Board of Review Decision 352-N454-VLP6

The claimant resigned for urgent, compelling, and necessitous reasons when she left the country to care for her ailing grandmother. She took reasonable steps to preserve her employment when she shared her situation with her supervisor, who said the claimant did not yet qualify for any form of leave. The claimant is eligible for benefits pursuant to G.L. c. 151A, § 25(e)(1).

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Issue ID: 352-N454-VLP6

Board of Review Decision

Introduction and Procedural History of this Appeal 

The claimant appeals a decision by a review examiner of the Department of Unemployment Assistance (DUA) to deny unemployment benefits. We review, pursuant to our authority under G.L. c. 151A, § 41, and reverse. 

The claimant resigned from her position with the employer on April 21, 2025. She filed a claim for unemployment benefits with the DUA, effective May 18, 2025, which was approved in a determination issued on September 29, 2025. The employer appealed the determination to the DUA hearings department. Following a hearing on the merits attended only by the employer, the review examiner overturned the agency’s initial determination and denied benefits in a decision rendered on March 4, 2026. We accepted the claimant’s application for review.

Benefits were denied after the review examiner determined that the claimant voluntarily left employment without good cause attributable to the employer or urgent, compelling, and necessitous reasons and, thus, was disqualified under G.L. c. 151A, § 25(e)(1). After considering the recorded testimony and evidence from the hearing, the review examiner’s decision, and the claimant’s appeal, we remanded the case to the review examiner to afford the claimant an opportunity to testify. Both parties attended the remand hearing. Thereafter, the review examiner issued her consolidated findings of fact. Our decision is based upon our review of the entire record.

The issue before the Board is whether the review examiner’s decision, which concluded that the claimant stopped reporting to work without good cause attributable to the employer or urgent, compelling, and necessitous reasons, is supported by substantial and credible evidence and is free from error of law, where the claimant left the country to care for her grandmother. 

Findings of Fact

The review examiner’s consolidated findings of fact and credibility assessment are set forth below in their entirety:

1. The claimant worked full-time as a beauty consultant for the employer, an airport retail store for high end products, from February 19, 2025, until April 21, 2025. 
2. When the claimant was hired, she received onboarding from the employer’s human resources department (HR) that included information on how to contact HR. 
3. During the onboarding process, HR gave the claimant information regarding Paid Family Medical Leave (PFML) that included an 8-page packet on how to apply for PFML. 
4. When the employer hires employees, they are “picked up” by a “beauty brand” (the Brand) and become an employee of both the employer and the Brand. 
5. After an employee is picked up by a brand, the employer relinquishes sole decision-making over the employee and instead shares decision-making with the Brand. 
6. The employer requires new employees [to] complete a 90-day probationary period. 
7. The claimant is from Albania. 
8. At the time the claimant worked for the employer, she had been in the U.S.A. less than two years. 
9. The claimant’s immediate supervisor (the supervisor) spoke Albanian. 
10. On approximately April 11, 2025, the claimant spoke to the supervisor, in person, and informed her that the claimant needed to return to Albania because her grandmother was having surgery and there was no one available to assist the grandmother with aftercare but the claimant. 
11. The claimant told the supervisor she would need three weeks off from work. 
12. The supervisor told the claimant that she would not be approved for a leave of absence because she had worked less than 90 days for the employer. 
13. The supervisor told the claimant she would not be approved for PFML for the same reason. 
14. The supervisor told the claimant she could return to work when she returned from Albania, and if there were no openings for her current position of beauty consultant in any of the employer’s branches, she could work in the supervisor’s branch as a sales representative until a beauty consultant position opened up. 
15. The supervisor also told the claimant she did not have a contact number for HR and that the claimant did not need it anyway. 
16. The claimant asked if she could speak to other managers. The supervisor told the claimant that she, the supervisor, would speak to the general manager (the GM) about the claimant’s time off request. 
17. Approximately three days later, the supervisor told the claimant that the GM said the claimant was not eligible for a leave of absence. 
18. The claimant had no reason not to believe anything the supervisor told her. 
19. The claimant did not apply for PFML. 
20. The claimant did not contact the employer’s human resources department (HR) regarding leave options. 
21. HR would have been notified if the claimant had applied for leave under the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA) or PFML. 
22. HR did not receive notification that the claimant had applied for FMLA or PFML. 
23. The claimant’s last day worked for the employer was April 21, 2025. 
24. On April 21, 2025, the claimant left her badge at work at the direction of the supervisor. 
25. The claimant left for Albania on April 26, 2025, or April 27, 2025. 
26. On or about April 26, 2025, the Brand terminated the claimant, which effectively ended the claimant’s employment with the employer. 
27. The claimant returned from Albania on May 13, 2025, or May 14, 2025. 
28. At 7:26 p.m. on May 14, 2025, the claimant sent a text message to the supervisor, written in Albanian, stating she had returned from Albania and requested to return to work. 
29. On May 15, 2026, the supervisor sent the claimant a text message, in Albanian, stating she would notify the other branches of the claimant’s availability to see if they had any openings and they would be in touch with the claimant. 
30. The claimant did not receive any correspondence from other branches. 
31. The claimant communicated with the supervisor regarding unpaid commissions due to the claimant, on or after May 31, 2025.

Credibility Assessment:

During the remand hearing, the claimant disputed the testimony of one of the employer’s witnesses (HR) who stated the supervisor told HR that the claimant had represented to the supervisor that she had applied for PFML and the claimant had been denied. The claimant stated she did not look into PFML eligibility because she believed the supervisor when the supervisor told her she had not worked long enough to be eligible for PFML. In addition, HR’s testimony during the first hearing contradicts the supervisor’s statements regarding PFML, because HR testified that HR would have been notified if the claimant had applied for FMLA or PFML, and it had not received any such notification. The claimant also disputed HR’s testimony that the supervisor offered her employment during their text message exchange on May 31, 2025, explaining that she believed something was being lost in translation from Albanian to English, as she was texting with the supervisor in Albanian about unpaid commissions. The claimant’s testimony is found to be direct, consistent, and credible. Neither of the employer’s two witnesses could offer firsthand testimony regarding the claimant’s conversations with the supervisor, and the employer did not present the supervisor as a witness in either the first hearing or the remand hearing. As such, the claimant’s testimony should be afforded more weight than that of the employer’s witnesses.

Ruling of the Board

In accordance with our statutory obligation, we review the record and the decision made by the review examiner to determine: (1) whether the consolidated findings are supported by substantial and credible evidence; and (2) whether the review examiner’s conclusion is free from error of law. After such review, the Board adopts the review examiner’s consolidated findings of fact except where, in Consolidated Findings 1 and 14, the job titles of beauty advisor and sales associate are mislabeled as beauty consultant and sales representative, respectively. In adopting the remaining findings, we deem them to be supported by substantial and credible evidence. We further believe that the review examiner’s credibility assessment is reasonable in relation to the evidence presented. However, as discussed more fully below, we disagree with the review examiner’s legal conclusion that the claimant is ineligible for benefits. 

Because the claimant resigned from her position, this case is properly analyzed under G.L. c. 151A, § 25(e)(1), which provides, in pertinent part, as follows:   

[No waiting period shall be allowed and no benefits shall be paid to an individual under this chapter] . . . (e) For the period of unemployment next ensuing . . . after the individual has left work (1) voluntarily unless the employee establishes by substantial and credible evidence that he had good cause for leaving attributable to the employing unit or its agent . . . [or] if such individual established to the satisfaction of the commissioner that his reasons for leaving were for such an urgent, compelling and necessitous nature as to make his separation involuntary.  

The express language of the statute places the burden of proof upon the claimant. 

There is no indication from the record that the claimant resigned because of some decision made or action taken by the employer. Therefore, we need not consider whether the claimant resigned for good cause attributable to the employer. 

We next consider whether the claimant showed that she separated from her position with the employer for urgent, compelling, and necessitous reasons. Our standard for determining whether a claimant’s reasons for leaving work are urgent, compelling, and necessitous has been set forth by the Supreme Judicial Court. We must examine the circumstances in each case and evaluate “the strength and effect of the compulsive pressure of external and objective forces” on the claimant to ascertain whether the claimant “acted reasonably, based on pressing circumstances, in leaving employment.” Reep v. Comm’r of Department of Employment and Training, 412 Mass. 845, 848, 851 (1992).

“[A] ‘wide variety of personal circumstances’ have been recognized as constituting ‘urgent, compelling and necessitous’ reasons under” G.L. c. 151A, § 25(e), “which may render involuntary a claimant’s departure from work.” Norfolk County Retirement System v. Dir. of Department of Labor and Workforce Development, 66 Mass. App. Ct. 759, 765 (2009), quoting Reep, 412 Mass. at 847. Domestic responsibilities, such as the need to provide care for a family member, may be sufficient to show such urgent and compelling circumstances as to render a claimant’s separation involuntary. See Manias v. Dir. of Division of Employment Security, 388 Mass. 201, 204 (1983) (citations omitted).

The review examiner found that the claimant resigned from her position with the employer because she needed to return to Albania for three weeks, where her grandmother was having surgery, and there was no one available to assist in her aftercare except the claimant. See Consolidated Findings 10–11. We are satisfied that this constituted an urgent, compelling, and necessitous reason that ultimately caused the claimant’s separation. 

However, our inquiry does not end there. To qualify for benefits, a claimant who resigns from employment must also show that she had “taken such ‘reasonable means to preserve his employment’ as would indicate the claimant’s ‘desire and willingness to continue his employment.’” Norfolk County Retirement System, 66 Mass. App. Ct. at 766, quoting Raytheon Co. v. Dir. of Division of Employment Security, 364 Mass. 593, 597–598 (1974). To satisfy the reasonable preservation requirement, a claimant does not have to establish that she had no choice but to resign. She merely needs to show that her actions were reasonable. Norfolk County Retirement System, 66 Mass. App. Ct. at 766.

Usually, a claimant can show that she desired to stay employed by making affirmative efforts to keep her job. Thus, the Board has held that, prior to separating from employment, a claimant must pursue a feasible course of action that would enable her to remain employed. See, e.g., Board of Review Decision 0014 8749 27 (Feb. 17, 2016). 

Here, the claimant spoke to the supervisor about her need to be away from work for three weeks while she cared for her grandmother in Albania. Consolidated Finding 10. While she asked for time off, the claimant did not specifically ask for a leave of absence because her supervisor had already informed her that she would not be eligible for one. Consolidated Finding 12. The supervisor also informed the claimant that she would be ineligible for PFML. Consolidated Finding 13. Consolidated Finding 8 provides that the claimant had no reason not to believe what the supervisor told her. Under the circumstances, we believe that the claimant made a reasonable attempt to preserve her employment when she informed the employer of the issues that would affect her ability to continue working. It is not required that a claimant request a leave of absence to establish that she made a reasonable attempt to preserve her employment. See Guarino v. Dir. of Division of Employment Security, 393 Mass. 89, 94 (1984) (“We reject the notion that in order to be eligible for benefits an employee must request a transfer to other work or a leave of absence.”).

We, therefore, conclude as a matter of law that the claimant is entitled to benefits pursuant to G.L. c. 151A, § 25(e)(1), because she left work due to urgent, compelling, and necessitous circumstances.

The review examiner’s decision is reversed. The claimant is entitled to receive benefits for the week beginning May 18, 2025, and for subsequent weeks if otherwise eligible.

Boston, Massachusetts                                              Date of Decision – July 27, 2026

1. Board of Review Decision 0014 8749 27 is an unpublished decision, available upon request. For privacy reasons, identifying information has been redacted.

Martha M. Wishart, Esq.
Chair

Michael J. Albano
Member

Any further appeal would further appeal further appeal would be to a Massachusetts State District Court
(See Section 42, Chapter 151A, General Laws, Enclosed)

The last day to appeal this decision to a Massachusetts District Court is thirty days from the mail date on the first page of this decision. If that thirtieth day falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday, the last day to appeal this decision is the business day next following the thirtieth day.

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