258E Guideline 1:00: In General; Definitions

Part of the Guidelines of Judicial Practice: Harassment Prevention Proceedings.

Guideline 1:00

These Guidelines apply to proceedings under the Harassment Prevention Act, G.L. c. 258E, in the District Court, Boston Municipal Court, Superior Court, and Juvenile Court departments of the Trial Court, and to related criminal proceedings in those court departments.¹ These Guidelines also apply to protection orders issued by other jurisdictions. General Laws c. 258E, § 7 provides that, any protection order issued by another jurisdiction, as defined by G.L. c. 258E, § 1, “shall be given full faith and credit throughout the commonwealth and enforced as if it were issued in the commonwealth for as long as the order is in effect in the issuing jurisdiction.” See Guideline 8:00 Criminal Prosecution of Violations of Harassment Prevention Orders; Venue and Guideline 10:00 Filing and Enforcement of Protective Orders Issued by Other Jurisdictions. All proceedings under c. 258E should be undertaken with sensitivity to safety, the need to ensure due process, and the personal and emotional nature of the issues involved.

Please note the term “clerk magistrate” in these Guidelines, unless otherwise expressly provided, shall mean anyone serving in the position of Clerk Magistrate, Clerk of Courts, or Assistant Clerk Magistrate. The terms “clerk” or “clerk’s office” shall mean any staff person working in the office of the Clerk Magistrate, Clerk of Courts, or Clerk.

The Guidelines describe harassment prevention orders issued under c. 258E in three categories:

• Emergency Orders. General Laws c. 258E, § 6 provides for temporary relief when the court is closed for business. When relief is granted under § 6, a complaint shall be filed in court on the next business day. Orders issued pursuant to § 6 are described in these Guidelines as “emergency” orders. See Guideline 9:00 Procedure for Response to Complaints When Court is Not in Session: Judicial Response System and Guideline 1:07 Plaintiff Unable to Appear in Court. Emergency orders expire at the end of the next available court business day when a judge is sitting.
• Ex Parte Orders. General Laws c. 258E, § 5 provides for the issuance of harassment prevention orders without notice to the defendant if the plaintiff “demonstrates a substantial likelihood of immediate danger of harassment.” Orders obtained during court hours pursuant to c. 258E, § 5 have a maximum duration of ten court business days and are described in these Guidelines as “ex parte” orders. See Guidelines 3:00, et seq., Ex Parte Hearings and Guidelines 4:00 et seq., Ex Parte Orders. They are initiated by the filing of a complaint or by a complaint received after the issuance of an out-of-court emergency order. A hearing is held forthwith but with no notice to the defendant.
• Orders After Notice. Harassment prevention orders issued under c. 258E that are not issued on an emergency or ex parte basis require the filing of a complaint, notice to the defendant, and an opportunity for the defendant to be heard. Such orders are described in these Guidelines as “orders after notice.” These orders may be issued in five different contexts:
  • (1) after a hearing that has been scheduled with notice to the defendant, where no ex parte order has issued;
  • (2) after a hearing held within ten court business days after the issuance of an ex parte order;
  • (3) when no emergency or ex parte order has been issued, but the defendant is present for the hearing (e.g., at an arraignment);
  • (4) on motion for modification by either party during the life of an order; or
  • (5) on the expiration date of an order that was issued after notice. 

There are differences between an “initial order” after notice, and an “extension order” after notice:

• Initial Order After Notice. This term refers to the first order that issues at the scheduled two-party hearing. An initial order after notice has a maximum duration of one year. G.L. c. 258E, § 3(d).
• Extension Order After Notice. This term refers to an order issued on the expiration date of an initial order after notice. An extension order may be issued for any additional time necessary to protect the plaintiff. This could include a permanent order.

As used in these Guidelines, the following terms shall have the following meanings:

• Harassment Prevention Order. Any emergency, ex parte, or order after notice issued pursuant to c. 258E.
• Terminated Orders. An order that has been terminated upon motion of either party, after a hearing, or because the plaintiff did not appear at a scheduled hearing. The term “vacate” or “vacated order” is used in the statute to describe those orders. In other contexts, the term “vacate” can mean that an order should not have been originally issued. For purposes of these Guidelines, vacating an order merely terminates the order as of the date it was vacated, with the record of the order remaining in the Statewide Registry of Civil Restraining Orders.² See Guideline 6:05 Modification of Orders; Terminating Orders; Expungement Standard. Therefore, to avoid confusion, both the Guidelines and forms will henceforth use the word “terminated” to describe those orders that have been terminated after a hearing or upon motion by the plaintiff. Notwithstanding that, “vacate” will still be used when that term is used in specific language in a statute or case.

Commentary

Chapter 258E covers a wide variety of conduct. There are three major categories of behavior covered by the statute: sexual violence and distribution of nude or sexual images; criminal harassment or stalking; and three or more acts of civil harassment. Matters under c. 258E involve varying degrees of complexity, privacy and safety concerns, and potential volatility.

Like c. 209A, c. 258E is protective and not penal in nature. See A.T. v. C.R., 88 Mass. App. Ct. 532, 540 (2015). Chapter 258E was enacted with the intent “to protect victims who could not legally seek protection under G. L. c. 209A,” because they did not satisfy the relationship requirement for jurisdiction under c. 209A, due to a lack of familial or romantic relationship with the perpetrator. See Seney v. Morhy, 467 Mass. 58, 60 (2014), citing O'Brien v. Borowski, 461 Mass. 415, 419 (2012). See also A.P. v. M.T., 92 Mass. App. Ct. 156, 161 (2017). Because of this shared protective purpose, the language in c. 258E is largely “analogous to the language found in c. 209A.” J.S.H. v. J.S., 91 Mass. App. Ct. 107, 109 (2017). The case law and Guidelines for Judicial Practice: Abuse Prevention Proceedings have been applied to c. 258E matters. See id. and cases cited. See also Tom T. v. Lewis L., 97 Mass. App. Ct. 698, 700 (2020); F.A.P. v. J.E.S., 87 Mass. App. Ct. 595, 601 n.14 (2015) (“[W]e see no reason why the [c. 209A] Guidelines … should not apply equally in [c. 258E] harassment order proceedings, absent some issue particular to harassment orders [under c. 258E]”). While there are many similarities in these Guidelines to the c. 209A Guidelines, these Guidelines also highlight and address the major differences in the legal requirements and the practical, procedural, and policy issues presented by c. 258E.

1. Chapter 209A proceedings are governed by the Guidelines for Judicial Practice: Abuse Prevention Proceedings, which will be hereinafter referred to as “209A Guidelines.”
2. The statute refers to the “statewide domestic violence recordkeeping system.” Consistent with the Guidelines for Judicial Practice on Abuse Prevention Proceedings, these Guidelines will refer to this as the “Statewide Registry of Civil Restraining Orders.”

Last updated:	October 20, 2025