Board of Review Decision 352-N3RT-N93M

The claimant’s reasons for separating from this employer had no bearing on her eligibility for benefits, because the claimant subsequently had at least eight weeks of work and earned at least eight times her weekly benefit amount with another employer prior to filing her claim. The present employer was not an interested party under G.L. c. 151A, § 38(b).

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Issue ID: 352-N3RT-N93M

Board of Review Decision

Introduction and Procedural History of this Appeal 

The claimant appeals a decision by a review examiner of the Department of Unemployment Assistance (DUA) to deny unemployment benefits. We review, pursuant to our authority under G.L. c. 151A, § 41, and reverse. 

The claimant resigned from her position with the employer on May 2, 2025. She filed a claim for unemployment benefits with the DUA, effective July 20, 2025, which was denied in a determination issued on September 18, 2025. The claimant appealed the determination to the DUA hearings department. Following a hearing on the merits attended by both parties, the review examiner affirmed the agency’s initial determination and denied benefits in a decision rendered on February 17, 2026. We accepted the claimant’s application for review.

Benefits were denied after the review examiner determined that the claimant voluntarily left employment without good cause attributable to the employer or urgent, compelling, and necessitous reasons and, thus, was disqualified under G.L. c. 151A, § 25(e)(1). Our decision is based upon our review of the entire record, including the recorded testimony and evidence from the hearing, the review examiner’s decision, and the claimant’s appeal.

The issue before the Board is whether the review examiner’s decision, which concluded that the claimant account clerk had not met her burden to show that she left her employment for good cause attributable to the employer or for urgent, compelling, and necessitous reasons, is supported by substantial and credible evidence and is free from error of law.

Findings of Fact

The review examiner’s findings of fact are set forth below in their entirety:

1. On February 22, 2022, the claimant began working full-time for the employer as an accounts payable and accounts receivable clerk. She reported to the controller. Her most recent rate of pay was $34.23 per hour. 
2. The office employees typically started work between 7:00 [a.m.] and 8:00 [a.m.] and left around 5:00 p.m. The employer did not want the office employees to stay at the office too late in the evening. 
3. The claimant had difficulty arriving at work on time. 
4. In order to help the claimant, the employer changed the claimant’s schedule to 10:30 a.m. to 6:30 p.m., effective April 22, 2024. 
5. The employer did not want the claimant to stay later than 6:30 p.m., unless she was asked to work overtime with her supervisor. 
6. The employer went over the claimant’s schedule of 10:30 a.m. to 6:30 p.m. during her 2024 performance review. 
7. In 2024, the claimant's daughter was diagnosed with cancer. The claimant needed to take a leave of absence to care for her daughter. 
8. The claimant was approved for an intermittent Paid Family and Medical Leave (PFML) from September 30, 2024, until February 28, 2025. 
9. The claimant was approved for a second intermittent PFML leave from April 4, 2025, until July 4, 2025. 
10. In an email dated September 26, 2025, the human resources manager laid out the rules and procedures for the claimant's intermittent leave and answered her questions about reporting her time off. 
11. If the claimant arrived late to work, she was supposed to inform her supervisor how many hours she missed, which would be recorded as PFML hours, and then work the remainder of her schedule until 6:30 p.m. She was also expected to clock in and out of work. 
12. The supervisor would communicate with the employer about the claimant’s hours. 
13. The claimant was able to utilize her PFML benefits as needed. The employer placed no restrictions on the claimant’s ability to use her intermittent leave. 
14. The claimant was not utilizing her PFML benefits. The claimant would frequently come in late to work, clock in, work 8 hours, and leave beyond 6:30 p.m., her scheduled end time. 
15. The employer did not want the claimant working after her scheduled end time. 
16. On approximately 5 different occasions, the general manager reached out to the claimant's supervisor and asked him to enforce her schedule. 
17. The general manager was not reducing the claimant’s schedule and did not ask the claimant’s supervisor to issue a written warning to the claimant. 
18. The claimant continued to work beyond her set schedule. 
19. On April 29, 2025, the human resources manager and the general manager had a meeting with the claimant. In the meeting, the employer reminded the claimant that there was no problem with her utilizing her PFML benefits for the hours where she could not appear for work, but that she had to stick to her set schedule and could not work beyond 6:30 p.m.
20. The employer did not reduce the claimant’s hours or take away her pay. 
21. The general manager did not raise his voice at the claimant. 
22. On April 29, 2025, the claimant emailed the human resources manager, stating that she was on intermittent leave and that “PFML trumps 10:30 a.m. start time.” (Exhibit 7). 
23. On May 1, 2025, the claimant sent the employer a resignation letter. She felt that the employer was violating her rights by asking her to adhere to her set schedule and to not work beyond 6:30 p.m. She felt that the employer was taking hours and pay away from her. 
24. On May 2, 2025, the claimant quit her position with the employer. She quit because she felt unhappy with the employer's request that she not work outside of her scheduled hours. 
25. On May 2, 2025, the vice president of human resources reached out to the claimant and offered to meet with her about her concerns. The claimant met with the vice president and told him that the general manager and the human resources manager were harassing her and reducing her schedule, despite being on a PFML leave. 
26. At the time the claimant quit, the employer had work for her and she was not in danger of being fired. 
27. On September 18, 2025, the Department of Unemployment Assistance issued a Notice of Disqualification denying the claimant benefits under Section 25(e)(1) of the Law commencing the week beginning July 26, 2025 and until she had had at least 8 weeks of work and has earned an amount equivalent to or in excess of 8 times the claimant’s weekly benefit amount. The claimant appealed the Notice of Disqualification.

Ruling of the Board

In accordance with our statutory obligation, we review the record and the decision made by the review examiner to determine: (1) whether the findings are supported by substantial and credible evidence; and (2) whether the review examiner’s conclusion is free from error of law. Upon such review, the Board adopts the review examiner’s findings of fact and deems them to be supported by substantial and credible evidence. However, as discussed more fully below, we disagree with the review examiner’s legal conclusion that the claimant is ineligible to receive benefits on this claim.

Under G.L. c. 151A, § 38(b), the DUA must give notice of a claim to the claimant’s most recent employing unit and to such other employers as the DUA shall prescribe. The DUA has prescribed that interested-party employers include those employers from whom the claimant became separated during the last eight weeks of employment prior to the effective date of her unemployment claim. Pursuant to this policy, a claimant’s eligibility under G.L. c. 151A, § 25(e), will only be based upon her separation from interested-party employers.

This policy is consistent with the eight-week disqualification period, which the Legislature embedded into G.L. c. 151A, § 25, which states:

[No waiting period shall be allowed and no benefits shall be paid to an individual under this chapter] . . . (e) For the period of unemployment next ensuing and until the individual has had at least eight weeks of work and in each of said weeks has earned an amount equivalent to or in excess of the individual’s weekly benefit amount after the individual has left work (1) voluntarily unless the employee establishes by substantial and credible evidence that he had good cause for leaving attributable to the employing unit or its agent, (2) by discharge shown to the satisfaction of the commissioner by substantial and credible evidence to be attributable to . . . a knowing violation of a reasonable and uniformly enforced rule or policy of the employer, provided that such violation is not shown to be as a result of the employee’s incompetence. . . .

(Emphasis added.)

Thus, an individual who separates from a prior employer and immediately files an unemployment claim may be disqualified under G.L. c. 151A, § 25(e)(1) or (2), depending upon the circumstances of that separation. However, what transpired with this former employer is not disqualifying if that individual subsequently performs eight weeks of work for another employer, earns eight times her weekly benefit amount, and then files a claim. The DUA has no interest in the prior employer’s separation because it has no bearing on whether the claimant is entitled to benefits under G.L. c. 151A, § 25. 

A review of the claimant’s profile in the DUA’s electronic recordkeeping system shows that the claimant filed her claim for benefits on July 22, 2025, with an effective date of July 20, 2025. As reflected in the findings of fact, this claim was filed more than ten weeks after the claimant’s separation from the instant employer, on May 2, 2025. See Finding of Fact # 24. Further, both the hearing record and DUA’s electronic record-keeping system confirm that, after separating from the instant employer, the claimant began working for another employer on May 8, 2025, where she worked for at least eight weeks and earned in excess of eight times her weekly benefit amount prior to filing her claim. Thus, the instant employer is not an interested party employer.

We, therefore, conclude as a matter of law that the claimant may not be disqualified under G.L. c. 151A, § 25(e), based upon her separation from this employer, because it was not an interested-party employer pursuant to G.L. c. 151A, § 38(b).

The review examiner’s decision is reversed. The claimant is entitled to receive benefits for the week beginning July 20, 2025, and for subsequent weeks if otherwise eligible.

Boston, Massachusetts                                              Date of Decision – May 22, 2026

Charlene A Stawicki, Esquire
Member

Michael J. Albano
Member

Any further appeal would further appeal further appeal would be to a Massachusetts State District Court
(See Section 42, Chapter 151A, General Laws, Enclosed)

The last day to appeal this decision to a Massachusetts District Court is thirty days from the mail date on the first page of this decision. If that thirtieth day falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday, the last day to appeal this decision is the business day next following the thirtieth day.

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Please be advised that fees for services rendered by an attorney or agent to a claimant in connection with an appeal to the Board of Review are not payable unless submitted to the Board of Review for approval, under G.L. c. 151A, § 37.

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