209A Guideline 1:00A: Subject Matter Jurisdiction; Eligibility for Relief

Part of the Guidelines of Judicial Practice: Abuse Prevention Proceedings.

Guideline 1:00A

The District Court, Boston Municipal Court, Probate and Family Court, and Superior Court have subject matter jurisdiction over claims filed pursuant to G.L. c. 209A. (Note: The Juvenile Court does not.)

To be eligible for relief, a plaintiff must establish that they are suffering from “abuse” by a “family or household member” as those terms are defined by G.L. c. 209A.

“Abuse” is defined as “the occurrence of any of the following acts between family or household members:

1. attempting to cause or causing physical harm;
2. placing another in fear of imminent serious physical harm;
3. causing another to engage involuntarily in sexual relations by force, threat or duress;
4. coercive control.”

Coercive control is defined as:

1. a pattern of behavior intended to threaten, intimidate, harass, isolate, control, coerce or compel compliance of a family or household member that causes that family or household member to reasonably fear physical harm or have a reduced sense of physical safety or autonomy, including, but not limited to:
   1. isolating the family or household member from friends, relatives or other sources of support;
   2. depriving the family or household member of basic needs;
   3. controlling, regulating or monitoring the family or household member’s activities, communications, movements, finances, economic resources or access to services, including through technological means;
   4. compelling a family or household member to abstain from or engage in a specific behavior or activity, including engaging in criminal activity;
   5. threatening to harm a child or relative of the family or household member;
   6. threatening to commit cruelty or abuse to an animal connected to the family or household member;
   7. intentionally damaging property belonging to the family or household member;
   8. threatening to publish sensitive personal information relating to the family or household member, including sexually explicit images; or
   9. using repeated court actions found by a court not to be warranted by existing law or good faith argument; or
2. a single act intended to threaten, intimidate, harass, isolate, control, coerce or compel compliance of a family or household member that causes the family or household member to reasonably fear physical harm or have a reduced sense of physical safety or autonomy of: (i) harming or attempting to harm a child or relative of the family or household member; (ii) committing or attempting to commit abuse to an animal connected to the family or household member; or (iii) publishing or attempting to publish sexually explicit images of the family or household member.

“Family or household member” is defined as persons who:

1. are or were married to each other;
2. are or were residing together in the same household;
3. are or were related by blood or marriage;
4. have a child together, regardless of whether they have ever married or lived together;
5. are or have been in a substantive dating or engagement relationship.

Eligibility for relief based on a substantive dating or engagement relationship, however, does not extend to the Superior Court. G.L. c. 209A, § 1.

A plaintiff who is not eligible for relief under c. 209A may qualify for a harassment prevention order pursuant to G.L. c. 258E which can be sought in the District Court, Boston Municipal Court, Juvenile Court, and Superior Court departments. (Note: Probate and Family Court does not have jurisdiction, and Juvenile Court has exclusive jurisdiction in a c. 258E action where the defendant is a minor). Unlike c. 209A, c. 258E does not require the plaintiff to have a familial, household, or substantive dating or engagement relationship with the defendant. Anyone “suffering from harassment” may seek to obtain a harassment prevention order under c. 258E. See 258E Guidelines.

Commentary

Chapter 209A confers authority to the District Court, Boston Municipal Court, Probate and Family Court, and Superior Court departments to issue abuse prevention orders regarding interpersonal violence, but not to the Juvenile Court.

Current or previous marriage between the parties is only one of the requisite relationships eligible for an abuse prevention order. Unmarried persons who currently live together, or who did so in the past, are also within the purview of c. 209A, regardless of whether the relationship between them is sexual in nature. In addition, a substantive dating relationship between the parties provides a basis for the District Court, Boston Municipal Court, and Probate and Family Court departments to issue an abuse prevention order, regardless of whether the parties ever lived together. See V.M. v. R.B., 94 Mass. App. Ct. 522, 525 (2018) (requisite relationship is not a jurisdictional requirement, it is merely an element of a claim for an abuse prevention order under G.L. c. 209A). Note: The Superior Court Department does not have authority to issue a c. 209A order where the plaintiff seeks relief based on the statutory criterion of a substantive dating or engagement relationship. See G.L. c. 209A, § 1.

Under G.L. c. 209A, § 1(e), whether a “substantive” dating relationship does or did exist depends upon the following statutory factors:

1. the length of time of the relationship;
2. the type of relationship;
3. the frequency of interaction between the parties; and,
4. if the relationship has been terminated by either person, the length of time elapsed since the termination of the relationship.

In these cases, the court should give broad meaning to the term “substantive dating relationship” to assure that the protective purposes of the statute are achieved. See E.C.O. v. Compton, 464 Mass. 558, 564 (2013) (three-month relationship involving regular, mutual electronic real time and face-to-face communication through instant messaging and Skype sufficient to constitute a substantive dating relationship under the statute). The existence of a “substantive dating relationship” is to be determined on a case by case basis applying the factors set forth in G.L. c. 209A, § 1(e)(1)-(4), while keeping in mind the statute’s protective purposes. C.O. v. M.M., 442 Mass. 648, 651 (2004). The plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating, by a preponderance of the evidence, that such a relationship existed between the parties. Id. at 654. The court should make appropriate inquiry to ascertain that the relationship between the parties is one that is covered under the statute. However, the nature of the relationship beyond the statutory definition is not an appropriate subject for comment.

The court should also give broad meaning to the words “related by blood or marriage.” In Turner v. Lewis, the Court held that the paternal grandparent of a non-marital child was “related by blood” to the child’s mother through the child, and therefore the child’s mother was able to invoke the protection of a c. 209A order. 434 Mass. 331, 334 (2001). In reaching this conclusion, the Supreme Judicial Court explicitly noted the “social reality that the concept of ‘family’ is varied and evolving and, that as a result, different types of ‘family’ members will be forced into potentially unwanted contact with one another.” Id. at 334-335.

Some circumstances may qualify for relief under more than one of the definitions of family or household member. For example, an unadopted “stepdaughter,” who had not lived in her “stepfather’s” household for twenty years following her biological mother’s divorce from him, was both related through marriage and had previously resided in the same household, and therefore was eligible for relief pursuant to c. 209A. Sorgman v. Sorgman, 49 Mass. App. Ct. 416, 417-18 (2000). The Court expressly rejected the defendant’s argument that the statute did not apply to “‘ex-stepchildren’ . . . whose ‘ex’ status has persisted for so many years,” on the basis of the “plain statutory language” of G.L. c. 209A, §§ 1 and 3. Id. at 418. Similarly, a defendant who had lived with his father, the plaintiff, and her two teenage children for approximately two years before moving to a new residence was a household member for purposes of c. 209A. Aguilar v. Hernandez-Mendez, 66 Mass. App. Ct. 367 (2006). The Appeals Court held that, in light of the broad interpretation of the statute, the defendant was a household member and the plaintiff could obtain an abuse prevention order under the statute. Id. at 370.

Individuals with certain living arrangements who do not otherwise qualify as “household members” pursuant to c. 209A may qualify for an order under c. 258E. See Silva v. Carmel, 468 Mass. 18, 22 (2014) (co-residents assigned to a residential program by a government agency do not qualify as “household members” for purposes of G.L. c. 209A, § 1); S.J. v. T.S., 103 Mass. App. Ct. 166, 169 (2023) (insufficient evidence that college students living in the same dormitory room were eligible for c. 209A order). In determining whether individuals in certain living arrangements meet the definition of “household members” under G.L. c. 209A, § 1, the judge must discern whether the parties have a “family-like” connection that falls under the protection of c. 209A. Although no single factor is dispositive, the court should consider:

(1) whether the living arrangement was voluntary, (2) the nature of the physical living space, including how much of it was shared, (3) the length of the parties’ relationship, and (4) the nature of their relationship and interactions, including whether they engaged in communal living activities.

S.J., 103 Mass. at 169. Similarly, household resident status, for the purpose of determining eligibility, should not be applied to those who live in different apartments in multiple family dwellings. The provision in the law which refers to multiple family dwellings provides that vacate orders can extend to a defendant living in the same building (though in a different apartment) as the plaintiff, where the court otherwise has authority to order relief, e.g., because the plaintiff and the defendant are family members or were dating. Unless the parties meet the other statutory requirements for relief, c. 209A does not apply to landlord-tenant situations and should not be used as a substitute for the procedural requirements of summary process. See Guideline 4:02 Ex Parte Orders to Vacate. In addition, a defendant who is ordered to vacate the plaintiff's household may be ordered to stay away from the entire building, including apartments other than the one occupied by the plaintiff, if such an order is necessary to protect the plaintiff from abuse.

As of September 18, 2024, “coercive control” was added to the definition of abuse. A plaintiff may support an allegation of coercive control by either demonstrating that the defendant has committed a single act or a pattern of behavior. The single act must be one of the following three acts: (i) harming or attempting to harm a child or relative of the family or household member; (ii) committing or attempting to commit abuse to an animal connected to the family or household member; or (iii) publishing or attempting to publish sexually explicit images of the family or household member. To demonstrate a pattern of behavior, the plaintiff must make a showing of three or more acts, which may include the acts enumerated in c. 209A, § 1 and described in the Guideline above. While not specifically defined in the statute, a pattern of conduct consists of three or more acts. See Commonwealth v. Welch, 444 Mass. 80, 89 (2005); Commonwealth v. Jenkins, 47 Mass. App. Ct. 286, 291 (1999), citing Commonwealth v. Kwiatkowski, 418 Mass. 543, 546–547 (1994). To support a finding of abuse based on coercive control, each act must be intended to threaten, intimidate, harass, isolate, control, coerce or compel compliance of a family or household member.

Additionally, the totality of the conduct must either cause that family or household member to reasonably fear physical harm, have a reduced sense of physical safety, or have a reduced sense of autonomy. A “reasonable fear of physical harm or reduced sense of physical safety” is connected to fear of physical harm but provides a lower threshold than “fear of imminent serious physical harm.” A “reduced sense of autonomy” is not defined by the statute. In scholarly commentary, coercive control has been described as “microregulation of everyday behaviors” including “controlling access to resources, isolating a partner from family and friends, stripping away a person's sense of self, and regulating daily activities such as what the person wears, watches on tv, or does in their free time.” Maria Puppo Martinez, Not Under Control, 110 Ill. B.J. 24, 26 (2022). States other than Massachusetts that have statutes governing coercive control characterize such control as “designed to make an individual dependent by isolating them from support, exploiting them, depriving them of independence, and regulating their everyday behavior.” Hawaii Revised Statutes § 586-1. See also Rev. Code Wash. (ARCW) § 7.105.010; Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 46b-1.

If, during the hearing, the facts do not establish a basis for relief pursuant to c. 209A, but do appear to meet the requirements for relief pursuant to c. 258E, the plaintiff must fill out a new complaint and the judge should deny the original complaint. The plaintiff may be able to use the same affidavit. The clerk’s office will close the original case and open a new case for the court to be able to issue an order pursuant to the c. 258E standard. Issuing an order on this new complaint is permissible so long as the defendant’s due process rights are protected. See R. S. v. A.P.B., 95 Mass. App. Ct. 372, 373 n.4 (2019) (same day conversion of order from c. 209A to c. 258E proper where defendant was on notice that judge was considering c. 209A complaint as a c. 258E complaint and defendant did not object to and suffered no prejudice from conversion). When issuing a c. 258E order, see 258E Guideline 1:00A Subject Matter Jurisdiction; Eligibility for Relief, and 258E Guidelines, generally. Only the judge should rule on the facts presented in support of a c. 209A order; a clerk should not attempt to “screen out” complaints. See Guideline 2:01 Assisting the Plaintiff.

Last updated:	October 20, 2025