Board of Review Decision 352-NDJJ-DLH3

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Board of Review
100 Cambridge Street, Suite 400
Boston, MA 02114
Phone: [phone]
Fax: [phone]

Issue ID:  352-NDJJ-DLH3      

Board of Review Decision

Introduction and Procedural History of this Appeal

The claimant appeals a decision by a review examiner of the Department of Unemployment Assistance (DUA) to deny the claimant benefits following her separation from employment on September 1, 2025. We review, pursuant to our authority under G.L. c. 151A, § 41, and we affirm in part and reverse in part. 

On November 26, 2025, the agency initially determined that the claimant was not entitled to unemployment benefits. The claimant appealed, and only she attended the hearing. In a decision rendered on April 13, 2026, the review examiner affirmed the agency determination, concluding that the claimant voluntarily left employment without good cause attributable to the employer or urgent, compelling, and necessitous reasons and, thus, was disqualified under G.L. c. 151A, § 25(e)(1). The Board accepted the claimant’s application for review. 

Findings of Fact

1. The claimant worked part-time as a Barista for the employer, a coffee shop, from 3/3/25 until she separated from the employer on 9/1/25.
2. The claimant left work in order to relocate from [City A], MA to [City B], CT with her family.
3. The claimant had lost her full-time job back on 12/31/24. She filed a claim for unemployment on 1/3/25.
4. The claimant submitted one month’s notice to the employer in early August of 2025. She told the employer she was quitting to move back home with her parents.
5. The claimant worked out her notice period.
6. The claimant resigned her position with the instant employer to relocate back home with her parents.
7. Prior to leaving, the claimant had not received any discipline. She never requested a leave of absence because she felt it would be better for her to search for full-time work instead. The claimant also did not request more full-time hours with the instant employer before quitting.
8. The claimant remained in [City B], CT until 12/1/25, when she moved to [City C], MA after being offered and accepting full-time work with [Employer B].

Ruling of the Board

After considering the recorded testimony and evidence from the hearing, the review examiner’s decision, and the claimant’s appeal, we conclude that the review examiner’s decision is based on substantial evidence and is free from any error of law affecting substantive rights. 

However, when a claimant separates from part-time employment, we must consider whether a constructive deduction, and not a full disqualification of benefits, should apply. The regulations under 430 CMR 4.76 provide, in relevant part, as follows:  

(1)        A constructive deduction, as calculated under 430 CMR 4.78, from the otherwise payable weekly benefit amount, rather than complete disqualification from receiving unemployment insurance benefits, will be imposed on a claimant who separates from part-time work for any disqualifying reason under M.G.L. c. 151A, § 25(e), in any of the following circumstances:  

(a) if the separation is: . . .

2. if the separation from part-time work occurs during the benefit year; . . .  

The DUA’s electronic record-keeping system shows that the claimant’s benefit year ran from December 29, 2024, through December 27, 2025. The findings show that the claimant both began employment and separated from the instant part-time employer during the benefit year. Her separation occurred on September 1, 2025. See Finding of Fact 1. Since the claimant separated from a part-time job in her benefit year, the regulation noted above is applicable.

A constructive deduction is defined as “the amount of remuneration that would have been deducted from the claimant’s weekly benefit amount . . . if the claimant had continued to be employed on a part-time basis.” 430 CMR 4.73. The amount of the constructive deduction each week is determined by the claimant’s earnings from the part-time employer. The DUA regulation at 430 CMR 4.78(1)(c), provides as follows:

On any separation from part-time work which is obtained after the establishment of a benefit year claim, the average part-time earnings will be computed by dividing the gross wages paid by the number of weeks worked.

In this case, we do not have information on the exact total amount of the claimant’s earnings from the employer. However, the claimant testified that she worked an average of 20 hours per week and earned $16.00 per hour. Therefore, the claimant’s average weekly earnings were $320.00 (20 x $16.00). This amount is treated as earnings and is subject to the earnings disregard provided for in G.L. c. 151A, § 29(b) and 430 CMR 4.78(2). Exhibit 7, the Monetary Redetermination dated June 5, 2025, shows that the claimant’s weekly benefit amount on her 2025-01 claim was $592.00 and her earnings disregard was $197.33. Applying the earnings disregard to her average weekly earnings, the constructive deduction is $122.67 ($320.00 -$197.33). 

We, therefore, conclude as a matter of law that the review examiner’s conclusion that the claimant quit her job under disqualifying circumstances pursuant to G.L. c. 151A, § 25(e), is free from error of law. We further conclude that the claimant is subject to a constructive deduction, rather than a complete disqualification of benefits pursuant to 430 CMR 4.76(1)(a)(2).

The review examiner’s decision is affirmed as to the disqualifying separation under G.L. c. 151A, § 25(e)(1). However, we reverse the total disqualification from receiving benefits. Beginning the week of August 31, 2025, the claimant shall be subject to a constructive deduction until she meets the requalifying provisions of G.L. c. 151A, § 25(e) or 430 CMR 4.76(3). The claimant’s weekly benefit amount shall be reduced by the constructive deduction amount of $122.67. She may receive the unemployment benefits only if she is otherwise eligible under G.L. c. 151A. 

Boston, Massachusetts                                              Date of Decision – July 17, 2026

1. We have supplemented the findings of fact, as necessary, with the unchallenged evidence before the review examiner. See Bleich v. Maimonides School, 447 Mass. 38, 40 (2006); Allen of Michigan, Inc. v. Deputy Dir. of Department of Employment and Training, 64 Mass. App. Ct. 370, 371 (2005). 

Martha M. Wishart, Esq.
Chair

Michael J. Albano
Member

Any further appeal would further appeal further appeal would be to a Massachusetts State District Court
(See Section 42, Chapter 151A, General Laws, Enclosed)

The last day to appeal this decision to a Massachusetts District Court is thirty days from the mail date on the first page of this decision. If that thirtieth day falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday, the last day to appeal this decision is the business day next following the thirtieth day.

Visit this page to locate the nearest Massachusetts District Court.

Please be advised that fees for services rendered by an attorney or agent to a claimant in connection with an appeal to the Board of Review are not payable unless submitted to the Board of Review for approval, under G.L. c. 151A, § 37.

SVL/rh