Finding 3 - License to Pour: Access & Equity in Massachusetts Liquor Licensing Report

License access rises with municipal wealth.

This Finding examines whether on-premises license access varies by municipal wealth across Massachusetts. The quota formula allocates licenses by resident population alone and does not account for differences in municipal tax base, commercial activity, or local economic conditions. The analysis in this Finding tests whether municipal wealth-associated patterns nevertheless emerge in license access—first among the 302 quota municipalities¹¹⁷ and 26 local-control municipalities¹¹⁸ combined (the outcome-based sample), then isolating the 302 quota municipalities, and finally isolating the 26 local-control municipalities.¹¹⁹

To evaluate whether on-premises license access varies by municipal wealth, this study compares Massachusetts municipalities along a statewide scale of equalized valuation (EQV) per capita, commonly used as a standard measure of municipal wealth.¹²⁰

The 328 municipalities in the outcome-based sample are sorted by EQV per capita and divided into four equal groups (n = 82 per wealth quartile).¹²¹ Table 2 defines the EQV per capita range for each wealth quartile. The same EQV per capita ranges are used in each of the three analyses, meaning the number of municipalities within wealth quartiles for Analysis B and for Analysis C are unequal.

Table 2. Statewide wealth quartiles¹²²

Wealth quartile	EQV per Capita Range	Number of Municipalities
Q1 (Lowest)	$76,427–$177,434	82
Q2	$177,435–$231,944	82
Q3	$231, 945–$328, 158	82
Q4 (Highest)	$328, 159–$2,837,676	82

The following three analyses demonstrate that license access rises with municipal wealth and that the extent of license access disparity between the lowest and highest wealth municipalities is exacerbated by the two-tier licensing system.

Analysis A. On-premises license access across the outcome-based sample (n = 328)

Across the 328 quota and local-control municipalities, license access rises with municipal wealth—the wealthiest quartile issues substantially more on-premises licenses per resident than the least wealthy quartile. See Table 3 below. 

Table 3. Analysis A—On-premises License Access by Wealth Quartile, Outcome-Based Sample (n = 328)

Wealth Quartile	EQV per Capita Range	Number of Municipalities (Quota + Local-Control)	Licenses Issued per 10,000 Residents123
Q1 (Lowest)	$76,427–$177,434	82	12.2
Q2	$177,435–$231,944	82	12.4
Q3	$231, 945–$328,158	82	13.6
Q4 (Highest)	$328, 159–$2,837,676	82	19.3

The 82 municipalities in the lowest wealth quartile (Q1) issue an average of 12.2 on‑premises licenses per 10,000 residents; the 82 municipalities in the highest wealth quartile (Q4) issue an average of 19.3: 58% more than Q1.

The difference across wealth quartiles is statistically significant, meaning the pattern is strong enough that it is unlikely to be explained by chance alone.¹²⁴ This does not mean municipal wealth by itself causes higher license access, but it does show a meaningful correlation between wealth and license access.¹²⁵

Analysis B. On-premises license access across quota municipalities (n=302)

Narrowing the analysis to the 302 quota municipalities shows that the wealth-access gap persists within the quota framework. Although all 302 municipalities are subject to the same quota formula, the highest wealth quartile (Q4) issues 37% more licenses per resident than the lowest wealth quartile (Q1) (see Table 4). This difference is statistically significant, meaning a gap this large would rarely appear by chance if wealth and license access were unrelated; therefore, the pattern is a real feature of the data rather than an artifact of which municipalities happen to fall in each wealth quartile. It does not establish that wealth causes the difference.¹²⁶

Table 4. Analysis B—On-premises License Access by Wealth Quartile, 302 Quota Municipalities

Wealth Quartile	EQV per Capita Range	Number of Municipalities (Quota)	Licenses Issued per 10,000 Residents127
Q1 (Lowest)	$76,427–$177,434	79	12.2
Q2	$177,435–$231,944	78	11.9
Q3	$231, 945–$328,158	75	12.7
Q4 (Highest)	$328, 159–$2,837,676	70	16.7

The highest wealth quartile (Q4) quota municipalities issue 37% more licenses than the lowest wealth quartile (Q1) quota municipalities (compared to the outcome-based sample disparity of 58% in Analysis A).

Analysis C. On-premises license access across local-control municipalities (n = 26)

The 26 local-control municipalities obtained local control status during the 1978–1984 statutory window described in Finding 2. Eligibility for the window turned on a municipality’s prior issuance of seasonal on-premises licenses and a local vote; it did not turn on municipal wealth. This analysis examines where the 26 local-control municipalities are distributed among the wealth quartiles.

Of the 26 local-control municipalities, 3 (12%) sit in the lowest wealth quartile (Q1), 4 (15%) in Q2, 7 (27%) in Q3, and 12 (46%) in the highest wealth quartile (Q4). See Table 5 below. Nineteen of the 26—approximately three-quarters—sit in the top half of the wealth distribution. If the 26 local-control municipalities were distributed evenly across the four wealth quartiles, each wealth quartile would contain 6 or 7 local‑control municipalities (26 ÷ 4 = 6.5). The observed distribution is significantly skewed toward higher wealth quartiles.¹²⁸

Table 5. Analysis C—Distribution of Local-Control Municipalities Across Wealth Quartiles (n = 26)

Wealth Quartile	EQV per Capita Range	Number of Municipalities (Local-Control)	Licenses Issued per 10,000 Residents129
Q1 (Lowest)	$76,427–$177,434	3	14.2
Q2	$177,435–$231,944	4	22.7
Q3	$231, 945–$328,158	7	23.8
Q4 (Highest)	$328, 159–$2,837,676	12	34.3
Total		26

Within the local-control group, license access again rises with municipal wealth. The three local-control municipalities in Q1 issue an average of 14.2 on-premises licenses per 10,000 residents; the twelve in Q4 issue an average of 34.3. In each wealth quartile, the average local-control municipality issues more on-premises licenses per resident than the average quota municipality. Figure 21 below compares the data in Table 4 and Table 5 to illustrate the difference in issued licenses between local-control and quota municipalities by wealth quartile.

Figure 21. Local-Control vs. Quota Municipalities by Wealth Quartile¹³⁰

For Quartile 1, quota municipalities issued 12.2 licenses per 10,000 residents while local control issued 14.2. For Quartile 2, quota municipalities issued 11.9 licenses while local control issued 22.7. For Quartile 3, quota municipalities issued 12.7 while local control issued 23.8. For Quartile 4, quota municipalities issued 16.7 licenses while local control issued 34.3.The local control column climbs steadily through the wealth distribution and is taller in every quartile. The gap between the bars widens systematically as wealth rises - 2.0 licenses per 10,000 residents in Quartile 1 against 17.6 in Quartile 4. On the other side, license issuance for quota municipalities stays nearly flat across the first three quartiles before stepping up slightly in Q4.

As the three analyses demonstrate, license access rises with municipal wealth. Further, as shown in Analysis C, local-control municipalities both (1) issue more on-premises licenses per 10,000 residents than quota municipalities at every wealth quartile and (2) sit disproportionately in higher wealth quartiles. Including them in the analysis therefore widens the wealth-access gap—the 58% disparity in Analysis A is the combined effect of license access rising with wealth among quota municipalities (Analysis B) and the concentration of local-control municipalities in higher wealth quartiles (Analysis C).

116.     License access is expressed as on-premises licenses issued per 10,000 residents. License access includes both quota allocation and special legislation licenses for quota municipalities and reflects municipalities’ actual issuance practice: It is the per-capita rate consumers and prospective applicants experience, not the per-capita rate the quota permits.

117.      Quota municipalities are subject to the state-imposed population-based quota under MGL c. 138, § 17.

118.      Local-control municipalities are authorized to grant on-premises licenses “in addition to, and irrespective of” the state-imposed population-based quota. St. 1978, c. 377, § 2. See Finding 2.

119.      The analysis in this Finding counts on-premises licenses currently issued, which include special legislation and other exception licenses. It does not separately model special legislation access, which is examined in Finding 4.

120.      EQV is the full and fair cash value of all taxable property within a municipality, established biennially by the Massachusetts Department of Revenue’s Division of Local Services. Per-capita normalization uses 2023 US Census population to be aligned with EQV data. EQV is preferred over income or local-receipts measures because it captures the underlying property-tax base independent of municipal tax-rate decisions or year-to-year revenue volatility. The Department of Revenue uses EQV as its principal interlocal wealth comparator.

121.      The 328-municipality outcome-based sample consists of the 302 quota municipalities subject to MGL c. 138, § 17, plus the 26 local-control municipalities exempted under the 1978–1984 statutory window. 23 Massachusetts municipalities are outside the scope of this study and are not included in the outcome sample: (1) 14 municipalities for which no data was provided by ABCC: Florida, Heath, Leyden, Middlefield, Monroe, Monterey, New Braintree, Pelham, Peru, Rowe, Royalston, Tolland, Warwick, and Washington; (2) 8 dry municipalities: Alford, Chilmark, Dunstable, Gosnold, Hawley, Montgomery, Mount Washington, and Westhampton; and (3) Milton, which maintains a local prohibition specifically on All-Alcohol licenses while permitting other license categories. See the ABCC fiscal year 2024 annual quota reports and the ABCC fiscal year 2024 active-license extract.

122.      EQV per capita is used as the measure of municipal wealth. EQV is the full and fair cash value of all taxable property in a municipality. Unlike assessed valuations, which vary based on local assessment practices, EQV is equalized across municipalities to enable direct comparison. EQV per capita is calculated by dividing the total EQV by the municipality’s 2023 census population. This analysis uses the most recent Department of Revenue–published EQV figures available at the time of data collection. EQV per capita was calculated for the 328 outcome-based sample municipalities (302 quota + 26 local control). 

123.     Calculations are group averages—the arithmetic mean of the municipal rates within each wealth quartile—and include special legislation and other exception licenses. Medians follow the same pattern, rising from 10.8 licenses per 10,000 residents in the lowest wealth quartile to 15.3 in the highest across the full sample, and from 10.8 to 13.6 within the quota group, so the gradient is not the product of a few high-outlier municipalities.

124.      Quartile figures are arithmetic means of on-premises licenses per 10,000 residents within each wealth quartile of the n = 328 outcome-based sample. The significance statement reflects a nonparametric Kruskal–Wallis test across the quartiles.

125.      Kruskal-Wallis H-test of on-premises licenses per 10,000 residents across the four wealth quartiles, full n = 328 outcome sample: H = 13.6, df = 3, p = 0.004; Spearman rank correlation ρ = 0.18, p = 0.001. This study used rank-based tests because the license-access distribution is right-skewed. Re-running the quartile test on all 351 municipalities (assigning zero access to the 23 that issue no on-premises licenses) yields the same direction and significance (H = 9.2, p = 0.027). The methodological decision was made to use quartiles to ensure that each comparison group includes enough municipalities to support reliable statistical analysis.

126.      The Mann-Whitney U test is a non-parametric statistical analysis used to compare on-premises licenses per 10,000 residents between highest wealth quartile and lowest wealth quartile among the 302 quota municipalities, using statewide EQV per capita quartile boundaries. The Q4 median (13.6 per 10,000 residents) exceeds the Q1 median (10.8), and the difference is statistically significant at the 5% level (Mann-Whitney U = 3,310, p = 0.038; a Welch’s t-test of the means yields the same conclusion, p = 0.028). This study used a rank-based test because the license-access distribution is right skewed and not approximately normal. A Kruskal-Wallis test across all four quartiles within the quota sample does not reach the 5% level (H = 6.50, df = 3, p = 0.090), and a Spearman rank correlation between wealth and license access is small but significant (rho = 0.12, p = 0.040). Read together, these results indicate that the within-quota difference is concentrated at the top of the wealth distribution rather than distributed evenly across it—the pattern the special legislation analysis in Finding 4 describes.

127.      Calculations are group averages—the arithmetic mean of the municipal rates within each group—and include special legislation and other exception licenses. Medians follow the same pattern, so the results are not driven by a few high-outlier municipalities.

128.      Distribution of the 26 local-control municipalities across the four statewide wealth quartiles (3 / 4 / 7 / 12 for Q1–Q4). Twelve of the 26 (46%) fall in Q4, compared with the 25% implied by a uniform distribution, and 19 of 26 fall in the wealthiest 50% (Q3 and Q4).

129.      Calculations are group averages—the arithmetic mean of the municipal rates within each group—and include special legislation and other exception licenses. Medians follow the same pattern, so the results are not driven by a few high-outlier municipalities.

130.      Calculations are group averages—the arithmetic mean of the municipal rates within each group—and include special legislation and other exception licenses. Medians follow the same pattern, so the results are not driven by a few high-outlier municipalities.

Date published:	October 13, 2026