Order  Final Order in the Matter of John Caplis

Date:	12/21/2021
Organization:	State Ethics Commission
Docket Number:	21-0005
Referenced Sources:	G.L. c. 268A, the Conflict of Interest Law, as Amended by c. 194, Acts of 2011

Final Order

On November 29, 2021, the parties filed a Joint Motion to Dismiss (“Joint Motion”) with a proposed Disposition Agreement requesting that the Commission approve the Disposition Agreement in settlement of this matter and dismiss the adjudicatory proceeding. The Presiding Officer, Wilbur P. Edwards, Jr. referred the Joint Motion, with the Disposition Agreement, to the full Commission for deliberations on December 15, 2021.

In the proposed Disposition Agreement, Respondent John Caplis, former Town of Templeton (“Town”) Director of Veterans Services, admits that he violated G.L. c. 268A, §§ 23(b)(2)(ii), 23(b)(3) and 23(b)(4).

Caplis admits that he violated § 23(b)(2)(ii) by using his official position as Director of Veterans Services to secure a reimbursement from the Town for a building permit fee for his friend Matthew LeClerc (“LeClerc”).[1] Caplis used his position as the Director of Veterans Services by submitting an invoice to the Town for G.L. c. 115 veterans benefits for LeClerc.[2] This enabled LeClerc to receive a $484 reimbursement for a building permit fee. The reimbursement LeClerc received was an unwarranted privilege of substantial value that was not available to similarly situated individuals because G.L. c. 115 benefits are not lawfully available for the reimbursement of building permit fees.

Caplis also admits that he violated § 23(b)(3) by participating as the Director of Veterans Services in matters involving LeClerc, when he had a personal friendship with LeClerc, and had a personal relationship with LeClerc’s relative.[3] Caplis knowingly or with reason to know, acted in a manner which would cause a reasonable person, having knowledge of the relevant circumstances, to conclude that LeClerc could unduly enjoy Caplis’s favor in the performance of his official duties as the Director of Veterans Services when he submitted an invoice to the Town for veteran’s benefits to be paid to LeClerc for the reimbursement of a building permit fee.

Finally, Caplis admits that he violated G.L. c. 268A, § 23(b)(4) by submitting an invoice for reimbursement to his employer, the Town, which was a false and fraudulent claim for payment of substantial value.[4]     

The Respondent agrees to pay a civil penalty of $2,500 and to waive all rights to contest the findings of fact, conclusions of law and terms and conditions contained in the Disposition Agreement in this and any other administrative or judicial proceeding to which the Commission is or may be a party.

In support of the Joint Motion, the parties assert that this matter would be fairly and equitably resolved by the terms set forth in in the Disposition Agreement and that this resolution would obviate the need for a hearing on any factual issues, saving time and resources for all involved. The parties assert that the interests of justice, the parties and the Commission will be served by the Disposition Agreement. 

WHEREFORE, the Commission hereby ALLOWS the Motion. Respondent’s tendered payment of the $2,500 civil penalty for violating G.L. c. 268A, §§ 23(b)(2)(ii), 23(b)(3), 23(b)(4) is accepted. Commission Adjudicatory Docket No. 21-0005, In the Matter of John Caplis is DISMISSED.

 

DATE AUTHORIZED:  December 15, 2021
DATE ISSUED:  December 21, 2021

                     

[1] G.L. c. 268A, § 23(b)(2)(ii), prohibits a municipal employee from knowingly, or with reason to know, using or attempting to use his official position to secure for himself or others an unwarranted privilege or exemption of substantial value ($50 or more) that is not properly available to similarly situated individuals.

[2] G.L. c. 115 benefits provide financial assistance for food, housing, clothing, and medical care to veterans and eligible dependents who have limited incomes.

[3] G.L. c. 268A, § 23(b)(3), prohibits a municipal employee from knowingly, or with reason to know, acting in a manner which would cause a reasonable person, having knowledge of the relevant circumstances, to conclude that any person can improperly influence or unduly enjoy his favor in the performance of his official duties, or that he is likely to act or fail to act as a result of kinship, rank, position or undue influence of any party or person.

[4] G.L. c. 268A, § 23(b)(4), prohibits a municipal employee from presenting a false or fraudulent claim to his employer for any payment or benefit of substantial value.