Board of Review Decision 352-MV2H-5LKL

Prior to her noticed resignation date, the employer fired the claimant, but because it presented no evidence of misconduct , she was eligible for benefits pursuant to G.L. c. 151A § 25(e)(2). However, starting from the date of her planned resignation, the claimant was ineligible for benefits under G.L. c. 151A § 25(e)(1), because she did not establish that her decision to resign stemmed from anything more than a personality conflict with a co-worker.

Board of Review
100 Cambridge Street, Suite 400
Boston, MA 02114
Phone: [phone]
Fax: [phone]

Issue ID: 352-MV2H-5LKL

Board of Review Decision

Introduction and Procedural History of this Appeal 

The employer appeals a decision by a review examiner of the Department of Unemployment Assistance (DUA) to award unemployment benefits. We review, pursuant to our authority under G.L. c. 151A, § 41, and we affirm in part and reverse in part. 

The claimant separated from her position with the employer on May 21, 2025. She reopened an existing claim for unemployment benefits with the DUA, which was effective September 22, 2024. In a determination issued on September 2, 2025, the DUA denied benefits, beginning June 1, 2025. The claimant appealed the determination to the DUA hearings department. Following a hearing on the merits attended only by the claimant, the review examiner overturned the agency’s initial determination and awarded benefits in a decision rendered on December 22, 2025. We accepted the employer’s application for review.

Benefits were awarded after the review examiner determined that the claimant voluntarily left employment for good cause attributable to the employer and, thus, was not disqualified under G.L. c. 151A, § 25(e)(1). After considering the recorded testimony and evidence from the hearing, the review examiner’s decision, and the employer’s appeal, we remanded the case to the review examiner to afford the employer an opportunity to testify. Both parties attended the remand hearing. Thereafter, the review examiner issued her consolidated findings of fact. Our decision is based upon our review of the entire record.

The issue before the Board is whether the review examiner’s decision, which concluded that the claimant had established good cause for resigning because her co-worker demonstrated harassing and hostile behavior towards her, is supported by substantial and credible evidence and is free from error of law.

Findings of Fact

The review examiner’s consolidated findings of fact and credibility assessment are set forth below in their entirety:

1. From March 12, 2025, to May 21, 2025, when she and the employer separated, the claimant worked full-time (40 hours weekly) as a billing clerk I, for the employer, a car dealership. 
2. The employer’s campus has five buildings. Each building has a billing clerk I and a billing clerk II. 
3. The employer’s billing clerk I and billing clerk II positions are the same. Billing clerks’ duties and responsibilities include acting as a cashier, invoice preparation, processing title paperwork, and administrative support. 
4. The claimant worked Monday through Friday, from 7:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. Her hourly rate was $25.00. 
5. The claimant’s direct supervisor was the employer’s manager. 
6. One of the employer’s billing clerks II (BC2) was responsible for training the claimant. Having the billing clerk II title did not confer any supervisory authority over employees who were classified as billing clerk I. During training, a billing clerk I and a billing clerk II, in the same building, would be expected to interact and communicate frequently. 
7. The claimant and BC2 had a personality conflict. 
8. The employer did not implement a structured training schedule for the claimant. The amount of time BC2 spent training the claimant varied. The BC2 showed the claimant how to process transactions using the employer’s internal system. The claimant’s desk and BC2’s desk were located less than five feet away from one another in the same room. The training would occur at the claimant’s desk, BC2’s desk, or at the front desk. The BC2 would be considered a supervisor to the extent that she had years of experience and was training a new employee. One of the employer’s billing clerks II in a different building could have trained the claimant. 
9. BC2 had worked for the employer for two years and provided coverage as a cashier/receptionist for different buildings and different departments including sales, service, and parts. BC2 told the claimant that she did not have time to train the claimant, and that she did not know why the employer was having her train the claimant. BC2 never refused to train the claimant. BC2 would keep folders of work in her desk so that she would have work to do, and the claimant would not. Sometimes if the claimant had a question, BC2 would tell the claimant that she would have to try to look for the answer herself because that was part of claimant’s job. 
10. On an unknown date in April 2025, the claimant first reported her concerns about BC2 to the employer’s resources representative (HR). The claimant and HR had a conversation in HR’s office, during which the claimant reported that BC2 was giving her attitude, making it hard to learn, and keeping work away from her. HR told the claimant she was highly valued and if she wanted, she would speak to BC2. The claimant declined and said she would try and work through it. 
11. Subsequently, on or about the week ending May 16, 2025, the claimant asked BC2 about a document, and BC2 “snatched” the paper out of the claimant’s hands. The claimant spoke to HR, who witnessed the incident. HR told the claimant that BC2’s actions were uncalled for and unprofessional. HR reported the incident to the manager, and the manager had a discussion with BC2 about her unprofessional behavior. BC2 apologized and told the manager that she was frustrated and pressed for time. The manager instructed BC2 that she needed to assist the claimant and needed to be more aware of her attitude towards the claimant. The manager also warned BC2 about keeping work in her desk away from the claimant so that the BC2 would have work to do. This was the only time BC2 snatched a document away from the claimant. 
12. The claimant discussed her concerns with HR three to four times. HR told the claimant there was attitude from both BC2 and the claimant. HR told the claimant that even if she felt disrespected by BC2, she could not disrespect BC2 in response. HR advised the claimant that she could always come to HR’s office and speak with her, and she was more than welcome to officially file a complaint. The claimant declined to file an official complaint. The claimant requested [that] HR speak to the manager, and every time, HR spoke to the manager. HR offered to have a meeting with the claimant, BC2 and the manager to address the claimant’s concerns, and the claimant declined. 
13. Prior to submitting her notice, HR asked the claimant if she would be willing to transfer to a different building on campus, and work with a different billing clerk II, with her same title and rate of pay. HR told the claimant, if the new building’s assigned billing clerk II was absent, the claimant would still have to interact with BC2 because BC2 would cover for the absent clerk. The claimant did not want to transfer because she would still have to interact with BC2. 
14. Prior to quitting her employment, the claimant no longer wanted to interact with BC2. Even if BC2 provided the proper information, the claimant would not listen to BC2. The claimant’s interactions, or lack of interaction with BC2, negatively impacted her on-the job training. Due to the short duration of her employment, it is unknown if the claimant’s interactions with the billing clerk impacted her ability to perform her job. 
15. On May 20, 2025, the claimant decided to quit her employment. The claimant decided to quit her employment due to BC2 snatching the paper out of her hands and due to her mistaken belief that the employer never spoke to BC2 about the incident. 
16. On May 20, 2025, the claimant quit her employment with an effective date of June 3, 2025. The claimant provided HR with a resignation letter. The claimant wrote that she was resigning because she “was offered a position back in the medical field and [had] accepted the position.” HR accepted the claimant’s resignation, and they agreed the claimant’s last day would be May 30, 2025. The employer did not try to convince the claimant to continue working. The employer believed the claimant had secured new employment. 
17. The claimant wanted to continue working until June 3, 2025. The claimant intended to go on vacation in Florida from June 26, 2025, to July 2, 2025. The claimant believed it would be difficult to take her planned vacation if she had to secure new employment. The claimant wanted to continue working for the additional income. 
18. On May 21, 2025, the claimant was assigned the front desk for the morning, and BC2 was assigned for the afternoon. BC2 knew the claimant had submitted her resignation. BC2 arrived at the desk early and told the claimant she could go back to her desk. The claimant told BC2 that she was still scheduled to work and would finish her shift. The claimant was logging off from the front desk computer when BC2 grabbed the mouse. The claimant told HR about the incident and that she had to leave. HR told the claimant if she felt it was best to leave, then she could leave. The claimant told HR that she was leaving for the day, but would return to work tomorrow. After the claimant left, HR then informed the manager about the incident. The manager decided, due to the tension in the office between the claimant and BC2, it would be best if the claimant did not work her two weeks’ notice. Later that day, HR left the claimant a voicemail instructing her not to return to work. 
19. On May 21, 2025, the employer terminated the claimant’s employment. 
20. On June 4, 2025, the claimant reopened her claim for unemployment benefits with an effective date of June 1, 2025. The claimant reported she was discharged by the employer on May 21, 2025. 
21. Had the employer not terminated the claimant’s employment, she would have continued working until her effective quit date of June 3, 2025. 
22. At the time the claimant quit, her job was not in jeopardy. 
23. At the time the claimant quit, the employer had work available. 
24. At the time the claimant quit, a transfer was available. 
25. At the time the claimant quit, she did not have an accepted job offer with a new employer.

Credibility Assessment:

In this case, the parties agree to the following, 1. The claimant and the billing clerk II (BC2) had a personality conflict; 2. BC2 treated the claimant unprofessionally including complaining that she was required to train the claimant and hiding work from the claimant; 3. The claimant spoke to human resources (HR) three or four times about what she perceived to be mistreatment from BC2; 4. The claimant knew that once she completed her training she would have fewer interactions with BC2; 5. If the claimant transferred, she would still have to interact with BC2 to some extent; 6. On or about the week ending May 16, 2025, BC2 snatched a document out of the claimant’s hands, and HR witnessed the incident; 7. On May 20, 2025, the claimant resigned her employment effective June 3, 2025; and 8. On May 21, 2025, the employer terminated the claimant’s employment. 

The claimant asserted she quit her employment due to BC2’s harassing and hostile behavior. The claimant maintained that she had no choice but to quit her employment because the employer took no action on her concerns and complaints. Further, where there were no available positions that did not require interacting with BC2, a transfer would have been futile. The claimant provided examples of mistreatment, including BC2 complaining about having to train the claimant, hiding work from the claimant, and once, snatching a document out of the claimant’s hand. The employer’s witness credibly testified that the employer did act on the claimant’s concerns, including warning BC2 about her “bad attitude” and unprofessional behavior, and warning her that she could not hide work from the claimant. Moreover, the employer’s witness testified the claimant’s bad attitude in response also contributed to the conflict. The claimant acknowledged BC2 never refused to train her and acknowledged she could have transferred to another building and be trained by a different BC2. Although both parties acknowledged the claimant would still have had to interact with BC2 to a limited extent, it is reasonable that the transfer, which would include training with a different billing clerk II, would have improved the claimant’s working conditions sufficient for her to remain employed. Where the claimant chose not to even try the transfer, in addition to her relatively short-term employment, it cannot be concluded that the claimant made a sufficient effort to preserve her employment, or that attempts to preserve her employment would have been futile. Further, where the claimant chose to work an additional two weeks after submitting her resignation, her assertion that she had no choice but to quit her employment due to BC2’s harassment, and the employer’s inaction, is not reasonable. Based on the totality of the evidence, including the employer’s credible testimony regarding their attempts to address the claimant’s concerns, including warning BC2 about her unprofessional treatment of the claimant, offering the claimant an opportunity to file a formal complaint, and offering a meeting with BC2, HR and the manger [sic], the claimant’s assertion that she had to quit her employment is not credible.

Ruling of the Board

In accordance with our statutory obligation, we review the record and the decision made by the review examiner to determine: (1) whether the consolidated findings are supported by substantial and credible evidence; and (2) whether the review examiner’s conclusion is free from error of law. After such review, the Board adopts the review examiner’s consolidated findings of fact except as follows. That portion of Consolidated Finding 14 stating, “[d]ue to the short duration of her employment, it is unknown if the claimant’s interactions with the billing clerk impacted her ability to perform her job,” is unsupported by the record, because both the claimant and employer witness expressly testified that the interactions did not impact the claimant’s job performance. In adopting the remaining findings, we deem them to be supported by substantial and credible evidence. 

Although we believe that the review examiner’s credibility assessment is reasonable in relation to the evidence presented, we set aside the review examiner’s legal conclusions about the claimant’s preservation efforts and whether further efforts would have been futile. At this point in the appeal process, “[a]pplication of law to fact has long been a matter entrusted to the informed judgment of the board of review.” Dir. of Division of Employment Security v. Fingerman, 378 Mass. 461, 463-464 (1979). While we believe that the review examiner’s consolidated findings of fact support the conclusion that the claimant did not establish good cause or urgent, compelling, and necessitous reasons for leaving her position, the claimant is eligible to receive benefits, but only during the pendency of her notice period.

The findings indicate that the claimant gave her resignation notice on May 20, 2025, offered June 3, 2025, as her last day of work, and subsequently agreed with HR that her last day of work would instead be May 30, 2025. See Consolidated Finding 16. The findings also show that the claimant’s last day of work was May 21, 2025, when the employer chose not to have the claimant work out her notice period. See Consolidated Findings 18–19.

For this reason, we analyze the claimant’s eligibility for benefits pursuant to G.L. c. 151A, § 25(e)(2), as of the week beginning May 18, 2025. However, the record shows that she planned to resign from the employer on June 3, 2025. Thus, we analyze the claimant’s eligibility for benefits pursuant to G.L. c. 151A, § 25(e)(1), as of the week beginning June 1, 2025, which is the week the claimant’s resignation would have taken effect had she been allowed to work out her notice period. See Board of Review Decision 0002 4012 73 (June 20, 2014).

First, we address the claimant’s involuntary separation from employment on May 21, 2025. The relevant statute, G.L. c. 151A, § 25(e)(2), provides, in relevant part, as follows:

[No waiting period shall be allowed and no benefits shall be paid to an individual under this chapter] . . . (e) For the period of unemployment next ensuing . . . after the individual has left work . . . (2) by discharge shown to the satisfaction of the commissioner by substantial and credible evidence to be attributable to deliberate misconduct in willful disregard of the employing unit’s interest, or to a knowing violation of a reasonable and uniformly enforced rule or policy of the employer, provided that such violation is not shown to be as a result of the employee’s incompetence . . . .

“[The] grounds for disqualification in § 25(e)(2) are considered to be exceptions or defenses to an eligible employee’s right to benefits, and the burdens of production and persuasion rest with the employer.” Still v. Comm’r of Department of Employment and Training, 423 Mass. 805, 809 (1996) (citations omitted).

As a threshold matter, the employer must show that the claimant’s termination was attributable to some sort of misconduct or rule violation. Here, there is no evidence that the claimant did anything wrong. The claimant notified HR on May 20, 2025, that she was quitting, effective June 3, 2025. Consolidated Finding 16. Although the employer chose to end the claimant’s employment on May 21, 2025, due to tension in the office between the claimant and BC2, there is nothing in the record to suggest that the claimant violated a rule, policy, or expectation of the employer. See Consolidated Findings 18–19. Submitting a two-week notice of resignation is not misconduct. Therefore, the employer has not met its burden under G.L. c. 151A, § 25(e)(2), to show that the claimant engaged in deliberate misconduct in wilful disregard of the employer’s interest or a knowing violation of a reasonable and uniformly enforced policy or rule of the employer.

The claimant intended to work for the duration of her two-weeks’ notice, and she intended to resign on June 3, 2025. Consolidated Findings 16 and 21. Considering these facts, the claimant’s separation from employment as of June 3, 2025, is deemed to be voluntary and her eligibility for benefits at that point is properly analyzed under G.L. c. 151A, § 25(e)(1).

Thus, we next address whether the claimant is eligible for benefits as of when her voluntary resignation would have taken effect pursuant to the following separate provisions under G.L. c. 151A § 25(e), which state in relevant part:

[No waiting period shall be allowed and no benefits shall be paid to an individual under this chapter] . . . (e) for the period of unemployment next ensuing . . . after the individual has left work (1) voluntarily unless the employee establishes by substantial and credible evidence that he had good cause for leaving attributable to the employing unit or its agent . . . 

An individual shall not be disqualified from receiving benefits under the provisions of this subsection, if such individual establishes to the satisfaction of the commissioner that his reasons for leaving were for such an urgent, compelling and necessitous nature as to make his separation involuntary.

These provisions expressly place the burden on the claimant to show that she is eligible to receive unemployment benefits.

“[A] ‘wide variety of personal circumstances’ have been recognized as constituting ‘urgent, compelling and necessitous’ reasons under G.L. c. 151A, § 25(e)(1), which may render involuntary a claimant’s departure from work.” Norfolk County Retirement System v. Dir. of Department of Labor and Workforce Development, 66 Mass. App. Ct. 759, 765 (2009), quoting Reep v. Comm’r of Department of Employment and Training, 412 Mass. 845, 847 (1992). We agree with the review examiner’s conclusion that the claimant did not establish that she quit for urgent, compelling, and necessitous reasons.

In her hearing decision, the review examiner credited the claimant’s testimony and determined that she had established good cause for resigning because her co-worker’s harassing and hostile behavior towards her persisted, despite numerous reports of the mistreatment she had made to HR and her supervisor. See Remand Exhibit 1. After remand, however, the review examiner’s consolidated findings are markedly different, in part, because she now found that the claimant and the BC2 had a personality conflict. See Consolidated Finding 7. Such assessments are within the scope of the fact finder’s role, and, unless they are unreasonable in relation to the evidence presented, they will not be disturbed on appeal. See School Committee of Brockton v. Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination, 423 Mass. 7, 15 (1996). “The test is whether the finding is supported by “substantial evidence.’” Lycurgus v. Dir. of Division of Employment Security, 391 Mass. 623, 627 (1984) (citations omitted). “Substantial evidence is ‘such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion,’ taking ‘into account whatever in the record detracts from its weight.’” Id. at 627–628, quoting New Boston Garden Corp. v. Board of Assessors of Boston, 383 Mass. 456, 466 (1981) (further citations omitted). Based upon the record before us, we conclude that the review examiner’s assessment is reasonable in relation to the record and should not be disturbed on appeal.

When a claimant contends that the separation was for good cause attributable to the employer, the focus is on the employer’s conduct and not on the employee’s personal reasons for leaving. Conlon v. Dir. of Division of Employment Security, 382 Mass. 19, 23 (1980). 

From these findings, it is evident that the claimant did not get along with the BC2. See Consolidated Findings 9–12. Although the BC2’s conduct could be reasonably perceived as unprofessional, rude or disagreeable, there is no evidence in the record showing that her behavior interfered with the claimant’s ability to perform her job, or that it was so egregious that it was impossible for the claimant to continue working. Compare Board of Review Decision 334-FHJ7-N7J3 (Oct. 20, 2025) (benefits denied where claimant did not get along with co-worker and failed to show co-worker interfered with claimant’s ability to perform her work) and Board of Review Decision 0082 4050 72 (Oct. 28, 2024) (benefits awarded where claimant was ignored, insulted, made to feel inferior, and did not receive adequate training, help or support to be successful). 

Even if the BC2’s conduct had adversely impacted the claimant’s job performance, our focus is on the employer’s behavior. Here, the findings do not reflect any unreasonable behavior on the part of the employer. On the contrary, the findings demonstrate that the employer made several attempts to address the claimant’s concerns, including warning the BC2 about her unprofessional treatment of the claimant; offering the claimant an opportunity to file a formal complaint against the BC2; offering a meeting with the BC2 and the manager; and asking if she would be willing to transfer to a different building on campus and train under a different BC2. See Consolidated Findings 10–13. Thus, the claimant has failed to show any unreasonable action or inaction taken by the employer that created good cause for the claimant to resign. 

Even if the personality conflict between the claimant and the BC2 constituted good cause attributable to the employer for leaving, the claimant is still not eligible for benefits because she did not take reasonable steps to preserve her employment before resigning. The Supreme Judicial Court has held that an employee who voluntarily leaves employment due to an employer’s action has the burden to show that she made a reasonable attempt to correct the situation or that such attempt would have been futile. Guarino v. Dir. of Division of Employment Security, 393 Mass. 89, 93–94 (1984). 

The review examiner concluded that further preservation efforts would be futile, because the claimant had reported the BC2’s behavior to HR and her supervisor multiple times without resolution, and, even if she transferred to a different department, she would still have to interact with the BC2. We disagree. 

After remand, the findings now indicate that the claimant had only reported the BC2’s behavior to HR and asked HR to relay her concerns to her supervisor, the employer’s manager. See Consolidated Findings 5, 10–12. While reporting her concerns about the BC2’s behavior to HR constitutes an effort to preserve her employment, we do not believe the claimant’s efforts went far enough. 

For instance, the claimant declined HR’s initial offer to speak with the BC2 directly. See Consolidated Finding 10. She also declined to file an official complaint against the BC2, declined to have a meeting with the BC2 and her manager to address her concerns, and declined a transfer to a different building because she would still have to interact with BC2. See Consolidated Findings 12–13. The claimant could have tried working in a different building to determine if working conditions sufficiently improved for her to remain employed, but she failed to avail herself of this option. 

Additionally, Consolidated Finding 12 states the claimant would “give attitude” back to the BC2 when she felt disrespected by her, while Consolidated Finding 14 indicates that the claimant would not listen to the BC2, even when the BC2 had provided proper information to her. Thus, we can reasonably infer that the claimant contributed to the interpersonal issues she had with the BC2, given the absence of any evidence that she made discernible efforts to modify her own behavior. Nothing in the record indicates that it would have been futile for the claimant to have addressed her concerns and preserved her employment by utilizing any of these options.

We, therefore, conclude as a matter of law that the claimant was eligible for benefits for a short period following her discharge by the employer pursuant to G.L. c. 151A § 25(e)(2). We further conclude that the claimant was ineligible for benefits pursuant to G.L. c. 151A § 25(e)(1), as of her planned resignation date.

The review examiner’s decision is affirmed in part and reversed in part. The claimant is eligible for benefits for the week beginning May 18, 2025, if otherwise eligible. The claimant is ineligible for benefits for the week beginning June 1, 2025, and for subsequent weeks, until such time as she has had at least eight weeks of work and has earned an amount equivalent to or in excess of eight times her weekly benefit amount.

Boston, Massachusetts                                              Date of Decision – June 18, 2026

1. Remand Exhibit 1 is the hearing decision, dated December 22, 2025. 
2. Consistent with Consolidated Finding 20, the DUA’s record-keeping database confirms that the claimant reopened her existing claim for benefits on June 4, 2025. We note that the database also confirms that the claimant did not submit requests for benefit payments from the week beginning March 9, 2025, through May 31, 2025. She certified again once she reopened her claim, for the week beginning June 1, 2025. 

Martha M. Wishart, Esq.
Chair

Michael J. Albano
Member

Any further appeal would further appeal further appeal would be to a Massachusetts State District Court
(See Section 42, Chapter 151A, General Laws, Enclosed)

The last day to appeal this decision to a Massachusetts District Court is thirty days from the mail date on the first page of this decision. If that thirtieth day falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday, the last day to appeal this decision is the business day next following the thirtieth day.

Visit this page to locate the nearest Massachusetts District Court.

Please be advised that fees for services rendered by an attorney or agent to a claimant in connection with an appeal to the Board of Review are not payable unless submitted to the Board of Review for approval, under G.L. c. 151A, § 37.

JMO/rh