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  • State Ethics Commission
Settlement

Settlement  Disposition Agreement in the Matter of John Caplis

Date: 12/21/2021
Organization: State Ethics Commission
Docket Number: 21-0005
Referenced Sources: G.L. c. 268A, the Conflict of Interest Law, as Amended by c. 194, Acts of 2011

Table of Contents

Disposition Agreement

The State Ethics Commission (“Commission”) and Respondent John Caplis enter into this Disposition Agreement pursuant to Section 3 of the Commission’s Enforcement Procedures. This Agreement constitutes a consented-to final order enforceable in the Superior Court, pursuant to G.L. c. 268B, § 4(j).

On June 25, 2020, pursuant to G.L. c. 268B § 4(a), the Commission initiated a preliminary inquiry into possible violations of the conflict of interest law, G.L. c. 268A, by Caplis. On February 18, 2021, the Commission concluded its inquiry and found reasonable cause to believe that Caplis violated G.L. c. 268A, § 23 subsections (2)(ii), (3), and (4). An Order to Show Cause was filed on September 10, 2021.

The Commission and Caplis now agree to the following findings of fact and conclusions of law:

Findings of Fact

  1. At all relevant times, Caplis was the Director of Veterans Services for the Town of Templeton.
  2. Massachusetts General Laws chapter 115 provides financial assistance for food, housing, clothing, and medical care to veterans and eligible dependents who have limited incomes. Massachusetts Department of Veterans’ Services (“DVS”) oversees the Chapter 115 benefits program in partnership with local veterans’ service officers.
  3. In order to obtain Chapter 115 benefits for a veteran or other eligible recipient, Caplis, as the Director of Veterans Services, needed to submit an invoice to the Town. The Town would then pay the benefit to the veteran or eligible recipient and the state, via DVS, would reimburse the Town. Caplis was also required to electronically submit each claim for reimbursement to DVS for verification or confirmation of the benefit.
  4. Matthew LeClerc (“Matthew”) is the owner of Valley View Farm, located at 179 Barre Road in Templeton. He also owns a two-family home located at Address A and Address B1 on or near Valley View Farm.
  5. In late 2016, Matthew began building a structure to be used for business purposes at Valley View Farm without first obtaining from the Town the required building permit. After construction started, the Templeton building commissioner notified Matthew that a building permit was required for the work.
  6. On January 17, 2017, Matthew applied for a building permit for 179 Barre Road with a total project cost of $10,000. In mid-January 2017, Matthew paid the Town $484 for the building permit by check drawn from the Valley View Farm account.
  7. Prior to Matthew’s payment, Caplis communicated with the Templeton building department staff and requested that Matthew’s building permit fee be waived.
  8. The Templeton building department does not have the authority to waive building permit fees.
  1. In February 2017, Caplis, as the Director of Veterans Services, submitted an invoice to the Town for Chapter 115 benefits for a $484 reimbursement payable to “Priscilla LeClerc c/o Matthew LeClerc,179 Barre Road”.
  2. On the invoice, Caplis identified the basis for the $484 reimbursement request as “medical and prescriptions” but the actual purpose was to reimburse Matthew for the cost of the $484 building permit.
  3. Chapter 115 benefits may not be used to reimburse building permits.
  4. Caplis did not follow the standard procedure for Chapter 115 benefits as he did not submit the claim for the $484 reimbursement to DVS for verification or confirmation of the benefit.
  5. In February 2017, Priscilla was eligible to receive Chapter 115 benefits, but Matthew was not eligible to receive Chapter 115 benefits.
  6. In February 2017, Caplis was friends with Matthew and involved in a personal relationship with a relative of Matthew’s who lived at Address B.
  7. The $484 reimbursement was placed on the Town warrant and approved by the Templeton board of selectmen on February 24, 2017. A $484 check was subsequently issued to Priscilla.

Conclusions of Law

  1. As the Templeton Director of Veterans Services, Caplis was a municipal employee as that term is defined in G.L. c. 268A, § 1(g).

Section 23(b)(2)(ii) Violation

  1. Section 23(b)(2)(ii) of G.L. c. 268A prohibits a municipal employee from knowingly, or with reason to know, using or attempting to use their official position to secure for such officer, employee or others unwarranted privileges or exemptions which are of substantial value and which are not properly available to similarly situated individuals. Pursuant to G.L. c. 268A, § 23(f), Commission regulation 930 C.M.R. 5.05 defines substantial value as $50 or more.
  2. Chapter 115 veterans’ benefits, including reimbursement payments, are a privilege.
  3. The $484 payment to Priscilla by the Town in 2017 to reimburse the building permit fee paid by Michael from the Valley View Farm account was of substantial value and was an unwarranted privilege because Chapter 115 benefits do not include reimbursement for building permit fees.
  4. The $484 reimbursement was not properly available to similarly situated individuals because reimbursement using Chapter 115 benefits is not lawfully available to businesses such as Valley View Farm and reimbursement of building permit fees using Chapter 115 benefits is not lawfully available to anyone.
  5. By, as Director of Veterans Services, submitting to the Town the invoice for Chapter 115 benefits in order to have Matthew reimbursed for the building permit fee he had paid, Caplis knowingly used his official position to secure for Matthew the substantially valuable unwarranted privilege of the $484 reimbursement that was not properly available to similarly situated individuals.
  6. In so doing, Caplis violated G. L. c. 268A, §23(b)(2)(ii).

Section 23(b)(3) Violation

  1. Section 23(b)(3) of G.L. c. 268A prohibits a municipal employee from, knowingly, or with reason to know, acting in a manner which would cause a reasonable person, having knowledge of the relevant circumstances, to conclude that any person can improperly influence or unduly enjoy his favor in the performance of his official duties, or that he is likely to act or fail to act as a result of kinship, rank, position or undue influence of any party or person.
  2. By submitting to the Town an invoice for veterans benefits to be paid to Priscilla LeClerc c/o Matthew LeClerc in order to provide an unwarranted reimbursement of building permit fees to Matthew, Caplis knowingly or with reason to know, acted in a manner which would cause a reasonable person, having knowledge of the relevant circumstances, including Caplis’s friendship with Matthew and his relationship with Matthew’s relative, to conclude that Matthew could unduly enjoy Caplis’s favor in the performance of his official duties as the Director of Veterans Services for the Town of Templeton.
  3. By so acting, Caplis violated G.L. c. 268A, § 23(b)(3).

Section 23(b)(4) Violation

  1. Section 23(b)(4) prohibits a public employee from knowingly, or with reason to know, presenting a false or fraudulent claim to his employer for any payment or benefit of substantial value.
  2. As Director of Veterans Services, Caplis was employed by the Town of Templeton.
  3. The February 2017 invoice for the $484 reimbursement which Caplis submitted to the Town for payment to Priscilla LeClerc c/o Matthew LeClerc was a claim presented to his employer for a payment of substantial value.
  4. The February 2017 invoice for reimbursement was a false or fraudulent claim for payment because Caplis represented to the Town that the basis for the reimbursement was “medical prescriptions” for Priscilla LeClerc when, in fact, Caplis submitted the invoice in order to cause the Town to reimburse Matthew LeClerc for a building permit fee he had paid.
  5. The February 2017 invoice for reimbursement was also a false or fraudulent claim for payment because Caplis submitted it to the Town knowing that he did not intend to submit a request to DVS to reimburse the Town for the payment.
  6. By, as Director of Veterans Services, knowingly, or with reason to know, submitting an invoice for reimbursement to the Town which was a false and fraudulent claim for payment of substantial value, Caplis presented a false or fraudulent claim to his employer for a payment or benefits of substantial value.
  7. By so doing, Caplis violated G.L. c. 268A, §23(b)(4).

Resolution

In view of the foregoing violations of G.L. c. 268A by Caplis, the Commission has determined that the public interest would be served by the disposition of this matter without further enforcement proceedings, on the basis of the following terms and conditions agreed to by Caplis:

  1. that Caplis pay to the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, with such payment to be delivered to the Commission, the sum of $2,500 as a civil penalty for violating G.L. c. 268A, §§ 23(b)(2)(ii), 23(b)(3) and 23(b)(4); and 
  2. that Caplis waive all rights to contest, in this or any other administrative or judicial proceeding to which the Commission is or may be a party, the findings of fact, conclusions of law and terms and conditions contained in this Agreement.

By signing below, Caplis acknowledges that he has personally read this Disposition Agreement, that it is a public document, and that he agrees to its terms and conditions.

STATE ETHICS COMMISSION

1. Address A and Address B refer to home addresses and as such, are not included as Parties are to refrain from filing with the Commission papers including such information. 930 CMR 1.04(b)(1).

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