Decision  Belgrave, Fabian v. Boston Police Department & HRD 7/9/26

Date:	07/09/2026
Organization:	Civil Service Commission
Docket Number:	B2-26-012

• Appearance for Appellant: Fabian Belgrave
• Appearance for Respondent: Joseph McClellan, Esq. , Michael Owens, Esq.
• Hearing Officer: Christopher C. Bowman

The Commission dismissed the two-part appeal of a Boston Police Department sergeant examination applicant as he failed to list the employment experience on his examination answer sheet for which he is now seeking to receive credit. 

Decision on Respondent's Motion for Summary Decision and Supplemental Motion to Dismiss

On January 4, 2026, the Appellant, Fabian Belgrave (Appellant), a police officer for the Boston Police Department (BPD), filed an appeal related to the experience and education component of a recent promotional examination for BPD police sergeant.   

On February 10, 2026, I, along with the Commission’s Deputy General Counsel, held a pre-hearing conference which was attended by the Appellant, co-counsel for the BPD, and counsel for the state’s Human Resources Division (HRD).  The BPD subsequently filed a motion for summary decision and a supplemental motion to dismiss and the Appellant filed an opposition to both. 

Undisputed Facts

1. The BPD entered into a delegation agreement with the state’s Human Resources Division (HRD) to administer promotional examinations, including for sergeant and lieutenant.
2. The BPD contracted with a vendor by the name of Morris and McDaniel (M&M) to conduct and score the examination. 
3. One portion of the examinations consisted of an experience and education  (E&E) component. 
4. As part of the E&E component, applicants may claim credit for supervisory experience outside of the BPD, including, for example, private sector supervisory experience. 
5. The deadline to complete the E&E component of the examination was December 27, 2024. 
6. A question on the E&E component asked:  “Do you have supervisory experience in a private company?” The Appellant answered “No” to this question and did not list any supervisory experience in a private company in the space provided. 
7. In September 2025, the Appellant received his examination score and filed a timely appeal with M&M. 
8. In his appeal to M&M, the Appellant stated that he served as a supervisor at:  a pizza shop for a large chain from 2005 to 2008; and a retail store from 2008 to 2010. 
9. In his appeal to M&M, the Appellant wrote:  “I fully acknowledge that the exam instructions required candidates to provide documentation, ideally in the form of an Experience Verification Form (EVF) signed by managers or HRD Departments. I also understand that all documentation was expected to be submitted by the published deadline.”  The Appellant indicated that he would have difficulty providing supporting documentation given how long ago the employment occurred and because the retail chain where he was employed had closed due to bankruptcy. 
10. The Appellant’s appeal was denied by M&M.
11. On January 4, 2026, the Appellant filed the instant appeal with the Commission. 
12. The Appellant’s appeal to the Commission did not reference his claim for supervisory experience at the pizza shop and retail store.  Rather, the Appellant raised questions regarding whether M&M had properly verified the outside supervisory experience of other candidates. 
13. On February 9, 2026, the Appellant submitted a pre-hearing memorandum to the Commission providing more detail on why he believes the verification process used by M&M was not sufficient. 
14. As part of that pre-hearing memo, the Appellant, for the first time since filing an appeal with the Commission, also stated: “This process [the alleged lack of verification of others’ claims] resulted in an unfair disadvantage to Officer Belgrave.  Officer Belgrave previously worked as a supervisor for [retail store] from approximately 2008 to 2010.  [The retail store] is no longer in business, and despite reasonable efforts, Officer Belgrave has been unable to locate a former supervisor or person of authority to complete the required verification form.  Consequently, Officer Belgrave was precluded from claiming legitimate supervisory experience solely due to the dissolution of his former employer.”  There was no reference in the Appellant’s pre-hearing memo to his supervisory experience at a pizza shop. 
15. During the pre-hearing conference, the Appellant stated that he is not alleging any fraud or deception and acknowledged that he was not aware of any specific case where an applicant received outside E&E credit for outside supervisory experience improperly.   Rather, the Appellant stated that he was aware of a specific applicant who claimed credit for outside supervisory experience that was not verified by M&M. 

Relevant Civil Service Law

Section 22 of Chapter 31 states in relevant part that:

Except as otherwise provided by sections sixteen and seventeen, an applicant may request the administrator to conduct one or more of the following reviews relating to an examination: (1) a review of the marking of the applicant's answers to essay and multiple choice questions; (2) a review of the marking of the applicant's training and experience; (3) a review of a finding by the administrator that the applicant did not meet the entrance requirements for the examination; provided, however, that the administrator may deny such request in the case of a competitive examination for original appointment if, at the time such request is made, the administrator is currently accepting applications for a subsequent examination of the same type for the same position.

Such request for review of the marking of the applicant's answers to essay questions, of the marking of the applicant's training and experience, or of a finding that the applicant did not meet the entrance requirements for appointment to the position shall be filed with the administrator no later than seventeen days after the date of mailing by the administrator of the notice to the applicant of his mark on the examination or his failure to meet the entrance requirements for appointment to the position.

…

An applicant may request the administrator to conduct a review of whether an examination taken by such applicant was a fair test of the applicant's fitness actually to perform the primary or dominant duties of the position for which the examination was held, provided that such request shall be filed with the administrator no later than seven days after the date of such examination.

Section 24 of Chapter 31 states in relevant part that:

The commission shall refuse to accept any petition for appeal unless the request for appeal, which was the basis for such petition, was filed in the required time and form and unless a decision on such request for review has been rendered by the administrator. In deciding an appeal pursuant to this section, the commission shall not allow credit for training or experience unless such training or experience was fully stated in the training and experience sheet filed by the applicant at the time designated by the administrator.”

Standard for Summary Disposition 

The Commission may, on motion or upon its own initiative, dismiss an appeal at any time for lack of jurisdiction or for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 801 CMR 1.01(7)(g)(3). A motion before the Commission, in whole or in part, via summary decision may be filed pursuant to 801 C.M.R. 1.01(7)(h). An appeal may be decided on summary disposition only when, “viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party”, the undisputed material facts affirmatively demonstrate that the non-moving party has “no reasonable expectation” of prevailing on at least one “essential element of the case”. See, e.g., Milliken & Co. v. Duro Textiles LLC, 451 Mass. 547, 550 n.6 (2008); Maimonides School v. Coles, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 240, 249 (2008); Lydon v. Massachusetts Parole Bd., 18 MCSR 216 (2005). See also Mangino v. HRD, 27 MCSR 34 (2014) and cases cited (“The notion underlying the summary decision process in administrative proceedings parallels the civil practice under Mass. R. Civ. P. 56, namely, when no genuine issues of material fact exist, the agency is not required to conduct a meaningless hearing.”); Morehouse v. Weymouth Fire Dep’t, 26 MCSR 176 (2013) (“a party may move for summary decision when . . . there is no genuine issue of fact relating to his or her claim or defense and the party is entitled to prevail as a matter of law”).

Analysis 

                Both prongs of the Appellant’s appeal must be dismissed.  First, Section 24 of Chapter 31 is unambiguous, stating in part that“ … the commission shall not allow credit for training or experience unless such training or experience was fully stated in the training and experience sheet filed by the applicant at the time designated by the administrator.”

                In his appeal to M&M and his pre-hearing conference memo to the Commission, which I have deemed a request to amend his appeal, the Appellant conflates two separate issues:  a) the failure to answer “yes” to the question on the E&E component of the examination; and b) the challenges associated with providing supporting documentation regarding past employers from many years ago, including one that is no longer in business.  Anticipating the latter does not justify the former.  By failing to state in the E&E component that he had prior supervisory experience (i.e. – answering “yes”), he divested the Commission of jurisdiction to determine whether such credit should be given on appeal. 

                For example, in O’Neil v. Boston Police Department & HRD, B2-25-320 (2026), Mr. O’Neil appealed a decision by M&M to deny him outside supervisory experience credit for failure to provide sufficient supporting documentation.  Since Mr. O’Neil answered “yes” on the E&E component and listed his prior supervisory experience from many years ago, the Commission had jurisdiction to hear his E&E appeal and ultimately concluded that alternate records (i.e. – a resume submitted to the BPD many years ago and tax returns) should be accepted as sufficient verification given the challenges associated with verifying employment from many years ago.  Put another way, had Mr. Belgrave answered “yes” to this question on the E&E component of the examination and listed the claimed supervisory experience, the Commission could have conducted the same type of review that was done in the O’Neil appeal. 

                I now turn to the second prong of the Appellant’s appeal -- his claim that he is aggrieved due to M&M’s alleged failure to sufficiently verify the outside supervisory experience claimed by other candidates. 

This is not the first time that the Commission has faced this issue.  Recently, in Re:  Request for Investigation by Douglas Trude, 38 MCSR 370 (2025), and in Callahan v. Human Resources Division, 38 MCSR 369 (2025), Mr. Callahan and Mr. Trude, two Quincy Fire Lieutenants, challenged the outside supervisory E&E credits awarded to another candidate for the Fire Captain examination.  In that case, the Appellants provided specific information regarding a possible misrepresentation by another candidate, providing the candidate’s name and detailed information regarding the credit claimed.  After receiving that detailed information, HRD conducted an audit and ultimately adjusted the E&E credit (downward) of the other Fire Captain candidate and the Appellants withdrew their appeals with the Commission. 

As referenced above, Mr. Belgrave does not allege any such fraud or deception and he acknowledges that he is not aware of any specific case where an applicant received outside managerial E&E credit improperly.  Mr. Belgrave’s understanding that a specific applicant’s legitimate claim for outside supervisory had not been verified, even if true, would not be sufficient to show that he is an aggrieved person. 

        While this appeal must be dismissed for the reasons cited above, I would encourage HRD to proactively review and establish more uniform standards and protocols regarding the claiming of outside supervisory experience, for both HRD-administered examinations and those delegated to the local appointing authority.  This review should consider, without limitation, the issues raised here; namely, for how far back in time does outside supervisory experience warrant credit, should there be a “one-size-fits-all’ set of points for all forms of outside experience, and what alternatives to verification are acceptable when an employer is no longer in business? For clarity, the Commission repeatedly has held that “consistency and equal treatment” are fundamental as important hallmarks of the basic merit principles under civil service law. DiGiando v. HRD, 37 MCSR 252 (2024).   When it comes to the methods used to grade the E&E component of examinations, particularly given some of the changes included in E&E post-Tatum, including the ability to claim outside supervisory experience, it would seem reasonable that “consistency” should be defined as ensuring uniformity statewide, as opposed to E&E calculation methodology and verification methods being left to each individual appointing authority’s interpretation.

Conclusion

                The Appellant’s appeal under Docket Number B2-26-012 is hereby dismissed.  

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

/s/ Christopher Bowman

Christopher C. Bowman
Chair

By a vote of the Civil Service Commission (Bowman, Chair; Dooley, Markey, McConney and Stein, Commissioners), on July 9, 2026. 

Either party may file a motion for reconsideration within ten days of receipt of this Commission order or decision. Under the pertinent provisions of the Code of Mass. Regulations, 801 CMR 1.01(7)(l), the motion must identify a clerical or mechanical error in this order or decision or a significant factor the Agency or the Presiding Officer may have overlooked in deciding the case.  A motion for reconsideration does not toll the statutorily prescribed thirty-day time limit for seeking judicial review of this Commission order or decision.

Under the provisions of G.L. c. 31, § 44, any party aggrieved by this Commission order or decision may initiate proceedings for judicial review under G.L. c. 30A, § 14 in the superior court within thirty (30) days after receipt of this order or decision. Commencement of such proceeding shall not, unless specifically ordered by the court, operate as a stay of this Commission order or decision.  After initiating proceedings for judicial review in Superior Court, the plaintiff, or his / her attorney, is required to serve a copy of the summons and complaint upon the Boston office of the Attorney General of the Commonwealth, with a copy to the Civil Service Commission, in the time and in the manner prescribed by Mass. R. Civ. P. 4(d).

Notice to:
Fabian Belgrave (Appellant) 
Joseph McClellan, Esq. (for BPD)
Michael Owens, Esq. (HRD

1. The pre-hearing conference was held concurrently with three other examination applicants who filed appeals related to one prong of the Appellant’s appeal.  Those three appeals were ultimately dismissed for lack of jurisdiction as the exam applicants failed to first file an appeal with the BPD, HRD or the testing vendor. There is no dispute that the Appellant first filed a timely appeal with the BPD, so the Commission retained jurisdiction to hear his appeal.