60’s at that time. 
22. There had been an incident where the design assistant had the claimant on speakerphone without notifying the claimant. The claimant then made a negative comment about a client. The client happened to be in the employer location and heard the comment made by the claimant. After the incident, the owner informed the design assistant that she should not use speaker phone without notifying the other employees. 
23. There was [sic] also times when the project manager and the design assistant were using profanity on the work premises. The owner spoke to those employees informing them that their use of profanity at work was not acceptable. 
24. When speaking with the project manager, the claimant stated in the presence of the owner, “look how beautiful she looks in that dress we could never wear that, because we don’t have that figure anymore.” Sometime thereafter, the owner asked the project manager if the claimant’s comments on her figure made her feel uncomfortable. 
25. The owner had heard the claimant on her telephone, talking with her son, during work. The owner felt that the claimant was on the call for an extended period, but did not discuss it with the claimant at that time. 
26. The owner was aware that the claimant was watching the broadcast of a local trial during work hours. The owner had informed the claimant that it was fine that she watch the trial, as long as she was also doing her work. 
27. The claimant was working on small design projects, along with performing other work that needed to be done within the design studio. 
28. The claimant was not able to perform the design work on the computer (i.e., AutoCAD) because she was not trained in that, and the other employees had gone to school to perform that work. 
29. The owner was trying to generate enough small decorating jobs for the claimant to perform and to increase the claimant’s hours of work. 
30. In the performance of her position, the claimant had gone to a town function as a means of networking for the employer. 
31. The owner felt that the claimant was spending too much time working on some of the assigned projects. 
32. At one point, when the owner felt that the claimant was struggling with the scale of items for a small bathroom project, she suggested that the claimant go to various furniture stores to view items to assist with scale. 
33. The claimant did not request any additional training from the employer in the position at the studio location. 
34. The claimant was not submitting her pay records in a timely fashion, as she was struggling with the system. The owner explained to the claimant the importance of entering that information timely, as the owner could not go back and bill clients at a later time for the work performed. 
35. The claimant’s last day at work for the employer was Wednesday, April 23, 2025. 
36. On April 23, 2025, the owner met with the claimant to discuss some issues. The owner discussed the claimant’s comments to a younger coworker complimenting her figure. The claimant responded that she made the comment to the coworker in a motherly way. The claimant was told that she could not make those comments at work. The owner also discussed her taking too long to work on a small bathroom project, whereupon the claimant responded that she felt she did not have enough direction. The owner addressed the claimant talking on the telephone with her son for an extended period during work. The claimant responded that her coworkers were also on their phones. The claimant was informed that the discussion was not about her co-workers. The owner also discussed the claimant’s failure to submit her payroll records timely. At no time was the claimant informed that she was going to be disciplined for any of the items discussed. 
37. The employer did not issue any disciplinary action to the claimant as a result of the April 23, 2025, discussion. 
38. On April 28, 2025, the claimant sent an email resignation to the owner, indicating in part, “I am submitting my resignation effective today, April 28, 2025. This has not been an easy decision as I have been a dedicated and loyal employee for over six years. However, I can no longer continue in an environment where I am not valued and respected. Since transferring from the retail shoppe to the design studio @ July 1, 2025, I was never given the support or fair opportunity to succeed. From the beginning I was assured three days per week, yet only two were consistently provided. I received no formal training in my new role, the limited training and design direction, was rushed and insufficient, making me feel like a burden rather than a valued team member. It has become clear through these actions, along with ongoing undermining, unequal treatment compared to my co-workers and the fostering of unnecessary conflict and tension, that there has been a deliberate effort to push me out. As a result, the work environment has become increasingly difficult, unhealthy and unsustainable.” 
39. The owner tried to call the claimant to talk to her after she submitted her resignation. The claimant text [sic] the owner, responding that she could not talk. 
40. After receiving the text message from the claimant that she could not talk, the owner waited to hear back from the claimant. When the claimant did not reach out by the end of the workday, the owner accepted the claimant’s resignation. 
41. The owner owed the claimant money on the product that the claimant brought over to the employer when she first began work for the employer. (The product came from the claimant’s prior home décor business.) The owner paid the claimant the money owed for the product when the claimant separated from employment. 
42. The claimant filed her initial claim for unemployment benefits, effective July 7, 2024. The claimant re-opened her claim for benefits.

Ruling of the Board

In accordance with our statutory obligation, we review the record and the decision made by the review examiner to determine: (1) whether the findings are supported by substantial and credible evidence; and (2) whether the review examiner’s conclusion is free from error of law. Upon such review, the Board adopts the review examiner’s findings of fact and deems them to be supported by substantial and credible evidence. However, as discussed more fully below, we disagree with the review examiner’s legal conclusion that the claimant is ineligible for benefits. 

Because the claimant resigned from her employment, her eligibility for benefits is properly analyzed pursuant to G.L. c. 151A, § 25(e)(1), which provides, in pertinent part, as follows: 

[No waiting period shall be allowed and no benefits shall be paid to an individual under this chapter] . . . (e) For the period of unemployment next ensuing . . . after the individual has left work (1) voluntarily unless the employee establishes by substantial and credible evidence that he had good cause for leaving attributable to the employing unit or its agent . . . [or] if such individual established to the satisfaction of the commissioner that his reasons for leaving were for such an urgent, compelling and necessitous nature as to make his separation involuntary.  

The express language in these provisions places the burden of proof on the claimant.

The claimant did not contend that she left her job due to urgent, compelling and necessitous reasons. Therefore, we only consider whether her reason for leaving was for good cause attributable to the employer. 

When a claimant contends that the separation was for good cause attributable to the employer, the focus is on the employer’s conduct and not on the employee’s personal reasons for leaving. Conlon v. Dir. of Division of Employment Security, 382 Mass. 19, 23 (1980). 

Not every incident described in these findings amounts to good cause for leaving employment. We agree with the review examiner that the claimant did not present substantial evidence to show that the owner had been singling her out, undermining her, or that she reasonably believed that she would soon be terminated from employment. See Findings of Fact 20, 22–26, 31–32, 34, and 36–37. 

However, in her decision the review examiner concluded that the primary reason that the claimant left her job was because her hours had been reduced. She found that, upon hire, the employer had been providing the claimant between 24 and 32 hours of work per week. See Findings of Fact 5–7. A few months prior to the closure of the employer’s retail store in July, 2024, the owner informed the claimant that she would be able to provide the claimant with two days of work in the employer’s studio and would try to increase the claimant’s hours. See Findings of Fact 11–12. As of July, 2024, the employer’s retail store closed, and the claimant began working at the employer’s studio location two days, for a total of sixteen hours, per week. See Findings of Fact 15–16. On April 28, 2025, the claimant resigned. See Finding of Fact 38.

A substantial decline in wages may render a job unsuitable and constitute good cause attributable to the employer to resign under G.L. c. 151A, § 25(e)(1). Graves v. Dir. of Division of Employment Security, 384 Mass. 766, 768 (1981) (citation omitted). In North Shore AIDS v. Rushton, the Massachusetts Appeals Court ruled that, relative to a modest $35,000 salary, a 16% reduction in pay was a substantial change to the terms and conditions of employment. No. 04-P-503, 2005 WL 3303901 (Mass. App. Ct. Dec. 6, 2005), summary decision pursuant to rule 1:28.

Here, the findings indicate that, prior to July, 2024, the claimant had been earning gross wages of $792–$1,056 per week. See Finding of Fact 5. Considering the current economic climate, we think that this is comparable to the salary noted in North Shore AIDS. Beginning July, 2024, the claimant earned gross wages of only $528 per week. See Finding of Fact 16. Because the claimant had previously worked anywhere between 24 and 32 hours each week, the employer cut the claimant’s regular hours between 33% and 50%. This amounts to a substantial reduction in pay. 

It is undisputed that the owner attempted to generate more work to increase the claimant’s hours but had not done so before the claimant resigned. See Finding of Fact 29. Additionally, nothing in the record, including the parties’ testimonies, indicates that the claimant was ever informed as to when, or whether, her hours would increase again. Thus, the record supports a conclusion that the reduction in hours was indefinite, and the claimant had good cause attributable to the employer to leave her employment. 

Our analysis does not stop here. The Supreme Judicial Court has held that an employee who voluntarily leaves employment due to an employer’s action has the burden to show that she made a reasonable attempt to correct the situation or that such attempt would have been futile. Guarino v. Dir. of Division of Employment Security, 393 Mass. 89, 93-94 (1984). 

Finding of Fact 18 provides that, shortly after starting at the studio location, the claimant asked the owner about receiving more hours of work, and the owner informed the claimant that she was trying to generate more client work. In our view, this evidence shows that the claimant made a reasonable attempt to correct the situation before submitting her resignation. 

Based on the above, we can reasonably infer that the claimant did not follow up with the employer about her hours after this, because she believed that there was nothing else that she could do to return to her previous schedule. Moreover, the totality of the evidence in the record supports the conclusion that such a belief on the claimant’s part was reasonable and further attempts to preserve would have been futile. 

In her decision, the review examiner reasoned that, even though the claimant had resigned because the employer had reduced her weekly schedule of hours, and she had requested additional hours prior to resigning, she should nonetheless be disqualified from receiving benefits because she had not spoken with the owner about any of her other workplace concerns. We disagree. Because the claimant had already established that the employer significantly reduced her pay and that she had asked the owner for additional hours, she was not required to do anything more under the circumstances to become eligible for benefits. 

We, therefore, conclude as a matter of law that the claimant is entitled to benefits under G.L. c. 151A, § 25(e)(1), because she voluntarily resigned from her employment with good cause attributable to the employer. 

The review examiner’s decision is reversed. The claimant is entitled to receive benefits for the week beginning April 20, 2025, and for subsequent weeks if otherwise eligible.

Boston, Massachusetts                                              Date of Decision – May 12, 2026

Charlene A Stawicki, Esquire
Member

Michael J. Albano
Member

Any further appeal would further appeal further appeal would be to a Massachusetts State District Court.
(See Section 42, Chapter 151A, General Laws, Enclosed)

The last day to appeal this decision to a Massachusetts District Court is thirty days from the mail date on the first page of this decision. If that thirtieth day falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday, the last day to appeal this decision is the business day next following the thirtieth day.

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