Board of Review Decision 352-ND8N-KTR4

The claimant quit, in part, because her supervisor told a story using a racial slur. Board held the claimant quit due to racial harassment within the meaning of 430 CMR 4.05, and was eligible for benefits pursuant to G.L. c. 151A, § 25(e)(1).

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Issue ID: 352-ND8N-KTR4

Board of Review Decision

Introduction and Procedural History of this Appeal 

The claimant appeals a decision by a review examiner of the Department of Unemployment Assistance (DUA) to deny unemployment benefits. We review, pursuant to our authority under G.L. c. 151A, § 41, and reverse. 

The claimant resigned from her position with the employer on June 5, 2025. She filed a claim for unemployment benefits with the DUA, effective May 25, 2025, which was denied in a determination issued on November 18, 2025. The claimant appealed the determination to the DUA hearings department. Following a hearing on the merits attended by both parties, the review examiner affirmed the agency’s initial determination and denied benefits in a decision rendered on January 26, 2026. We accepted the claimant’s application for review.

Benefits were denied after the review examiner determined that the claimant voluntarily left employment without good cause attributable to the employer or urgent, compelling, and necessitous reasons and, thus, was disqualified under G.L. c. 151A, § 25(e)(1). Our decision is based upon our review of the entire record, including the recorded testimony and evidence from the hearing, the review examiner’s decision, and the claimant’s appeal.

The issue before the Board is whether the review examiner’s decision, which concluded that the claimant was ineligible for benefits because she did not make a reasonable attempt to preserve her employment before quitting, is supported by substantial and credible evidence and is free from error of law.

Findings of Fact

The review examiner’s findings of fact are set forth below in their entirety:

1. In March 2024, the claimant began working as a part-time (20–30 hours per week) office administrator for the employer, an optical shop. 
2. The claimant did not have a second job. Her work with the employer was her only job.
3. The claimant’s direct supervisor was the employer’s manager.
4. In January 2025, the employer’s owner of the company required the claimant to wear a mask at work. Nobody else was required to wear a mask at work.
5. On May 22, 2025, the manager was telling a story about a trip she took with her ex-boyfriend. The manager said that her [sic] and the ex-boyfriend used to carry a golf club that they both referred to as the “nigger be good”.
6. The claimant, who was listening to the manager’s story, was offended by the manager’s use of the n-word.
7. The claimant did not tell the manager that she was offended by what the manager said. The claimant “did not react” to the manager’s use of the n-word.
8. On May 23, 2025, the claimant texted a co-worker, telling the co-worker that she had been offended by the manager’s use of the n-word the previous day. The claimant stated, in the text message, that the incident had been “bothering” her and that she did not know what to do.
9. On June 5, 2025, the owner came to the shop. The claimant observed that the owner spoke to all employees except her. The claimant perceived this to be “differential treatment.”
10. Throughout her employment, the claimant “often” felt like the owner treated her “differently” than other employees, and that he did not “associate very well” with her.
11. On June 5, 2025, after the claimant felt that the owner had ignored her, she verbally told the manager that she had quit, and she walked out of the shop.
12. The claimant quit her job on June 5, 2025, because she felt like the owner treated her “differently” when he spoke to all other employees that day except herself.
13. After walking out of the shop on June 5, 2025, the claimant emailed the owner explaining her reasons for resigning. In the email, the claimant stated that she had resigned because of the manager’s use of the n-word, and because each time she took time off from work, she “felt a noticeable shift” in how she was treated.
14. The owner responded to the claimant’s email, stating that if the claimant reconsidered her resignation, the owner would “work diligently to resolve your concerns.” The claimant did not withdraw her resignation.
15. After the claimant resigned, the owner spoke to the manager about her use of the n-word, and cautioned her that it was unacceptable at the workplace.
16. The claimant applied for Unemployment Insurance (UI) benefits with the Massachusetts Department of Unemployment Assistance (DUA), with an effective date of May 25, 2025. The DUA disqualified the claimant from receiving UI benefits. The claimant appealed the disqualification.

Ruling of the Board

In accordance with our statutory obligation, we review the record and the decision made by the review examiner to determine: (1) whether the findings are supported by substantial and credible evidence; and (2) whether the review examiner’s conclusion is free from error of law. After such review, the Board adopts the review examiner’s findings of fact except as follows. Finding of Fact 12 is incomplete insofar as it says that the claimant quit because the owner treated her “differently.” As shown in Finding of Fact 13, the claimant also quit due to the use of a racial slur. In adopting the remaining findings, we deem them to be supported by substantial and credible evidence. However, as discussed more fully below, we reject the review examiner’s legal conclusion that the claimant is not entitled to benefits. 

As the claimant resigned from her employment, this case is properly analyzed under the following provisions of G.L. c. 151A, § 25(e), which provide, in pertinent part, as follows: 

[No waiting period shall be allowed and no benefits shall be paid to an individual under this chapter] . . . (e) For the period of unemployment next ensuing . . . after the individual has left work (1) voluntarily unless the employee establishes by substantial and credible evidence that he had good cause for leaving attributable to the employing unit or its agent . . . [or] if such individual established to the satisfaction of the commissioner that his reasons for leaving were for such an urgent, compelling and necessitous nature as to make his separation involuntary.

According to her resignation e-mail, the claimant resigned, in part, because of the manager’s use of a racial slur. See Finding of Fact 13. Therefore, we also consider the sixth paragraph of G.L. c. 151A, § 25(e), which provides as follows:

An individual shall not be disqualified, under the provisions of this subsection, from receiving benefits if it is established to the satisfaction of the commissioner that the reason for leaving work and that such individual became separated from employment due to sexual, racial or other unreasonable harassment where the employer, its supervisory personnel or agents knew or should have known of such harassment.

DUA regulation 430 CMR 4.04(5) provides, in relevant part, as follows: 

(b) Sexual, racial or other unreasonable harassment may result from conduct by the employer or the employer’s agents, supervisory employees, co-employees or non-employees. Such conduct may occur in or off the worksite and on or off company time. . . . 

(c)  1. A claimant shall not be disqualified from receiving benefits under M.G.L. c. 151A, § 25(e)(1) for leaving work voluntarily without good cause attributable to the employing unit or its agent if he or she establishes to the satisfaction of the Commissioner that his or her reason for leaving work and separation from employment is due to:

a. sexual, racial or other unreasonable harassment by an employer, its agents or supervisory employees and the employer, its agents or supervisory employees knew or should have known of such harassment … 

2. For purposes of determining a claimant’s eligibility for benefits under 430 CMR 4.04([5])(c)1a., an employer is deemed to have knowledge of sexual, racial or other unreasonable harassment committed by its agents and supervisory employees in connection with the employment relationship regardless of whether the employer had actual knowledge of these acts. . . .

The express language of these provisions places the burden of proof upon the claimant.

Further, 430 CMR 4.04(5)(a)(1), defines racial harassment as follows: 

[C]onduct with racial content which has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual's work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment.

In this case, the manager engaged in conduct with racial content when she told a story that referenced a golf club she and her ex-boyfriend called by a name that included a highly offensive racial slur. The name also indicates that they thought of the golf club as a weapon they could use to threaten or intimidate people of the race targeted by that slur. See Finding of Fact 5.

This conduct had the effect of creating an offensive working environment for the claimant. Although she did not react in the moment or tell the manager that she was offended, it is apparent that the claimant was offended by the manager’s use of the racial slur, as she texted a co-worker the next day, saying the incident was bothering her, and that she didn’t know what to do. See Findings of Fact 6 – 8. Furthermore, this text shows that the claimant’s feeling that the manager had created an offensive working environment persisted and was not limited to the day on which the manager used the racial slur. 

In our view, the claimant has established that she resigned due to racial harassment within the meaning of G.L. c. 151A, § 25(e)(1), and 430 CMR 4.05.

Ordinarily, to meet her burden to show good cause attributable to the employer, a claimant must also show that she made a reasonable effort to correct the situation before leaving. See Guarino v. Dir. of Division of Employment Security, 393 Mass. 89, 93–94 (1984). However, since we conclude that the claimant quit due to racial harassment, she is not required to show that she made such efforts. See 430 CMR 4.04(5)(c)(1) and (3); see also Tri-County Youth Programs, Inc. v. Acting Deputy Dir. of Division of Employment and Training, 54 Mass. App. Ct. 405 (2002). All that she needs to show is that “the employer or its supervisory personnel knew or should have known of such harassment.” G.L. c. 151A, § 25(e). 

In this case, the manager who committed the racial harassment was the claimant’s direct supervisor. See Findings of Fact 3 and 4. Since the manager was a supervisory employee, the employer is deemed to have knowledge of the racial harassment she committed, regardless of whether it had actual knowledge of her acts. See 430 CMR 4.04(5)(c)(2). 

We, therefore, conclude as a matter of law that the claimant met her burden to show that she left her job for good cause attributable to the employer pursuant to G.L. c. 151A, § 25(e)(1).

The review examiner’s decision is reversed. The claimant is entitled to receive benefits for the week ending June 14, 2025, and for subsequent weeks if otherwise eligible.

Boston, Massachusetts                                              Date of Decision – April 27, 2026

1 Although the official version of 430 CMR 4.04(5)(b)(2) refers to “430 CMR 4.04(7)(c)1.a,” this appears to be a scrivener’s error, as there is no subsection (7)(c)1.a under 430 CMR 4.04.

Charlene A Stawicki, Esquire
Member

Michael J. Albano
Member

Any further appeal would further appeal further appeal would be to a Massachusetts State District Court.
(See Section 42, Chapter 151A, General Laws, Enclosed)

The last day to appeal this decision to a Massachusetts District Court is thirty days from the mail date on the first page of this decision. If that thirtieth day falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday, the last day to appeal this decision is the business day next following the thirtieth day.

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