Board of Review Decision 352-MPF6-374V

The claimant accessed a patient’s electronic health records without authorization, a legitimate business purpose, or due to mitigating circumstances. Board held the claimant knowingly violated a reasonable and uniformly enforced policy and engaged in deliberate misconduct in wilful disregard of the employer’s interest. She is denied benefits under G.L. c. 151A, § 25(e)(2).

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Issue ID: 352-MPF6-374V

Board of Review Decision

Introduction and Procedural History of this Appeal 

The claimant appeals a decision by a review examiner of the Department of Unemployment Assistance (DUA) to deny unemployment benefits. We review, pursuant to our authority under G.L. c. 151A, § 41, and affirm. 

The claimant was discharged from her position with the employer on June 10, 2025. She filed a claim for unemployment benefits with the DUA, effective June 8, 2025, which was approved in a determination issued on August 12, 2025. The employer appealed the determination to the DUA hearings department. Following a hearing on the merits attended by both parties, the review examiner overturned the agency’s initial determination and denied benefits in a decision rendered on December 22, 2025. We accepted the claimant’s application for review.

Benefits were denied after the review examiner determined that the claimant engaged in deliberate misconduct in wilful disregard of the employer’s interest and, thus, was disqualified under G.L. c. 151A, § 25(e)(2). After considering the recorded testimony and evidence from the hearing, the review examiner’s decision, and the claimant’s appeal, we remanded the case to the review examiner to obtain additional evidence pertaining to the claimant’s access to patient records. Both parties attended the remand hearing. Thereafter, the review examiner issued her consolidated findings of fact. Our decision is based upon our review of the entire record. 

The issue before the Board is whether the review examiner’s decision, which concluded that the claimant’s separation was disqualifying under G.L. c. 151A, § 25(e)(2), is supported by substantial and credible evidence and is free from error of law, where, after remand, the employer submitted additional documentary evidence substantiating that the claimant accessed a patient’s health records without authorization.

Findings of Fact

The review examiner’s consolidated findings of fact and credibility assessment are set forth below in their entirety:

1. From September 25, 2023, to June 10, 2025, when she was discharged, the claimant worked full-time as a clinician, level 3 for the employer, a company that treats individuals (patients) with substance abuse disorders in a residential setting.
2. Prior to her employment, the claimant worked as a clinician for three years in a patient detox facility.
3. The employer maintained a written “PATIENT RIGHTS, PRIVACY, CONFIDENTIALITY AND SECURITY” policy, contained in the employee handbook, which stated, “All employees are expected to comply with the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) regarding patient privacy and with Federal Regulations, 42 CFR, Part II regarding confidentiality of Alcohol and Drug Abuse patients…” and “Employees authorized to access the electronic health record…will only access the health record of patients they are treating.” Pursuant to the policies, employees who violate the policy are subject to discipline up to and including termination.
4. The employer maintained a “Written Information Security Policy,” which limited access to patients’ protected information to those employees whose duties relevant to their job title and description, had a legitimate need to access these records for job-related purposed [sic]. Employees who violated the policy were subject to discipline up to and including termination.
5. The purpose of the policies was to protect the privacy and security of patients’ confidential health information and to comply with HIPAA and applicable state and federal regulations.
6. The employer expected employees to refrain from accessing the personal and confidential health information of patients, unless they were the patient’s treating clinician.
7. The employer maintained this expectation to protect patient information and to comply with the federal laws and regulations.
8. The claimant reviewed the policies at orientation and through subsequent trainings, including the employer’s mandatory “Confidentiality in Substance Use Disorder Treatment” training, which the claimant completed on September 27, 2023, and on February 16, 2025.
9. Through her review of the policies, completion of the mandatory trainings, and years of experience with HIPAA compliance, at all times, the claimant was aware the employer expected her not to access patients’ confidential records if they were not assigned to her.
10. In practice, the employer discharges all employees who violate HIPAA by accessing client information without a legitimate business purpose. The employer does not know how many employees have been discharged upon the first violation of the policy.
11. When clinicians are initially hired, they are assigned a supervisor for a training period. During that time, as part of their training, clinicians can access their supervisor’s assigned patients’ medical records.
12. When patients enter the program, they are assigned a specific treating clinician (TC) to help them with treatment planning, discharge planning, and working on case management. As the patient’s treating clinician, the TC is authorized to access all the patient’s records, including a patient’s problem list, progress notes, and “Biopsychosocial/Adult Comprehensive Assessment”. Patients are also assigned a group clinician (GC). The employer runs several patient groups per day. Each patient is assigned to a specific group, and each group has an assigned GC. A patient’s TC may not be the patient’s GC. GCs are required to log a patient’s group participation in the “group notes” section of the patient’s medical records. A GC who is not the patient’s TC, is only authorized to access the “group notes” section to enter a “group note”. Entries for group notes are recorded in a patient’s file as “IP/OP Group Note”.
13. If there was an “urgent need” and a patient’s TC was unavailable, another clinician could access the applicable records for the patient. The clinician would be authorized to access the records as the patient’s TC. The clinician would be required to document her reasons for accessing the patient’s private medical information.
14. If a patient’s TC was absent from work for an extended period of time, a new clinician would be assigned. If a third-party asked a clinician for a patient’s medical information, and the clinician was not the patient’s TC, the clinician was expected to refer the third-party to the TC.
15. If a third-party told a GC they were requesting a patient’s private medical information because the patient’s TC was not responsive to requests, the GC would be expected to notify her supervisor and/or the clinical director.
16. Patients could be assigned a new TC. Patients would not have more than one TC at a time.
17. Patient A was one of the employer’s patients from on or about January 12, 2025, through on or about April 9, 2025, when he was discharged. During that time period, the program had three clinicians, the claimant, clinician 1 and clinician 2.
18. Patient A’s TC was Clinician 1. Clinician 1 did not ask the claimant to assist him with Patient A at any point. Except for one day, the claimant was not Patient A’s TC. The claimant was Patient A’s GC. The claimant, as Patient A’s GC, was authorized to access Patient A’s records solely for the purpose of entering the “group notes”.
19. From January 12, 2025, through April 9, 2025, the claimant accessed Patient A’s electronic health records approximately 435 times and on approximately 20 different dates. Of the 435 times, the claimant accessed the “group notes” section approximately 221 times. The claimant accessed Patient A’s private medical records without authorization approximately 214 times.
20. Without authorization, and on unknown dates, the claimant accessed Patient A’s private medical information and provided the information to the claimant’s parole officer and a third-party program. The claimant did not document why she accessed Patient A’s private medical information without authorization. The claimant did not document the identity of the parties that she disclosed the private medical information to.
21. The claimant disclosed Patient A’s personal medical information over the phone to third parties including Patient A’s parole officer.
22. On an unknown date, without authorization and without notifying the employer or Patient A’s TC, the claimant printed Patient A’s entire patient file and faxed the documents to a third-party.
23. The Bureau of Substance Addiction Services (BSAS) is the licensing authority that oversees substance use treatment programs and counselors. BSAS does not investigate complaints. BSAS refers complaints filed against clinicians to the clinician’s employer for investigation. Employers are required to investigate and submit their findings to the BSAS within 10 days.
24. On or about May 30, 2025, BSAS notified the employer that an anonymous complaint had been filed against the claimant regarding one of the employer’s patients, Patient A. BSAS shared the content of the complaint with the employer. The complaint alleged that the claimant: 1. Accessed Patient A’s medical records without authorization, 2. Requested to meet with Patient A outside of the program when Patient A was on a “day pass” from the program, 3. Requested to engage in sexual acts with Patient A, 4. Threatened Patient A that she would contact his parole officer, and 5. Contacted Patient A after he was discharged from the program.
25. On about May 30, 2025, the employer’s chief human resources officer and the employer’s director of compliance interviewed the claimant’s coworkers at the employer’s residential facility. The claimant was not at work that day. As part of the investigation, the employer’s director of compliance and the facility clinical director audited the claimant’s record access logs for Patient A. The employer also audited the claimant’s record access logs for any patients who had graduated from the program and came back to visit, and for who the claimant was not the TC. The logs showed the claimant accessed previous patients’ records after they had graduated. The logs showed the claimant accessed Patient A’s private medical records without authorization on or about 20 different dates, including after Patient A was discharged. Patient A was the only active patient audited.
26. The audit showed the claimant accessed the records of multiple clients who were not assigned to her. The claimant accessed multiple patients’ private medical information, including after they were discharged, and she was not the TC. Because the claimant was not the TC, she was not authorized to access patients’ records outside of a “group note” if she was the GC. The claimant was not authorized to access the patients’ records. The results of the BSAS investigation “partially substantiated” the original complaint.
27. On June 2, 2025, the claimant’s next scheduled workday, the employer’s chief human resources officer and the employer’s director of compliance, at the time, met with the claimant at the facility. The employer informed the claimant they were conducting a BSAS investigation. The employer asked the claimant if she had accessed records for patients that were not assigned to her as the TC, if she had ever contacted a patient when the patient was on a day pass from the program, if she had ever contacted a patient on a day pass and required the patient to return to the facility, and if she had accessed a patient’s records post discharge. During the meeting, the employer asked the claimant about Patient A by name. Following the meeting, the claimant knew the identity of Patient A.
28. The claimant reported she had accessed the private medical records of patients and she was not the patients’ TC. The claimant reported she accessed the private medical records, without authorization, for the following reasons; 1. Obtain contact information related to relaying message to the patient, 2. Provide information to a continue[d] treatment entity, 3. To determine if a prospective patient was entering the program, 4. On behalf of other clinical staff, and 5. To assist the patient with a specific discharge referral. The claimant acknowledged she had contacted patients on day passes and had requested that they return to the program. The claimant reported she did not provide pertinent medical documentation with any patient record during clinical coverage or other patient encounters.
29. Following the meeting, the employer placed the claimant on administrative leave pending an investigation into the claimant’s unauthorized access of patients’ private medical information.
30. Subsequently, the employer determined the claimant’s conduct, accessing Patient A’s confidential and protected health information on 20 different dates, approximately 241 times without authorization, disclosing the private medical information to third-parties, via phone, and failing to properly document the disclosures, violated the employer’s policies and expectations regarding patient confidentiality, privacy, and HIPAA compliance, and decided to discharge the claimant.
31. On June 5, 2025, the employer concluded its investigation.
32. On June 10, 2025, the employer’s chief human resources officer discharged the claimant.
33. After the claimant’s discharge, the employer audited the records of patients who attended the program from on or about January 2, 2025, to on or about April 15, 2025, approximately the same time period as Patient A’s enrollment, and where the claimant was the GC but not the TC.
34. The employer’s audit identified four patients, 26244, 13086, 27216 and 26302, in addition to Patient A, where the claimant was the GC but not the TC. The audit showed the claimant accessed patient 26244’s records 0 times, 13086 records 4 times on one day, and 29 times on a second day, 27216 records 1 time, 26302 records 2 times on one day, 6 times a second day, and 11 times on a third day.
35. There were no circumstances that would necessitate the claimant accessing Patient A’s medical records approximately 241 times over the course of approximately 20 days.
36. Prior to her discharge, the claimant never told the program director that she was concerned about the program manager’s “inappropriate requests”. The claimant never filed a complaint against the program manager with the employer. There was nothing that prevented the claimant from reporting her concerns to the program director.

[Credibility] Assessment:

As an initial matter, at the start of the remand hearing, the claimant testified that the documentation she submitted was evidence of Patient A’s parole officer contacting her directly on her cell phone. The employer declined to disclose Patient A’s identity but testified that that where the claimant submitted documentation from Patient A’s parole officer as evidence for the remand hearing, the claimant knew Patient A’s identity. Indeed, at the remand hearing, although the claimant maintained that the employer never told her Patient A’s identity, the claimant acknowledged that she knew Patient A’s identity, “not initially but after time I [claimant] was able to piece together who they [the employer] were talking about.” As such, the claimant’s repeated assertions throughout the initial hearing, that she did not know the identity of Patient A and, therefore, could not properly address the employer’s allegations of misconduct, are not credible. Moreover, although the employer failed to provide first hand testimony or documentation regarding the employer’s investigatory meeting with the claimant on or about June 2, 2025, the employer testified that per the employer’s director of compliance’s contemporaneous notes, the claimant was told Patient A’s identity, and admitted to accessing Patient A’s private medical records, disclosing Patient A’s private medical information via phone/and or fax to third parties and Patient A, and not properly documenting why she accessed Patient A’s private medical information. It is not reasonable that the employer would expect the claimant to respond to allegations without disclosing Patient A’s identity. As such, it is concluded that Patient A’s identity was disclosed to the claimant prior to discharge.

In this case, the parties do not dispute that the claimant accessed Patient A’s private medical records, disclosed Patient A’s private medical information to third parties and Patient A, including via phone, and did not properly document her reasons for accessing Patient A’s records. Further, the parties agree the clamant was not Patient A’s assigned treating clinician (TC), the claimant was Patient A’s group clinician (GC), and as Patient A’s GC the claimant was aware she was only authorized to access “group notes” section of Patient A’s medical records. The employer credibly testified that in accordance with the employer’s policies, and state and federal regulations, including HIPAA, to maintain patient confidentiality and privacy, without an emergent reason, only a patient’s treating clinician (TC) is authorized to access all sections of a patient’s private medical records. In this instance, only Patient A’s TC, Clinician 1, was authorized to access all sections of Patient A’s records. Yet, per the employer’s business records, authenticated by the employer’s witness[es] and submitted into evidence, the claimant accessed Patient A’s private medical records without authorization (i.e. [sic] excluding group notes) on or about 20 different dates, approximately 241 times. The claimant maintained she believed she was Patient A’s TC for one day before he was reassigned to a different TC. The employer agreed it was possible that a patient could have more than one TC, although not concurrently, but could not confirm that at any time the claimant was Patient A’s assigned TC. However, even if the claimant was Patient A’s TC for one day, it would not explain her accessing his private medical records the approximately 19 other days. Further, there is no reasonable explanation for the number of times and days that the claimant accessed Patient A’s records in comparison to the four additional patients’ record[s]. Although it is noted that the employer selected the four additional patient audit records submitted into evidence, the witnesses’ testimony, that the records are an accurate reflection of the claimant’s access for all patients for the time period in question, is credited.

The claimant maintained that she accessed Patient A’s private medical records, disclosed the private medical information to third-parties and Patient A via phone, and failed to properly document her reasons for accessing Patient A’s private medical records for multiple reasons including she: 1. Did not know only a patient’s assigned TC was authorized to access all sections of a patient’s private medical records, 2. Was never properly trained on the employer’s policies and procedures for accessing patient’s medical records, 3. Her supervisor, the program manager, instructed her to view patients’ private medical records during training and throughout her employment, 4. The supervisor instructed her to view prospective patients’ medical records to determine if they had a warrant and/or were going to attend the program, 5. To assist other clinicians due to a heavy workload, 6. A patient’s TC was absent or non-responsive, 7. To tell a patient their next scheduled appointment, 8. It was common practice amongst all the clinicians, 9. She was unfamiliar with requirements in [a] residential setting, and 10. She was trying to be responsive and efficient.

If the claimant’s assertions, that she was unaware that when she was not the TC, she was not authorized to access patients’ records and/or provide private medical information to third-parties and patients via phone, is credited, it is logical that the claimant’s unauthorized access to other patients, where the claimant was only the GC during the same time period, would be similar. This however was not the case. Even taking into account, that some patients required more assistance than others, in comparison to the four other patients, there is no reasonable explanation for the claimant to have accessed Patient A’s records 241 times over the course of approximately 20 days.

Based on the totality of the circumstances, particularly the claimant’s false assertions during the initial hearing, that she did not know the identity of Patient A, her failure to disclose that she acted under the instructions of the program manager both during the employer’s investigation and in her initial written responses to the DUA’s requests for information, and the claimant’s three years of experience in the field (albeit in an inpatient setting), this review examiner finds the claimant’s overall testimony not credible and finds the employer’s testimony, corroborated by business records, that the claimant accessed Patient A’s private medical information without a legitimate business reason more plausible and credible.

Ruling of the Board

In accordance with our statutory obligation, we review the record and the decision made by the review examiner to determine: (1) whether the consolidated findings are supported by substantial and credible evidence; and (2) whether the review examiner’s conclusion is free from error of law. After such review, the Board adopts the review examiner’s consolidated findings of fact except as follows. 

We reject the portion of Consolidated Finding 12, which states that a clinician who is not a patient’s treating clinician is only authorized to access the patient’s Group Notes section. The employer’s Director of Human Resources testified that the claimant’s access to the Client Lookup and the Compliance Status sections of patient 26302’s record was appropriate, even though the claimant was not this patient’s treating clinician. We also reject the portion of Consolidated Finding 25 that states that Patient A was the only active patient audited, as Consolidated Finding 17 and other portions of Consolidated Finding 25 show that, when the employer ran its audit, Patient A had already been discharged from the employer’s facility. We further reject the portion of Consolidated Finding 28 that indicates that the claimant admitted that she accessed medical records without authorization, as the Credibility Assessment shows that the claimant maintained that she believed her access was authorized.

We reject the portion of Consolidated Finding 30 that insofar as it indicates that the claimant was discharged for any reason other than accessing Patient A’s health records without authorization. The totality of the employer’s testimony indicates that the sole reason for the claimant’s discharge was accessing Patient A’s health records without authorization. We further note that, in Consolidated Finding 34, where the review examiner lists the number of times the claimant accessed patient records, she appears to be referring to sections other than the Group Notes section of the patient records. A review of Remand Exhibits 5–8, the User Audit Reports, shows that the review examiner’s calculations in Consolidated Finding 34 are inaccurate if we count the number of times that the claimant accessed the Group Notes section of the patients referred to in the finding. 

We set aside the portion of Consolidated Finding 36 that refers to a program director, as this appears to be a scrivener’s error; the evidence in the record shows that the review examiner is referring to the clinical director We further reject the portion of the Credibility Assessment that states that the parties agree that the claimant was aware that, as Patient A’s group clinician, she could only access the group notes section of Patient A’s medical records. As stated above, another portion of the Credibility Assessment shows that the claimant maintained that she believed her access to other parts of Patient A’s medical records was authorized.

We note that the portion of the Credibility Assessment that states that, without an emergent reason, only a patient’s treating clinician is authorized to access all sections of a patient’s private medical records contains a scrivener’s error. The evidence in the record shows that the review examiner was referring to an urgent reason rather than an emergent reason. Finally, we reject the portion of the Credibility Assessment that states that the claimant failed to disclose that she acted under the instructions of the program manager during her initial written responses to the DUA’s requests for information, as this statement is inaccurate. During the initial hearing, the review examiner read into the record a portion of the claimant’s fact-finding response, where the claimant refers to acting under the program manager’s instructions. See Exhibit 3, Claimant Additional Information.

In adopting the remaining findings, we deem them to be supported by substantial and credible evidence. We further believe that, despite the inaccuracies noted above, the review examiner’s credibility assessment is generally reasonable in relation to the evidence presented. 

Because the claimant was terminated from her employment, her qualification for benefits is governed by G.L. c. 151A, § 25(e)(2), which provides, in pertinent part, as follows:

[No waiting period shall be allowed and no benefits shall be paid to an individual under this chapter for] . . . the period of unemployment next ensuing . . . after the individual has left work . . . (2) by discharge shown to the satisfaction of the commissioner by substantial and credible evidence to be attributable to deliberate misconduct in wilful disregard of the employing unit’s interest, or to a knowing violation of a reasonable and uniformly enforced rule or policy of the employer, provided that such violation is not shown to be as a result of the employee’s incompetence. . . .

Under G.L. c. 151A, § 25(e)(2), it is the employer’s burden to establish that the claimant was discharged for a knowing violation of a reasonable and uniformly enforced rule or policy of the employer, or for deliberate misconduct in wilful disregard of the employer’s interest. See Still v. Comm’r of Department of Employment and Training, 423 Mass. 805, 809 (1996) (citations omitted).

The employer discharged the claimant for violating the employer’s policy prohibiting unauthorized access to patient electronic health records, by accessing parts of a patient’s health records without a legitimate need to access these records. See Consolidated Findings 
3–4, and 30. Where the review examiner found that the purpose of the employer’s policy was to protect the privacy and security of patients’ confidential health information and to comply with HIPAA and applicable state and federal regulations, we believe that it is reasonable. See Consolidated Finding 5. The review examiner also found that the claimant was aware of the employer’s policies against unauthorized access of patient electronic health records, because she had reviewed the policies during orientation and subsequent trainings. Consolidated Findings 8–9. 

The employer discovered the claimant’s unauthorized access to a patient’s health records while investigating a complaint filed against the claimant with the Bureau of Substance Addiction Services. Consolidated Findings 23–24. During its investigation, the employer specifically found that the claimant was Patient A’s group clinician and only authorized to access parts of Patient A’s health records related to entering group notes. Consolidated Finding 18. However, on multiple occasions, the claimant accessed parts of Patient A’s health record that only his treating clinician was authorized to access. Consolidated Findings 18–20. The above findings establish that the claimant violated the employer’s relevant policy regarding unauthorized access to patient electronic health records. 

Consolidated Finding 10 states that the employer terminates all employees who access patient health information without a legitimate business purpose. Because there is no indication in the record that the claimant mistakenly accessed the portion of Patient A’s health records that she was not authorized to access, we conclude that she knowingly violated a reasonable and uniformly enforced policy of the employer.

The employer also met its burden to show that the claimant engaged in deliberate misconduct in wilful disregard of the employer’s interest. 

To meet this initial burden, the employer is required to show that the claimant’s actions were not only misconduct but that they were deliberate. The record shows that the claimant violated the employer’s policy when she accessed parts of Patient A’s electronic health records without authorization on multiple dates. Therefore, the employer has established that the claimant engaged in misconduct. There is nothing in the record to suggest that the behavior was accidental or inadvertent. Therefore, we can reasonably infer that she deliberately looked up Patient A in the employer’s electronic records and went through his health information on multiple dates. 

However, our inquiry does not end here. The employer must also show that the claimant’s actions were done in wilful disregard of the employer’s interest. To determine whether an employee’s actions were in wilful disregard of the employer’s interest, the proper factual inquiry is to ascertain the employee’s state of mind at the time of the behavior. Grise v. Dir. of Division of Employment Security, 393 Mass. 271, 275 (1984). To evaluate the claimant’s state of mind, we must “take into account the worker’s knowledge of the employer’s expectation, the reasonableness of that expectation and the presence of any mitigating factors.” Garfield v. Dir. of Division of Employment Security, 377 Mass. 94, 97 (1979) (citation omitted). The question is not whether the employer was justified in firing the claimant, but whether the Legislature intended that unemployment benefits should be denied under the circumstances. Id. at 95. 

In this case, the review examiner found that the employer expected the claimant to refrain from accessing certain parts of a patient’s confidential health record unless they were the patient’s treating clinician and, therefore, authorized to access to such information. Consolidated Findings 3 and 6. The purpose of the expectation was to protect patient information and comply with federal laws and regulations. Consolidated Finding 7. As noted earlier, we believe that the employer’s expectation was reasonable. The review examiner also found that the claimant was aware of the employer’s expectation because she reviewed the relevant policies during orientation and subsequent trainings. Consolidated Findings 8 and 9. 

We next consider whether the record supports the presence of mitigating circumstances which prevented the claimant from complying with the employer’s expectation. Mitigating circumstances include factors that cause the misconduct and over which a claimant may have little or no control. See Shepherd v. Dir. of Division of Employment Security, 399 Mass. 737, 740 (1987). 

Here, the claimant has not set forth any circumstances that could mitigate her misconduct. Instead, she maintained that she believed she could access all parts of Patient A’s health information even though she was not his treating clinician, a contention which the review examiner did not find credible. The absence of mitigating factors for the claimant’s misconduct indicates that the claimant acted in wilful disregard of the employer’s interest. See Lawless v. Department of Unemployment Assistance, No. 17-P-156, 2018 WL 1832587 (Mass. App. Ct. Apr. 18, 2018), summary decision pursuant to rule 1:28. 

We, therefore, conclude as a matter of law that the employer has met its burden to show that the claimant knowingly violated a reasonably and uniformly enforced policy and engaged in deliberate misconduct in wilful disregard of the employer’s interest within the meaning of G.L. c. 151A, § 25(e)(2).

The review examiner’s decision is affirmed. The claimant is denied benefits for the week ending June 14, 2025, and for subsequent weeks, until such time as she has had at least eight weeks of work and has earned an amount equivalent to or in excess of eight times her weekly benefit amount. 

Boston, Massachusetts                                              Date of Decision – July 27, 2026

1. While not part of the consolidated findings, this testimony, as well as the testimony and Exhibits referenced below, are part of the unchallenged evidence introduced at the hearing and placed in the record, and they are thus properly referred to in our decision today. See Bleich v. Maimonides School, 447 Mass. 38, 40 (2006); Allen of Michigan, Inc. v. Deputy Dir. of Department of Employment and Training, 64 Mass. App. Ct. 370, 371 (2005).

Martha M. Wishart, Esq.
Chair

Michael J. Albano
Member

Any further appeal would further appeal further appeal would be to a Massachusetts State District Court
(See Section 42, Chapter 151A, General Laws, Enclosed)

The last day to appeal this decision to a Massachusetts District Court is thirty days from the mail date on the first page of this decision. If that thirtieth day falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday, the last day to appeal this decision is the business day next following the thirtieth day.

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SVL/rh