Board of Review Decision 352-NDJ2-JK9K

The claimant’s reasons for separating from this employer had no bearing on her eligibility for benefits, because the claimant subsequently had at least eight weeks of work with another employer prior to filing her claim. The present employer was not an interested party under G.L. c. 151A, § 38(b).

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Issue ID: 352-NDJ2-JK9K

Board of Review Decision

Introduction and Procedural History of this Appeal 

The claimant appeals a decision by a review examiner of the Department of Unemployment Assistance (DUA) to deny unemployment benefits. We review, pursuant to our authority under G.L. c. 151A, § 41, and reverse. 

The claimant resigned from her position with the employer on May 2, 2024. She filed a claim for unemployment benefits with the DUA, effective October 26, 2025, which was denied in a determination issued on November 25, 2025. The claimant appealed the determination to the DUA hearings department. Following a hearing on the merits attended by both parties, the review examiner affirmed the agency’s initial determination and denied benefits in a decision rendered on January 26, 2026. We accepted the claimant’s application for review.

Benefits were denied after the review examiner determined that the claimant voluntarily left employment without good cause attributable to the employer or urgent, compelling, and necessitous reasons and, thus, was disqualified under G.L. c. 151A, § 25(e)(1). Our decision is based upon our review of the entire record, including the recorded testimony and evidence from the hearing, the review examiner’s decision, and the claimant’s appeal.

The issue before the Board is whether the review examiner’s decision, which concluded that the claimant had not met her burden to show that she resigned from the instant employer for good cause attributable to the employer or for urgent, compelling, and necessitous reasons, is supported by substantial and credible evidence and is free from error of law.

Findings of Fact

The review examiner’s findings of fact are set forth below in their entirety:

1. The employer is a heart specialty medical practice. The claimant worked full-time as a medical assistant from 10/9/23 to 5/2/24. 
2. The claimant worked 32 to 40 hours per week. 
3. The claimant’s supervisor was the office manager. 
4. On 1/22/24, the employer gave the claimant her 90-day probation evaluation. She was put on a performance improvement plan. The employer cited the claimant for several issues, including personal phone use, attendance, dress code and utilizing the employer’s computer for personal use. 
5. During the pay period from 4/1/24 to 4/12/24, the claimant worked 79.09 hours. 
6. During the pay period from 4/13/24 to 4/26/24, the claimant worked 74.83 hours. 
7. During the pay period from 4/29/24 to 4/30/24, the claimant worked 0.00 hours. 
8. On 4/30/24, the claimant sent an email to the practice administrator (PA) and to the practice executive assistant, asking to reduce her schedule to part-time, 1 day per week. The PA replied via email that they could not agree to that; they needed her to work 3 to 4 days. 
9. On 5/1/24, the claimant did not respond to the PA’s email. 
10. On 5/2/24, the claimant emailed the PA that she would not be returning to work. 
11. On 5/2/24, the claimant resigned because the employer denied her request to reduce her schedule to 1 day per week. 
12. The claimant was not on final warning at the time of her separation, and her job was not in jeopardy. 
13. The claimant filed a claim for unemployment insurance benefits. The effective date of the claim is 10/26/25.

Ruling of the Board

In accordance with our statutory obligation, we review the record and the decision made by the review examiner to determine: (1) whether the findings are supported by substantial and credible evidence; and (2) whether the review examiner’s conclusion is free from error of law. Upon such review, the Board adopts the review examiner’s findings of fact and deems them to be supported by substantial and credible evidence. However, as discussed more fully below, we reject the review examiner’s legal conclusion that the claimant is ineligible to receive benefits on this claim.

Under G.L. c. 151A, § 38(b), the DUA must give notice of a claim to the claimant’s most recent employing unit and to such other employers as the DUA shall prescribe. The DUA has prescribed that interested-party employers include those employers from whom the claimant became separated during the last eight weeks of employment prior to the effective date of his unemployment claim. Pursuant to this policy, a claimant’s eligibility under G.L. c. 151A, § 25(e), will only be based upon his separation from interested-party employers.

This policy is consistent with the eight-week disqualification period that the Legislature embedded into G.L. c. 151A, § 25, which states:

[No waiting period shall be allowed and no benefits shall be paid to an individual under this chapter] . . . (e) For the period of unemployment next ensuing and until the individual has had at least eight weeks of work . . . after the individual has left work (1) voluntarily unless the employee establishes by substantial and credible evidence that he had good cause for leaving attributable to the employing unit or its agent, (2) by discharge shown to the satisfaction of the commissioner by substantial and credible evidence to be attributable to . . . a knowing violation of a reasonable and uniformly enforced rule or policy of the employer, provided that such violation is not shown to be as a result of the employee’s incompetence. . . .

(Emphasis added.)

Thus, an individual who separates from a prior employer and immediately files an unemployment claim may be disqualified under G.L. c. 151A, § 25(e)(1) or (2), depending upon the circumstances of that separation. However, what transpired with this former employer is not disqualifying if that individual subsequently performs eight weeks of work for another employer and then files a claim. The DUA has no interest in the prior employer’s separation because it has no bearing on whether the claimant is entitled to benefits under G.L. c. 151A, § 25. 

A review of the claimant’s profile in the DUA’s electronic recordkeeping system shows that the claimant filed her claim for benefits on October 29, 2025, with an effective date of October 26, 2025. As reflected in the findings of fact, this claim was filed more than a year after the claimant’s separation from the instant employer, on May 2, 2024. See Findings of Fact 1, 11, and 13. Further, both the hearing record and DUA’s electronic record-keeping system confirm that, after separating from the instant employer, the claimant subsequently worked for at least two other employers and had worked for her most recent employer from January 13, 2025, until October 21, 2025. Because DUA records indicate that the claimant did not work for the instant employer during the last eight weeks of employment prior to filing her claim, the employer is not an interested party employer. 

We, therefore, conclude as a matter of law, that that the claimant may not be disqualified under G.L. c. 151A, § 25(e), based upon her separation from this employer, because it was not an interested-party employer pursuant to G.L. c. 151A, § 38(b).

The review examiner’s decision is reversed. The claimant is entitled to receive benefits for the week beginning October 26, 2025, and for subsequent weeks if otherwise eligible.

Boston, Massachusetts                                              Date of Decision – March 5, 2026

1. There is nothing in the DUA’s record-keeping database showing that the claimant had been separated from this most recent employer under disqualifying circumstances. 

Charlene A Stawicki, Esquire
Member

Michael J. Albano
Member

Any further appeal would further appeal further appeal would be to a Massachusetts State District Court.
(See Section 42, Chapter 151A, General Laws, Enclosed)

The last day to appeal this decision to a Massachusetts District Court is thirty days from the mail date on the first page of this decision. If that thirtieth day falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday, the last day to appeal this decision is the business day next following the thirtieth day.

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Please be advised that fees for services rendered by an attorney or agent to a claimant in connection with an appeal to the Board of Review are not payable unless submitted to the Board of Review for approval, under G.L. c. 151A, § 37.

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