Board of Review Decision 352-MP8J-V7J5

After the claimant's car broke down and he could not afford repairs or find alternate transportation, he made reasonable efforts to preserve his employment before leaving. He established urgent, compelling, and necessitous reasons for leaving work and is eligible for benefits under G.L. c. 151A, § 25(e).

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Issue ID: 352-MP8J-V7J5

Board of Review Decision

Introduction and Procedural History of this Appeal 

The claimant appeals a decision by a review examiner of the Department of Unemployment Assistance (DUA) to deny unemployment benefits. Benefits were denied on the ground that the claimant voluntarily left employment without good cause attributable to the employer or urgent, compelling, and necessitous reasons, pursuant to G.L. c. 151A, § 25(e)(1). 

The claimant had filed a claim for unemployment benefits, effective June 1, 2025, which was approved in a determination issued by the agency on August 7, 2025. The employer appealed to the DUA Hearings Department. Following a hearing on the merits attended only by the employer, the review examiner reversed the agency’s initial determination in a decision rendered on September 20, 2025. The claimant sought review by the Board, which denied the appeal, and the claimant appealed to the District Court pursuant to G.L. c. 151A, § 42.

On February 12, 2026, the District Court ordered the Board to obtain further evidence. Consistent with this order, we remanded the case to the review examiner to afford the claimant an opportunity to testify. Only the claimant attended the remand hearing. Thereafter, the review examiner issued her consolidated findings of fact.

The issue before the Board is whether the review examiner’s decision, which concluded that the claimant separated due to a lack of transportation but failed to make reasonable efforts to preserve his employment, is supported by substantial and credible evidence and is free from error of law.

After reviewing the entire record, including the recorded testimony and evidence from the hearings, the review examiner’s decision, the claimant’s appeal, the District Court’s Order, and the consolidated findings of fact, we reverse the review examiner’s decision.

Findings of Fact

The review examiner’s consolidated findings of fact and credibility assessment, which were issued following the District Court remand, are set forth below in their entirety:

1. The claimant worked as a sales technician for the employer from September 16, 2024, until June 2, 2025, when the claimant separated. 
2. The claimant’s rate of pay was $22.50 per hour. 
3. Prior to May 23, 2025, the claimant rented a vehicle to report to work because his personal vehicle was in disrepair. 
4. On or about May 23, 2025, the claimant, while driving the rented vehicle, was in [a] car accident. The claimant was responsible for paying for the repairs and he had not purchased car insurance for the vehicle. 
5. May 23, 2025, was the claimant‘s last physical day at work. 
6. The claimant did not have the necessary funds to repair his vehicle. 
7. Public transportation was not available for the claimant’s commute to the employer’s location. 
8. The claimant did not have anyone available to grant him rides to work. 
9. The claimant repaired his vehicle about six months after his separation from the employer. 
10. On May 26, 2025, the claimant notified his supervisor that he was unable to report to work due to transportation issues. 
11. The employer did not offer a leave of absence to the claimant. 
12. The claimant separated due to lack of transportation.

Credibility Assessment:

The claimant separated due to lack of transportation. 

The employer did not attend the remand hearing. 

The claimant was not present at the initial hearing. At the remand hearing, the claimant provided detailed testimony regarding his transportation issues that prevented him from reporting to work, including his lack of funds for necessary repairs. He also testified credibly that he notified the employer of these issues. The claimant could not return to work because he lacked transportation for at least six months from his last date of work. 

Given the above, it is concluded that the claimant’s direct testimony is credible.

Ruling of the Board

In accordance with our statutory obligation, we review the record and the decision made by the review examiner to determine: (1) whether the consolidated findings are supported by substantial and credible evidence; and (2) whether the review examiner’s conclusion is free from error of law. Upon such review, the Board adopts the review examiner’s consolidated findings of fact and deems them to be supported by substantial and credible evidence. We further believe that the review examiner’s credibility assessment is reasonable in relation to the evidence presented. However, as discussed more fully below, we now disagree with the review examiner’s legal conclusion that the claimant is ineligible for benefits. 

The Consolidated Findings show that the claimant resigned from his employment due to transportation issues. See Consolidated Findings 10 and 12. As such, the review examiner appropriately analyzed his separation pursuant to the following provisions under G.L. c. 151A, 
§ 25(e), which provide, in relevant part, as follows:

No waiting period shall be allowed and no benefits shall be paid to an individual under this chapter . . . (e) For the period of unemployment next ensuing . . . after the individual has left work (1) voluntarily unless the employee establishes by substantial and credible evidence that he had good cause for leaving attributable to the employing unit or its agent . . . . 

An individual shall not be disqualified from receiving benefits under the provisions of this subsection, if such individual establishes to the satisfaction of the commissioner that his reasons for leaving were for such an urgent, compelling and necessitous nature as to make his separation involuntary. 

The express language of these provisions places the burden of proof upon the claimant.

The record here does not indicate that the claimant left his employment due to any action taken by the employer. We, therefore, need not consider whether the claimant had good cause for leaving attributable to the employing unit or its agent under G.L. c. 151A, § 25(e)(1).

Our standard for determining whether a claimant has demonstrated urgent, compelling, and necessitous reasons for leaving work has been set forth by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court. To make such a determination, we examine the circumstances in each case and evaluate “the strength and effect of the compulsive pressure of external and objective forces” on the claimant to ascertain whether the claimant “acted reasonably, based on pressing circumstances, in leaving employment.” Reep v. Comm’r of Department of Employment and Training, 412 Mass. 845, 848, 851 (1991). 

Prior to May 23, 2025, the claimant rented a vehicle to report to work because his personal vehicle was in disrepair. Consolidated Finding 3. On or about May 23, 2025, the claimant was in a car accident while driving the rental vehicle and was subsequently required to pay for the repairs directly because he had not purchased car insurance for the vehicle. See Consolidated Finding 4. On May 26, 2025, the claimant notified his supervisor that he was unable to report to work due to transportation issues. Consolidated Finding 10. Consequently, the claimant’s separation occurred because he lacked transportation to get to and from work. See Consolidated Finding 12. 

Loss of transportation has been recognized as an urgent, compelling, and necessitous reason for leaving employment, where a claimant demonstrates that no reasonable transportation alternative is available. See Raytheon Co. v. Dir. of Division of Employment Security, 364 Mass. 593, 597–98. (1974). In this case, we believe that the claimant has demonstrated this. The review examiner credited the claimant’s testimony that, after his personal vehicle became inoperable and his rental vehicle was damaged in an accident, the claimant lacked the necessary funds to repair his vehicle. See Consolidated Findings 3, 4, and 6. The review examiner also credited the claimant’s testimony that public transportation was not available for his commute to the employer’s work location, and that he did not have co-workers, friends, or family who could provide him with rides to work. Consolidated Findings 7–8.

Such assessments are within the scope of the fact finder’s role, and, unless they are unreasonable in relation to the evidence presented, they will not be disturbed on appeal. See School Committee of Brockton v. Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination, 423 Mass. 7, 15 (1996). “The test is whether the finding is supported by “substantial evidence.’” Lycurgus v. Dir. of Division of Employment Security, 391 Mass. 623, 627 (1984) (citations omitted). “Substantial evidence is ‘such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion,’ taking ‘into account whatever in the record detracts from its weight.’” Id. at 627–628, quoting New Boston Garden Corp. v. Board of Assessors of Boston, 383 Mass. 456, 466 (1981) (further citations omitted). In this case, we believe that the review examiner’s view of the evidence is reasonable in relation to the evidence presented. Thus, the record shows that there was no reasonable transportation alternative that would have allowed the claimant to continue working for the employer. 

Where a claimant has shown that circumstances beyond his control have forced him to resign, he must also show that he “had taken such ‘reasonable means to preserve his employment’ as would indicate the claimant’s ‘desire and willingness to continue her employment.’” Norfolk County Retirement System v. Dir. of Department of Labor and Workforce Development, 66 Mass. App. Ct. 759, 766 (2006), quoting Raytheon Co., 364 Mass. At 597–98. 

Because public transportation was unavailable and there was no one who could give him a ride to work, we can reasonably infer that the claimant relied upon a personal vehicle to report to work. See Consolidated Findings 7 and 8. When his own vehicle broke down, the claimant did not have the funds to repair it, so he secured a rental vehicle to commute to and from work until on or about May 23, 2025. However, that vehicle was damaged in an accident. See Consolidated Findings 3–4 and 6. At that point, the claimant notified his supervisor that he was unable to report to work due to transportation issues. See Consolidated Finding 10. Although not in the findings, we note that the claimant testified that, prior to his separation, he had also asked his supervisor if he could temporarily utilize one of the employer’s work vehicles to commute to and from work, but the supervisor told him that the employer did not allow this. Under these circumstances, we are satisfied that the claimant took reasonable steps to preserve his employment. 

We, therefore, conclude as a matter of law that the claimant is entitled to benefits pursuant to G.L. c. 151A, § 25(e)(1), because he left work due to urgent, compelling, and necessitous circumstances. 

The review examiner’s decision is reversed. The claimant is entitled to receive benefits for the week beginning June 1, 2025, and for subsequent weeks if otherwise eligible.

Boston, Massachusetts                                              Date of Decision – May 1, 2026

1. This portion of the claimant’s testimony is part of the unchallenged evidence introduced at the remand hearing and placed in the record, and it is thus properly referred to in our decision today. See Bleich v. Maimonides School, 447 Mass. 38, 40 (2006); Allen of Michigan, Inc. v. Deputy Dir. of Department of Employment and Training, 64 Mass. App. Ct. 370, 371 (2005).

Charlene A Stawicki, Esquire
Member

Michael J. Albano
Member

Any further appeal would further appeal further appeal would be to a Massachusetts State District Court.
(See Section 42, Chapter 151A, General Laws, Enclosed)

The last day to appeal this decision to a Massachusetts District Court is thirty days from the mail date on the first page of this decision. If that thirtieth day falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday, the last day to appeal this decision is the business day next following the thirtieth day.

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