Guideline 6:00
At a hearing where the defendant has notice, whether or not preceded by an ex parte order, the court may issue orders protecting the plaintiff from abuse upon a finding, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the plaintiff is suffering from abuse. These orders may include, but are not limited to, the following:
- ordering the defendant to refrain from abusing the plaintiff, whether the defendant is an adult or a minor;
- ordering the defendant to refrain from contacting the plaintiff, unless authorized by the court, whether the plaintiff is an adult or a minor;
- ordering the defendant to vacate forthwith and remain away from the household, multiple family dwelling, or workplace;
- awarding the plaintiff temporary custody of any minor child(ren);
- ordering the defendant to pay temporary support for the plaintiff or any child(ren) in the plaintiff’s custody or both, when the defendant has a legal obligation to support such a person;
- ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiff monetary compensation for losses suffered as a direct result of the abuse (compensatory losses may include, but not be limited to: loss of earnings or support, costs for restoring utilities, out-of-pocket losses for injuries sustained, replacement costs for locks or personal property removed or destroyed, medical and moving expenses, and reasonable attorney’s fees);
- ordering information in the case record to be impounded;
- ordering the defendant to refrain from abusing or contacting the plaintiff’s child(ren), or child(ren) in plaintiff’s care or custody, unless such contact is authorized by the court;
- ordering the possession, care, and control of any domesticated animal owned, possessed, leased, kept, or held by either party or any minor child(ren) residing in the household to the plaintiff or petitioner, and/or prohibiting abusing, taking, or disposing of such animal.
- ordering the defendant to refrain from abusing, threatening, taking, interfering with, transferring, encumbering, concealing, harming, or otherwise disposing of a domesticated animal;
- authorizing the defendant to pick up any personal belongings in the company of the police at a time agreed to by the plaintiff;
- ordering the surrender or continued surrender of a defendant’s license to carry firearms, and firearms identification card, and the surrender of all firearms, rifles, shotguns, machine guns, and ammunition;
- recommending, as opposed to ordering, that the defendant attend a Department of Public Health (DPH) certified intimate partner abuse education (IPAE) program; and,
- any other order necessary to protect the plaintiff from abuse.
Plaintiffs should receive all of the relief to which the law and the facts entitle them. Judges should not, as a matter of practice, eliminate any option (e.g., support) from the relief statutorily available. See Guideline 6:05B Support Orders.
The court may issue mutual abuse prevention orders only if the court has made specific written findings of fact. See Guideline 6:07 Mutual Abuse Prevention Orders. Absent a mutual order, a judge cannot order any affirmative relief to the defendant.
If it is not obvious from the affidavit why a judge is restricting contact with the defendant’s minor child(ren), or if the order conflicts with an existing order from the Probate and Family Court, the judge should consider making additional findings that support the judge’s decision. See factors to consider listed in Commentary of Guideline 4:03A: Ex Parte Orders Involving Minor Children. This can be done by writing on the affidavit itself, making clear that these are findings credited by the judge.
Probate and Family Court judges have superseding jurisdiction over custody and support and exclusive jurisdiction over parenting time of any minor child(ren). If an order issued by a court other than a Probate and Family Court restricts a defendant’s contact with their minor child(ren), the parties should be told that the Probate and Family Court can amend the terms of the order with regard to custody and contact with any minor child(ren). See Guideline 12:00, et. seq., Related Probate and Family Court Matters and Guideline 1:11 Plaintiff’s Requested Order Will Contradict Existing Probate and Family Court Order.
Commentary
Unlike ex parte orders, which require the court to find a substantial likelihood of immediate danger of abuse, orders after notice only require that the court find that the plaintiff is suffering from abuse. Both findings are made using the preponderance of the evidence standard. “Suffering from abuse” is determined by the definition of abuse as set forth in G.L. c. 209A, § 1 as follows: (1) attempting to cause or causing physical harm; (2) placing another in fear of imminent serious physical harm; (3) causing another to engage involuntarily in sexual relations by force, threat, or duress; or (4) coercive control.
Upon such a finding, G.L. c. 209A, § 3 lists the orders that are expressly authorized by law, and G.L. c. 209A, § 11 expressly authorizes the issuance of orders regarding domesticated animals. The court, however, is not limited to the options listed in c. 209A, as a judge is authorized to order relief to the plaintiff “including, but not limited to” the relief listed in c. 209A. G.L. c. 209A, § 3. See Commentary to Guideline 4:01 Content of Ex Parte Orders (“[w]hen justified by the facts, the court has authority to order a defendant to stay away from a particular school or job site, even if the defendant attends the school or works at the same job”); see also Commonwealth v. Habenstreit, 57 Mass. App. Ct. 785 (2003), rev. denied, Commonwealth v. Habenstreit, 439 Mass. 1106 (2003).
Judges should be aware that handwritten orders may not appear in the electronic database used by the police when enforcing such orders. Judges should advise the parties to keep a copy of the order with them to show police should questions arise about what is contained in any handwritten part of the order. Similarly, the police will not have access to other court orders such as Probate and Family Court orders. Therefore, ordering compliance with such orders through an abuse prevention order will be difficult for the police to interpret and enforce. See Caplan v. Donovan, 450 Mass. 463, 463-464 (2008), cert. denied, Donovan v. Caplan, 553 U.S. 1018 (2008).
Each time an order issued under c. 209A is extended or modified, the judge must continue the firearms surrender order if returning the defendant’s firearms or firearms license would present a likelihood of abuse to the plaintiff, and, if so, must indicate that determination by checking the box that continues the order of surrender. See G.L. c. 209A, § 3C; Guideline 6:05 Orders to Surrender Firearms, Ammunition, and Firearms Licenses (FID; LTC). If the judge continues the firearms surrender order, the judge should then determine whether there is a credible threat to the physical safety of the plaintiff, and, if so, indicate that finding in the order. See United States v. Rahimi, 144 S.Ct. 1889, 1901 (2024) (upholding federal law barring an individual from possessing a firearm if they are the subject of a restraining order that includes a finding that they pose a “credible threat to the physical safety” of a protected person) While abuse predicated on physical assault, threats of violence or sexual assault may clearly pose a credible threat, certain abuse, i.e. some instances of coercive control, may not. The Rahimi court declined to address whether a finding of a credible threat to physical safety is required to order a firearm surrender. Id. at 1900.
If the defendant did not appear at the two-party hearing and the defendant may be a non- resident, it is advised that in addition to ordering surrender pursuant to G.L. c. 209A, § 3C, the court should also prohibit the defendant from having a firearm in the Commonwealth as this is a prohibitory order that does not require personal jurisdiction over the defendant. See Guideline 5:01B Personal Jurisdiction: Objection.
Whenever an abuse prevention order includes a firearm surrender order, the court must transmit a report containing the defendant’s name and identifying information and a statement describing the defendant’s alleged conduct and relationship to the plaintiff to the Department of Criminal Justice Information System (DCJIS). See G.L. c. 209A, § 3D. Upon expiration of any such order, the court must notify DCJIS of the expiration, which is then required to notify the US Attorney General of the change. See Id.
Ordering a defendant to stay away from and to have no contact with their minor child(ren) is tantamount to extinguishing parental rights, at least for the duration of the order. Before issuing such an order, the judge should assess the danger of abuse to the child(ren) independently from the danger of abuse to the plaintiff. It is important that the plaintiff provide the court with a reason for ordering the defendant to have no contact with the defendant’s minor child(ren). “If there is to be a G.L. c. 209A order that a defendant stay from and have no contact with [their] minor children, there must be independent support for the order.” Smith v. Joyce, 421 Mass. 520, 523 (1995). However, a defendant who abuses their child(ren)’s other parent in the child(ren)’s presence may be placing the child(ren) in fear of imminent serious physical harm and/or by causing emotional and psychological harm to the child(ren). Schechter v. Schechter, 88 Mass. App. Ct. 239, 251-52 (2015). See Guideline 4:03A Ex Parte Orders Involving Minor Children.
In certain cases (e.g., where it is not obvious from the affidavit the basis for issuing an order inconsistent with the Probate and Family Court), the judge should make written findings to explain the reasons for the no contact order. See, e.g., Care and Protection of Lillith, 61 Mass. App. Ct. 132, 139-142 (2004), citing Custody of Vaughn, 422 Mass. 590, 599 (1996) (requirement of findings in custody cases when there has been evidence of domestic violence). Such findings will offer guidance to the Probate and Family Court in any later proceeding relating to custody of or parenting time with the minor child(ren). Cf. Smith v. Joyce, 421 Mass. 520, 523 (1995). Appropriate reasons may include, but are not limited to, a finding that the child(ren) has/have been abused; that the child(ren) has/have witnessed the defendant’s abuse of the plaintiff and are therefore afraid of the defendant, and would be harmed by seeing the defendant; or, that no parenting time can be arranged with child(ren) in the plaintiff’s custody without endangering the plaintiff.
General Laws c. 209A, § 3(e) requires that all orders of support “issued, reviewed or modified” under the statute must also conform to and be enforced under the provisions of G.L. c. 119A, § 12 (pertaining to child support enforcement). See Guideline 6:05B Support Orders. When a request for a child support order is made for the first time in the District Court, Boston Municipal Court, or Superior Court, the judge in that court must decide it. See Quilla Q. v. Matt M. 102 Mass. App. Ct. 237, 242 (2023) (the protective purpose of the statute is frustrated if a child-support order is not available).
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| Last updated: | October 20, 2025 |
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